Avis Poai
LIS 610 / Wertheimer
Philosophical Paper
The Constitutionality of CIPA
“When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, ‘This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know,’ the end result is tyranny and oppression, no matter how holy the motives.” -Robert A. Heinlein
I. The Internet and its Use in Public Libraries
The Internet is a vast, decentralized, interactive medium that provides easy access to any person who wishes to provide or distribute information to a worldwide audience. There is an estimated total of 7.1 million unique websites, but the total number of Web pages that can be reached in theory is around 2 billion.[1] Moreover, the indexable Web is growing at a rate of approximately 1.5 million pages per day.[2] In terms of its use, at least 400 million people access the Internet worldwide, and approximately 143 million Americans were using the Internet as of September 2001.[3] Of the 143 million Americans using the Internet, approximately 10%, or 14.3 million people, accessed the Internet at a public library.[4] In short, the Internet is a vital tool for public libraries as it vastly expands the amount of information available to patrons of public libraries.
However, “while the beneficial effect of the Internet in expanding the amount of information available to its users is self-evident, its low entry barriers have also led to a perverse result—facilitation of the widespread dissemination of hardcore pornography within the easy reach not only of adults who have every right to access it (so long as it is not legally obscene or child pornography), but also of children[[5]] and adolescents to whom it may be quite harmful.”[6] The viewing of these materials in public libraries have motivated librarians to find ways to protect or prevent patrons, especially children, and staff from:
q accidentally viewing sexually explicit images, or other Web pages containing content deemed harmful, that other patrons are viewing on the Internet;
q unwittingly or accidentally accessing Web pages that they do not wish to see while they are using the Internet;
q intentionally accessing sexually explicit materials or other materials that the library deems inappropriate;
q doing inappropriate or illegal behavior that is thought to stem from viewing Web pages that contain sexually explicit materials or content that is otherwise deemed unacceptable.[7]
Some of the methodology utilized by librarians in addressing these problems have been the institution of an Internet Use Policy, and the implementation of Internet software filters. Prior to Congressional involvement, however, only 7% of libraries nationwide mandated the use of filters.
II. Filters
Very briefly, filtering systems function either by “limiting access to an approved list of sources, blocking designated inappropriate sites, or attempting to block messages containing identifiable, objectionable features.”[8] There are many commercial software filtering packages that exist including: CYBERsitter, Net Nanny, Parental Guidance, WebTrack, N2H2, Cyber Patrol, etc.[9] The general problem with filters is that they “block valuable information because of imperfections in the technology that make certain filters insensitive to the meaning of a particular word in a given context, or because of the inability of filter-producers’ staff to review sites as quickly as they develop.”[10]
Thus, while filters may shield the user from illegal content, it also blocks content that is legal and valuable. Unfortunately for public libraries, they are in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” position regarding Internet filters—they can be sued for filtering or for not filtering.[11] In fact, libraries have already faced suits for their decisions on filtering Internet access. First, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) successfully sued a library in Loudoun County, Virginia, for restricting patrons to filtered access.[12] Meanwhile, a patron in Livermore, California, sued a library for not filtering her son's access.[13] Although the California case was dismissed, the patron’s concerns are clearly indicative of certain anxieties in the community. We see this as public libraries struggle with local community groups forming picket lines outside of the entrance.[14] We also see these societal concerns reflected in the current federal mandates of filtering technology.
III. Three Congressional Acts
The United States Congress, in an effort to protect America’s children and adolescents from obscene and pornographic Web sites, passed a variety of Acts—each of which have been scrutinized by the United States Supreme Court.
First, in 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that prohibited Internet users from viewing or transmitting pictures, videos or messages that were offensive or pornographic to anyone under the age of 18.[15] A year later in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that CDA violated the First Amendment.
Shortly thereafter in 1998, Congress enacted the Children Online Protection Act (COPA) which limited the scope of CDA, making it illegal for commercial web sites to transmit material deemed harmful to minors.[16] In May 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002), that while COPA was not facially unconstitutional, Congress did not have the power to enforce it.
Most recently Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, which required school and public libraries to use anti-pornography filtering software as a condition for the libraries to receive government funding and discounts for computer technology.[17] In short, CIPA requires that certain libraries have appropriate filtering systems in place to prevent children from accessing three types of content: online materials that are obscene,[18] visual depictions of child pornography,[19] and online materials that are harmful to minors.[20] CIPA was thereafter challenged by a group of public libraries, library associations, library patrons and Web site publishers.[21]
The Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania held CIPA to be unconstitutional.[22] The Defendant timely appealed to the United States Supreme Court.[23]
The questions presented by the Plaintiffs were: 1) Whether CIPA induces public libraries to violate the First Amendment; 2) Whether CIPA imposes unconstitutional conditions on funding to public libraries in violation.[24] In a 6-3 split decision, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s findings and upheld the constitutionality of the text of CIPA.[25] The Court acknowledged, however, that the application of CIPA in libraries is open for constitutional challenge. Justice Kennedy commented in his concurring opinion that if some libraries cannot unblock protected Internet material, or if it is shown that a user’s election to view constitutionally protected Internet material is burdened in a substantial way, CIPA could be challenged for its unconstitutional application in libraries.[26]
Congress’ purpose for passing CDA, COPA, and CIPA was to protect children from harmful materials. Protecting children comports with Congress’ power for providing for the “general welfare.”[27] However, it is important to note that while Congress is empowered to pass laws like CIPA, the First Amendment explicitly states that: “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” Hence, Congress can pass laws that protect children from harmful materials, so long as it does not abridge the right to freedom of speech.
IV. Arguments
A. Con-CIPA: Use the Filters You Were Born With:
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that the right to receive information and knowledge is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press because “the dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”[28] In application, filtering software blocks patrons’ opportunity to receive information and exchange ideas via the Internet.[29] It could thus be argued that there is a right of a library user to receive information via the Internet and mandatory use of filtering software violates free speech pursuant to the First Amendment.
The other problem is that CIPA is overbroad in its application. A statute is overbroad if it bans speech which could constitutionally be forbidden but also bans speech which is protected by the First Amendment. The general rule articulated by the Supreme Court is that “the Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.”[30] This rule reflects the judgment that “[t]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted.”[31] Hence, the problem we would encounter is the constitutional application of CIPA—filters wrongly block protected speech while at the same time do not catch every single website that should be blocked. A library in compliance with CIPA would bar patrons from accessing thousands of sites offering fully constitutionally protected content while at the same time still not accomplishing the main goal of Congress: the protection of children from viewing obscene and pornographic websites.
B. Pro-CIPA: Filters Are Like Librarians’ Collection Development Policies
Interestingly, the Supreme Court focused on reconciling the result in ALA by comparing filters to the deference given to library book selection policies.[32] That is, when libraries block Internet pornography from their computer terminals, they are simply declining to put onto their computer screens the same content they have traditionally excluded from their bookshelves—indeed, librarians are simply exercising their discretion as to the content that their libraries will contain, and how their library resources will be used. Essentially, librarians make choices regarding library materials—internet filters do the same thing.
V. My Professional Philosophy
I personally have a problem with the Supreme Court’s rationale quite simply because it is illogical to compare filters with a librarian’s selection for books and other materials. First, it implies that librarians are not capable of affirmatively making a choice to include or exclude appropriate material. The filters apparently act as proxies for the librarians and that is enough.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not seem to grasp the changing role of libraries. The old model described librarians as “information gatekeepers.”[33] In contrast, libraries are viewed today as providing access to information—indeed, the Library Bill of Rights explicitly affirms this policy. Admittedly, libraries cannot provide universal coverage—it is “[t]he librarian’s responsibility…to separate the gold from the garbage, not to preserve everything.”[34] And it is true that society needs librarians to make certain inevitable content-based judgments. However, the Court took this a step farther and compared the editorial discretion of a Library to that of public television stations.[35] Let’s say that a public television station refused to air a debate on homosexual marriage or abortion because it felt that the programs were too controversial. This is considered constitutional, and viewers would probably accept the decision.[36] But, if a public library refused to acquire books on these topics—the result would be inconsistent with the role that libraries are expected to play. While it may be permissible to fail to stock books on these topics based on limited resources, it probably would not be okay for a library to make an absolute value judgment and refuse to put anything like that on the shelves. That is, the key difference is that it is valid for librarians to make choices about the relative values of different materials but it is not okay to make absolute judgments since such judgments deny access to some information without also providing access to other information.[37]
In short, I feel that Internet filters are an ineffective way of protecting children and adults from the trappings of the Internet. Furthermore, I feel that filters, because they censor constitutionally protected materials, are generally inappropriate in a public library setting—especially if the largest group of clientele includes adults. My largest complaint is that after the ALA case, it still leaves libraries open to attack. I know that some libraries have opted to forgo federal funding—I probably would as well.
[1] American Library Association v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
[2] Id.
[3] National Telecomm.& Info. Admin. A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet (February 2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntia-home/dn/.
[4] John C. Bertot & Charles R. McClure, Public Libraries and the Internet 2000: Summary Findings and Data Tables, Report to National Commission on Libraries and Information Science at 3
[5] In 1998, seventeen million children ages 2 to 18 were online; a number that is expected to grow to more than forty-two million by 2003. See Daniel Okrent, “Raising Kids Online”, Time, May 10, 1999, at 41. Use of Internet filtering software in schools grew fifty percent from 1998 to 1999, according to Quality Education Data, which found that filtering is most prevalent in the South (67.7% of schools), followed by the West (62.5%), the Northeast (58.3%), and the Midwest (44.8%). See “Survey Finds Growing Use of School Internet Filters”, Comm. Daily, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1
[6] ALA, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06. The percentage of sexually explicit Web pages is relatively small: 1-2%. However, the total number of Web sites offering free sexually explicit material is extremely large, approximately 100,000 sites.
[7] ALA, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06.
[8] Whitney Kaiser, The Use of Internet Filters in Public Schools: Double Click on the Constitution, 34 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 49 (2000).
[9] Fifty companies currently provide filtering software and the market for such software is projected to be worth over $600 million a year in 2004 with an annual increase of nearly 50%. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Children’s Internet Protection Act: Study of Technology Protection Measures in Section 1703, last accessed on December 1, 2004, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ntiageneral/cipa2003/CIPAreport_08142003.htm.
[10] Mark Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Libraries Exclude?, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1117 (2000).
[11] Richard J. Peltz. Use the Filter You Were Born With: The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries. 77 Wash. L. Rev. 397, 399 (2002).
[12] Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998)
[13] Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Cal. App. 1 Div. 2001).
[14] E.g., Wayne Risher, Library To Block Porn on Computers Open to Public, [Memphis] Com. Appeal, Sept. 24, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WL 22126601. This report indicated that “300 placard-waving citizens rallied against pornography outside the Main Library,” prompting the Memphis library board to mandate filtering unanimously.
[15] See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1996).
[16] See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31 (Supp. II 2001).
[17] See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Div. B. Tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-336, §1703; See also Neighborhood Children’s Internet Protection Act (NCIPA), H.R. 4577, amend. No. 3635, 106th Congress. CIPA thus applies to schools and libraries funded under: 1) the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965; 2) the Museum and Library Services Act of 1996 (MLSA), namely its included Library Services and Technology Act of 1996 (LSTA); 3) Universal service discounts, or e-rate funds under the Communications Act of 1934, and as subsequently amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It should also be observed that because public libraries are usually funded and controlled by state and local governments, they are state actors. This means that public libraries are subject to the United States Constitution pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—as opposed to purely private actors, who are not bound to act constitutionally. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
[18] Essentially, obscenity is expression that is not protected by the First Amendment—so the states can ban it, punish it, or do whatever they want without worrying about the First Amendment. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). I believe that Justice Stewart defined it best by stating, “I know it when I see it.” However, the general standard is as follows: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
[19] Child pornography is a category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Federal law explicitly bans child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 defines “child pornography” as “any visual depiction” of a minor under 18 years old engaging in “sexually explicit conduct.”
[20] States may prohibit access by minors to material deemed “harmful to minors.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). “Harmful to minors” is defined by CIPA as “any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that: “(1) Taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex or excretion. (2) Depicts, describes, or represents in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (3) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors.” Notably, for adults, the only kinds of visual depictions that must be blocked or filtered for adults are child pornography, and obscene visual depictions.
[21] ALA, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 414; See also Richard J. Peltz. Use the Filter You Were Born With: The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries. 77 Wash. L. Rev. 397 (2002). One particular library patron challenging CIPA is Emmalyn Rood. ALA, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 415. In 1999, when Rood was 13, she went to her public library in Multnomah County, Oregon to access web sites about gay and lesbian issues. Emma was struggling with her identity so she decided to conduct her search at the library so she could remain anonymous. Id. She had once attempted to search for information on lesbian teens at a public library terminal where the blocking software had already been activated and found that the site was blocked. Id. Using the unblocked terminals at the library, Emma visited Planetout.com and communicated via chat rooms with other gay teens as well as adults who gave her reassurance and advice about coming out to her family and friends. Id. Not long afterward, Emma came out to her family, who were loving and supportive. Id. Emma claims that if internet filters were mandatory at the time, she would have been hesitant to ask a librarian for assistance. Id.
[22] Id. at 496.
[23] See United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2002) (hereinafter, “ALA”)
[24] In brief, how is Congress enabled to pass laws that seem so attenuated from their purview of power? For example, where in the Constitution does it state that Congress has the power to pass laws regarding the imposition of Internet software filters? First, according to the United States Supreme Court decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and has repeatedly employed their “spending power” to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal directives. Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s (section in the Constitution dealing with Congress) enumerated legislative fields may nevertheless be attained through the use of Congress’ spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds. Congress’ spending power is explicated in Article 1 § 8(1), Congress has the power to “pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.” In addition, pursuant to Article 1 § 8(18), Congress has the power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers…”
[25] Id. at 214.
[26] Id. at 215.
[27] See supra note 24.
[28] First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
[29] R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 755 (1999).
[30] Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
[31] Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
[32] See ALA, 539 U.S. at 203-204.
[33] When I did my paper on the Honolulu Library and Reading Room Association, I learned all about the role of good Christian librarian.
[34] ALA, 539 U.S. at 204 (citing W. Katz, Collection Development: The Selection of Materials for Libraries 6 (1980)).
[35] Id.
[36] See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998).
[37] See Felix Wu, United States v. American Library Ass’n: The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles, 19 Berkeley Tech L.J. 555, 576 (2004).