The Three Great Critiques relate to three modes of consciousness:

**Critique of Pure Reason**  
Knowledge

**Critique of Practical Reason**  
Desire

**Critique of Judgment**  
Feeling

The *Critique of Pure Reason* seeks to establish the foundation for making objective, universally valid empirical judgments about the world—both ordinary and scientific. This critique focuses on knowledge of **Nature** which is a realm of necessary laws.

The *Critique of Practical Reason* seeks to establish the conditions for making objective, universally valid moral judgments. **As morality depends upon freedom** this critique focuses on the realm of **Freedom**.

These first two critiques leave a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the realms of **Nature** and **Freedom**.

The *Critique of Judgment* (1790) aims to reunite the worlds of **Nature** and **Freedom**. It seeks to establish the *a priori* conditions for making universally valid aesthetic and teleological judgments.

It is generally regarded as foundational treatise in modern philosophical aesthetics. It was the first attempt to integrate aesthetic theory into a complete philosophical system.

He hoped to provide a theory of the aesthetic judgment that would justify its apparent claim to intersubjective validity, and escape the temptations of skepticism and relativism. Believed this could be accomplished only by giving a deeper interpretation of art and its values and by establishing for it a more intimate connection with the basic cognitive faculties of the mind.

How does the *Critique of Judgment* fit within Kant’s overall project and provide the bridge between the gaping chasm opened up between the realm of **nature** and **freedom**?

We need to start by reviewing the main outlines of the first two critiques.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* sought to provide a foundation for the universality of judgments of natural science which seemed to have been called into question by Hume’s skepticism.
**Hume’s Fork**

All knowledge is either:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation of Ideas</th>
<th>Matters of Fact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>a priori</em></td>
<td><em>a posteriori</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>necessary truths</td>
<td>contingent truths</td>
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<tr>
<td>“All bachelors are unmarried males”</td>
<td>“All swans are white”</td>
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<td>the negation is a contradiction:</td>
<td>the negation is not a contradiction:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“All bachelors are not unmarried males”</td>
<td>“All swans are not white”</td>
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In Kant’s language

these are *Analytic Statements*

the concept of the predicate (“is an unmarried male”) is included in the concept of the subject (“Bachelor”)

these tell us nothing important about the world only about our language

these are necessary truths by definition or by *Analysis* of our language

these statements are contingently true requiring sense evidence for verification

**Hume’s Skepticism**

Hume’s analysis of causality had shown that the judgment that A is the cause of B is based on:

1) temporal priority: Event A must precede event B
2) spatial contiguity: A must be spatially connected to B—the problem of action at a distance
3) constant conjunction: we must see repeated instance of event B following event A all of these can be verified by sense evidence but the fourth step cannot
4) necessary connection: for A to be the cause of B there must be some necessary connection this idea of necessary connection is based on the assumption: “The future will be like the past”

Is this statement a Relation of Ideas of a Matter of Fact?

the negation “The future will not be like the past” does not imply a contradiction

Thus it is not an *a priori* necessary truth but a *synthetic* statement requiring sense evidence and there can be no sense evidence to verify that the future will be like the past

**Thus we have a major problem!**

the presumed basis for *all* human knowledge the causal relation is never ratified by direct human experience!!!

Hume didn’t let this trouble him too much. As we cannot live without making judgments about cause and effect, we continue to make those judgments out of necessity. But the necessity is not grounded objectively in sense evidence. The necessity is only of subjective conviction. One
perceives the regularity of events, but not their necessity. Science is possible, but it is a science only of the *phenomenal* only, of appearances registered in the mind, and its certainty is a subjective one, determined not by nature but by human psychology.

For Hume, even the ideas of *space* and *time* are ultimately not independent realities as Newton assumed, but are instead simply the result of a habit of association of ideas. The notions of space and time are abstracted by the mind from repeated experience. At bottom the mind experiences only particulars—any relation between these particulars is woven by the mind into the fabric of its experience. In other words, the mind experiences with impressions only a buzzing confusion. The mind must organize these impressions in order to make sense of experience. Thus the intelligibility of the world reflects the *habits of the mind*, not the nature of reality.

This was not good enough for Kant. One of the main aims of the Enlightenment was to provide a solid foundation for science—for making objective, universally valid judgments about the world.

*The Critique of Pure Reason*

sought to provide this foundation and save the Enlightenment project by responding to Hume’s skepticism.

came up with an imaginative synthesis of empiricism and rationalism

In response to Hume’s Fork
all knowledge is either

Analytic and A priori  or  Synthetic and A posteriori

with the supposition that some knowledge is

*Synthetic and A Priori*

In other words, he agreed with the rationalists that there are important truths (not just *Analytic* truths that tell us about words) about the world that do not come from experience, in other words, truths that are *synthetic a priori*.

He seeks to go beyond rationalism by providing a more adequate explanation for the possibility of such knowledge.

He agrees with the empiricists that much of our knowledge comes from experience, yet he argues that the empiricists neglected the “formal” contribution the mind gives to the “content” received by experience.

In other words, the mind is not merely a passive mirror of nature. The mind actually “frames” or imposes some order upon the data received by the senses.
Although we rely on experience, on ‘receptivity’ or what Kant calls ‘intuition’ for the particular contents of our knowledge, the structure or form of that experience is provided by the human mind, or what Kant calls the ‘understanding’ (Verstand). Without the mind to provide the structure or form to what is given through the senses we would have no experience of the external world at all.

This is what Kant described as the “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy prior to Copernicus they couldn’t satisfactorily explain the movement of the heavens based on the supposition that the heavens revolved around the spectator (the sun revolving around the earth). Copernicus achieved a breakthrough by supposing that it was the spectator that revolved (the earth revolving around the sun).

Similarly Kant thought he had achieved a breakthrough in metaphysics. Prior to Kant the mind was conceived as a passive mirror of nature and crucial notions like space and time and causality were thought to reside outside the mind and only passively mirrored in the mind. The foundation for making objective, universally valid empirical judgments (judgments about the external world) was thought by rationalists to lie in a priori innate ideas that mirrored an objective reality. Or by empiricists in ideas given in sensation (a posteriori) whose source lay outside the mind. Both rationalists and empiricists assumed the mind to be a passive mirror of nature but the mind supplies the form to that content and thus the rationalists were right about there being some non-analytic a priori knowledge. Thus the Copernican Revolution is that Kant finds the source of the objective, universally valid empirical judgments to lie within the mind.

The mind is no longer a passive mirror, but actively structures or imposes form upon our experience.

How, one might ask, if the source is within the mind, can the judgments be objective and universally valid? For Kant, the universality lies in the structure of the human mind all of us have a mind that is hardwired to experience the world through the categories of space and time and causality.

The aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is to demonstrate that we can have a priori knowledge of the structure or form of experience. He calls this knowledge “transcendental” it concerns the nature of our experience but “transcends” the way empiricists supposed it was derived. The project Kant undertakes is to lay out the structure of the human mind he seeks transcendental knowledge of the basic form or structure of experience.
Another important distinction for Kant is between the Phenomenal World and the Noumenal World; the world as it appears to us and the world as it is “in-itself.”

Kant accepts the conclusion of Hume’s consistent empiricism: we don’t know the world as it is “in-itself” only the world “as it appears to us” but it appears to us in ways that are structured by the human mind and that structure, for Kant, is the same in all of us the world appears to us through a necessary, and thus, universal structure of experience.

we cannot experience the world except through space and time space and time are the *a priori* conditions of our being affected by things (Sensibility)

the necessary connection that makes possible causal judgments is not found looking outside the mind to what is given in sense experience the necessary connection is in the way the mind structures experience causality is one of the categories of understanding which, for Kant, are the *a priori* conditions of making judgments (Understanding)

in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant attempts to prove his claims about the necessary structure of our experience he calls this the “transcendental deduction” of the “categories” which aims to establish the transcendental conditions of all possible experience

the difficulty of Kant’s arguments here are notorious
the difference between mainstream analytic and continental philosophy divides here over responses to Kant
the starting point of analytic philosophy is the rejection of Kant’s transcendental arguments they claim they cannot be successful deductions thus, according to analytic philosophers, Kant’s crucial class of *synthetic a priori* truths is empty they revert to Hume’s fork, all truths are *analytic a priori* or *synthetic a posteriori*
this tradition maintains that philosophy should ignore those questions that ‘it is not able to answer’

the continental tradition places greater emphasis on Kant’s recognition that there are important metaphysical, moral and aesthetic questions that we are unable to ignore some continental philosophers are more sympathetic to Kant’s transcendental deductions
the continental tradition also places more emphasis on the second and third critiques

the *Critique of Practical Reason* which aims to discover the *a priori* conditions of making objective, universally valid moral judgments
the *Critique of Judgment* which aims to discover the *a priori* conditions for making judgments based on feeling
Here is Kant’s definition of Enlightenment:
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another” (Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”)

this means the unfettered pursuit of factual or scientific understanding
no more throwing scientists like Galileo in prison

but it also means freedom of public speech (within responsible limits)
freedom in religious matters
freedom in discussing legislation (what laws we set for ourselves)
all of these are essential elements in the unfinished process of Enlightenment

Kant was certainly aware that Enlightenment philosophy created a serious problem for morality and religion
a purely mechanistic view of a world governed by necessary laws seems to undermine notions of freedom and responsibility

it is not obvious how the scientific rationality of the Enlightenment can support moral principles any basis for objective moral evaluation is seemingly undermined

Kant’s strategy is to establish a secure basis for moral judgments independent of scientific reason
on the one hand, the Critique of Pure Reason sets to establish the limits of scientific rationality scientific rationality is limited to the phenomenal world, the world as it appears to us
this limitation, in Kant’s view, makes room for faith

I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the source of all that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality. (Critique of Pure Reason)

Kant simply assumes morality as a fact of human existence
in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant seeks to determine the necessary conditions for its possibility
the necessary condition for its possibility is freedom
but causal necessity is an essential feature of the physical world (as perceived by the human mind)

so we come back to the distinction between
the Phenomenal World and the Noumenal World
the world as it appears to us and the world as it is “in-itself”
is the realm Nature and thus not causally determined is a realm of Freedom
which appears to us causally determined
the empirical self is causally determined the intelligible self has free will

The conclusion Kant draws from this is that free or moral action must be something completely purified of any ‘empirical’ motivations—the desires and impulses of particular human individuals (phenomenal selves)

A moral action must be motivated purely by the intention to do what is right not by any particular interest or desire of the individual

Thus, for Kant, who is more morally praiseworthy—the one who does X (helps the needy)
a) out of a sentiment or feeling (wanting to help the needy)
b) out of a sense of duty, a obligation to do what is right

For Kant the individual acts freely and morally only when he or she acts purely in obedience to a universal moral law that is the product of reason alone

how does reason determine what the moral law is?
Through the famous ‘categorical imperative’
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”

in another famous formulation Kant’s categorical imperative is expressed as the injunction never to treat others merely as means but always as ends in themselves we should thus never use other people merely as instruments to our own ends to act morally is to treat others as rational beings and therefore as moral ends

We can see now how the realms of Nature and Freedom are sundered by the first two critiques thus the Critique of Judgment seeks to reunite the worlds of Nature and Freedom

it is Aesthetic experience which mitigates the stark opposition between two seemingly incommensurable dimensions of human life: our bodily existence within the deterministic realm of physical nature our existence as autonomous rational agents obeying universal dictates of practical reason our aesthetic experience delivers an awareness of the meaningfulness or ‘purposiveness’ of nature like the natural inevitability of a work of art such a work seems to be ‘purposive’ but as an “end it itself” has no determinate purpose
we are thus able to feel at home in nature

Critique of Judgment

_Critique of Judgment_: are there a priori conditions for making judgments based on pleasure? Kant takes as his paradigm the type of judgment everyone believes is based on feeling of pleasure—the judgment that something is beautiful

his epistemology and metaphysics based on division between

Sensibility—the passive ability to be affected by things by receiving sensations; this is not yet at the level of thought, or even experience in any meaningful sense

Understanding—the faculty of producing thoughts; it is non-sensible, discursive, works with general concepts, not individual intuitions

Ordinary experience comes about through the synthesis of these two powers
the Understanding takes the material of sensation and organizes it into a concept resulting in a thought or judgment
by ‘judgment’ Kant simply means experience that results in a claim or assertion about something the judgment that something is beautiful he calls a ‘judgment of taste’

THE ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL

an analysis of “what is required in order to call an object beautiful”

_The Four Moments_

is divided into four “Moments” corresponding to heading of the table of judgments in the first _Critique_: quantity, quality, relation, modality

**First Moment (Quality)**

*Disinterested Pleasure*

concludes that in order to call an object beautiful one must judge it to be “the object of an _entirely disinterested_ satisfaction or dissatisfaction” aesthetic pleasure comes only to those who attend to the object disinterestedly

how does Kant reach this conclusion:
begins with the observation that the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment thus not a cognitive judgment
in a cognitive judgment I use a concept to connect my experience to an object
in an aesthetic judgment, I don’t use a concept, but my own subjective state (sentiment) when judging something to be beautiful, one is relating the object (one’s awareness of the object) “back to the subject and to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure” judgments of taste are thus subjective rather than objective
then Kant differentiates pleasure in the beautiful from other pleasures
what is unique about pleasure in the beautiful is that it is
“a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason, here forces our assent”

there are two types of interest:
1) by way of sensations in the agreeable
the pleasure in the beautiful is not in an object’s gratifying our senses: like sweetness of candy

2) by way of concepts in the good
the pleasure in the beautiful is not based on finding some practical use (the mediately good or the useful)
nor based on fulfilling moral requirements (the morally good)
the pleasure in the beautiful is “merely contemplative”
a kind of free contemplation and reflection
this disinterestedness is what is unique about the judgment of taste
for contemplation and reflection are absent in what pleases through sensation
and contemplation and reflection in the practical concerns (the useful or moral) are not free but constrained by definite concepts

The judgment results in pleasure, rather than pleasure resulting in judgment.

This leads Kant to claim that aesthetic judgment must concern itself only with forms
shape, arrangement, rhythm, etc
Kant is thus the founder of all formalism in aesthetics
This claim of the disinterestedness of all aesthetic judgment is strongly challenged by subsequent philosophers of art
by those like Nietzsche and Freud who question the very possibility of disinterested contemplation
by those who see art as a form of cultural production and thus always invested in a political context
by those who see art in terms of some expression theory

SECOND MOMENT (QUANTITY)
Universal Pleasure
concludes that “the beautiful is that which pleases universally without [requiring] a concept”
this conclusion is badly put since it is plainly false: a beautiful thing does not please everyone what he means is better put earlier

“the beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction”
aesthetic judgments thus *behave* universally
they involve an expectation or claim upon the agreement of others
we make the judgment that something is beautiful ‘as if’ beauty where a real property of the object—in this sense the pleasure in the beautiful is not wholly subjective

we think that others should find the object beautiful as well, while fully recognizing that not everyone will in fact agree

“the judgment of taste itself does not *postulate* the agreement of everyone”

we tend to see disagreements over judgment of the beautiful as involving error
an agreement as more than coincidence

Kant calls this feature of judgments of taste their “subjective universality
argues for this in two ways

1) through the concept of disinterestedness
if the pleasure in finding something beautiful does not lie in any interest
then one can conclude that it doesn’t depend on private conditions

“must be regarded as grounded on what he can presuppose in every other person . . .
Consequently the judgment of taste, accompanied with the consciousness of separation from all interest, must claim validity for everyone”

2) to say that something is beautiful is (linguistically) to claim universality for one’s judgment

this universality is distinguished first from the mere subjectivity of judgments like
“I like honey”—this judgment is not universal, nor do we expect it to be

and secondly is distinguished from the strict objectivity of judgments like
“honey contains sugar and is sweet”
here the judgment is based on a concept—the sweetness of sugar

Judgments of taste are not objective but only subjectively universal
they cannot be proved like the judgment that “honey contains sugar and is sweet”

“there can be no rule according to which anyone is to be forced to recognize anything as beautiful”

At this point Kant’s explication of the judgment of taste seems to lead to an insoluble problem:
the judgment of taste is based on feeling of pleasure but also claims universal validity
yet judgments of taste cannot be proved since they do not rest on concepts or rules

the crucial question, which Kant says “is the key to the critique of taste”
How is it that the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is universally communicable?

The answer is that the pleasure is universally communicable only if it is based not on one mere sensation but on a state of mind that is universally communicable since the only universally communicable states of mind are cognitive states somehow the pleasure in the beautiful must be based on cognition but he has already determined that a judgment of taste is not cognitive in that there is no referring to a concept but rather to a feeling thus his answer is that the pleasure underlying the judgment of taste is not based on a particular cognitive state of mind, but only on “cognition in general” judgment of taste is based on the free play of the cognitive faculties imagination: that which gathers together the stuff of our experience into definite images or representations understanding: forms definite concepts from these representations in aesthetic experience the same two faculties operate together however the end result is not a definite concept instead the two faculties interact in free play: the imagination forms a representation of the object but unlike the case of cognition the understanding does not form a definite concept for in aesthetic experience no definite concept could adequately capture what we observe in aesthetic experience the two faculties do not come to a definite conclusion but they work back and forth in a free play between imagination and understanding take the case of the experience of a flower in the case of cognition, the imagination presents to the understanding a representation of the flower the understanding then determines the appropriate concept (e.g., a petunia) completing the process of cognition but in aesthetic experience this process does not come to a completion but works back and forth the understanding still seeks understanding but the imagination is continually reworking its representations thus in aesthetic experience there is more than understanding can grasp the understanding also stimulates the imagination into further reformulations the aesthetic experience thus enhances our experience of the object’s particularity while cognition seeks generically classifiable features
**THIRD MOMENT (RELATION)**

*The Form of Purposiveness*

pursues to explain what is being related to in the judgment that something is beautiful

the content of the judgment of taste

Kant concludes it is the form of the purposiveness or finality of an object, insofar as this is perceived without any representation of a purpose

“purposiveness without purpose”

the straightforward (easier) part of the third moment is that the pleasure in the beautiful is based on the perceived form of the object

Kant argues that a pure judgment of taste cannot be based on pleasures of charm or emotion

nor simply on empirical sensations such as charming colors

nor on a definite concept

but only on formal properties

these formal properties are essentially spatial and temporal relations

manifested in the spatial delineation or design of figures

temporal composition of tones

ornamentation or elements of charm or emotion may attract us to beautiful objects

but in order to make an aesthetic judgment we must abstract from these elements

reflect only on the form

the harder part of the third moment concerns the concept of “purposiveness without purpose”

an object’s purpose is the concept according to which it was manufactured

purposiveness is then the property of appearing to have been manufactured according to some purpose


to say that an object (say a knife) has a purpose is to say that the concept of its being the way it is, having the form it has, came first and is the cause of its existence

the knife’s form makes sense because we know its purpose—its purpose is to cut

the judgment as to whether the knife is a good one is based on utility—does it serve its purpose?


to see something as beautiful, according to Kant, is to see it as purposive

we see an object to be *purposiveness in its form*

but there is no concept by which we can identify a definite purpose

Kant identifies two primary examples of such purposeless purpose—one natural, the other cultural:

the living organism

the work of art
FOURTH MOMENT (MODALITY)

Necessary Pleasure

Kant is trying to show that aesthetic judgments must pass the test of being “necessary” which means “according to principle”

“The beautiful is that which without any concept is cognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction”

when we find something beautiful we think that everyone ought to give their approval and also describe it as beautiful

but this necessity is of a peculiar sort—its necessity is not theoretical and objective as we cannot prove that everyone will find the same object beautiful

nor can it be a practical necessity—there is no moral ground for this necessity

Kant calls the necessity “exemplary”—this means that the judgment does not follow from or produce a determining concept

“conditioned”—here Kant reaches the core of the matter
He is asking: what is it that the necessity of the judgment is grounded upon?

based on a “ground that is common to all”

describes this as “common sense”
this does not mean “common sense” in the familiar sense

here is where we see the connection to the first critique
it is a sense that is common to all of us just as we cannot but see the world as causally conditioned
the causal connection is an a priori principle—one of the “categories” of Understanding

similarly, Kant assumes all of us have this common sense

“A subjective principle which determines what pleases or displeases only by feeling and not by concepts, but yet with universal validity”

it is a common sense that is exemplary—an ideal or norm—but is presupposed by all aesthetic judgment
strictly speaking the “Analytic of the Beautiful” was only supposed to show what is required to call an object beautiful—to give an explanation of what a judgment of taste means.

but Kant also begins to discuss the problem of whether one can ‘provide a deduction’ (show the legitimacy) of a class of judgment “which imputes the same satisfaction necessarily to everyone”

this is what he thinks subsumes the Critique of Judgment under transcendental philosophy.

the key question of philosophical aesthetics: is it legitimate to make a judgment based merely on the pleasure experienced in perceptually apprehending something, while implying that everyone ought to agree?

Kant believes he has established a link to the general problem of transcendental philosophy: how are synthetical a priori judgments possible?”

His answer: claims that the pleasure in the beautiful must be based on “cognition in general,” which is described as the harmony of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding) in free play that is, not determined by concepts because such faculties are required for all theoretical cognition they can be assumed to be present a priori and thus present in the same form and in the same way in all human beings

the key move is to claim that the aesthetic judgment rests upon the same unique conditions as ordinary cognition and thus have the same universal communicability and validity as cognitive judgments

The conclusion of the Deduction: it is legitimate to impute to everyone the pleasure we experience in the beautiful because 1) we are claiming it rests on the subjective element that we rightly presuppose in everyone to be necessary for cognition for otherwise we would not be able to communicate with one another at all 2) we are assuming that our judgment of taste is pure—not affected by charm, emotion, the mere pleasantness of sensation, or even concepts

experiencing beauty is thus a doubly reflective process: 1) we reflect on the spatial and temporal form of the object by exercising our powers of judgment (imagination & understanding) 2) we judge the beauty of an object when we come to be aware through the feeling of pleasure we get of this harmony that is the free play between imagination & understanding which we become aware of by reflecting upon our own mental states.
Kant now turns his attention to fine art
with this Kant marks a great turn in the focus of philosophical aesthetics
before Kant, philosophical aesthetics was largely content to take its primary examples of beauty
(and sublimity) from nature
after Kant the focus shifts to works of art

he assumes the cognition involved in judging fine art is similar to the cognition involved in
judging natural beauty

however, the problem that is new with the case of fine art (as opposed to natural beauty)
is not how it is judged by a viewer
but how it is created

How is fine art possible?

Before examining Kant’s answer to this we need to see how Kant defines “fine art”

as a general term “art” refers to the activity of making according to a preceding notion
If I make a chair I must have a preceding notion of what a chair is
this is different from creation in nature where there is no preceding notion

“art” is also different from science
it is skill distinguished from a type of knowledge
art involves some practical ability
not a mere comprehension of something
knowledge can be taught
though there is some role for training in art
art cannot be taught and depends upon some native talent
Kant will thus claim that there can be no scientific “genius,” because a scientific mind can never
be radically original

furthermore, art is distinguished from labor or craft
craft is a making that is satisfying only for the payoff which results from it
and not satisfying for the mere activity of the making

art, like beauty, is free from any interest

arts are subdivided into mechanical and aesthetic
mechanical arts are distinguished from handicraft
but are still directed toward some definite concept of a purpose

aesthetic arts are those whose end is pleasure itself
aesthetic arts are further subdivided into the agreeable and fine art
the *agreeable* aesthetic arts are those that produce pleasure through sensation alone

the *fine arts* produce pleasure through various types of cognitions

thus we come back to the question:

How is fine art possible?
What goes on in the mind of the artist in creating works of fine art?

the solution comes through two new concepts: the “genius” and “aesthetic ideas”

Kant argues that art can be tasteful (agreeable to aesthetic judgment) and yet be “soulless” in other words, lacking that certain something that would make it more than just an artificial version of a beautiful natural object

what provides soul in fine art?—an aesthetic idea
what is an aesthetic idea?

contrast with a “rational idea”—a concept that can never be adequately exhibited sensibly an aesthetic idea is a set of sensible presentations to which no concept is adequate

it is the talent of genius that generates aesthetic ideas

through genius “Nature gives the rule to art”
“*Genius* is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art”

genius has a talent for producing that for which no rule can be given

genius does not imitate
originality is his essential property

influence of Kant’s theory of genius:
radical separation of the aesthetic genius from the scientific mind (129)

emphasis on the near miraculous expression of the ineffable, excited states of mind (132)

the link of fine art to a ‘metaphysical’ content (133)
the requirement of radical originality (128)
the raising of poetry to the head of all arts

all of these were a commonplace for well over a century after Kant

when modernists protested against the concept of the artist by using ‘automatic writing’ or ‘found objects’ it is, for the most part, this concept of the artist-genius that they are reacting against