One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, by Russell Hardin. Princeton University Press, 1995. 288 pp.

The Rebel's Dilemma, by Mark Irving Lichbach. University of Michigan Press, 1995. 514 pp.

Three methodological threads bind together these otherwise dissimilar books on collective action. The most visible one is a commitment to the rational choice approach. Another, however, is the recognition that successful application of the approach to their topics must be sensitive to interpersonally-determined variations in individual preferences and beliefs, variations that have traditionally been ignored within rational choice. The third, at least implicitly, is the acceptance of certain deviations from the preoccupation with general, predictive theory-building that is characteristic of the approach.

Hardin's book focuses on the role of group identity, particularly ethnic identity, in collective action. He argues that, far from being irrational, collective action based upon ethnic identity can largely be seen as purposive and self-interested. Such an argument puts him in a fairly long line of rational choice authors seeking to debunk the (now not-so) conventional wisdom that ethnic collective action is the irrational expression of primitive passions.

Like most of these authors, Hardin supports his view by pointing out that collective action often has consequences for the distribution of limited resources among groups, and that this creates a collision of interests that promotes group conflict. Likewise, he notes, this tendency towards conflict may be exacerbated by the presence of numerous "tipping" phenomena in group interaction that lead rational actors to escalate levels of hostilites. However, while such factors can help explain group conflict, they cannot explain why conflict often occurs along ethnic (roughly, hereditary and/or cultural) boundaries rather than boundaries that have more direct economic salience, such as income level, occupation or production sector.

Unlike most rational choice authors, Hardin addresses this issue head-on, investigating the factors that make ethnic factors so influential in determining the boundaries of collective action. In particular, he focuses on the "coordination" role of ethnicity. Individuals within ethnic groups, he argues, will have developed shared preferences and beliefs through a history of common experience. These shared preferences and beliefs, he argues, will create a concert of interest among group members that promote the group as a basis for collective action.

He places this analysis of the development of group identification alongside an analysis of social norms. Quite sensibly, he argues that while traditional views of homo economicus and homo sociologicus portray rationality and norm-following as two mutually exclusive forms of decision-making, norm-following can be incorporated into a rationalist model as a function of an individual's preferences and beliefs.

This analysis of social norms is linked to group identity by identifying a particular type of norm, "norms of exclusion," which discriminates between group members and non- members. Norms of exclusion, he argues, may be the result of existing group differences in preferences and beliefs, but they may also act to exacerbate these these differences as well. He shows how certain types of exclusionary norms might be sustained over time by rational actors, and how they might break down. He complements this with an analysis of non-exclusionary, "universalistic" norms, arguing that they are more difficult to maintain over time than exclusionary ones. In the course of this discussion of norms, Hardin delves into a wonderfully eclectic set of cases drawn from Evans-Pritchard, Kazuo Ishiguro, Verdi and A Tribe Called Quest, among others, as well as extended discussions of the norms of duelling and vendetta, the Mafia's code of omerta, and the difference between Jewish and Catholic views of guilt.

The main question that I have about Hardin's approach concerns whether he intends it to simply to be a critique of previous attempts to construct predictive theories of ethnic collective action, or whether he intends the factors he discusses to be the basis for new, improved predictive theories. If the latter is the case, it brings up the questions of how to measure the coordination power of particular groups based on shared preferences and beliefs, or how to predict it endogenously as function of measurable variables. This is particularly crucial since individuals are often not surrounded by a single possible ethnic boundary, but multiple boundaries, each a potential basis for collective action. It is not clear whether Hardin believes the various coordination phenomena that induce collective action within particular boundaries ought to be viewed as analytically separate, whether they can be combined into a single coordination power metric, or whether they might even be absorbed into some already well-soaked conceptual sponge such as transaction costs or social capital. At any rate, whether such a clarification is necessary depends on the view one takes of the role of the rationality assumption in theoretical analysis, something I will return to at the end of this review.

Lichbach's main focus is on rebellion and revolution, particularly on the "paradox" of individual participation in anti-government activity. The volume is a companion to a more general theoretical volume on collective action called The Cooperator's Dilemma.

The bulk of the book is devoted to presenting a huge list of "solutions" to the rebellious collective action problem, i.e. steps that rebel leaders can take to promote collective action and steps that government leaders can take to discourage it. While the analysis is based upon rational choice assumptions, the narrative is sufficiently non-technical and the definition of rationality sufficiently broad for it to be read with interest by anyone concerned with the issue of rebellious collective action. This could include would-be revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries, since the book, though perhaps not intended this way, often comes across as a manual of tips on how to wage successful rebellious collective action and how to stop it. In fact, it contains perhaps the most exhaustive list ever compiled of manipulable factors that facilitate or inhibit collective action against a government, comprising twenty one solutions, most divided into subcategories, each illustrated by an impressive range of empirical examples.

The list of solutions is divided among four major supercategories: market, community, contract and hierarchy, which are in turn defined along the two dimensions of unplanned vs. planned and spontaneous vs. contingent. Though the categorization is a reasonable one, and perhaps necessary in order to divided the book into chapters of manageable length, the categories are ideal types, and many of the more concrete solutions discussed under one category seem like they could just as easily be placed in another. Why does selecting for social homogeneity go under contract rather than community? Why does increasing the probability of participation making a difference go under market rather than hierarchy? The criteria for placing solutions in categories is not clearly explained, nor is it obvious.

More helpful, in my view, is the extent to which Lichbach points out how cultural and leadership factors can play major roles in influencing rational action through their effect on the preferences and/or beliefs of potential rebels. Anti-government leaders, he observes, often spend a great deal of time promoting beliefs that can be conducive to participation, such as trust, confidence in success and sense of personal efficacy, even if this means feeding members with false information. Furthermore, leaders also select for members with culturally-induced expressive preferences for participation or altruistic preferences for other members' welfare, and may then attempt to enhance the supply of these goods as selective incentives in order to further induce participation. No analysis of rebellion, he argues, will make accurate predictions without recognition of these factors, which go beyond the purview of conventional rational choice.

In a further discussion, Lichbach contends that solutions to rebellious collective action problems are ultimately political, and that success in eliciting collective action can often have pathological consequences for the ultimate goals of a revolutionary movement. I doubt that either contention will be very controversial, but they do bring up interesting areas of neglect in conventional rational choice theories of rebellion and revolution, such as the failure to consider the state's collective action problem as well as the rebel's, or to consider the possible cross-purposes between successful rebellious collective action and successful revolution. Those responsible for such theories might reply in defense that deductively explaining one corner of the problem has been more than difficult enough!

These two volumes are distinctive in that, despite rational choice's central concern with deductive generality and falsifiability, neither purports to provide a general predictive theory of the phenomenon being analyzed. Given the complexity of the phenomena being studied, taking the subtlety route over predictiveness is quite reasonable. For both authors, the rationality assumption is used primarily as a heuristic lens through which to view and explain action rather than the foundation for any grand or mid-range deductive pyramid. Nonetheless, each book provides a rich source of material for theorists who wish to build such pyramids.