Concept Summary      Chapter 5

In Chapters 2 and 4 we showed that science attempts to walk a very difficult epistemological path between relativism and absolutism: Its method attempts to achieve reasonable beliefs about the world without being absolutely assured that these beliefs are true. In this chapter our cultural roots were further explored, and the role of cultural background was presented from the point of view that it is ultimately an aid to scientific method, rather than a validation of relativism. The history of science shows both a meandering parade of ideas heavily influenced by culture and an expansion of our understanding of the universe and our place in it.

The ancient Greek faith in order, and the philosophies of Platonism and Pythagoreanism, produced a mental set early in the history of Western culture that drew attention to the need for an explanation of the motion of the planets. Although several systems of explanation, both geocentric and heliocentric, where proposed at the time of the Greeks, Ptolemy's geocentric system was considered the most reasonable until the seventeenth century. Persuasive theoretical and observational reasons existed for the acceptance of Ptolemy's system. Hence, a complex mix of philosophical, religious, cultural, and observational reasons was needed for its replacement by the Copernican and Keplerian systems.

By the time of Copernicus several problems with the Ptolemaic system were well known. Although the system was functional, it was far from perfect in terms of observational accuracy and the mathematics was not sufficiently consistent with what astronomers of this time were convinced to be a harmoniously constructed universe. As a Neoplatonist, Copernicus was convinced that the Sun must replace the Earth as the center of the universe. Although the Copernican system was simpler in terms of astronomical calculations, and had an impressive and elegant explanation for retrograde motion, it still maintained the Pythagorean principles of perfectly circular and uniform motion and the mathematical devices of deferents, epicycles, and eccentrics. Most important, although the system may have been more pleasing mathematically to many astronomers, it was no more accurate observationally than the system of Ptolemy. It was also accepted and explored further by Galileo and Kepler in spite of problems of realistic interpretation. No convincing explanation existed prior to Newton for how the Earth could simultaneously spin and race around the sun so fast without everything flying off.

Although some empirical evidence existed for the new model, as with many turning points in the history of science, the acceptance of this new model was based upon a mix of scientific and extra-scientific ideas. It is not an exaggeration to say that the initial staying power of this new system was based as much on religious and philosophical concerns as it was on its pure scientific merit. For instance, Tycho Brahe, the acknowledged best observationalist of his time, was committed to a non-Copernican system, whereas Kepler, interested in the facts of planetary motion primarily because the discrepancies proved to him that no one had yet read the mind of God, became a committed Copernican. Like Copernicus, Kepler was convinced that the Sun must be given a central significance. Others were committed Copernicans because it was thought that this new system was consistent with the greatness and infinite perfection of God.

The story of Kepler and the Copernican Revolution shows that although those who have a passion to know must confront and be intimate with the world, there is an ironic, serendipitous, messy humanness to this relationship. The world views intermingled in Kepler's culture forced him to confront the world from a point of view. It was impossible, and would have been counterproductive to even try, for him to be totally objective; Kepler was faced with too many choices to spend a lifetime objectively exploring each one. He had to choose an idea to develop and test, or like Sartre's self-taught man discussed in Chapter 2, he would have wallowed in a sea of infinite, aimless facts.

Was the discovery of the ellipse inevitable? Is scientific progress inevitable? If so much of science depends upon having the right idea at the right time, and because the origin of ideas can depend on so many contingent factors -- such as subjective hidden agendas and biases, philosophical and religious dogmas, cultural traditions -- and if ideas not only offer direction for viewing the world, but obscure the world as well, what guarantee is there that science will always find the right idea at the right time? If science reveals much contingency to life, why should we be surprised to find much contingency in the application of scientific method?

Although there is much disagreement today as to what extent science is objective, perhaps the answer that deserves serious thought is that the overwhelming presence of the world makes the veil of our ideas, no matter how strongly held, inescapably translucent and penetrable. In other words, the rightful distinction of science lies in the fact that in spite of and because of our biases, because science makes us confront the world, the method provides us with a great opportunity to transcend our biases.