

Book Reviews

Alistair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006), p.482

All the essays in this excellent volume, which I have assigned to my course on Chinese foreign policy, are produced by highly knowledgeable analysts. The able authors can be divided into two groups. One finds China peacefully integrating into international norms. The other group sees Chinese leaders as domestically self-interested about their power, as patriotic, and as sometimes conflicted because there is a perceived clash between international (American?) norms and Chinese (or CCP) interests. The first group of analysts consists of Robert Ross, Alistair Iain Johnston, Samuel Kim and Yong Deng, the latter of Thomas Christensen, Margaret Pearson, Allen Carlson, John Garver and Peter Gries.

Not every author can be thus categorized. Avery Goldstein's sophisticated speculations on how North Korea impacts PRC policy does not, however, sufficiently distinguish CCP interests (a non-democratic Pyongyang regime) from Chinese security interests (the American military out of the Korean peninsula).

There is much statistical wisdom in editor Johnston's powerful essay on Chinese public opinion and PRC foreign policy. He counters the Mansfield-Snyder thesis that transitions to democracy uniquely generate war-proneness. His goal is to negate the view that Chinese "public opinion is mostly increasingly nationalist, and that the Chinese leadership cannot ignore this content," concluding that rising middle class influential in China actually are moving in an internationally integrative direction. Actually the scholarly consensus is that the CCP's quest for nationalistic legitimation and the commercialization of the mass media in China have led to inflammatory chauvinistic reporting. Johnston's perspective, based on a very shrewd dissection of incomplete and biased survey data, contrasts with Goldstein who finds that "perceived American humiliations of China" "have elicited a sometimes strident nationalist reaction in the media and on the streets."

As in most countries, people focus on domestic matters. There is little persuasive evidence that there is well-defined public opinion on foreign policy issues anywhere to which leaders respond until after a bad policy has a decisive negative impact. Rage at Japan may lead to caution by the CCP on signing a contract with Japan to build a rail line, but when the CCP sees opinion that could define the rulers as too soft, it swiftly restricts the media and mass mobilization. The party leadership is in control.

John Garver systematically mines much new data on Mao's decision for war with India, brilliantly showing how Mao misunderstood Nehru, inventing Indian designs on Tibet. This is important. But Garver pays little attention to analysts in China who see Mao motivated by a competition with Khrushchev for leadership of the world anti-imperialist movement and therefore ignoring opportunities for

compromise with India because Mao wanted to discredit Nehru, imagined as a tool of Khrushchev.

The superb authors are challenged by the editors to use social science methodologies and to apply Allen Whiting's work on CCP efforts at deterrence, especially in Korea (1950) and India (1962). More could have been done with the excellent work of Chen Jian (who teaches in China as well as America) and many Chinese analysts such as Yang Kuisong whose scholarship undercuts Whiting's hypotheses on deterrence signaling. We should be long past the time when students of Chinese foreign policy could marginalize the contributions of critically independent Chinese analysts. The best works and shrewdest insights in this fine volume of solid articles make good use of that well-informed Chinese literature.

The first group of authors, presenting China as peacefully integrating with established international norms, does not respect China's rise to superpower status and the CCP's goal of predominance in its region, a return to pre-modern glories, restoring China's supposedly natural place in the world. Ross's view of "China's intrinsic inability as a land power to contend with the naval forces of an advanced maritime power" slights both China's policies as a historically advanced maritime pioneer in the past and its behavior in the post-Mao era to once again resume that dominant position in neighboring oceans.

In contrast Peter Gries convincingly explores how Chinese nationalism seeks vengeance for a century of humiliations so as to obtain "an inversion of hierarchies with China in the superior position." Chinese now stress historical glory because "[p]ride in past accomplishments translates into confidence about the future."

In the group seeing China integrating with international norms, Robert Ross concludes that "there is minimal likelihood" of "true great power crisis" in the Taiwan Straits. In contrast, Thomas Christensen exquisitely analyzes Beijing's use of force in the PRC era. He concludes that, "like Mao, the post-Mao leadership took significant risks to launch a war for largely political, rather than territorial objectives." To understand foreign policy-making in China requires nuanced data on ruling group interactions. Since the authoritarian regime's decision-making remains largely non-transparent, this creates great uncertainty about future PRC military actions in places such as the Taiwan Strait. In contrast to Ross, Christensen finds reason for concern.

In a balanced and thoughtful presentation of China's growing and successful multilateralism, Allen Carlson concludes finding that there is "a heavy emphasis on the continuing influence of the historical memory of the 'century of humiliation' on China's contemporary stance on sovereignty and intervention" such that "the perpetuation of collective memories about past violations of Chinese sovereignty, coupled with ongoing concerns about the fragility of Beijing's rule over China, has made Chinese acquiescence [to international norms] especially tenuous and contingent." The editors are to be congratulated for presenting authors who disagree with their own informed judgments.

Margaret Pearson's very smart and thorough article on Chinese behavior in the WTO shows that the PRC has not usually tried to undermine WTO rules. Exceptions are dealings with Taiwan and mechanisms for monitoring Chinese compliance. China, the big winner in the new era of globalization, has generally learned that its interests lie more with the developed than with the developing nations. But the CCP's asserted identity as at one with the latter group has kept Beijing from joining with the former in rule-making. Consequently, Beijing has not quite integrated with global norms.

Michael Yahuda's informed article on Sino-Japanese relations takes seriously "China's nationalist aspirations." He finds that CCP policy results from a struggle "between those who would look forward to a China that will continue to reform economically, and ultimately politically at home, and integrate more closely with the international economy abroad and those of a more conservative outlook who fear the dilution of Communist Party rule amid growing social dislocation and favor a slower course of reform and a nationalist resistance to integration with the outside world." Internal CCP politics is decisive. The debate in the book often mirrors the debate in Chinese politics.

Still, all agree that worst case outcomes, despite clashes between a rising hegemon and an existing one, are not inevitable. All depends on politics in China and among its neighbors and within other world power centers. The book's applications of Whiting's hypothesis and the authors' use of diverse social science methodologies to explore a host of vital issues end up as does informed common sense. The result is a very good book.

EDWARD FRIEDMAN
University of Wisconsin at Madison

Chenshan Tian, *Chinese Dialectics: from Yijing to Marxism* (Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2005), p.237, \$70.00, paper.

In ancient times the Greeks thought all matter was composed of four elements: air, earth, fire, water. China had a different set of basic material forms: metal, water, wood, fire, and earth. These early conceptions reflect different mentalities: the Greek elements were analogous to how we think of elements today, even though we have a different and longer list. That is, all material things could be disintegrated into air, earth, fire, and water; and these could not be disintegrated further. The Chinese "elements" (some would prefer the term "agencies") were different. They were not an irreducible substratum, but transform into one another. Metal produces water (dew), which produces wood, which produces fire, which produces earth (ashes), which produces metal. Spinning the wheel in reverse: metal destroys wood, which destroys earth, which destroys water, which destroys fire, which destroys metal. There are other patterns of relationships among the agencies

as well. The endless cyclical transformations and combinations of these agencies generate the ten thousand things.

Chenshan Tian argues that Chinese thinking identifies no “essences,” fixed models of things, but conceives the world in terms of endless correspondences and correlations. Taking a term from the *Yi Jing*, he calls this *tongbian*, “continuity through change.” He says that when the dialectic Marx adopted from Hegel was introduced into China, Chinese thinkers cast their concept of it in terms of *tongbian*. He demonstrates his thesis through an analysis of various Chinese Marxist theorists, especially Qu Qiubai, Li Da, Ai Siqi, and Mao Zedong, with Mao representing the most fully developed formulation.

The thesis is persuasive, especially its contention that the various thinkers interpreted western dialectics in terms of the Chinese tradition. But, as Tian stresses, dialectical thinking invites *bian* (here 辯, analytical argument, not 變, change); and this is true of his ideas as well.

Tian may make too sharp a contrast between China and the West, in that a rejection of essences and a focus on change are characteristic of very much of modern western thought. No doubt Chinese thinkers interpreted western ideas in Chinese terms; but they may also have interpreted the Chinese tradition in terms of modern thought. Not all Chinese thinking is in the *tongbian* pattern. Chairman Mao’s favorite concept was contradiction, *maodun*, and Mao did indeed use this in a dialectical fashion. But the term originally comes from the *Han Feizi*, from a story of a man who claimed to have a spear (*mao*) that could penetrate anything and a shield (*dun*) that nothing could penetrate. As Han Fei points out, it’s possible to have one or the other, but not both. He was describing a real contradiction, with nothing dialectical about it. Indeed, since the Chairman’s death some critics have insinuated that what Tian takes to be a major sign of Mao’s philosophical acumen is instead an inability or disinclination to reason logically.

Tian may also overemphasize the difference between Marx’s determinism and Mao’s voluntarism. Marx was a determinist, but only in a “dialectical” fashion (men make their own history; but they don’t make it any old way they wish). In practice Marxist-Leninist movements, with their focus on ideology, consciousness, and the role of the Party, have all tended toward some kind of voluntarism. Non-Leninist “western Marxism” in a different way has also downplayed the deterministic side of Marx.

Tian’s last chapter expands on the perhaps dubious claim by Roger Ames and David Hall that Confucianism remains more pervasive in China than Marxism. He traces Hu Jintao’s concern for a harmonious society to the *tongbian* mentality. With Mao, however, the dialectic took the form of struggle, struggle that would apparently continue until the sun explodes. The Party line today may be more in accord with the mainstream of the Chinese tradition than was the Thought of the late Chairman.

PETER R. MOODY, JR.
University of Notre Dame

Sujian Guo, ed. *China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 272 pp. \$99.95 cloth

The debate in China over its great power status is in high gear. With a documentary on the "Rise of the Great Powers" showing on CCTV, with Chinese peacekeepers in the Middle East, a trillion dollars in foreign exchange and massive investment in developing countries around the globe, China's government leaders are no doubt cognizant of the power accruing to China through their development policies. The core question for China is - how much responsibility comes with such power. Will its international obligations, or the expectations (and fears) of its neighbors, conflict with perceived domestic needs? Will China be able to trade and invest freely around the world while strictly maintaining its convenient principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries? How can the Chinese leadership address its domestic growth pains and maintain power?

These questions lie at the heart of this book's methodical examination of the domestic and international conditions that will affect the path of China's development. The book's central concern is that China may fall prey to the dangers of revisionism within or frictions abroad and no longer work to maintain the international status quo. It notes that the international challenges for China include, first of all, the Taiwan issue, other border and territorial disputes, and the relationship with the United States. Domestic challenges are even more disturbing: corruption, mass unrest, inequitable income distributions, growing unemployment and an insufficient social safety net, energy and resource shortages, serious problems in the financial sector, excessive public debt, environmental degradation, to name only a few.

Surprisingly, then, the overall impression from this book is that on the domestic front, the regime is stronger than the problems would seem to indicate, that corruption is being managed, political legitimacy is being strengthened and the regime is showing some finesse in dealing with unrest. In fact, political development is the underreported story of China's rise, although a recent New York Times article on the importance of an expanding middle class may indicate a new recognition of this phenomenon. In his chapter, Wang Zhengxu looks at how China is developing into a "hybrid regime", which will precede a transition to a fully democratic one. He points to citizen demands for fairer laws, judicial justice coinciding with the Party's recognition that good governance will be crucial to the maintenance of regime legitimacy and its hold on power. This recognition is apparent in not only the promulgation of new laws (on legislation, government force, permission and punishment) that are intended to limit government power, but also on the emphasis placed on enhanced training for government officials, whether through the national or local party schools, or even overseas.

The second half of this book examines the interplay between domestic and foreign issues to determine how selected international issues may affect China's

“peaceful development.” The relationship with the United States obviously plays a large role in China’s growth and two chapters focus on how China is managing that relationship on both the macro political and the military dimensions. Other chapters describe the geopolitics of the Central Asia region and the difficult relations with Japan. They generally agree that the international situation is rife with difficult spots but that areas of mutual interest and benefit will determine the development of relations with the major powers, at least. Despite overtones of neorealist and liberal perspectives on international relations, these chapters rely on a realist conception of China’s world as interactions among nation-states acting in their best interests with rational forethought.

In sum, the book provides careful analyses of many of the most salient issues facing China’s leadership in the early 21st century. It is well-thought out and brings together a diversity of writers to address the important question of what might keep China from becoming a world power peacefully. Minor grammatical problems, which arise throughout the book, and ambiguity about the dependent and independent variables, are the only areas that could use some revision. By bruiting about the slogans (*kou hao*), “Peaceful Rise,” or “Peaceful development,” the Chinese leadership is evidencing hopeful optimism rather than a real national strategy. This book is similarly optimistic and, in this era of troubled transitions, maybe such optimism is healthy.

JULIAN CHANG
Harvard University

China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy. Edited by Yufan Hao and Lin Su (Aldershot, New Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005). p.230

For two decades, China’s foreign policy making has been a subject of enormous interest to international scholars. Quite some work has been done, among which the prominent examples include those by A. Doak Barnett, K. Lieberthal and M. Oksenberg, Lu Ning, and David M. Lampton. *China’s Foreign Policy Making* is a continuation of this enterprise and it will be of interest for people working on Chinese affairs. Its subtitle *Societal Force and Chinese American Policy* suggests the volume’s focus and captures an extremely interesting new development in China’s foreign policy making process, namely, how societal forces are impacting upon its foreign policy-making. On the whole, a group of scholars who are based in American and Chinese universities are successful in making this effort to analyze it and to add a new dimension to Chinese foreign policy making research.

Yufan Hao’s introductory chapter rightly points out “the moment may have arrived in China when policy makers cannot create policy initiatives without a serious consideration of public opinion,” while most of the previous studies “do not pay enough attention to domestic constraints.” Thus the various chapters attempt to elaborate on a number of domestic factors that have come into foreign policy

making process. “Public opinion” on the Internet is undoubtedly a new factor in policy-making. It is reported that even Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao often go to the Internet to read about what people think.

Quansheng Zhao’s chapter discusses the impact of intellectuals and think tanks on Chinese foreign policy, an increasingly conspicuous phenomenon. It is a consensus that more and more, policy research organizations and think tanks are playing a larger role than before in China’s foreign policy making. For example, the whole September 2002 issue of *The China Quarterly* is dedicated to this question. Zhao’s chapter adds an updated analysis and therefore helps people better understand some new developments in that regard. However, his identification of seven “channels between the center and the periphery,” while being interesting, is not completely convincing. As a matter of fact, the seven “channels” can be divided into two categories. The former three, i.e., “consultation with policy makers,” “internal reports via government channels,” and “conferences and public policy debates” refer to how those research organizations affect policy making, while three of the latter four (i.e., policy NGOs, overseas scholars, and highly specialized professional community) are different kinds of groups or organizations and they themselves may overlap. The number five channel, i.e., “out-system (*tizhiwai*) discussions” by and large refers to and correctly points out the influence of the public opinions expressed on the Internet, which is more fully researched in Junhao Hong’s and Xin-an Lu’s chapters.

The influence of public opinions on policy-making in China tends to be issue-specific and it differs from one area to another. Most spectacular and vivid examples have been those concerned with the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway project, and the widely reported 2005 demonstrations that were partly aroused by Japan’s bid for a permanent membership of the UN Security Council, i.e., those Japan-related ones. Since the book is focused on Chinese American policy, understandably there isn’t a particular chapter on Beijing’s Japan policy *per se*. Still, social force and Japan policy-making is touched upon and explored in the Internet-related chapters, including Xin-An (Lucian) Lu’s on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Internet.

While the authors have indeed done a fine job, some expressions here and there could be more nuanced and accurate. For instance, in Chapter 10, “It was reported that Wang Daohan first mentioned the new statement before Qian [Qichen] announced it [the “new three sentences”] officially.” (p. 218) The author should have mentioned Mr. Wang’s important “eight-six characters” before the “new three sentences,” which adopt a more moderate and realistic line to deal with Taiwan on a more equal footing. “Ministry of Foreign Trade” (p.7) should have been updated to “Ministry of Commerce.” There are also some spelling errors on pages 5, 134, and 220. Needless to say, those minor imperfections do not eclipse this valuable work.

REN XIAO
Fudan University, Shanghai

Qingjiang Kong, *WTO, Internationalization and the Intellectual Property Rights Regime in China* (Singapore: Marshall Cavenish Academic, 2005), 231p. \$26.00 cloth

Professor Kong's volume traces the transformation of the intellectual property regime in China. He attempts to diagnose the dynamics of China's evolving regime for intellectual property rights (IPR), and analyze the political economy of the regime's interface with the internationalized intellectual property regime. As not much has been written on this important subject, this book should be of considerable interest to those concerned with IPR issues in China.

The book, however, is largely a collection of previously published journal articles, and the author does not offer an introduction or conclusion to piece them together as an integrated whole. As a senior academic working in China, there appears attempts to be politically correct, as illustrated by the following statements: "It is therefore understandable that enforcement officials are not well equipped in terms of expertise in this area (of IPR regime)" (p. 35); "Fortunately, the current government attaches great importance to the issue of IPR protection" (p. 36); etc. Corruption is recognized as a problem, but the author refuses to discuss this issue in any detail.

In the building of China's IPR regime, Kong indicates that there is an ongoing debate focusing on the relationship between the scope of China's IPR laws and its stage of economic development. An important feature of this building process has been its gradualism, and international pressure, especially that from the United States, has been an important factor pushing for progress. While trying to enforce a WTO-compatible IPR regime, Beijing has begun to implement a separate national IPR strategy to improve its competitiveness.

Kong explains that the problem of IPR infringement in China is deeply rooted in its own economic self-justification exacerbated by immature industrial self-policing. Pirating is rampant in China mainly because of the simply technology, low risks and high returns involved. Another reason is the existence of a maturing pirate market. China, however, is following the examples of other Asia-Pacific countries or regions such as South Korea and Taiwan, which had significantly reformed their IPR regimes under external pressure. China's IPR protection is currently similar in many respects to that in these countries in the early 1980s.

A valuable contribution of this book is its many detailed case studies. They allow the readers a better understanding of the operations of China's IPR regime which cannot be secured simply through a study of the relevant policy documents. As a senior academic in this field, Professor Kong has no hesitation in making public his recommendations to the Chinese authorities. The gist of such recommendations is that China has to fulfill its international obligations, though the Chinese authorities should fully exploit the room of maneuver allowed.

Kong supports international co-operation in China's IPR protection. He argues that the Sino-American dialogues and the training programs offered by the

United States help foster mutual understanding between the Chinese and United States IPR enforcement officials as well as between the United States industries and the Chinese IPR enforcement officials. Kong, however, admits that IPR infringement is not likely to be reduced to a level found tolerable in countries such as the United States.

Professor Kong also discussed China's IPR strategy drafted by the Ministry of Science and Technology. The Chinese authorities consider China's IPR strategy a part of the national development strategy; they would concentrate on IPR legislation in the next five to ten years with an emphasis on the enforcement of IPR; and they would participate actively in the adjustment of international rules on IPR. The Chinese government planned to invest RMB20 billion to focus on twelve selected priority areas with the objective of securing 2,000 patents in 2001-2005. The book provides a useful bibliography. Editing has to be improved to avoid repetitions and the many typographical errors.

JOSEPH Y.S. CHENG
City University of Hong Kong

Sang Ye, *China Candid: the People of the People's Republic*, ed. by Geremie R. Barme' with Miriam Lang (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 338p. \$ 19.95 paper.

China Candid is an attempt at breaching the great wall of history of day-to-day life of individuals in contemporary China, which has been characterized by a singular and overarching narrative as told by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Importantly, this book is about capturing the variety, minutiae, drudgery, and bathos of individuals from different walks of life in all its richness. These lives that had been reduced to undifferentiated stereotypes and depicted as a monolithic whole to the serve the party's political goals has been rescued by Sang Ye in vivid and fascinating detail. Personal stories narrated in *China Candid* are indeed candid because these stories are infused with courage, tragedy, cleverness, greed, lust, the basic urge to survive, and triumph over seemingly insurmountable challenges. The stories are raw, unvarnished, and they describe a vast and diverse undercurrent of attitudes among Chinese people towards the party, political authorities, culture, social mores, and history that is remarkably different from hagiographic versions of victory and progress told by the communist party.

The book has 26 chapters that are divided into six sections, which details the in-depth interviews conducted by the author over a four-year period in a narrative format. These chapters cover a variety of lives drawn from the hinterland as well as from the throbbing urban centers of China that attracts migrants, vagrants, hookers, hooligans, sweeties, counterfeiters, smugglers, and itinerant artists. None of the subjects interviewed for the book express simplistic attitudes or offer easy solutions for a China that is modernizing at a breakneck speed. Every character in the book

seems to have learnt to stoically navigate the complex realities and adversities confronting them; some have relied on wisdom derived from hard-knocks, few have relied on their *guanxi*, and others have learnt to exploit the economic peculiarities and bend themselves to the flow of political winds.

The story of a young woman named Zhao Li, who confronts debilitating ailments and poverty, but goes on to study art at a leading national university is a stirring endorsement of individual courage (chapter 9, *Moonwalking: A Differently Abled Young Woman*). Similarly, the story about the founders of *Shashi Private Orphanage*, who struggle against unexpected odds to operate the orphanage, while facing constant threats and roadblocks from the local government is inspirational. The parents of a kidnapped child (chapter 7, *Getting Organized: The Parents of a Stolen Child*) evoke such strong pathos that it is almost impossible not to get angry with the callous, corrupt, and apathetic bureaucracy. This particular account points to the absolute impotency of the state when it comes to protecting the private welfare of its citizens and points to the enormous efficiency in cracking down on any dissenter or petitioner, who dares to challenge the primacy of the state. Supremacy of the state is powerfully brought to bear upon the reader through the story of an university educated case-hardened executioner (chapter 25, *Parting Shot: A Beijing Executioner*), who reveals the gory details of the last moments of inmates condemned to death and the pitiless way in which they are executed.

Three separate sections titled *Unlevel Playing Field*, *Heaven's Narrow Gate*, and *Mastering New China* describe the ingenuity and the enduring capacity of Chinese citizens to navigate the public and private sphere in a rapidly evolving China. The software pirate who cracks the code to rip-off specialized software produced by foreign multinationals, the athlete who takes performance enhancing drugs, the consumer products inspector who chooses to ignore widespread counterfeiting because she knows that consumers shopping in the Changsha market in Hunnan Province are aware that they are buying fake goods, and the English professor who experiences the vagaries of moonlighting as a private tutor, the policeman who unrelentingly pushes his child into becoming a piano prodigy, the Shenzhen Hooker who drives a hard bargain, and the Chongqing mistress are all intensely focused on their personal economic growth. Everybody, from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that runs its own restaurant and entertainment ventures to the party cadres who rely on their political *guanxi* to run side-businesses, wants to make a quick buck. Apparently, Deng Xiaoping's slogan "to get rich is glorious," has become the abiding motto of modern China, which in turn is enabling hundred entrepreneurial flowers to bloom.

China Candid does not have a conclusion; that is for each reader to make. Sang Ye has written a book, which is simultaneously thought-provoking, stimulating, and a joy to read. I hope that it makes the reading list of anyone interested in understanding contemporary China.

SIRINI SITARAMAN
Clark University

Elizabeth Freund Larus, *Economic Reform in China, 1979-2003: The Marketization of Labor and State Enterprises* (Lewiston New York and Queenston Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005), 286p. \$119.95, cloth.

Restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is an important issue of China's reform. An immense number of books and articles concerning China's SOE reform have been published since the 1980s. It seems that this book makes only one more piece of work to literature. Elizabeth Freund Larus, however, makes her book outstanding by focusing on the impact of economic reform on labors and labor's responses to reforms. Labor relation is still one of the critical issues in China today. Dr. Larus tries her best to unravel SOE reform by focusing on this key issue, and provides readers with a better understanding of the process.

In this important book, much of Larus' analysis is concerned with the reform of labor administration at the enterprise level. By focusing on the state industrial enterprises, especially the experiments of Baogang and Angang (two of China's largest iron and steel corporations), Dr. Larus examined issues of layoff, establishment of performance-based system, in-house unemployment, and implementation of labor contract system as well as reforms in housing and retirement pensions. She finds that, in the reform process, some skilled workers (it's the minority of employees) were winners while others were losers. The losers faced not only the reduction of their welfare benefits but also opportunities to find a second job in the non-state sector. Owing to lacking a national and comprehensive safety net, Dr. Larus argues that, massive lay-offs could heighten labor tensions and lead to social chaos. China indeed saw several large-scale laborer protests in the 1990s. In this sense, labor relations and labor's responses to reforms restrained the pace of China's reform on SOEs.

Unlike Russia and Eastern Europe countries which adopted the so-called "shock therapy" to reform their state industries, China adopted a gradualist approach to reform to its SOEs. Dr. Larus affirms that these step-by-step reform strategies opted by Chinese leadership were politically prudent, which made it possible for the reformers to seek a balance between the needs to make profits and to protect the stability of society. For the sake of further reforming large SOEs, as this book underscores, in-deep marketization accompanied by corporatization was opted in the late 1990s. Although privatization was implemented to some SOEs, it was limited only to the small and medium-sized ones. Dr. Larus argues that it is labor's negative responses to the reforms that obstructed Chinese government officials' option for privatization.

The book is based on both archives and interviews conducted in China and Hong Kong. Baogang and Angang were selected as two case studies. Dr. Larus conducted intensive interviews at Baogang in the early 1990s. She also interviewed some Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong. In the well researched book, Dr. Larus

employed a significant number of archival documents. These materials clearly contributed to her discussion on the topics from an institutional approach. In the community of SOEs studies, it is rare to find such a clear explanation of the process of SOE labor administration reform.

Using institutional approach to interpret human interactions is the conspicuous characteristic of this book. It allows the author to examine reforms from a micro level. Expectably, however, institutional approach unfolds its weakness in explaining behavioral related issues. Rules and regulations shaped the frame of human interaction, but didn't determine the real behavior of human. It would be better if the author's analysis of the relations between enterprise director and the party secretary as well as workers were supplemented by behavioral approach.

Dr. Larus' work is a fine piece of writing. It makes a significant contribution to the literature on China's rapid industrialization and economic reform. Any serious student who is interested in China's political economy will find that this book is an essential resource.

WEIHONG MA
Shenzhen University, China

Christopher A. Bayly and Timothy N. Harper, *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 555p, \$18.95 paper.

During the decade leading up to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the international system evolved from a multipolar system to a loose bipolar system. On one level, World War II in Asia and the Pacific accelerated that evolution. Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. fought against an ostensibly pan-Asian Japan. At the same time, strategizing for national independence by nationalists in British and other colonies did not stop. Military defeats inflicted by Japan on Western powers in Asia in the early 1940s destroyed the myth of Caucasian imperialist invincibility. Although Japan would eventually lose the war, colonized peoples shed their illusions in British protection almost overnight. Meanwhile, aggravatingly reflexive British wartime assertion of imperial privileges motivated conservative and communist nationalists alike to redouble their efforts for independence.

Along with the title, the authors' phrase "Far Eastern War" needs qualification. The book focuses on political, sociological and strategic aspects of World War II in the "crescent" running from Calcutta to Singapore (p. xxxi). Following a useful "Preface" and a two-part "Prologue," ten chapters discuss colonial societies at war in South Asia and peninsular Southeast Asia. In light of the closing date (1945) in the subtitle, non-specialists need to be reminded that Britain's retreat from its Asian colonies took several decades. In one form or another, administrative British colonialism persisted in Malaya until 1958, in Singapore,

Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) until 1963, in Brunei until 1984, and in Hong Kong until mid-1997.

The British Army, the King's African Rifles, other African troops under UK command and the Australian Imperial Force recruited, tried to dominate, collaborated with or fought against one or more "forgotten armies" during 1941-1945. "Above all, it was Indian soldiers, civilians, labourers and businessmen who made possible the victory of 1945" (pp. xxix). Others included the Indian National Army, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, Aun San's Burma Defence Army, and the Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps. Also negotiating with and challenging these armies was Hitler's Indian Legion under the Indian Subhas Chandra Bose. In the field, the British did not always collaborate well with the American Volunteer Group led by U.S. General Claire Lee Chennault or special forces like the U.S. Army's 5307th Composite Unit which was heavily recruited from among Burma's Kachins. In another indicator of emerging trends, influential Asian participants in these political and military conflicts included supporters of Mahatma Gandhi, Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong.

Bayly and Harper emphasize affinities between Japan's military sexual enslavement of women with British military brothels into which Asian women were driven by poverty and free enterprise. One might also ask why post-independence nationalist historiography has been obtuse to the need for woman-centered analysis of wartime systematic sexual abuses sanctioned by Japanese and British colonizers.

The book is richly sourced with manuscripts and official papers from fourteen libraries and archives, participant-observer accounts, ten newspapers and periodicals and numerous scholarly studies. Six maps and thirty-four photographs enhance the documentation. Seventy-six biographical sketches and an index facilitate tracking of "Key Characters" in *Forgotten Armies*.

Many of the horrific events vividly recounted in *Forgotten Armies* were overtaken by dramatic developments after 1945. Fixing their attention on antecedent variables, Bayly and Harper have also traced the long-term unintended consequences of Japanese, British and U.S. policies. Consequently, readers will better appreciate the etiology of social forces that have stimulated Muslim-Hindu animosity in contemporary India and Pakistan since the 1940s; six decades of civil war between the Burmese majority and the Kachin, Shan and Karen minorities; conflicts between *Bumiputera* (the majority-Malay "sons of the soil") and Chinese in Malaysia; and the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Overall, this book will enhance graduate reading lists in world politics courses.

VINCENT K. POLLARD
University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Huaiyin Li, *Village Governance in North China: 1875-1936*
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 325p. \$60 cloth.

Through using original archive materials from Huailu County, Hebei province, this book provides a very sophisticated account of village governance in North China in the late 19th century and early 20th century. It tackles the village governance in mainly the issue areas such as land tax collection, land sales, foundation and management of village schools in Huailu County.

Rather than simply documenting various formal and informal institutions in the village governance like the rotation of *xiangdi* service, the election of village head, the role of locale elites, especially the gentry class in the village governance, Huaiyin Li drilled deeply into the underlying function logic for the village governance in order to illuminate the driving forces for peasants behaviors in the Huailu area in late imperial Qing period. What Li found out in his sophisticated analysis is neither an imagined ideal peasant community where locale norms like *Cungui* (locale regulations) govern peasants' actions automatically in a rarely conflict-free rural area, nor the image of "rational peasant" who cares only personal gains and loses calculations in their individual and collective behaviors, capture the village governance picture in a whole. Instead, Huaiyin Li contended that both material self-interest calculations as propounded by rational choice theory, and locale norms, whose origins can be traced back to the broad ecological environment as well as deep-rooted kinship in North China, dictate peasant's choice of strategies in their cooperation behaviors in village governance. Based on this sophisticated analysis, Li concluded that the preexisting theories on Chinese rural governance, such as oriental despotism, patrimonial bureaucracy, or bureaucratic monarchy, don't work in understanding rural practices and their importance in the structure of the Chinese state. Instead, according to Li, what characterizes the village-state relationship in late imperial China was more interdependence than paired opposition. He borrowed Michael Mann's concept of "infrastructural power," which means the "ability of the state to penetrate civil society by collecting taxes and information, carrying out the government's directives, and coordinating economic activity," to illustrate China's informal village governance, which Yuaiyin Li maintained that coexists with regular central formal institutional despotic power.

In addition to recording the variety and underlying forces for the various institutions in Huailu county's village governance, Huaiyin Li further documented the evolution history of the village governance throughout the late imperial Qing to the early Republican China period: how the late Qing's Xiangli system was replaced with a village head system, and how the formally elected village government, the primary schools and new measures of land taxation were introduced into Huailu County in the Republican China period. In this way, the author put his major subject "village governance" in a broad historical perspective: how the evolution of China's village governance illuminates China's state-making process in its modern history, and how this evolution history of village governance can help provide a realistic picture of the Chinese state and its interactions with society. In his analysis, *Guomindang* government in the Republican period

departed from the traditional approach of local control and penetrated into the rural society by installing the ward government at the supra-village level and formally elected xiang government at the locale level, while eliminating the traditional informal local agents in local control and land taxation, such as the *xiangdi* and *sheshu*.

This is truly a well-written book on China's village governance, a very good example of combining theory, first-hand materials and sophisticated analysis. Even though Li is cautious in extending his arguments into other areas and epochs, this book still helps shed new light to the traditional Chinese local governance.

CHENGHONG LI
University of South Carolina

Joseph W. Esherisk, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds,
The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 2006), 382p.

This volume is a valuable collection of essays on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, an important but painful decade for Chinese people. It consists of 9 chapters. Except for the introduction chapter by the editors, all other remaining chapters are contributed by young scholars. Topics in this volume range from red guards at the elite Qinghua University to political violence in a distant village, from a model village favored by Jiangqing, Mao's wife, to a small-town school teacher, from popular paleoanthropology to the protection of cultural treasures during the Cultural Revolution. The span of these studies extends from the earliest stage of attacks by red guards on "old" culture to the mid-1970s efforts to consolidate and institutionalize the revolution. While reflecting the established methodologies in historical studies, the contributors focus on the local and the particular, probing the multiple intersecting, interpenetrating, and interacting relations between state and social actors during the Cultural Revolution. These studies suggest that neither the structure of the Maoist regime nor the focused agendas of particular social interest groups were decisive in shaping the course of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, only the contingent and ever-shifting interactions of these and other factors explain the history of Cultural Revolution.

Publication of this volume is both timely and important. It is not only because the Cultural Revolution still remains a painful memory in the deeper layer of Chinese people's brains and continues to influence people's life in many ways. It is also because many of these studies challenge the old, conventional wisdoms that the Cultural Revolution was fundamentally a top-down, state-manipulated political campaign and an urban phenomenon. These studies bring rural China back into the picture. They document the spasms of violence, sufferings, and hardships that affected many parts of the Chinese hinterland. These studies also suggest that the Cultural Revolution was not necessarily dominated by the top political elites, such

as the “Gang of Four” and their immediate followers, or by the powerful mass organizations, such as various Red Guard organizations. Instead, as the studies demonstrate, it was driven by the combined, but ever-shifting and conflicting dynamics between these top political elites and social actors.

These studies share a unique methodology. Previous scholarship on the Cultural Revolution mainly focused on a general or overall picture of the campaign. While it could satisfactorily describe the motives, discourse, and expectations of the campaign, it certainly could not give the readers specific explanations for specific events in specific issue areas and geographical regions. By focusing on particular localities or case studies, this volume offers many details of the events, which were simply impossible in the previous scholarship.

Another important feature of this volume is that it enjoys many new sources of information, which was not at all available for the previous scholarship on the history of the Cultural Revolution. The new information and new interpretations of the events as a result of it, alone were enough to make this volume a very useful reference for students of the Cultural Revolution in particular and the Chinese politics in general.

All coins have two sides, so do these new sources of information, especially those unofficial sources. On one hand, these new sources can give readers a new and more accurate picture of the events. On the other hand, more efforts are required to sort out these sources and double check the authenticity. This is because untruthful and invalid information can only misinterpret the events and mislead the readers. On this front, contributors in this volume need to do more work. However, this volume is still very valuable for students of China studies.

XIUSHAN LI
Old Dominion University