David and Godzilla:[1] Anti-Semitism and Seppuku in Japanese Publishing
By Tom Brislin,
Ph.D.
University of
Hawaii
tbrislin@hawaii.edu
Introduction
Two months
before the March 20, 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on Tokyo's subways using
Nazi-developed sarin poison gas, a leading Japanese news magazine published a
story "There Were No Nazi Gas Chambers!" in World War II. Ironically,
large ads for the Holocaust-denial article hung in hundreds of subway cars
throughout Tokyo's myriad mass transit system. The magazine, Marco Polo, was on
sale at numerous newsstands in the cavernous Kasumigaseki station, the gassing
target where three major subway lines meet and thousands of officials and
workers disembark beneath the metropolitan government complex.
Anti-Semitic
books and articles are not uncommon in Japan. Most tend to favor conspiracy
theories of international Jewish control of political and economic forces, and
attempts to subdue the Japanese economy. Most, like the Marco Polo article, are
one-sided, riddled with historic inaccuracies, and lack any semblance of
substantiation. They are met with official protests from the Israeli Embassy,
and occasionally the U.S. Embassy, who traditionally ask for a public,
published apology and a subsequent corrective article that cites historic
record. The "No Gas Chambers" article also brought a strong protest
from the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, who called for an advertiser
boycott.
The response
by the Marco Polo parent company, publishing giant Bungei Shunju, was as
surprising as it was swift: In abject apology, Marco Polo would cease
publication. The magazine would be completely disbanded. All unsold issues
would be recalled. Its editor would be transferred to a non-publishing research
section, and its staff dispersed to other Bungei publications. The top
officials at Bungei Shunju would take hefty salary cuts as personal penance.
One would resign. Officials, editors and staff would attend a series of
seminars conducted by the Wiesenthal Center to atone and correct their
misconceptions on Jewish history.
The
termination of the 250,000 circulation Marco Polo was an unprecedented
response, stunning both its admirers and critics. But was the killing of the
magazine a symbolic seppuku -- ritual suicide as the ultimate apology -- on
the part of Bungei Shunju, or was it more of a case of cosmetic surgery -- to
rid the publishing house of what had become an increasingly irritating,
unsightly, and unprofitable, lesion on its otherwise respectable product and
record?
The Marco
Polo incident offers a case study in contradictions, conflicts and paradoxes in
intercultural communication. Japanese publications seem to simultaneously
delight in and decry Jews, based on a construction of deep-seated conspiracy
theories and shallow stereotypes. The structure and value systems of the
Japanese press produce extremely uniform and conservative mainstream
newspapers, and wildly sensational ³news² magazines, neither comfortable with
any attempt to impose a Western framework of ³objectivity.² Japanese systems of
internalized management decision-making and conflict resolution are traumatized
in the face of a Western style of confrontational politics, such as the
advertising boycott that forced the Marco Polo case into the harsh glare of
international publicity. The extreme action of killing off of a magazine left a
lingering question: Did it communicate the need for more tolerance, diversity
and education in Japanese publications, or did it send the offending messages
of conspiracism underground, to replenish and sprout anew?
This study
was conducted primarily in Tokyo, Japan, at two intervals: three months after
the demise of Marco Polo, and three years later. Japanese and American
journalists, and embassy officials from the United States and Israel were
interviewed, as were leaders of the Jewish Community Center. Additional
interviews were conducted with, and materials gathered from, the Los
Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Center. News stories about the Marco Polo
controversy were analyzed from the English-language editions of four Japanese
newspapers as well as from reports filed by the Tokyo bureaus of four major
American newspapers, one wire service, and the international edition of one
news magazine. A search for subsequent news stories in the three years
following the controversy was done through the databases for newspapers of the
Foreign Press Center, and for magazines of the Ooya Sooichi Library, in Tokyo.
Background information on the Bungei Shunju publishing company and its nine
magazines, including Marco Polo, was obtained from Japanese magazine and
advertising sources, and from the Foreign Press Center. The "No Gas
Chambers" article in Marco Polo was analyzed for content, as was
advertising in one of Japan's leading national dailies, and a leading weekly
magazine, for an anti-Semitic book. Background was gathered and analyses made
of Japanese perceptions of Jews from several Japanese and U.S. published books
and articles, and from interviews with Japanese, U.S. and Israeli officials.
Anti-Semitism in
Japan
With only
about 2,000 Jews living in Japan, the Japanese have little first-hand
experience in relating to Jewish people and culture. There have been, however,
numerous books and magazine articles published in Japan about the Japanese and
the Jews, or Nihonjin and Yudayajin. These writings have
increasingly, within the last decade, adopted anti-Semitic themes that blame
shadowy international Jewish cartels and conspiracies with Japan's current
economic problems. Whole sections of bookstores, since the mid-1980s, have been
given over to books about Yudayajin with such titles as: The Jewish Plot to
Control the World, The Expert Way of Reading the Jewish Protocols,
and The Secret of Jewish Power
That Moves the World.
The
anti-Semitic tone of such books, educators, authors and officials believe, is
borne not so much out of hatred as out of ignorance and economic uncertainty.
Goldstein credits it "not (to) race or religion, but economics"
(1989, 22). A Japanese professor of Jewish history says "The Japanese
don't know anything about the Jews. That's why they imagine things"
(Sakamaki, 1995, 17). David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, in Jews in the
Japanese Mind, write
"Various attempts have been made to account for the intensity of Japanese
interest in Jews, and particularly to explain the persistent chimerical belief
in a global Jewish conspiracy bent on destroying Japan" (1995, 11). Arie
Dan, First Secretary for Press and Information of the Israeli Embassy in Tokyo
notes that "Japanese high school students do not study World War II. They
have no sense of their, or anyone else's history" (1995).
Still, the
pervasiveness of the "Jewish
Conspiracy" sentiment is alarming, called by an American journalist
"a persistent theme in Japanese intellectual life that has taken on a new
virulence since the Persian Gulf War" and by a Japanese journalist
"not a fad but a dangerous phenomenon that needs to be stopped.
"(Goozner, 1989, 22) . Two books by Masami Uno, the leading anti-Semite
author, have sold more than 1 million copies, If You Understand the Jews, You Will Understand the World,
and If You Understand the Jews You Will Understand Japan. Arie Dan
points out that millions more Japanese are familiar with Uno's claims against
the Jews because they are highlighted in lengthy advertisements for the books
carried -- uncritically, Dan complains -- by Japan's leading newspapers.
"They see the headlines in bold type: statements that the Jews are
responsible for Japan's economic crisis. That's all they see, that's all they
know, that's what they come to believe." Dan recounted his own two years of graduate study in
Business Administration at Tokyo's prestigious Keio University: "In my
classes, my own professors, learned men, would espouse international Jewish
conspiracy theories to control the Japanese Economy" (1995).
Yoshito
Takigawa, a former journalist and chief information officer for the Embassy of
Israel adds his dismay that the newspaper advertisements for Uno's and other
conspiracy theory books also boost their sales "from under a total of
5,000 to 30,000 or more a
month," giving them an aura of credibility as best-sellers. Because of the
increased sales following the advertisements, "the newspaper itself starts
quoting the book's thesis as valid economic theory. The Yomiuri (Japan's
largest newspaper: 10 million daily circulation) did that," Takigawa said,
a concern echoed by Goodman and Miyazawa, who also noted that Uno's theories
were given credibility through inclusion in Bank of Japan discussions and that
Uno himself was subsequently invited to a lecture series by the then-ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (1995).
The Nihon
Keizai (Nikkei) Shimbun, Japan's counterpart to the Wall Street Journal,
and Bungei Shunju¹s own Shukan Bunshun, a popular general interest
weekly, carried advertisements in 1993 for Get Japan, The Last Enemy: The
Jewish Protocols for World Domination, described by Goodman and Miyazawa:
Emblazoned with Jewish stars and an image
of Satan, the ad claimed that 'Jewish cartels surrounding the Rothschilds
control Europe, America, and Russia and have now set out to conquer Japan!' It
outlined the Jewish scenario to destroy the Japanese economy, blaming the Jews
for everything from the cut in Japanese interest rates in 1987 to the Gulf War
and predicting the 'reoccupation' of Japan by Jews by the end of the decade
(1995, 245).
The
anti-Semitic success phenomenon is not restricted to relatively unknown authors
boosted to fame through media advertisement and coverage. The Secret of Jewish Power to
Control the World was written by Eisaburo Saito, a member of the Upper
House of the Japanese Diet. A book by Yoshio Ogai, an influential official of
Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, prescribes Hitler as a role model for winning
office in Hitler Election Strategy: A Bible for Certain Victory in Modern
Elections.
Even Shoko
Asahara, leader of the doomsday Aum Shinrikyo cult responsible for the 1995
subway gassing, published a book Manual of Fear that attacked Jews as
the ³world shadow government² (Pipes, 1997, 180) that controlled the Emperor,
President Clinton, and Madonna (Kaplan & Marshall, 1996, 219-220).
Daniel Pipes
(1997) sets three basic elements of a conspiracy theory:
·
A
powerful, evil and clandestine group that aspires to global hegemony;
·
Dupes
and agents who extend the group¹s influence around the world so that it is on
the verge of succeeding; and
·
A
valiant but embattled group that urgently needs help to stave off the
catastrophe (22).
Pipes states
conspiracism the basaltic belief in conspiracy theories ³tends to come
disproportionately from two broad groups of people: the politically disaffected
and the culturally suspicious (2) . . . Benign and malign views of Jewish power
have co-existed in Japan for nearly a century, leading to confusion so intense
it has a near-comic quality² (190).
The conspiracy
theories have their roots in a belief of a powerful Jewish cartel with immense
economic and geopolitical control. Uno, for instance, claims that the U.S.
Reagan and Bush administrations were merely puppet governments responding to
the strings pulled by the Jewish shadow regime. That brings a handy
anti-American overtone to the theories as well. Jewish interests, he claims,
control IBM, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Standard Oil, Exxon and AT&T.
"Jewish" mass media in the United States manipulated public opinion
to get Bill Clinton elected president so that he could carry out cabal
instructions to enact economic policies to ruin Japan. Anyone viewed as working
against contemporary or historic Japanese interests, in Uno's books, is
declared a Jew, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Rockefellers and the
Morgans, Vladimir Lenin, and, inexplicably, former Saudi Arabian Oil Minister
Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani (Goodman & Miyazawa, 1995). William Morgan, U.S.
Embassy press attaché, feels the Japanese have been historically fond of or
"susceptible to conspiracy theories," citing the historic ABCD theory
(attempts at containment by the Americans, British, Chinese and Dutch) as
justification for attacks on China and expansionism in Asia in the 1930s.
(1995).
Uno and
other anti-Semitic theorists speculate the conspiracy to destroy Japan is
rooted in a hatred by Jews for Japan's joining the Axis Powers in World War II
and its adherence to all OPEC conditions of trade embargoes with Israel during
the oil crises of the 1970s. Ironically, one historic precedent for the
theories of Jewish economic and geo-political influence comes from the
financing and fundraising by American Banker Jacob Schiff for Japan's 1904-05
war with Russia. Inherent in many books and magazine articles is a begrudging
respect for what is perceived as Jewish economic prowess, an image the Japanese
like to picture in themselves. This is reflected in such works as Make Money
With Stocks the Jews Aim At, and in the boastful descriptions by leading
executives such as Den Fujita, president of McDonald's Japan, who calls himself
the "Ginza Jew."
Not all the published works in the
"Jewish Corners" of Japanese bookstores deal with conspiracy theories
or anti-Semitic themes. Some represent what Goodman and Miyazawa call
"philosemitism." Ann
Frank: Diary of A Young Girl is one of the major best-sellers in Japan, as
is The Japanese and the Jews, an adulatory work by Shichihei Yamamoto,
writing as Isaiah Ben-Dasan. There is also a national fascination with links
between Japanese and Jews that is reflected in popular Yudayajin books and magazine
articles through three major themes:
* Lost
Tribe:
Some authors have speculated on an anthropological link between Jews and
Japanese under the theory that the Japanese are descendants of the seventh, or
"lost tribe" of Israel that migrated eastward across Asia, through
China and into Japan. One author draws support from the similarities between
the Kagome family crest (symbolizing basket weaving) and the six-pointed Star
of David (Ben-Dasan, 1971). Some speculate the indigenous Ainu, eventually
driven to the northern island of Hokkaido, are the descendants of the Lost
Tribe. One theory holds that
Christ himself was buried in Japan following his flight from the Holy Land
after his brother James was crucified in his place.
*
Japanese Schindler:
Although Japan sided militarily with Nazi Germany in World War II, it did not
accept the Third Reich's policy of persecution -- and extermination -- of
Jews. A Japanese counterpart to
Oskar Schindler, who saved the lives of thousands of Jews, arose in the form of
Chiune Sempo Sugihara, Japan's consul in Lithuania, who saved as many as 8,000
Jews by issuing them exit visas, allowing them to emigrate to Japan. Although
Sugihara was acting against national policy, the Jews who used Japan as a
wartime waystation were not isolated or persecuted by the government. Nearly
all left Japan by war's end.
* Fugu
Plan: Although
the Japanese held no racial animosity toward the Jews in World War II, the
government saw some potential for its own empire building while helping Nazi
allies remove Jews from Europe. The Japanese had seized the vast province of
Manchuria from China and renamed it Manchukuo. But the government had few
citizens to spare, or who were interested, in settling in the Chinese mainland
and converting it into a Japanese economic stronghold. The Fugu Plan was
designed to resettle 50,000 persecuted European Jews in Manchukuo, who would
also act as a buffer against the neighboring Soviet Union. It never got off the
ground, but is often cited as an example of a legacy of wartime compassion
(Kranzler, 1996, 562-3).
The Japanese
character is often described in terms of contrasts and paradoxes. "Anti" and
"philo" Semitic sentiments can be held, and published,
simultaneously. The same publishing house released Ann Frank, a major
"Lost Tribe" treatise, carried advertisements for Zionist Conspiracy
books, published an empathetic article on Auschwitz, and the "No Nazi Gas
Chambers" debacle: Bungei Shunju.
The Bungei Empire
and Rise of Marco Polo
Bungei
Shunju is a powerhouse of a publisher in Japan, comparable to Time-Life in the
United States. It published nine magazines up to the elimination of Marco Polo.
Its flagship magazine is the self-titled Bungei Shunju, a monthly with 550,000
circulation, described by the Japan Magazine Advertising Association as
"the most prestigious general interest magazine in Japan, reflecting the
opinions of the intellectual elite of the country" aimed at "readers
in their 40s and 50s with annual incomes of $90,000 . . ..² (1993, 24).
Bungei also publishes some of the oldest
and most established magazines in Japan, including All Yomimono (92,000
circulation), featuring light fiction, and Bunga Kukai (50,000 circulation),
serious Japanese and international fiction. Both were started in the 1930s.
Bunga Kukai is regarded as one of the most respected magazines in Japan.
The
publishing house also produces popular journals of analysis and commentary. The
Shokun! (145,000 circulation), a "national forum for national debate and
summary of ideas,² and Shukan Bunshun (704,000 circulation), featuring
"social, political, economic, sports and health issues; feature articles
and opinions by world renowned novelists; and critical essayists" (1993,
28).
Bungei has
engaged in successful niche publishing for specialty topics and audiences,
including a Sports Illustrated-modeled Sports Graphic Number (280,000
circulation), Crea (250,000 circulation), a woman's magazine, and No Side
(80,000 circulation), for "sophisticated and wealthy readers over 45 . . .
with quality articles (that) help readers lead more comfortable and healthy
lives" (1993, 26).
In 1992
Bungei began publishing Marco Polo, aimed at the market its other magazines
were missing: young adults in their 20s and 30s. This lucrative market was
weaned on manga,
or comic magazines and graphic novels, which they continue to read into
adulthood. To reach them, Bungei designed its new magazine to present stories
visually, with plenty of photos, illustrations and graphic type. It described
its content as: "Articles (that) deal with lifestyle, love, fashion, car,
entertainment, domestic and international politics and the economy. Practical,
informative, yet enjoyable stories to fill the need of reading pleasure"
(Japanese Magazine Advertising Association, 1993, 26). Several Japanese and
American journalists in Tokyo likened Marco Polo to People magazine in the
United States. The name Marco Polo was selected to emphasize a sense of
discovery and internationalism. Ironically, Marco Polo ran an article during
its first year of publication about Auschwitz, ³from the eyes of a young Jew
who visited there² (Schreiber, 1998).
The book and
magazine market in Japan is huge. The Foreign Press Center reports in Japan's
Mass Media (1994) that magazines sell 3.7 billion copies a year. Most are
sold in retail bookstores, so rely on intensive advertising campaigns to
support single-copy sales. Subway and rail cars are prime advertising space,
with 10-12 placards per car hanging from the ceilings, as well as dozens more
framed on the upper walls.
Marco Polo
began as a semi-monthly, but its younger audience was not as easily drawn or
loyal as the publisher hoped. It quickly changed to a monthly, with a
respectable 500,000 circulation. But by the time of its demise, its circulation
dropped by half, it had undergone several design changes, and relied more
heavily on sensational and attention-grabbing stories that could be boldly
proclaimed in subway placard ads. The ones appearing January 20, 1955 to
promote the February issue proclaimed: "The Greatest Taboo of Postwar
History: There Were No Nazi 'Gas Chambers.'"
"No Gas
Chambers"
Masanori
Nishioka is a physician and amateur historian. He had been unsuccessful in
finding a home for his freelance holocaust-denial treatise until he received an
acceptance from Marco Polo editor Kazuyoshi Hanada.
The article
appeared in the February 1995 issue of Marco Polo. An editor's note introduced
the article:
On January 27, the
Auschwitz concentration camp will observe the 50th anniversary of its
'liberation.' However, here the greatest taboo of postwar history is being kept
a secret . . .. There can be no mistake that jews died tragically. However,
there is scant evidence that they were systematically killed in gas chambers.
After the war's end, it was proved that no gas chambers existed in any of the
concentration camps situated in the West . . .. Actually, these type of
suspicions have been subjected to the scrutiny of journalism in Europe and the
U.S. . . . Why is it that only Japan's mass media that does not write anything
on this subject? Here is the new historic truth that a young doctor has taken
it upon himself to investigate as an individual (1995).
The title
pages were illustrated by the headline overlaid on a graphic photo of a pile of
concentration camp corpses in striped uniforms, with eyes and mouths open,
transfixed in death. Other photo illustrations included stacked canisters of
Zyklon-B (hydrogen-cyanide) gas, and the brick crematorium ovens and
smokestacks.
Nishioka
claimed these images, as shocking as they are, are misleading. Although Jews
were imprisoned by the Nazis in World War II, he contended, they were not
summarily destroyed in gas chambers. The gas chamber taboo, or myth, he claims,
was started by the Polish communist government to legitimize itself by heaping
more hate on the Nazis.
Yes,
Nishioka admits, many Jews died in the camps. But their deaths were the result
of septic diseases such as typhus, resulting from their cramped and unsanitary
conditions. And yes, according to Nishioka, such casualties of disease were
cremated in the ovens.
But the idea
of gas chambers just doesn't make sense, according to Nishioka. The cyanide gas
was there because it was used, in low strengths, for delousing. The tales of
high-strength gas pouring from showerheads or ceiling spigots defies Nishioka's
scientific sense: Such gas is lighter than air, he claims. It would not fall
and settle efficiently on the prisoners for mass killing. And besides, Nishioka
triumphs, the gas is highly flammable. The "shower rooms" are
pictured next to the crematoriums: If gas were dispensed there, it would ignite
and explode, destroying the buildings.
Some
excerpts from Nishioka's article:
A gas chamber in
Auschwitz has no structural features needed for gassing people to death . . ..
The Holocaust was a fabricated story. The gas chambers and so on at Auschwitz
and the other concentration camps didn't exit. The 'gas chambers' currently
open to the public at the remains of the Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland
were built either by the postwar Polish Communist government, or else by its
patron, the Soviet Union. Neither at Auschwitz nor anywhere else in territory
occupied by Germany during World War II, did even one 'mass extermination of
Jews' occur in 'gas chambers.'
I have absolutely no
intention of defending wartime German policy toward Jews. Although the mass
extermination of Jews in concentration camps never took place, it is a clear
historical fact that innocent Jews were made to suffer by Germany . . .. (But)
forget Schindler's List -- a movie is not history.
The story of gas chambers was propaganda,
one of the psychological strategies used in wartime . . .. The Holocaust is
nothing but a story which has become 'history' after the war without being
given investigation (1995).
Despite his
attack on "manufactured history" and his analysis of the layout,
structure and administration of Auschwitz and Dachau, Nishioka admitted he
never visited any of the concentration camps, Poland, Germany or any European
country. He never talked to a camp survivor, guard, or liberator. Most of his
research was drawn from well-known Holocaust denier Arthur Butz' The Hoax of
the Twentieth Century and similar writings by Thies Christophersen, author
of The Auschwitz Lie. (Lipstadt 1993; Hoffman 1995; Takahama
1995;). He never did original
research or "investigation."
The Response and
Protests
The "No
Nazi Gas Chambers" article in Marco Polo was published 50 years to the
month marking the liberation of Auschwitz. Ironically, the camp complex at
Dachau was liberated by the nisei Japanese-American forces of the 522nd Field
Artillery Battalion, a unit of the famous 442nd "Go For Broke"
Regimental Combat Team, who had made a recent celebrated visit to Japan to
"talk story" about their experiences (Chang, 1991; Dan 1995).
On the day of publication (January 20 in
Japan, January 19 in the United States), Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, protested to Takakazu Kuriyama,
Japanese ambassador to the United States and asked the Japanese government to
publicly condemn the article:
It is almost beyond
belief that the magazine Marco Polo would present to the Japanese public a
ten-page essay which seeks to deny the murderous gassings of Jews at the
Auschwitz death camp . . .. Under the guise of a serious investigation, the
author has simply repeated outrageous fabrications of Holocaust deniers to
create his 'new historic truth.
Mr. Ambassador, this
article is more than a cruel joke. It is a monstrous attack on history and the
innocent victims of Nazism that slanders an entire people. It was timed to
appear at the very moment that world leaders gather at Auschwitz . . . to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the liberation of that death factory and
the innocents who were systematically murdered there.
For the survivors of the
Holocaust, the Marco Polo article is akin to a public denial of the dropping of
the A-bomb on Hiroshima and the death and suffering which is wrought on the
Japanese people.
. . . We
hope that the government of Japan will publicly condemn through the appropriate
Japanese governmental agency, the views expressed by these hate mongers (1995a).
Israeli
Embassy First Secretary Arie Dan filed an oral protest on January 20 with the
Japan Foreign Ministry. Dan said he was particularly upset with this article
because "Marco Polo was the mainstream press. Usually such articles are a
marginal phenomenon, limited to the fringe press. Not this time." Dan was
also shocked by the sensational ads for the February issue and the "No Gas
Chambers" story hung throughout the subway and rail systems.
"Millions saw it -- statements that 'There were no gas chambers. Jews are
lying.' Dan was also aware of the target audience of Marco Polo, the affluent,
but historically naive young adult. "This would be the only source of
their knowledge about the Holocaust," he complained. He visited the Marco Polo offices on January
20 and demanded a retraction, but was rebuffed. After meeting with deputy
editor Seigo Kimata, Dan said, "The man did not react. He did not
apologize." Dan said he went
to the magazine expecting the usual response -- "an apology and a
subsequent article laying out historical facts. In the past, editors have said
'Oh, we're only printing the author's view. We didn't know the other side.
Please write your own article and we'll print it in the next issue.'"
(1995)
Former
journalist and Israeli Embassy spokesman Takigawa said Marco Polo Editor
"Hanada acted as if this was breaking news -- the first time such facts
had been revealed. He wouldn't back down. That was very unusual" (1995).
Hanada went a step further and publicly defended the article, telling the
Associated Press "It's not
good for everything about a certain subject to be taboo. Maybe Israelis and
Japanese have different ways of thinking about that"
(1995).
The Japanese
Foreign Ministry responded to the Israeli Embassy protest by calling the
article "extremely improper." Kunihiko Saito, vice foreign minister,
said, "The government thinks that the content gravely lacks consideration
and is extremely improper." The Japanese Embassy in the United States
responded to the Simon Wiesenthal Center protest by saying "We strongly
oppose any form of discrimination whatsoever." (Holocaust Denial 1995).
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Terusuke Terada said it is "very important to
help deepen in Japan an accurate understanding of the tragic history of the
Holocaust of Jews in Europe. We trust that the Japanese people will exercise a
sound judgment, based on historical perspectives, of whatever they read"
(Associated Press 1995).
Rabbi Cooper
of the Wiesenthal Center said:
We never contacted Marco Polo. That was
my call. The editors of the magazine wrote a lead-in to the article that was an
endorsement, saying 'Finally the last taboo has been broken.' So we decided
there was nothing to say to them. We'd been through the whole cycle before:
outrage, apology, new outrage, new apology, like with the anti-Semitic book ads
in the Nikkei.
We found out about the article right
after the Kobe earthquake. Because of that, I felt on a moral level, because so
many people were trying to find out about their families and loved ones, it was
inappropriate for us to badger the Japanese Embassy and Consulate here. So I
sent one letter. But I wanted to find a way to get out of the outrage-apology
cycle (1995c).
So Cooper
turned up the heat by asking several international corporations, whose
advertisements appeared in the February Marco Polo issue, to boycott the
magazine. The request to ³ . . . immediately decide to stop all future
advertising in Marco Polo, a publication which sadly has chosen the path of
hate mongering" (1995b) went to Microsoft, Philip Morris, Philips
Electronics, Cartier, Mitsubishi and Volkswagen. The latter three pulled their
ads over a period of January 23-30, adding to the pressure on Bungei.
Volkswagen Chairman Ferdinand Piech responded:
³ . . . I am
also appalled and angered by the irresponsible statements made in the article .
. .. The tragedy of the holocaust and of the war must never again be repeated.
Please let me assure you that Volkswagen has taken all the steps required to
cease advertising in the Japanese magazine Marco Polo until the incident has
been unambiguously clarified" (1995).
Taizo
Yokoyama of Mitsubishi released a statement that concluded "Mitsubishi
Motors of Japan has decided to cease advertising in the Japanese magazine
'Marco Polo' until the incident has been clarified" (1995).
The
"clarification" came quickly. Bungei Shunju would shutter Marco Polo.
Demise of Marco
Polo
Bungei
Shunju President Kengo Tanaka announced on January 30, 1995, that the company
would shut down Marco Polo and, effective the previous Friday (January 27), all
unsold copies of the February issue had been recalled. "We came to know of
the very deep pain and agony inflicted by the Marco Polo article," Tanaka
said. "It was as if we were hit by an iron club in having our eyes
opened" (Watanabe, 1995). Tanaka gave few details of the extreme decision
to close the magazine, but said, "After rereading the article, we found it
had a superficial understanding of Jewish issues and lacked fairness. On
reflection, we decided to discontinue the publication" (Hoffman 1995).
Tanaka
confessed to Rabbi Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center:
The article in question
was written by a civilian Japanese who took a view inconsistent with solidly
documented facts about the mass murder of Jews and others in the gas chambers
of Nazi concentration camps during World War II. His essay was based on the
discredited writing of a small number of historical revisionists in Europe and
the United States who assert the Holocaust did not take place.
. . . We regret very deeply that
the article has caused immeasurable pain not only to Jews who have suffered
more than enough, but also to millions of others dedicated to truth and
decency. We fully realize that no apology can fully undo the damage that has
been done (1995).
Tanaka held
a subsequent news conference, February 2, with Cooper, who flew to Tokyo, to
show conciliation and promised, "We will set up stronger checking
procedures and an ombudsman system" to avoid future errors (Karasaki,
1995). Tadashi Saito, a Bungei spokesman, added "All the editors and
workers of Bungei Shunju accept the responsibility for publishing this biased
article (which shows) the low understanding among Japanese about the Jewish
people and the victims of Nazi camps" (Pollack 1995).
The Marco
Polo staff, Tanaka announced, would be dispersed among the other Bungei
publications, but editor Kazuyoshi Hanada would be moved to a non-publishing
position in the company's historic research and archives section. Tanaka took a
self-imposed six-month pay cut and Bungei Supervising Editor Nobumitsu Sakai
took a three-month cut. Tanaka resigned the title of president, but maintained
his status as company chairman (Bungeishunju Executives 1995).
Tanaka
distanced the publishing house from the Marco Polo editors and at the same time
pledged Bungei's sincerity in finding accommodation with Rabbi Cooper and the
Wiesenthal Center when writing to Cooper:
Regrettably, the editors
of 'Marco Polo', lacking proper perception regarding a wide range of matters
relating to Jewish history, published the article, wrongly believing that it
represented 'a new set of facts hitherto undisclosed in Japan.'
That such an article was
published not only points up a serious problem with the editors of 'Marco
Polo', but also reflects an overall lack of understanding on the part of Bungei
Shunju Ltd., regarding the Holocaust and the historical facts surrounding this
outrage against humanity.
. . . Japanese history and culture are
so widely different and removed from those of the Jews that a proper perception
of the realities involving the Jewish people will be possible here only through
an extensive educational effort with the assistance of organizations such as
yours. In this program we invite your guidance (1995).
Hanada was
not allowed to attend the news conference announcing the killing of Marco Polo,
nor would he comment later, other than to say that although he found the
decision extreme, he would accept it. Tokyo journalists saw Hanada's lateral
move as tantamount to a firing. Although he was given a desk and salary, he had
very few duties and was regarded as a pariah in the publishing house. It was
expected he would wait a "face saving" period and resign and move on
(Takigawa, 1995). He shortly began appearing on television as a commentator.
The killing
of the magazine surprised not only Hanada, but also the major critics of the
"No Gas Chambers" article. "We only demanded that the magazine
take responsibility and apologize. We never demanded that it be abolished,"
said Dan of the Israeli Embassy (1995), echoed by Cooper of the Wiesenthal
Center, "I was shocked!"
(1995c).
Dan feels
the Marco Polo case was not handled well and suspects more was going on behind
the scenes at Bungei Shunju than concern about advertiser boycotts. Takigawa
and other journalists in Japan confirm there were several internal power plays
as well as external pressures -- not all of them economic.
Behind the
Headlines
Was the
death of Marco Polo the contemporary extension of some kind of samurai code --
ritual suicide as abject apology and restoration of the "family"
honor -- in this case the Bungei Shunju publishing family? While those elements
are certainly present on the surface, a deeper investigation reveals this
extreme action rose out of an inability to handle the external pressures on
Bungei, and at the same time as a solution to the internal pressures the
company faced.
Several
journalists in Japan report that Marco Polo had been the source of economic and
political strife within Bungei Shunju. The magazine had become a drain on the
publishing house's resources. Because of the heavy emphasis on photos and
graphics, Marco Polo had been expensive to produce, but had yet to show a
profit after three years. The magazine went through several redesigns, first in
an attempt to boost sales, later to cut costs.
A year
earlier Bungei had moved Kazuyoshi Hanada, a well-known and respected
journalist, to the editor's post. Hanada had been the top editor at Bungei's
Shukan Bunshun, bringing that magazine to the top in weekly magazine sales
through several news scoops and exclusives, such as sumo wrestler and national
hero Takanohana's engagement to a popular actress. Under Hanada¹s editorship,
the Shukan Bunshun also ran the offending ad for The Jewish Protocols for
World Domination. Hanada continued to deliver "sensational," but
well-documented reports in Marco Polo, such as the expose of a "sex
island" off the coast of Japan, frequented by high government officials to
enjoy the services of prostitutes. Nishioka had tried to sell his ³No Gas
Chambers² story to numerous publishers, who universally rejected it. Hanada
became interested because of the sarin gassing in the small mountain community
of Matsumoto that investigators would later link to the Aum Shinrikyo cult as a
practice run for their eventual Tokyo subway attack (Kaplan, 1996).
"I
subscribed to Marco Polo because its articles challenged a lot toward so-called
taboo topic for the mainstream Japanese publishing industry," said Naomi
Uzumi, an advertising executive. "In the past, Marco Polo featured stories
about cults in Japan. It was
interesting to read. But this controversial feature about Nazi, I thought it
was taishitakoto-nai -- not so
worthy
reading" (1995).
The earlier
stories made Hanada popular in the investigative journalism community, but not
in the staid and conservative editorial departments of his own company's other
magazines, particularly the mainstay literary journals. This is not unique to
Bungei. In Japanese journalism, investigative journalism falls to magazines. It
is rarely done in daily newspapers, whose reporting is often constrained by
their journalists' memberships in kisha kurabu, or press clubs, which
put self-imposed limits on the flow of news from government and business. In
exchange for regular briefings and access to news sources, the newspaper
reporters agree to withhold certain news and not to pursue "news
scoops" in competition with each other. As a result, newspaper journalism
in Japan tends to be both homogenous and flaccid among the national dailies.
(Yamamoto, 1989; Japanese Mass Media, 1994). The "mainstream"
press were aware of the "sex island" story, for example, but refused
to report on it (Kaplan, 1995).
Some
newspapers publish their own magazines to print, at arms length, the kinds of
stories they can't in their own columns. Work on these magazines is considered
"second class," at best, among the journalistic elite. Although
immensely popular, hard-hitting, and sometimes precipitating reforms, investigative
magazine journalism is looked down upon by traditional editors, even in the
magazine trade. Heuvel and Dennis quote a mainstream newspaper senior editor:
"We believe in covering politicians from the waist up. What they do from
the waist down is generally none of our business" (1993, 82). The
"waist down," sometimes literally, has become the central business of
the investigative magazines.
Investigative
magazines, such as Marco Polo, do not belong to industry associations, which
exert a considerable degree of standard setting and regulatory control, such as
the Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, or Japanese Newspaper Publishers & Editors
Association, does on newspapers. The lack of an industry association
contributes to a free-for-all in the editing and marketing of magazines, often
marked by exaggerated and misleading claims. Hanada "fell into the common
pitfall of Japanese magazine reporting and ran anything that looked good,
without worrying about the facts. They are willing to run almost any story, no matter
how irresponsible it is, as long as it boost sales. In addition, they will run
almost any story as long as it is written in Japanese under an 'island
mentality'" (Takahama, 1995). The sensational bent in stories is
exacerbated by excesses in marketing them. David Kaplan is a highly regarded
investigative journalist whose book The Yakuza is considered the
definitive study of Japanese organized crime. While Marco Polo was running, and
promoting, the "No Gas Chambers" article, Kaplan's series on
psychological warfare conducted by the United States Information Service in the
1950s and 1960s was running in Views magazine, the flagship monthly of
Kodansha, one the top three publishers in Japan. "Even those solid reports
would get headlines (translated into ad placards) that absolutely lied about
the contents. It's pure hype and typical of Japanese magazine publishing"
(Kaplan, 1995).
Dan, Kaplan,
Takigawa, and other journalists also point to an insular mindset of Japanese
journalists that hold a general assumption that what they write won't be read
outside of Japan, particularly if written in Japanese, and so would face no
challenge. Isuki Iwata, Los Angeles bureau chief for The Yomiuri Shimbun
writes "The (Marco Polo) incident . . . reveals that the logics of Japanese
society does not always apply in the international community" (1995).
Tatou Takahama, a senior fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute, writes,
"The publisher may have thought the controversy would not spread overseas
since Marco Polo is a Japanese-language magazine" (1995).
The protests
over the "No Gas Chamber" article were not the first, nor isolated,
objections to content that Bungei had to face. The publishing house had been
amassing an embarrassing number of complaints and apologies (Morgan, 1995). In
the last two years Bungei publicly apologized to Japan Railways and to the
Imperial Family for inaccurate reporting. Shukan Bunshun publicly apologized
for cruel references to sufferers of autism. Bungei was also smarting from
criticism over a previous revisionist World War II article by a former
education minister that argued "the Rape of Nanjing didn't violate
international law" (Sakamaki, 1995). And Bungei was also reminded in the
course of the Marco Polo criticism that its subsidiary book publishing arm had
published a leading "Jewish
Conspiracy" book, The Jewish World Empire's Plot to Invade Japan
(Sutel, 1995). Bungei has a reputation of being "rightist" in
Japanese politics. The "No Gas Chambers" article opened up a new
round of criticism of all rightists and revisionist government policies, such
as the reluctance to apologize for World War II excesses, by such
"leftist" publications as the powerful daily Asahi newspaper,
also owner of TV-Asahi, which treated the controversy as major news (Dan, 1995).
The
pressures inside the publishing house were mounting. Hanada was viewed as an
out-of-control editor who did not fit the conservative Bungei profile. The
financial failure of Marco Polo was draining resources from other editors'
magazines and projects. Bungei found itself as an unwitting avenue for
political attacks on its conservative government friends and in the process
being held up to ridicule by competing news agencies. Bungei was becoming
isolated. Government officials and publishing colleagues were distancing
themselves from the company. The intense criticism and protests from the
"No Gas Chambers" article were staining Bungei internally,
domestically, internationally -- and economically.
Advertiser
boycotts are virtually unknown in Japan. Just as publishers often distance
themselves from criticism of individual articles by crediting all claims to the
authors, advertisers take no responsibility for the content of the magazines in
which they advertise. The moral arguments of the Simon Wiesenthal Center,
however, overrode the traditional distance. The appeal was particularly felt by
Volkswagen, a German company, and Mitsubishi, an auto and electronic
conglomerate with international sales. Although Mitsubishi and Volkswagen
stated publicly they would withdraw all advertising from Marco Polo, the threat
extended to all Bungei publications. Guy Ley Marie of Cartier Japan, Ltd., was
specific: ³ . . . we have stopped immediately all the advertisement programs
with this magazine and the others from this publisher" (1995) Rabbi Cooper
said he was told that media buyers in Japan for these international advertisers
told Bungei officials "clean this up, or we're out of here completely --
out of all Bungei publications," (1995c).
"The
lawyers for Bungei just couldn't handle negotiations on such a scale and in
such a short time. The Japanese prefer drawing out negotiations. This came on
them too much and too fast," says Arie Dan of the Israeli Embassy.
"If they only had to deal with Mitsubishi, they could have come to a
'Japanese-style' accord. But they had to deal with international corporations
as well. And Bungei used the same lawyers to handle the protests from the
(Israeli) Embassy, passed through the Japanese Foreign Ministry. They were overwhelmed" (1995).
Added Rabbi Cooper, "It dawned on me . . . we pushed buttons more
profoundly than we had ever assumed. We were impacting the lives of people in
such expanded ways." (1995c).
The
"Japanese-style" resolution Dan refers to is described by sociologist
Takeshi Ishida as the uchi-soto and omote-ura dimensions of Japanese
conflict resolution and accommodation. Uchi-soto is literally
"in-out" and omote-ura "front-back." Ishida's paradigm places relationships
horizontally in terms of in- and out-groups, and vertically in terms of
formality and authority that comes with rank, each with flexible boundaries.
Conflicts can be resolved or accommodated by encompassing adversaries within
the "insider" group, or by relaxing the formal distance between superior
and inferior, or by a combination of boundary flexing. Ishida's paradigm is
graphically portrayed as (1984, 17):
|
Omote (surface or formal arena) |
Ura
(background or informal arena) |
Uchi |
No
conflict should exist |
Conflict
does exist but is usually solved implicitly. |
Soto |
No
concession should be made |
Negotiation
is possible if neither party loses face and both can maintain integrity. |
In Ishida's paradigm, Bungei Shunju's internal conflict, including negotiations with Mitsubishi, would be placed in the uchi-ura stage and solved there, most likely through staff realignment at Marco Polo. But the publishing house was unable to simultaneously handle the soto-ura dimension of conflict with "outsiders" in dealing with the multiple demands of the Israeli Embassy, the Wiesenthal Center and the international advertisers. Bungei's first response was, in fact, in the omote-soto dimension of denying a response to the Israeli Embassy's request for apology and corrective article. The ideal stage, according to Ishida, is omote-uchi, where all elements of the conflict can come into harmony and -- just as important -- all be considered "insiders" to prevent future conflict by working toward common goals.
The shuttering
of Marco Polo certainly accomplished the omote-uchi goal by
short-circuiting all other stages of the process. Although the Wiesenthal
Center had not asked for the magazine to be cut off, Bungei Chairman Tanaka
invited the Center's Rabbi Abraham Cooper to stand by him at the press
conference announcing not only Marco Polo's demise, but also an educational
seminar series for all Bungei journalists on Jewish history, culture, and
international relations. Bungei and the Wiesenthal Center were effectively turned
from adversaries to partners, and the Center an "insider" in Bungei's
uchi-soto dimension.
By embracing the Wiesenthal Center, Bungei eliminated any need to continue
dealing directly with the Israeli Embassy and indirectly with the Foreign
Ministry. Since the advertising boycott was at the behest of the Wiesenthal
Center, it was called off by Cooper without the need for Bungei to deal
directly with the disaffected advertisers.
Could all of
this have been accomplished without Bungei's corporate serving up of the head
of Marco Polo to placate its adversaries? Perhaps. But balancing internal
realignments with external concessions would have left the publishing house
wounded in image in the publishing and political worlds and continuing to
hemorrhage money with a financially and journalistically damaged product. The
decision to kill Marco Polo put the control of the headlines, and through them
the reputation of the company, back in Bungei's hands. Bungei Shunju lost a
magazine, but no face.
But did the
death of Marco Polo for the "No Gas Chambers" article signify a
change in Japanese attitudes toward the Jews? The reviews are mixed.
Aftermath:
Education or New Life for a Conspiracy?
Marco Polo
has become a double-edged legacy in Japanese publishing. The high-profile news
coverage of the Marco Polo incident did much to educate Japanese readers about
Jews and Jewish history, citing historic record of the Holocaust and the lack
of any record for the various "Jewish Conspiracy" theories. But at
the same time, the author of "No Gas Chambers," Masanori Nishioka,
outraged by the killing off of Marco Polo because of his article, told
reporters he felt "deep anger" that rather than challenging his ideas
with debate, the forum for any debate was cut off. He claimed the "Jewish
lobby used the ads to kill Marco Polo, and Bungei Shunju gave in"
(Sakamaki, 1995). Nishioka later published a book expanding on his Holocaust
denial theories, and accusing Bungei Shunju of ruining his reputation by
closing Marco Polo. Since they accepted his article, Nishioka reasoned, they
should have defended him. (Schreiber, 1998). Nishioka voiced what many
Japanese, including journalists, openly believe: The Marco Polo incident is yet
more evidence of Jewish control over Japanese life.
David Goodwin, writing in the Asahi
Evening News, reports:
The closure only appears to prove what
anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists say is true, that the Jews want to control
the world. When I asked some of my Japanese friends why they thought Marco Polo
was closed down they said it was because Jewish people controlled most of the
banks, media outlets and other institutions in the United States, stating this
as if were fact (1995).
Arie Dan of
the Israeli Embassy is concerned about this double effect, but admits others
don't share his worries. "Others, like Rabbi Cooper, say it's a good thing
-- a strong signal to the Japanese media that you can't publish such stories.
If they want to think it's because we're powerful, that's fine. The important
thing is to stop the stories" (1995). Tomoo Ishida, professor of Jewish History at Tsukuba
University, predicts Cooper will be right. "Major publishing houses will
be careful how they handle Jewish issues in the future because they are afraid
of ad boycotts" (Sakamaki, 1995). Naomi Uozumi of the Asahi Tsuushin-sha
advertising agency in Tokyo said,
"The incident reminded me of the big power of sponsors against
Japanese press" (1995).
Cooper also
said he hoped his seminar series on the Holocaust and Jewish society with
Bungei editors and officials would influence future reporting: "I feel
optimistic . . .. There is no environment of hate (toward Jews) in Japan. But
it does have enormous stereotypes" (Karasaki, 1995). "For whatever reason,
anti-Semitism sells. The challenge is understanding why it sells and what we
can do to change that" (Sutel 1995).
Many
journalists do not share Cooper's optimism. The Yomiuri Research Institute's
Takahama wrote, "While I applaud (Bungei President) Tanaka's action, I do
not think the irresponsible attitude of Bungei Shunju, showed by publishing the
article in the first place will be corrected just by closing down one
magazine" (1995). David
Goodwin, in the Asahi Evening News, agrees:
Committing ritual magazine suicide
because an editor made a grave error does nothing to inform the Japanese people
about a subject that desperately needs to be discussed here. Most Japanese know
virtually nothing about Jews and Jewish history and I think that the most
responsible action for Marco Polo to have taken would have been to set the
record straight. But it can't now, the magazine is dead, and so is the issue
(1995).
Echoing
Takahama and Goodwin, Hajime Takano, editor in chief of the internet-based Insider,
writes, "In choosing the most simple way out of the problem Bungei Shunju
has committed suicide twice over" (1995).
Arie Dan
admits the killing of Marco Polo has had a positive impact in at least one
aspect of his work. "Whereas protests over (anti-Semitic book) ads were
met with indifference, now the newspapers are calling and asking for review and
comment." The Yomiuri Shimbun called him regarding such an ad, Dan
reported. He told the newspaper it was definitely anti-Semitic. "Yomiuri
refused to run it. But that's now," he cautions. In six months or a year,
they'll stop calling and another article or ad will appear somewhere else. We
need education, not sanctions" (1995).
Rabbi Cooper
holds that his seminar series produced some "person-to-person, real
contacts. We discussed not only Holocaust history, but the standards of
journalism. When one of the editors stood and asked 'why didn't you just send
us this information and we would have published it,' I replied 'It was your job
as editor to check out the information you had. Why didn't you do your job? What
was done wasn't journalism.' "
Cooper said the timing of the May seminar series, immediately after the arrest of Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult leader Shoko Asahara in the subway sarin gas attack, drove home the point. "When I showed them a canister of Zyklon-B, they wanted to touch it, to sniff it. Gas chambers became very clear after the Aum attack" (1995c).
Three years
later, the effects of the Marco Polo closing could still be felt. A database
search of Tokyo newspaper articles in both Japanese and English show no entries
on stories about Jews or Jewish conspiracies. Major bookstores feature titles
in their Yudayajin section such as Light One Candle: A Survivor¹s Tale from
Lithuania to Jerusalem, The Holocaust Oral History Project, the
memoirs of Yitzak Rabin, and Alan Dershowitz¹ Chutzpah. Major bookstores
in Tokyo, including Maruzen and Kinokuniya, could not locate any of Uno¹s
conspiracy texts. Uno has discovered a new, profitable focus in astrology-based
end-of-the-world tracts. A 10-storey banner drapes the Ginza¹s Hankyu
department store advertising an international touring company production of
³Fiddler on the Roof.² An academic journal, Namal, has emerged, publishing the
writings of the Japanese Jewish Friendship and Study Society, a group based in
Kyoto of university professors studying Jewish culture.
Ernest
Salomon, president of the Tokyo Jewish Community Center, feels comfortable with
the subsequent press and publishing house behavior. ³Before, we would complain
to publishers and they would listen with only half an ear. But after Marco
Polo, they realized this could be big trouble and they stopped.² Salomon said
the Center¹s Anti-Defamation Committee was consulted by several newspapers who
followed the group¹s suggestions and rejected several anti-Semitic book
advertisements. ³The goal of the Anti-Defamation Committee is to go out of
business. We are hoping we finally will,² he said (Salomon, 1998).
Salomon and
members of the Center¹s Anti-Defamation Committee also reported a marked
reduction in harassment of the Center by right-wing groups who would park
swastika-draped sound trucks outside, blasting German martial music and
recorded speeches of Hitler (1998).
The near
elimination of Jewish conspiracy publications following Marco Polo is significant
because the Japanese economy continued to fall into recession during the
following three-year period. Journalists in Tokyo reported that criticisms and
fears over the economy broke through the shrouds of conspiracy into open anger,
directed at the Finance Ministry and internal government, rather than at
shadowy outside forces.
The
intercultural success, however, is measured more by the unwillingness to join
another battle, rather than by the willingness to embrace diversity. No news
may be good news in this case. But it is still no news. The Jewish Community Center in the
Tokyo ward of Hiroo set aside a room for the press in its library, containing
Japanese-language reference materials on Judaism, and conducted special
programs on Jewish history and culture. The response was minimal, however, and
the pressroom was closed (Schreiber, 1998).
Although
Bungei Shunju editors and journalists attended the Rabbi Cooper-conducted
seminars in Tokyo, and several of them toured the Simon Wiesenthal Center in
Los Angeles, they wrote no articles about the experience for Bungei
publications. One magazine, Weekly Gendai,² covered the Cooper seminars, but
its article was critical of both Cooper and Bungei, calling the seminars
brainwashing sessions and accusing Cooper of extorting money from Bungei for
the Center¹s Holocaust Museum. Another magazine, Bubka, continued to carry some
anti-Semitic columns, but dropped them after repeated protests from the Jewish
Community Center and Israeli Embassy. A third magazine, the monthly Hoseki,
recently ran a series of articles on a ³foreign financial mafia² by long-time
anti-Semitic writer Hirose Takashi that resurrects the standard conspiracism,
attacking Goldman-Sachs, the Lehman Brothers, the Rothschilds and others, but
all mention of Yudaya Jews were conspicuously removed by the publisher. (Schreiber, 1998; Takigawa,
1998).
Takigawa of
the Israeli Embassy joins Salomon in enjoying the nearly three-year respite
from anti-Semitic articles, books and advertisements. But he is concerned that
a new generation of anti-Semitic thought may be emerging. At Kawaijuko, a
network of preparatory schools in Nagoya, a recent lecture series on the 21st
century as the era of information was based on the premise that Jews control
the media and channels of information. Jews are avoiding real issues of world
hunger and diminishing food resources by distracting audiences with
pronouncements that information is the most important commodity. According to
the lecturer, this is because Jews do not produce agricultural products, and so
want to divert investments into the mass and telecommunication industries they
control (Takigawa, 1998).
As is
typical of conspiracy theories, the Yudayajin conspiracism in
Japanese publishing targets no particular Jews as the heads or organizers of
the feared cabal. Only their ³agents,² ranging from the U.S. President to pop
diva Madonna, are attacked, under the premise that their actions are controlled
by shadowy puppeteers in the world domination market. Obtuse symbolism attains
the power of fact such as the contention that the reflection of Mt. Fuji in
Lake Hakone, as portrayed on the back of the 10,000 yen bill is actually Mt.
Sinai when it is published in a book or magazine. Conversely, the accomplishments
of actual, individual Jews whether in the arena of finance or war are
portrayed as heroic and admirable.
Such are the
contradictions of anti- and philo-Semitism in Japanese publishing. The Marco
Polo case, however, shifted the focus of Jewish community response from trying
to disprove a negative always problematic to defending a positive and
painful set of facts.
The
short-term strategies were effective: gaining international attention, support
and pressure through an advertising boycott. But this ³Western² confrontational
approach was inconsistent and incompatible with Japanese styles of conflict
management and resolution. The ignoble death of Marco Polo was the result of
the contradictions in intercultural communication styles, and a short-term
solution to internal corporate strife growing out of contradictory press styles
and values within a ³mainstream² publishing house.
The
long-term effects, however, are not as conclusive or dramatic. While few
negative references to, or images of, Yudayajin have appeared in the
Japanese press, no positive ones have either, to balance a decade of
anti-Semitic conspiracism. No news is not necessarily good news, as there are
recent indications and incidents in both education and publishing that
conspiracism is rerooting, with no positive images to challenge or counteract
its growth.
Conspiracism
has been the province of books, as it gains credence when draped in the
symbolic robes of a scholarly text. Because of the differentiated structure and
values of the Japanese press system, conspiracism also has found a place in
magazines that are within, or on the periphery, of "mainstream
journalism,² giving the articles the cachet of objective truth. An even wider
dissemination of conspiracism may come from the Internet and world-wide-web,
where websites can easily be constructed to appear as authoritative and
scholarly as any university site. The Internet got off to a slower start in
Japan, partly because of landline costs and transmission quality, but is
quickly catching up. Monitoring and control of web-based communication will
undoubtedly prove more difficult than traditional print publishing.
But this
implies a continued scenario of almost guerilla-like action of print, attack,
recede, and re-emerge. The missing element remains: the disseminating of
positive articles and images, a difficult prospect in the face of a publishing
philosophy that it is better, and safer, to print nothing. The uchi-soto/omote-ura style of conflict
resolution held some promise to transfer the energies of confrontation into
collaboration, but that promise has gone unfulfilled. The model is worthy of
further study to develop strategies for balancing coverage of Yudayajin working within the
structure of the Japanese press system, rather than confronting it through its
vulnerable economic flank.
In a repeat
of history, another major Japanese publishing house, Shogakukan Inc., published an article in its Weekly Post
magazine in October 1999 claiming an International Jewish Conspiracy was behind
the acquisition of a Japanese bank by a U.S. company. The Simon Wiesenthal
Center immediately protested and asked international advertisers to withdraw
advertising support unless an apology and correction were made. Unlike Bungei
Shunju and Marco Polo, Shogakukan immediately agreed, publishing the apology
and correction not only in Weekly Post, but on its website and on
advertisements for the magazine in the major Tokyo dailies. Two executives
visited theWiesenthal Center and invited a Center representative to conduct
workshops for its Tokyo executives and journalists (Ishii 1999).
³Publishers and editors have been reached by the message (of Marco Polo),² said Yoshito Takigawa of the Israeli Embassy, ³but not readers, especially youth. Those who were at the junior high school age during Marco Polo are now reaching high school and the university, when they are most suseptable to conspiracy thinking and cults² (1998).
References
Anti-Defamation
Committee, Jewish Cultural Center, Tokyo. Interview With Author, 22 May.
Associated Press. 1995.
Jewish Groups Blast Magazine for Denying Holocaust. Daily Mainichi. 26
January.
Ben-Dasan, Isaiah
(Yamamoto Shichihei). 1971. The Japanese and the Jews (Nihonjin to
Yudayajin). trans. Richard Gage. Tokyo: Weatherhill.
Bungeishunju Executives
Disciplined. 1995. Daily Yomiuri 23 February.
Bunshun Apologizes Over
Reference to Autism. 1995. Daily Mainichi. 21 April.
Chang, Thelma. 1991. I
Can Never Forget: Men of the 100th/442nd. Honolulu: Sigi Productions.
Cooper, Abraham. 1995a.
Associate Dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles. Correspondence to
Ambassador Takakazu Kuriyama, Embassy of Japan, Washington D.C. 19 January.
__________. 1995b.
Correspondence to Ferdinand Piech, Chairman, Volkswagen, Berlin. 19 January.
Same correspondence to: Tohei Takeuchi, President, Mitsubishi Motor Corp.,
Cypress, CA; Ralph Destono, Chairman, and Simon Critchell, President, Cartier,
New York; William Gates, President & C.E.O., Microsoft, Redmond, WA; Steven Tumminello, President &
C.E.O., Phillips of North America, New York; Michael Miles, Chairman of the
Board & C.E.O., and John Murphy, Vice Chairman, Philip Morris Co., New
York.
__________. 1995c.
Interview With Author. 27 June.
Dan, Arie. 1995. First Secretary, Press & Information, Embassy of Israel, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 25 May.
Emerson, Tony, Takayama,
Hideko & McKillop, Peter. 1995. Ghosts of World War II. Newsweek
(International). 13 February, 17.
Facts and Figures of
Japan. 1993. Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, Japan.
Goldstein, Clifford.
1989. Anti-Semitism in Japan. Liberty. March/April, 21-23.
Goldman, Alan. 1988. For
Japanese Only: International Communication With Americans. Japan Times.
Goodman, David G. &
Miyazawa, Masanori. 1995. Jews in the Japanese Mind. Tokyo: The Free
Press.
Goodwin, David. 1995.
Anti-bigotry Fight Starts With Information. Asahi Evening News. 9 April.
Goozner, Merrill. 1995.
Japanese Journal Has Jews Furious. Chicago Tribune. 23 January.
Haberman, Clyde. 1987.
Japanese Writers Critical of Jews. New York Times. 12 March, 13(A).
Heuvel, Jon Vaden &
Dennis, Everette E. 1993. The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia's Changing Media.
New York: Freedom Forum Media Studies Center
Hoffman, Michael. 1995.
Rewriting History. Daily Mainichi. 5 February.
Holocaust Cannot Be
Denied (Editorial). 1995. Japan Times. 5 February.
Holocaust Claim Irks
Mitsubishi. 1995. Ashai Evening News. 28 January.
Holocaust Denial Dooms
Marco Polo. 1995. Japan Times. 31 January.
Ishida, Takeshi. 1984.
Conflict and Its Accommodation: Omote-ura and Uchi-soto Relations. Conflict In Japan.
E.S. Krauss, T.P. Rohlen, & P.G. Steinhoff, Eds. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press. 16-38.
Ishii, Kazuo. 1999.
Publisher to Apologize for Anti-Semitic Article. Yomiuri Shimbun. 30
October.
Iwata, Itsuki. 1995.
Magazine Marco Polo Ceases Publication. Yomiuri Shimbun Los Angeles
Bureau Dispatch. 2 February.
Japan Magazine
Advertising Association. 1993. Advertiser's Guide to Magazines in Japan
'93-'94.
Japan: Rewriting History
of the Holocaust. 1995. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 March, 17.
Japan's Mass Media.
1994. Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, Japan
Japan's Money Woes:
Blaming It on the Jews. 1987. Newsweek.
23 March, 40.
Kaplan, David. 1995.
Freelance Journalist, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 24 May.
Kaplan, David &
Marshall, Andrew. 1996. The Cult at the End of the World. New York:
Crown Publishers, Inc.
Karasaki, Taro. 1995.
Head of Publisher Apologizes. Asahi Evening News. 3 February.
Kohno, Tetsu. 1996.
³Japan After the Holocaust² in Wyman, David (ed), The World Reacts to the
Holocaust. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. 573-595.
Kranzler, David. 1996.
³Japan Before and During the Holocaust,² in Wyman, Davis (ed). The World
Reacts to the Holocaust. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. 554-572.
Kyodo News Service.
1995. Japan Responds to Holocaust Letter. Japan Times. 28 January.
Ley Marie, Guy. 1995.
Cartier Japan, Ltd., Tokyo. Correspondence to Rabbi Abraham Cooper. 30 January.
Lipstadt, Deborah. 1993.
Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. New
York: Macmillan.
Magazine To Cease Due To
Holocaust Denial Story. 1995. Daily Mainichi. 31 January.
Morgan, William. 1995.
Press Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. Interview With Author, 24 May.
Nakane, Chie. 1970. Japanese
Society. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle
Namal, the
journal of the Japanese-Jewish Friendship and Study Society. Vol 1 (1996) and
Vol 2 (1997). Kyoto University.
Nihon Shinbun Kyokai.
1994. The Japanese Press '94. Tokyo: Japanese Newspaper Publishers &
Editors Association.
Nishioka, Masanori.
1995. There Were No Nazi Gas Chambers. Marco Polo. February, 170-179.
Piech, Ferdinand. 1995.
Chairman, Volkswagen. Correspondence to Rabbi Abraham Cooper. 23 January.
Pipes, Daniel. 1997. Conspiracy:
How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From. New York: The
Free Press.
Pollack, Andrew. 1994.
Japanese Book Praises Hitler For His Electoral Techniques. New York Times.
8 June, 10(A).
Pollack, Andrew. 1995.
Tokyo Magazine to Close After Article Denying Holocaust. New York Times.
31 January, 11(A).
Publisher Closes 'Marco
Polo' for Holocaust Denial. 1995. Daily Yomiuri. 31 January.
Publisher Folds Magazine
That Denied the Holocaust. 1995. Asahi Evening News. 31 January.
Reid, T.R. 1995. Tokyo
Magazine Shut For Denying Holocaust. Washington Post. 31 January, 20(A).
Sakamaki, Sachiko. 1995.
The Battle for History. Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 March, 17.
Salamon, Ernest. 1998.
President, Jewish Community Center, Tokyo. Interview With Author, 21 May.
Sanger, David E. 1987. Japan Apologizes For A Racial
Slur. New York Times. 16 August, 11(A).
Schreiber, Mark. 1998.
Freelance Writer, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 24 May.
Shinowaza, Junta. 1995.
Freelance Writer, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 24 May.
Stern, Willy May. 1989.
David and Godzilla. New Republic. 27 February, 17-18.
Sutel, Seth. 1995.
Publisher Folds Magazine That Denied Holocaust, But Ill Will Remains.
Associated Press dispatch p0619. 2 February.
Takahama, Tatou. 1995.
Marco Polo Demonstrates Insensitivity. Daily Yomiuri. 7 February.
Takano, Hajime. 1995.
The Bungeishunju Ltd. Commits Corporate Suicide. Insider. Shima News
Network: www.ecosys.com/SMN/forum. 13 February.
Takigawa, Yoshito. 1995.
Chief Information Officer, Embassy of Israel, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 25
May.
________. 1998. Chief
Information Officer, Embassy of Israel, Tokyo. Interview With Author. 26 May.
Tanaka, Kengo. 1995.
President & C.E.O., Bungei Shunju Ltd., Tokyo. Correspondence to Rabbi
Abraham Cooper. 30 January.
Uozumi, Namoi. 1995.
Asahi Tsuushin-sha, Tokyo. Correspondence with Author. 5 July.
Watanabe, Teresa. 1995. Tokyo Publisher Regrets 'Pain' to
Jews. Los Angeles Times. 3 February, 8(A).
Watanabe, Teresa. 1995. Los
Angeles Times Tokyo Bureau. Interview With Author. 24 May.
Yamamoto Taketoshi. 1989.
The Press Clubs of Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies 15:2, 371-388.
Yokoyama, Taizo. 1995. Managing Director, Public Relations and Advertising. Mitsubishi Motors, Tokyo. Correspondence to Rabbi Abraham Cooper. 26 January.
[1] NOTE: The reference to both Biblical and Popular Culture icons is meant as ironic: not to create or perpetuate stereotypes, but to comment on the stereotypes that are foundational to the conspiracism that pervades this case study, and continue beyond it.