

Chapter 6 PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICIES: MIDDLE EAST

by George Kent*

INTRODUCTION

While it seems clear that personal values influence perceptions of political facts, the specific nature of this influence has not been adequately assessed. The purpose of this study is to show how personal values affect one's views of the foreign policies of nations. The term *values* here refers not to abstract, moralistic ideals, but to preferences among alternative future actions or conditions which can be imagined. Many different personal values could be related to the perceptions of foreign policies.¹ Our particular concern is with the way in

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¹The literature is reviewed in William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Sociological Analysis*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 71-103.

In "International Ideology and Interpersonal Ideology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1960), pp. 419-435, Scott demonstrated a relationship between students' personal values and what they thought United States foreign policy should be. A comparable study of personal values and their relationships to views of what Norwegian policy should be was conducted by Bjorn Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*, Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959. The present study, in contrast, investigates the relationship between personal values and perceptions of what the policies of different countries actually are.

In another political domain, a number of studies have been addressed to the question of whether partisan preferences affect perceptions of candidates, but "the findings remain ambiguous." See Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (December 1969), p. 1114.

which an individual's positions on issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict influence his perceptions of the policies of nations on those issues.

Fifty-seven students at San Francisco State College were asked to say how they thought twenty different countries would respond to each of thirty different resolutions. These resolutions, all dealing with possible futures in the Arab-Israeli conflict, are listed in Appendix I. The responses given in behalf of the countries were limited to *yes*, *abstain*, or *no*. It has been argued elsewhere that if, say, 70% or more of the respondents concurred that a given country would reply *yes* (or *no*) to a given question, then that consensus answer is likely to be an accurate reflection of the country's foreign policy.² These consensus answers can be identified in the table in Appendix II which shows the percentages of *yes* and of *no* answers given in each instance.

Besides indicating how he thought the countries would respond, each student also said how he himself would respond to the resolutions. These *self* responses to the same questions answered in behalf of the countries express the personal values most relevant to these issues. It is these values which form the basis of the following analysis.

Index of Agreement

We will frequently have occasion to compare sets of responses to the resolutions to determine the extent to which they correspond. Arend Lijphart has developed an index which can be used to measure the degree of agreement between any two sets of answers, whether between countries, between persons, or between a country and a person:

The index of agreement between two states should take into account all three possibilities: (1) state A and state B may be in complete agreement by both voting in favor, both voting against, or both abstaining; (2) A and B may be in partial agreement, i.e., one of them votes either in favor or against, and the other abstains; (3) A and B may be in complete disagreement, i.e., when A votes in favor and B against, or *vice versa*. It seems reasonable to credit a partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement. If this is accepted, we can use the following formula as our Index of Agreement (IA) between countries A and B:

²George Kent, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Middle East," *Proceedings: Peace Research Society (International)*, Vol. XIII (1970). This earlier study showed how the data analyzed here could be viewed from a different perspective to produce information about the countries rather than about the respondents.

$$IA = \frac{f + \frac{1}{2}g}{t} \cdot 100\%$$

in which *t* equals the total number of votes under consideration, *f* equals the number of votes on which A and B were in full agreement, and *g* equals the number of votes on which they agreed only in part. An IA of 100.0 per cent indicates full and complete agreement on all roll-call votes; an IA of 0.0 per cent indicates that the two countries always voted in opposite directions.³

Lijphart treats the case in which both parties *abstain* as a full agreement. Since this does not signal political agreement as fully as agreements on *yes* or *no* answers, we differ with Lijphart, and score the *abstain-abstain* case as only a partial agreement. Even with this minor revision, the computations and interpretations are very simple. Full agreement (Y-Y, N-N) is scored as one, partial agreement (Y-A, N-A, A-A) as one-half, and full disagreement (Y-N) as zero. These scores are then summed and divided by the total number of votes counted to obtain the Index of Agreement. An index of zero means total disagreement, 100% means total agreement, and intermediate scores mean corresponding intermediate degrees of agreement.

This Index can be used in the analysis of the data to obtain a number of different measures describing the political and psychological character of the respondents.

Partisanship

The degree to which an individual is sympathetic with the position of a particular country in a conflict can be estimated by the extent to which his personal values match the values he attributes to that country. Here, the degree to which the respondent is pro-Israel is estimated by the Index of Agreement between his *self* answers and the values he attributes to Israel. This Pro-Israel score for each respondent is shown as variable X_1 in Table 1, on the following pages. Similarly, the degree to which the respondent is Pro-Egypt is measured as the Index of Agreement between his *self* answers and the responses he thinks Egypt (the United Arab Republic) would give. The degree to which the individual is Pro-Egypt is listed as variable X_2 .

³Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 4 (December 1963), p. 910.

TABLE I

Respondent	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
	Pro-Israel	Pro-Egypt	Polarization	"True" Knowledge	"True" Knowledge of Israel	"True" Knowledge of Egypt	Claimed Knowledge	Opinion-attitude	Stereotyping	Projection on Israel	Projection on Egypt	Overall Projection
1	75.0	46.7	28.3	81.2	92.5	83.3	81.0	86.7	66.1	-51.0	-50.0	50.0
2	65.0	26.7	38.3	96.0	92.5	100.0	80.0	63.3	86.7	-51.0	-	50.0
3	86.7	26.7	60.0	81.0	97.5	100.0	78.7	62.2	62.2	-	-	-
4	53.3	45.0	8.3	97.2	92.5	100.0	80.7	63.3	83.7	-50.0	-	50.0
5	70.0	25.0	45.0	96.0	95.0	91.7	65.2	76.7	77.4	+50.0	-	50.0
6	75.0	35.0	-	77.6	90.0	94.4	88.5	83.3	67.2	0	+50.0	25.0
7	66.7	40.0	26.7	79.8	87.5	91.7	62.5	80.0	58.5	0	-50.0	25.0
8	38.3	75.0	36.7	97.0	95.0	100.0	86.5	83.3	92.9	+50.0	-	50.0
9	71.7	26.7	45.0	83.8	95.0	94.4	97.0	100.0	58.3	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
10	46.7	55.0	8.3	64.6	85.0	52.8	83.5	66.7	63.5	-50.0	+12.5	31.3
11	51.7	51.7	0.0	81.2	77.5	88.9	86.2	56.7	87.5	-50.0	+50.0	37.5
12	55.0	28.3	26.7	91.6	90.0	100.0	81.3	73.3	70.1	-50.0	-	50.0
13	76.7	45.0	31.7	96.2	97.5	94.4	97.8	90.0	96.8	-	+50.0	50.0
14	41.7	58.3	16.7	92.4	95.0	88.9	96.8	76.7	89.0	-50.0	-50.0	50.0
15	65.0	51.7	13.3	92.0	90.0	54.4	90.0	90.0	85.6	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
16	63.3	26.7	36.7	86.2	100.0	100.0	76.7	100.0	76.8	-	-	-
17	83.3	20.0	68.3	96.8	95.0	100.0	71.2	83.3	82.9	-	-	-
18	83.3	25.0	58.3	96.6	97.5	97.2	74.2	86.7	82.6	-	-	-
19	56.7	33.3	23.3	85.0	70.0	83.3	99.5	100.0	83.3	-15.7	+16.7	16.7
20	73.3	30.0	43.3	92.8	75.0	94.4	82.7	83.3	93.2	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
21	98.3	21.7	76.7	97.2	100.0	94.4	93.5	96.7	79.9	-	+50.0	50.0
22	41.7	73.3	31.7	95.0	82.5	94.4	73.2	70.0	81.4	-50.0	-50.0	50.0
23	83.3	30.0	53.3	90.8	92.5	58.3	84.3	86.7	62.1	-50.0	+21.4	35.7
24	46.7	51.7	5.0	93.6	65.0	91.7	74.0	83.3	76.0	0	-	0
25	70.0	26.7	43.3	95.2	100.0	94.4	92.7	100.0	82.1	-	+50.0	50.0
26	53.3	63.3	10.0	80.2	95.0	72.2	92.3	100.0	87.5	-50.0	+30.0	40.0
27	38.3	65.0	26.7	91.0	100.0	97.2	88.8	70.0	65.4	-	-	-
28	68.3	46.7	21.7	95.0	100.0	94.4	87.2	80.0	86.7	-	+50.0	50.0
29	63.3	60.0	3.3	87.4	95.0	72.2	87.2	86.7	87.6	-50.0	+30.0	40.0
30	61.7	48.3	13.3	95.6	95.0	97.2	77.5	63.3	78.2	-50.0	-	50.0
31	83.3	36.7	46.7	94.0	90.0	83.3	95.7	100.0	89.7	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
32	48.3	45.0	3.3	95.2	97.5	83.3	76.0	76.7	78.6	-	0	0
33	56.7	33.3	23.3	93.8	95.0	88.9	95.7	93.3	92.6	-50.0	0	25.0

TABLE I continued

Respondent	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇	X ₈	X ₉	X ₁₀	X ₁₁	X ₁₂
	Pro-Israel	Pro-Egypt	Polarization	"True" Knowledge	"True" Knowledge of Israel	"True" Knowledge of Egypt	Claimed Knowledge	Opinion-attitude	Stereotyping	Projection on Israel	Projection on Egypt	Overall Projection
34	18.3	75.0	56.7	97.8	100.0	94.4	91.2	83.3	84.3	-	-50.0	50.0
35	60.0	36.7	23.3	92.4	95.0	88.9	98.5	93.3	86.2	-50.0	0	50.0
36	33.3	46.7	13.3	91.4	100.0	94.4	77.3	86.7	72.1	-	-50.0	50.0
37	21.7	90.0	68.3	98.8	95.0	100.0	92.3	96.7	88.1	-50.0	-	50.0
38	55.0	45.0	10.0	81.6	82.5	91.7	74.2	80.0	72.1	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
39	46.7	56.7	10.0	92.8	90.0	91.7	85.7	53.3	86.9	0	+50.0	25.0
40	30.0	40.0	10.0	73.2	75.0	66.7	69.8	80.0	57.4	-30.0	+16.7	23.3
41	25.0	85.0	60.0	77.0	80.0	77.8	75.2	80.0	92.5	-25.0	-25.0	25.0
42	81.7	25.0	56.7	95.0	92.5	100.0	78.5	93.3	86.4	+50.0	-	50.0
43	70.0	40.0	30.0	86.6	85.0	88.9	96.7	100.0	90.7	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
44	58.3	40.0	18.3	90.6	90.0	91.7	68.3	63.3	78.6	+50.0	-	50.0
45	68.3	16.7	51.7	96.4	75.0	94.4	91.2	100.0	83.2	0	-	0
46	81.7	25.0	56.7	92.0	75.0	94.4	91.2	100.0	93.3	-25.0	+50.0	37.5
47	73.3	30.0	43.3	95.8	92.5	100.0	94.7	93.3	93.8	-50.0	-	50.0
48	63.3	38.3	25.0	93.6	95.0	91.7	94.0	93.3	90.8	-50.0	+50.0	50.0
49	51.7	53.3	1.7	85.0	97.5	83.3	69.2	66.7	77.6	-	+16.7	16.7
50	80.0	26.7	53.3	98.8	95.0	100.0	96.7	93.3	91.9	+50.0	-	50.0
51	66.7	33.3	33.3	94.0	95.0	97.2	83.2	66.7	78.5	-	-	-
52	66.7	43.3	23.3	94.2	95.0	94.4	83.8	93.3	84.7	-	-	-
53	78.3	33.3	45.0	90.4	92.5	94.4	81.5	90.0	83.3	+50.0	+50.0	50.0
54	58.3	40.0	18.3	75.4	100.0	86.1	71.8	66.7	53.5	-	-50.0	50.0
55	40.0	71.7	31.7	93.0	97.5	77.8	86.7	63.3	79.3	-	-50.0	50.0
56	48.3	68.3	20.0	76.0	92.5	69.4	90.8	90.0	86.5	-50.0	+30.0	40.0
57	48.3	56.7	8.3	96.8	100.0	91.7	92.0	83.3	89.4	-	+50.0	50.0

Polarization

It may be of interest to know to what extent an observer takes sides without being concerned with which side it is that he supports. If an individual agrees very strongly with one side and disagrees very strongly with the other, he is very highly polarized. Thus, polarization can be measured as the difference in the extent to which the individual agrees with each of the two sides to a conflict.

Egypt can be taken to be reasonably representative of the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The degree to which a respondent is polarized is measured simply as the absolute difference between his Pro-Israel and his Pro-Egypt scores. These Polarization scores are shown as variable X₃ in Table I.

as friendly. For nations viewed as unfriendly or as enemies, negative projection would take place, with a disproportionate mismatching of errors with personal values. Disagreeable values would be imputed to those countries with which the respondent was in general disagreement. There would be a polarization whereby enemies were more or less automatically attributed values opposite to those of friends.

An error is defined here as a deviation from the group consensus, a case in which the individual respondent says a country would answer *yes* while the group consensus says the country would answer *no*, or *vice versa*. Cases in which the individual abstains or where the group fails to reach a 70% consensus are not counted. After these erroneous imputations are identified we ask what percentage of them match the personal value indicated by the respondent's *self* answer. By chance alone, they would tend to match about half the time. If they match significantly more frequently there is positive projection taking place, with the respondent tending to assign his personal values to the country. If they match significantly less frequently there is negative projection, with the respondent tending to assume the country's values are opposed to his personal values.

The scores for Projection on Israel were established by first determining the percentage of cases in which the respondent's personal value matched his erroneous attribution to Israel, and then measuring the deviation of this percentage from 50%. The resulting scores are reported as variable X_{10} in Table 1. No score is reported if there were no errors. Positive numbers signify positive projection and negative numbers signify negative projection. The projection of personal values onto Egypt was assessed in the same way. Variable X_{11} shows the extent to which errors in the attributions to Egypt were in the direction of the respondent's personal values, again measured as the deviation from 50%.

It would be useful to have a generalized measure of the extent to which individuals project their personal values. The average of the absolute projection scores for each of the twenty countries might be used for this purpose. A rougher, but usable, measure is obtained simply by averaging the absolute projection scores for Israel and for Egypt. This Overall Projection measure is shown as variable X_{12} .⁴

⁴While there will be a large error component in this estimate, that error is likely to be random. Rather than introducing a systematic bias in favor of any of the hypotheses, this error tends to make the tests conservative. That is, if the error component is so large as to wash out true effects, the consequence will be that hypotheses involving the Overall Projection score will not be confirmed. This is true of random errors in the other measures as well.

HYPOTHESES

Having operationalized a number of variables, we can now formulate a few specific hypotheses about their interrelationships. Rather than speculate on systematic differences between the pro- and anti-Israel sides, however, we will simply allow the analysis of the data to reveal those differences.

It should be recognized that the operationalizations of the variables studied here are not all independent of one another, so some correlations between them do not signify true empirical relationships. In some cases the built-in relationships are clear from the way in which one variable was derived directly from the others; e.g., Polarization from Pro-Israel and Pro-Egypt scores, or Overall Projection from Projection on Israel and Projection on Egypt. Other connections are more obscure. For example, one might hypothesize that respondents who are more polarized tend to be more opinionated. By our definitions of these terms, however, the respondent who does not give many *yes* or *no* personal opinions cannot possibly be highly polarized. There is a built-in negative correlation between Opinionatedness and Polarization because of the way in which the variables have been operationalized. Similarly, if one tends to stereotype the "other" side more than one's own, those who are more Pro-Israel will be found to stereotype more, simply because only stereotyping of the Arab side is measured here. Such artifacts can produce misleading results. Although it is not certain, all the explicitly stated hypotheses developed below appear to deal with independently defined variables.⁵

This attempt to state propositions of general interest will focus on the major variables: Polarization (X_4), "True" Knowledge (X_4), Opinionatedness (X_8), Stereotyping (X_9), and Overall Projection (X_{12}). We begin by considering the relationship between being knowledgeable and having opinions, regardless of the content of these opinions. Are more knowledgeable people more or less likely to be opinionated? The more knowledgeable person might be expected to have more fully developed positions on the issues, but contrary arguments suggest themselves. Uninformed people might be free about offering opinions in an

⁵A good test of independence can be obtained by establishing data sets based on responses produced by a random number generator, and then intercorrelating the variables obtained from that random data. If the variables are independent, the correlations should all be near zero.

The hypotheses can be meaningful and can be tested even if the variables are not independent in their definitions. The hypotheses assert an expectation that the obtained relationships will be significantly different from that which would have been expected if the responses had been random. That is, the null hypothesis is that the correlation is the same as would be obtained with random data. If the expected correlations for random data were determined, the substantive hypotheses would be supported if the obtained correlations were significantly different from those values.

effort to appear sophisticated, or they might not fully appreciate the issues, and therefore not be quite so indecisive as those who know more of the arguments of the different factions. A person might inform himself precisely because he recognizes his own indecision, but still not find that information helpful for formulating positions. On balance, however, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that:

H1: People who are more knowledgeable on particular political issues tend to be more opinionated on those issues.

This can be tested by measuring the correlation between variables X_4 and X_8 . While it may sometimes seem that the polarization tends to be a function of ignorance, we hypothesize that as a rule:

H2: More knowledgeable people tend to be more highly polarized.

A high positive correlation between variables X_4 and X_8 would support this proposition. The argument is simply that both are indicators of involvement with the issues. The more polarized individual will have to deal with the arguments more frequently, and will therefore have to assure himself that he is knowledgeable. Ignorance of the issues will correspond to neutrality on the issues.

For similar reasons we hypothesize that:

H3: More knowledgeable people tend to stereotype less.

and that:

H4: More knowledgeable people tend to project less.

H3 would be supported by a negative correlation between variables X_4 and X_9 , while H4 would be supported by a negative correlation between variables X_4 and X_{12} . These propositions reflect the conviction that both projection and stereotyping are functions of ignorance.

We would expect that:

H5: More opinionated people tend to be more highly polarized.

A positive correlation between variables X_8 and X_9 would provide evidence

supporting this proposition. If this hypothesized relationship exists, however, it could be due to the fact that both variables are positively correlated with knowledge, as hypothesized in H1 and H2. We expect that the relationship would still hold if knowledge was, in effect, held constant:

H6: When controlling for knowledge levels, more opinionated people tend to be more highly polarized.

This would be tested by measuring the partial correlation between X_8 and X_9 while controlling for X_4 . Similarly, we expect that:

H7: People who stereotype more tend to project more.

This would be confirmed by a positive correlation between X_9 and X_{12} . The effect may be due to the fact that both are negatively correlated with knowledge, in accordance with hypotheses H2 and H3. We expect that same relationship to hold, however, even if that influence is separated out:

H8: When controlling for knowledge levels, people who stereotype more tend to project more.

This is tested by measuring the partial correlation between X_9 and X_{12} while controlling for X_4 . We expect that:

H9: When controlling for knowledge levels, more highly polarized people tend to project more.

This would show up as a positive partial correlation between X_9 and X_{12} when controlling for X_4 . When there is no such control, however, we expect that:

H10: More highly polarized people tend to project less.

That is, we expect a negative correlation between X_9 and X_{12} . The reason for this is that one of these variables is predicted to be positively related to knowledge, in accordance with H2, while the other is predicted to be negatively related to knowledge, in accordance with H3. H9 and H10 are more interesting than the preceding pairs, H5 and H6 or H7 and H8, because here the control is expected to actually reverse the direction of the relationship.

This data can be used to test a number of common beliefs about partisanship.

For example, from the general hypothesis of cognitive consistency theory that "most individuals will both know and believe more facts congenial to their opinion than facts uncongenial to their opinion,"⁶ we can draw the specific proposition that:

H11: People tend to have greater knowledge of a country the more they agree with the country.

This hypothesis is closely related to H1, but differs in that it takes into account the content of the respondent's personal values. H11 would be supported by a positive correlation between X_5 and X_1 and between X_6 and X_5 .

Besides knowing those countries with which they agree, people also tend to know a great deal about the countries to which they are opposed. It is probably true that the more non-neutral a person is toward a country, whether agreeing or disagreeing, the more he tends to know about that country. This hypothesis has, in effect, already been stated in H2 which asserts that more knowledgeable people tend to be more polarized. This is not inconsistent with H11. There is probably a general non-linear relationship between knowledge and attitude, with peaks of knowledge near (but not at?) the poles of strong agreement and strong disagreement, and a minimum of knowledge where there is little concern. The knowledge level probably peaks more highly near the agreement end than near the disagreement end.⁷

In all the preceding hypotheses the knowledge variable was assumed to be "true" knowledge. It is often useful to distinguish between actually having accurate knowledge and claiming to have knowledge. People probably claim to know more about enemy countries than about countries with which they are unconcerned. They probably also have a greater tendency to make errors in their assertions about enemies. Thus the discrepancy between "true" knowledge and claimed knowledge of a country is probably greater the greater the disagreement with the country.⁸

These and other more intricate arguments could be tested, but they will not be pursued here. The hypotheses that have been listed are only suggestive of the variety which could be formulated and tested with these data. Among the more interesting possible hypotheses are those which examine the relative strengths of different relationships (e.g., does claimed knowledge correlate more strongly

⁶Don D. Smith, "Cognitive Consistency and the Perception of Others' Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring 1968), p. 4.

⁷This view is supported by Joseph B. Cooper, "Attitudes and Presumed Knowledge," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 34 (August 1951), pp. 97-110. Also see Harry A. Grace and J. O. Neuhaus, "Information and Social Distance as Predictors of Hostility Toward Nations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 47 (1952), 540-545; and Christiansen, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-69, 215-220.

ly than "true" knowledge with polarization?), and those which postulate non-linear relationships (asserting, for example, that given relationships will be stronger for higher values of a particular variable). Beyond these interrelationships, the potential for relating these measures to other information about the respondents remains wholly untapped.

RESULTS

Hypotheses

The eleven hypotheses and the obtained correlations are summarized in Table 2.⁹ A one-tailed test with a significance level of 0.05 was used as the criterion of acceptability in each case. With 57 cases this implies a requirement that the correlation be higher than about 0.22. Only a few of the hypothesized relationships were actually obtained. In accordance with the hypotheses, it was found that more knowledgeable people tend to be more highly polarized (H2), and that more opinionated people tend to be more highly polarized (H5). Controlling for knowledge did not have much effect on this last relationship, so

TABLE 2

Hypothesis	N	Obtained Correlation	Hypothesis Confirmed
H1 $r_{4,8} > 0$	57	+0.106	No
H2 $r_{4,3} > 0$	57	+0.315	Yes
H3 $r_{4,9} < 0$	57	+0.550	No
H4 $r_{4,12} < 0$	50	+0.255	No (wrong direction)
H5 $r_{8,3} > 0$	57	+0.412	Yes (wrong direction)
H6 $r_{8,3/4} > 0$	57	+0.402	Yes
H7 $r_{9,12} > 0$	50	+0.176	No
H8 $r_{9,12/4} > 0$	25	+0.044	No
H9 $r_{3,12} < 0$	25	+0.179	No
H10 $r_{3,12} < 0$	50	+0.244	No
H11 $r_{5,1} > 0$	57	+0.108	No
	57	-0.284	No

⁹Cooper, *ibid.*

⁷The writer thanks Mr. Thomas M. Bell for his able assistance in the analysis of the data.

H6 was confirmed as well. Contrary to expectations, more knowledgeable people were found to stereotype more (H3) and to project more (H4).

While it seemed so obvious as to be unworthy of stating as an explicit hypothesis, to our surprise the correlation between "true" and claimed knowledge did not quite reach the chosen level of significance ($r_{1,7} = +.215$). But, as expected, the Pro-Israel and Pro-Egypt scores did show a high negative correlation ($r_{1,2} = .799$), indicating that these measures are valid.

Pro-Israel and Pro-Egypt Comparisons

Although prior expectations have not been formulated into hypotheses, we will review the interrelationships between the partisanship variables, X_1 and X_2 , and some of the other variables.

Neither general "true" knowledge nor claimed knowledge levels were related to positions on the Pro-Israel or Pro-Egypt dimensions. There was no significant relationship between being partisan toward these particular countries and having "true" knowledge of them, except for the fact that those who were more Pro-Egypt showed *less* "true" knowledge of Egypt ($r_{2,6} = -.284$). And curiously, while those who were more Pro-Israel tended to be more highly polarized ($r_{1,3} = +.407$), as would be expected, those who were more Pro-Egypt tended to be *less* polarized ($r_{2,3} = -.296$). In addition, those who were more Pro-Israel tended to be more opinionated ($r_{1,8} = +.342$), while those who were more Pro-Egypt tended to be less opinionated ($r_{2,8} = -.241$), according to the measures used here. It was also surprising to find that those who were more Pro-Israel tended to project *positively* onto Egypt ($r_{1,11} = +.543$), and those who were more Pro-Egypt tended to project *negatively* onto Egypt ($r_{2,11} = -.451$). It is not clear why these effects should be obtained. They need to be explained.

Clear comparisons can be made by separating out Pro-Israel and Pro-Egypt subgroups. In the first attempt to do so, the twenty respondents who scored most highly on the Pro-Israel dimension were designated as the Pro-Israel subgroup, and similarly, the twenty who scored most highly on the Pro-Egypt dimension were designated as the Pro-Egypt subgroup. But it was noted that the average Pro-Israel score for this Pro-Israel subgroup was 79.2, while the average Pro-Egypt score for this Pro-Egypt subgroup was only 62.8, indicating that the sample of respondents as a whole tended to favor Israel. The fixed size of the subgroups made it necessary to include a disproportionate number of politically middling respondents in the Pro-Egypt category. To overcome this problem we instead used a given degree of partisanship as the membership criterion. In the following analyses the Pro-Israel subgroup consists of those who scored 70.0 or higher on the Pro-Israel variable, and the Pro-Egypt subgroup consists of those who scored 70.0 or higher on the Pro-Egypt variable.

The resulting Pro-Israel subgroup has nineteen members and the Pro-Egypt subgroup has six members. The average Pro-Israel score for the Pro-Israel subgroup was 78.7 and the average Pro-Egypt score for the Pro-Egypt subgroup was 78.3. The symmetry between the two subgroups is remarkable. The average Pro-Egypt score for the Pro-Israel subgroup was 30.3, while the average Pro-Israel score for the Pro-Egypt subgroup was 30.8.

It was just observed that according to the intercorrelations those respondents who were more Pro-Israel tended to be more highly polarized, while those who were more Pro-Egypt tended to be less polarized. This phenomenon can also be studied by comparing the two subgroups. The average Polarization score for the Pro-Israel subgroup was 48.4, while the average Polarization score for the Pro-Egypt subgroup was 47.5. The insignificance of the difference suggests that the previous result was probably an artifact of the underrepresentation of Pro-Egypt respondents.¹⁰

The intercorrelations also showed that those who are more Pro-Israel tend to be more opinionated. The average score on the opinionatedness variable for the Pro-Israel subgroup was 90.7, while for the Pro-Egypt subgroup the average score was 79.4. The difference between them is significant, supporting the conclusion that those who are Pro-Israel are more opinionated than those who are Pro-Egypt.

There was no significant difference between the two subgroups on any of the knowledge variables. Surprisingly, there was not even a significant difference in the degrees to which the two subgroups stereotyped the Arab countries.

While the projection scores as such are not very meaningful, their signs may be meaningful. We can count the number of instances of positive or negative projection onto Israel or onto Egypt in each subgroup without being concerned with the degree of projection. The following results are obtained:

	X_{10} Projection on Israel	X_{11} Projection on Egypt
Pro-Israel subgroup	5 positive 7 negative	11 positive 1 negative
Pro-Egypt subgroup	2 positive 2 negative	0 positive 4 negative

¹⁰This and the following comparisons are based on a one-tailed "t" test of the significance of the difference of means, using a 0.05 criterion level.

Inferences from such scanty data are hazardous, but they clearly correspond with the previous observation that those who are Pro-Israel tend to project positively onto Egypt while those who are Pro-Egypt tend to project negatively onto Egypt.

With this inability to confirm most of the hypotheses and the absence of many of the expected differences between the subgroups, it is worthwhile to measure the similarities, and not just the differences, between those who are Pro-Israel and those who are Pro-Egypt. To do this we first identified those instances in which there was a consensus of 70% or more in the attributions within each subgroup. By this standard, the Pro-Israel subgroup reached a consensus in 268 cases, and the Pro-Egypt subgroup reached a consensus in 274 cases. These results for the two subgroups were then compared to determine the degree of similarity in their attributions. In the 173 cases in which both subgroups reached a consensus, their answers were the same in every case. There was perfect agreement between the two subgroups' consensus answers. (In the earlier study, the Index of Agreement between the consensus answers for pro- and anti-Israel subgroups was 98.7%). This high level of similarity between the attributions of the two subgroups of very different personal values indicates that these personal values did not influence their perceptions very much. There was little variance in their attributions, and thus little to be accounted for by differences in their preferences.

CONCLUSION

The disappointing box score for the hypotheses reported in Table 2 and the unfulfilled expectations might be explained by a number of different factors. There was relatively little variance in the "true" knowledge variable, thus making it inherently impossible that it could be used to explain variations in any other variable. The stereotyping variable behaved strangely, raising serious doubts about its validity. The projection scores were troublesome too. Since there were few errors on which to base them, their numerical values were not very meaningful. It seems that, as anticipated, they contained a very large error component.

Since this study has been concerned only with variations within the group, the fact that the sample of respondents was biased in favor of Israel does not necessarily invalidate the results. The respondents covered a broad political range, including both ardent Israeli Zionists and ardent Palestinian Arabs. Although the question still needs to be investigated, it seems unlikely that the results would be very different with samples centered at different portions of the Arab-Israeli spectrum.

The attributions of the subgroups selected according to their values were not very different from what would be expected from randomly selected subgroups. While the failure to confirm the hypotheses may have been due to invalid definitions or other weakness in the research technique, it is also possible that the hypothesized relationships simply are not true. If these relationships between values and perceptions are so pervasive as some social scientists suggest, it should be possible to demonstrate them by some easily replicated procedure like that used here. The evidence suggests that common beliefs about the malleability of perceptions under the influence of personal values are greatly exaggerated. They do not have much effect on perceptions of the preferences of nations.

If foreign policies are characterized only in a gross way, as aggressive or not aggressive, for example, there certainly will be differences in perceptions depending on the politics of the observer. But if foreign policies are characterized in terms of national preferences among concrete alternatives, these preferences appear the same regardless of the preferences of the observer. The policies which make up the Middle East conflict look essentially the same regardless of the side from which they are viewed. Whether or not people with different values see foreign policies as they actually are, they do tend to see them in much the same way.

APPENDIX I

RESOLUTIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

1. If the refugees wish, they should be allowed to establish a new sovereign state of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in area occupied by Israel in the war of June, 1967.
2. Israel should withdraw from all territories occupied in June, 1967, including the Old City of Jerusalem.
3. Israel should withdraw from all territories occupied in June, 1967, except for Jerusalem.
4. Israel should withdraw from territories occupied in June, 1967 as part of an overall settlement, when the sovereignty and integrity of the State of Israel are secured.
5. Israel should withdraw to the armistice lines established in 1949.
6. The Arab states should coordinate their build-up of their military forces, in preparation for the elimination of Israel as a state.

7. Israel should relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem to international control.
8. Direct, face-to-face Arab-Israeli negotiations should begin, without intermediaries.
9. Both the United States and the Soviet Union should report all arms sold or given to countries of the Middle East to the United Nations, on a regular basis.
10. Passage through the Suez canal should be open equally to all, at all times.
11. The conflicting parties should agree to a peace treaty in which boundaries and other questions would be clearly settled.
12. The Arab states should pool their military resources under a new Joint Defense Command to coordinate their movements in times of war.
13. The United States should help Middle Eastern countries pursue joint development of their resources, work to keep nuclear weapons out of the region, and try to prevent the recurrence of local wars through the United Nations.
14. The United States should continue supplying arms to Israel so long as its existence is threatened.
15. The United States and the Soviet Union should begin talks with a view to curbing the flow of arms into the Middle East and maintaining the security of all nations of the area.
16. The Arab states should declare an end to the state of belligerency with Israel.
17. Israel should permit the return of all refugees to their former homes.
18. Israel should offer Israeli citizenship to all refugees, granting them the same rights as other new immigrants.
19. Israel should pay reparations to the Arab countries for damages incurred during the war of June, 1967.
20. Israel and individual Arab countries should enter into negotiations, with the understanding that no formal recognition of Israel would be implied.
21. The Old City of Jerusalem should be returned to its status prior to the 1967 war.
22. Israel should control all of Jerusalem, with the Holy Places under the administration of the three major religious bodies concerned.
23. All nations, including Israel, should be granted unrestricted navigation rights through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.
24. After permanent borders are agreed upon by Israel and the Arab states, a strong United Nations peacekeeping force should be posted at the borders.

25. A general Middle East peace guarantee should be made jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France.
26. The Arab states should make no concessions to Israel, offer no diplomatic recognition, and never engage in any negotiation, direct or indirect, with Israel.
27. The major powers, the Security Council, or the United Nation's Special Representative to the Middle East should propose a timetable toward peace and the Security Council should guarantee that it would be put into effect.
28. Discussions should be conducted with a view toward laying the foundations for a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states.
29. Israel should withdraw from territories occupied in June, 1967 in exchange for a declaration of an end to belligerency by the Arab states.
30. The United States should unilaterally terminate all military assistance to nations of the Middle East.

APPENDIX II

PERCENTAGES OF YES AND OF NO ANSWERS
FOR EACH COUNTRY TO EACH RESOLUTION.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ALGERIA	%Y	46	93	11	25	84	70	44	23	23
	%N	51	5	82	68	9	16	46	72	65
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	42	91	18	21	79	75	40	21	44
	%N	51	4	74	74	12	16	49	65	42
FRANCE	%Y	42	58	35	81	37	2	82	44	63
	%N	21	19	32	9	25	86	4	18	21
IRAN	%Y	49	81	18	44	68	33	54	32	33
	%N	28	7	70	39	12	39	32	37	46
IRAQ	%Y	51	96	16	21	93	77	42	23	16
	%N	47	4	81	68	4	12	47	72	70
ISRAEL	%Y	35	0	5	42	5	2	7	87	35
	%N	63	98	91	46	93	95	91	11	54

JORDAN	%Y	40	98	14	28	91	74	39	16	18	25
	%N	58	2	84	65	9	11	53	74	65	68
KUWAIT	%Y	44	88	11	32	84	61	51	18	25	26
	%N	42	4	74	60	7	21	40	72	56	61
LEBANON	%Y	53	93	16	32	84	54	49	25	25	25
	%N	39	2	75	54	4	21	47	67	65	49
LIBYA	%Y	44	89	18	37	84	51	51	19	23	26
	%N	42	4	72	51	9	23	44	67	54	46
MOROCCO	%Y	44	89	16	33	88	51	53	23	23	25
	%N	33	4	72	46	4	21	37	61	54	51
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	47	98	19	33	96	68	42	19	17	26
	%N	47	0	79	61	4	12	54	75	63	61
SUDAN	%Y	49	96	16	26	93	65	47	25	19	26
	%N	44	0	75	58	2	18	44	65	60	56
SYRIA	%Y	51	96	18	23	96	88	40	14	16	16
	%N	47	4	81	72	4	9	58	79	74	81
TUNISIA	%Y	40	84	21	37	82	33	54	28	28	33
	%N	39	4	68	44	2	32	35	49	49	37
U.S.S.R.	%Y	44	96	14	40	82	30	56	19	4	47
	%N	42	0	67	42	4	35	25	56	84	25
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	47	96	16	19	86	89	37	12	14	9
	%N	49	2	82	75	12	7	58	82	77	88
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	39	32	46	82	16	4	81	65	53	98
	%N	25	28	28	5	47	89	5	14	32	0
UNITED STATES	%Y	40	19	35	89	7	0	74	74	26	100
	%N	22	44	35	4	65	96	11	12	56	0
YEMEN	%Y	53	88	11	21	86	60	40	18	23	19
	%N	39	4	79	61	7	19	47	68	67	63
ALGERIA	%Y	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	%N	42	75	30	2	28	7	96	51	84	51
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	47	11	49	91	56	88	2	28	4	9
	%N	42	75	14	5	12	9	93	47	82	32
FRANCE	%Y	37	12	82	93	79	79	2	26	4	44
	%N	95	9	51	23	75	77	60	67	26	70
IRAN	%Y	0	51	30	40	7	7	7	11	26	4
	%N	75	37	56	5	63	28	84	61	60	56
	%N	11	18	19	60	28	42	0	16	5	16

APPENDIX II continued

IRAQ	%Y	46	72	28	0	28	11	96	51	88	47
	%N	44	11	47	91	61	81	2	33	2	42
ISRAEL	%Y	91	2	63	98	53	95	7	11	5	23
	%N	7	93	26	2	32	5	82	68	93	72
JORDAN	%Y	53	75	49	0	39	12	95	47	95	54
	%N	40	7	35	96	44	81	4	30	5	30
KUWAIT	%Y	54	58	53	0	42	16	95	49	79	46
	%N	37	9	32	86	42	70	2	30	4	30
LEBANON	%Y	58	61	49	0	49	12	98	51	82	51
	%N	32	12	30	93	39	70	2	30	4	28
LIBYA	%Y	53	63	44	0	37	9	93	49	79	47
	%N	32	12	32	86	40	74	2	28	2	21
MOROCCO	%Y	58	54	42	0	42	12	96	51	82	44
	%N	28	14	32	86	37	65	2	26	2	32
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	49	68	47	0	30	5	96	49	95	53
	%N	40	19	37	98	47	88	2	30	2	35
SUDAN	%Y	49	74	37	2	25	5	95	53	88	46
	%N	37	14	46	89	54	84	2	28	2	37
SYRIA	%Y	37	89	28	0	18	4	98	49	96	49
	%N	56	5	65	98	77	93	2	35	2	46
TUNISIA	%Y	67	49	51	0	47	16	96	53	77	53
	%N	18	16	23	84	32	60	0	26	2	18
U.S.S.R.	%Y	63	60	16	0	67	18	88	53	88	56
	%N	16	11	63	91	11	49	0	23	0	16
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	39	93	23	4	14	7	98	44	96	47
	%N	53	7	67	96	72	91	2	33	2	49
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	96	5	93	56	95	93	35	49	11	49
	%N	2	67	4	14	0	2	1	12	49	23
UNITED STATES	%Y	98	2	98	93	88	96	30	42	7	51
	%N	2	75	0	4	2	0	26	12	65	30
YEMEN	%Y	42	67	35	2	28	12	96	49	89	44
	%N	37	7	42	91	44	77	2	28	2	40
ALGERIA	%Y	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
	%N	93	4	14	35	19	49	28	40	33	67
	%N	4	93	75	53	63	33	51	30	46	21

APPENDIX II continued

CHINESE	%Y	84	5	19	18	11	60	11	19	33	81
	%N	9	86	65	68	81	16	65	47	44	18
PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	60	11	84	88	86	0	81	81	68	40
	%N	11	35	4	4	5	82	7	5	11	28
IRAN	%Y	79	9	40	60	46	16	53	63	56	30
	%N	7	74	35	21	35	47	26	14	19	40
IRAQ	%Y	96	2	16	37	19	54	32	37	32	61
	%N	0	93	70	46	60	25	53	47	47	23
ISRAEL	%Y	4	81	91	53	33	5	37	75	18	7
	%N	95	12	9	30	47	89	51	11	65	91
JORDAN	%Y	96	0	18	53	30	32	39	46	44	28
	%N	4	98	74	33	47	32	42	28	39	49
KUWAIT	%Y	91	5	25	42	28	37	40	47	44	54
	%N	2	88	63	32	44	33	44	30	33	21
LEBANON	%Y	95	4	16	49	37	32	39	53	49	42
	%N	2	91	68	35	39	39	35	25	28	30
LIBYA	%Y	93	2	18	39	26	28	35	42	44	46
	%N	0	89	63	30	44	33	39	32	30	30
MOROCCO	%Y	95	2	21	51	28	25	40	46	49	44
	%N	0	91	58	25	42	35	32	26	25	32
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	96	0	9	40	30	42	33	46	39	40
	%N	0	98	75	42	47	28	44	33	40	42
SUDAN	%Y	93	2	11	33	21	44	28	44	39	58
	%N	4	93	74	35	53	26	46	32	33	23
SYRIA	%Y	91	2	7	28	16	68	19	33	30	81
	%N	5	98	89	56	70	18	67	47	56	14
TUNISIA	%Y	93	4	30	53	32	18	49	53	49	44
	%N	0	79	46	21	35	47	19	21	21	25
U.S.S.R.	%Y	88	2	32	46	60	9	51	46	54	79
	%N	2	82	30	25	19	47	23	19	18	12
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	95	0	4	30	21	63	30	37	35	82
	%N	5	100	93	53	67	18	56	44	49	14
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	33	39	93	91	84	4	81	81	65	14
	%N	25	14	2	0	4	91	4	5	12	67

APPENDIX II continued

UNITED STATES	%Y	25	39	96	89	86	0	86	84	61	9
	%N	33	12	0	2	7	96	5	5	18	88
YEMEN	%Y	88	9	16	35	19	40	21	39	33	60
	%N	5	88	74	39	60	25	47	37	42	21