CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES:
THE AMERICAN MODEL

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Introduction

A persistent assumption of disciplinary histories of the social sciences is the idea that each of the main branches of today's social sciences reflects at least reasonably firm strata of the social world. There is, thus, a 'natural' division of labor which was finally realized with the maturation of the distinct social sciences. Explaining the emergence of the disciplines, then, takes the form of showing how pathfinders, interested in constituting analogues to the successful modern natural sciences, broke from the prescientific past and established restricted domains for controlled inquiry. Each story is different, of course, and some are stormier than others. Some, for example psychology, are even less settled than others (1).

This altogether Whiggish view of the history of social sciences must, I think, be rejected --along with the assumptions on which it is founded. This is not the place to give arguments against these assumptions, but especially the assumption that the disciplines constitute, like tigers and tangerines, 'natural kinds.' What follows takes an alternative, tack. I assume that the very idea of a social science was (and is) a contested idea, that there were (and are) alternatives to the practices which we now call social science. But more than this, I assume that the branches of what we think of as the modern social sciences were creations from materials at hand by persons at particular times and places in history. Put in other terms, practices in social science could have been different. What needs explaining, then, is not how the disciplines escaped from a prescientific past, but how and why they were constituted as they are. My argument

presupposes, of course, a theory of history and society. But this will be displayed rather than argued (Manicas, 1987).

My task in this chapter is to give a sketch of what seems to me to be the most critical juncture in this constitution, in the United States from approximately the mid-1880's to the period immediately following World War I. The critical players saw two deeply related problems: First, could social scientists in America have authority without having some specialized 'discipline'? As Becker put it, was 'a science without an identifiable central problem ...a science at all?' (Becker, 1971: 82). Second, how was social science to be 'objective' and yet have political impact in a rapidly changing America? These problems were incompletely resolved by the first generation. But as the American students of their German-trained professoriate came to occupy places in a very rapidly expanding university system, they defined their newly articulated 'disciplines' in the empiricist terms which have since characterized modern disciplinary social science. As I have noted elsewhere, were we, as social scientists, to transport ourselves to Oxford, the Sorbonne, Harvard or even Berlin, in say, 1890, we would find practices unfamiliar. There would be no 'departments' of sociology or psychology, the research practices would be for us a hodgepodge of philosophy, social theory, history and hard science methods. There would be no undergraduate 'introduction,' no textbooks which set out the domain of inquiry, its central problems or the 'history' of the discipline. The Ph.D. (or Dr. phil.) degree would be just that, a doctorate in Philosophy. But if we were to make a similar visit to any prominent American university in 1925, we would find very little which is not familiar. To be sure, there would be some 'traditionalists' in these departments --there still are --but they could not be said to define the discipline. The chapter gives but a sketch of the period; any sort of adequate account would not only have more to say about it, but would, of necessity, need to begin much earlier and elsewhere, at least in the seventeenth century in Western Europe.

Speaking abstractly, there were, I believe, four sets of materials from which the disciplines were constituted: First and fundamental, post-Civil War America experienced an explosive capitalist development. This generated a host of new problems -'the social question': immigration, urbanization, and class war. Second, the US had an extremely weak state. Federalism, the lack of a significant state bureaucracy, and a middle-class political culture which de-emphasized politics, had marginalized governments in Washington, in the several states, and in the counties and cities.
In the period under study, these were to grow, especially with World War I. Still, the institutions and capacities of government, relative to other modern states of the period, were (and are) minimal. But if the conjunction of explosive development and the weak state made some responses less possible, it made others more possible. As I think is by now well acknowledged, the leaders of America's largest corporations and financial institutions, all 'progressives,' brought together 'thoughtful men of all classes' into a new corporate liberal order (Kolko, 1967; Weinstein, 1968). This was the fundamental fact. But by itself it cannot explain what happened in American social science. We need to add at least two more dimensions.

Most critically, a new breed of 'educational managers' in cooperation with these 'thoughtful men' reconstituted higher education in America. In some twenty-five years, a host of new private universities came into existence, among them Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Chicago, Clark and Stanford. Meanwhile, the 'traditional' colleges of the East reluctantly but rapidly transformed themselves into modern universities. Along with these came dozens of new land-grant institutions spawned by the Morrill Act of 1862. Originally conceived as agricultural and mechanical colleges, some of these were transformed into full-fledged university centers. Undergraduate enrollments escalated, from 154,300 in 1890 to 582,000 in 1920, and graduate degrees, unknown in the United States before the 1860's, went from 2,400 in 1890 to 15,600 in 1920 (McClelland, 1980). In 1890, some 315 institutions of higher learning had productive funds of 74 million dollars; ten years later 488 institutions distributed 166 million dollars and by 1928, 1.15 billion dollars went to 1,076 institutions (Mills, 1954: 45).

There was nothing inevitable about this. Nor do I believe that the leaders of this movement had any sort of clear idea of the consequences, consequences which far outrun those of immediate concern in this essay. Although, as one writer notes, 'it is a commonplace to describe the emergence of the modern university in post-Civil War America as a phenomena of revolutionary proportions,' it is usually not emphasized that this development was not merely the indispensable material condition for what John Dewey called 'the new body of studies' that emerged out of the traditional curriculum of 'moral philosophy,' but given the conditions of this development it was, as well, a fundamental constraint on what this new body of studies was to become.

Here we can distinguish two features. First, as Veblen saw, the rule of
higher education was taken out of the hands of clerics and put in the hands of businessmen --and this in a double-barrelled sense. The fortunes of the Carnegies, Rockefellers, Cornells, Hopkins, Clarks, Vanderbilts, Stanfords, etc., would be used to build the new universities. But just as important, both these, the public institutions which mimicked them, and the older traditional 'colleges,' Yale, Harvard and Columbia, which now found themselves competing for students and status, would be led by educational entrepreneurs whose values and goals were closely aligned with the leaders of the emerging corporate liberal order (2). Although it cannot be developed here, the earlier institutionalization of 'higher learning' in England and France, in conditions which were vastly different, had issued in: different outcomes. In Germany, too, 'modernizers,' leading a revolution from above, faced different problems (McClelland, 1980; Schiera, and Heilbron, in this volume).

There was a critical fourth factor, the *conceptual materials* which were available to those who would constitute the social sciences in America. While difficult to characterize briefly, it can be said, I believe, that there were three main sets of notions.

First, there was a *distinctly German, historical and holistic conception of society.* Of course there was considerable disagreement and difference over the precise content of this conception, from Ranke to Droysen to Schmoller, to Dilthey, Simmel and Max Weber. Nonetheless, we are entitled to follow Iggers (1983) and think of this tradition of thought as both distinct and distinctly German. That this body of thought figures critically in our story is not surprising if we remember that the majority of the 9,000 Americans who studied in Germany between 1820 and 1920 did their studies in the 'social sciences' in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Herbst, 1965). These included not only many of the men who were leading architects of the new universities in America, Andrew Dickson White and Jacob Gould Schurmann (Cornell), C.K. Adams (Cornell and Wisconsin), Daniel Coit Gilman (Johns Hopkins and California), G. Stanley Hall (Clark), Edmund J. James (Northwestern and Illinois), Arthur T. Hadley (Yale) and Benjamin Ide Wheeler (California), to name but a few, but it included nearly all the leading first-generation academics in the social sciences in America. Even a partial list is stunning: Herbert B. Adams, John W. Burgess, Richard Ely, John Bates Clark, Frank Goodnow, Simon E. Patten, E.R.A. Seligman, Munroe Smith, Richmond Mayo Smith, Albion Small, Henry Farnum, Frank Taussig, James Mark Baldwin, Edward S. Tichener and James McKeen
Cattell. William Graham Sumner's degree was in theology; William James studied medicine. Nor ought we to exclude Franz Boas, Herman W. von Holtz and Hugo Munsterberg, Germans who played large roles in the earliest years in the process of the development of American social science (see also Gunnell, in this volume).

Yet--and this needs explaining--this distinctly German conception of social science could not take root in the soil of America. As I argue, political and institutional pressures --as Veblen rightly diagnosed --provided resistance which its most adamant advocates were unwilling to challenge. It is tempting to argue that what emerged was a unique synthesis, for example, an American pragmatic version. I believe that this was tried by some, John Dewey and Albion Small come quickly to mind, but as I shall argue, Small succumbed and Dewey was misunderstood where he had impact and otherwise ignored. This is, I believe, a most important dead-end in the mainstream history of the social sciences.

Of course, it is easier to be clear now about what was at stake than it was then and, in addition, these ideas had to compete with other ideas, including the individualistic, naturalistic and evolutionary ideas which owed to Herbert Spencer and to British political economy. Sumner, and in different ways, Franklin Giddings, are associated with this strand. It is important to notice that Lester Ward should not be. It is true that, like Sumner and Giddings, he is properly thought of as an evolutionary naturalist, but Ward's debt was to Comte, not Spencer. Ward had a more holistic conception of the social along with a 'statist' orientation which put him much closer to Ely or to Small. As I suggest, Ward was never a force in the professionalization of American sociology.

Of far more significance to our problem, second, was an optimistic variation of 'old' laissez-faire political economy. America had a version of the Methodenstreit, between Richard Ely, inspired by the Verein für Sozialpolitik, and Simon Newcombe, an able and articulate spokesman for the abstract deductivist conception of political economy which Ricardo had inspired and which J.S. Mill had tried to restrict. John Bates Clark's original integration of the new marginalism effectively 'answered' the socialists and single-taxers and was an important part of the ideological battle which had to be fought. A consequence of the American battle over the nature of political economy, impelled by wholly independent institutional factors, was the opportunity provided to the 'political scientists' to establish 'government' as their domain and to Small, Giddings and E.A. Ross, one of the first of Ely's Wisconsin Ph.D.'s, to
capture the residue under the heading of an autonomous sociology. In the course of this, of course, all three disciplines had to be separated from history.

But if I am correct, the ideas of science which were held, if but vaguely, by the first generation insufficiently distinguished their work (or the promise of their work) from the work done by men of the previous generation. These earlier efforts were seen to be moralistic and metaphysical, a priorist and undisciplined. A clearer articulation of social science as *science* was a desideratum which was much sought. With the advance of chemistry and the culmination of classical physics, the precise nature of a genuine science was just then being debated by an eminent group of philosopher/physicists in Germany, France and England. Kirchhoff's *Principles of Mechanics* (1874), Mach's *Science of Mechanics* (1883), and Ostwald's *General Chemistry* (1888) were among the first blasts toward establishing a *stringently anti-metaphysical empiricist philosophy of science* (Passmore, 1957: ch. 14), the third conceptual source early American social scientists drew on. These writers were joined by Boltzmann and Hertz in Germany, by Duhem and Poincaré in France, and in England by W.K. Clifford and, following the path of Mach, by Karl Pearson. Much of this new philosophy was not new (3). What was new, however, was that with the industrializing of the physical sciences and with the manifest practical applications which attended it, these men could command an authority which would have made Bacon envious. Most critical was the much older idea that scientific explanation was not metaphysical, requiring, as Mach put it, the elimination of superfluous assumptions which cannot be controlled by experience, and above all, assumptions that are metaphysical in Kant's sense (Mach, 1959: xi). Americans of the period were very much aware of this program, and from C.S. Peirce and William James, Giddings and Veblen, it quickly drew responses (Manicas, 1988). Plainly, these ideas had application to social science, and after 1900, they increasingly became part of the explicit rationale for a social science which was self-consciously aimed at prediction and control.

Writing near the end of this transition, Veblen clearly grasped the links between the 'new' empiricist philosophy of science and the constraints and opportunities presented to social scientists. In his brilliant 1906 essay, 'The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,' Veblen defended an old-fashioned view of science in which 'idle curiosity' motivated the search for causal explanations. And he explicitly attacked Pearson and the new
school of anti-metaphysicians: 'Those eminent authorities who speak for a colorless mathematical formulation invariably and necessarily fall back on the (essentially metaphysical) preconception of causation as soon as they go into the actual work of scientific inquiry' (Veblen, 1961: 15). The German-influenced social science of the first generation of American professionals, like the evolutionary naturalist conception which was articulated by Lester Ward, had insisted that empirical outcomes, e.g., poverty, had complex 'underlying' causal determinants. But the search for these causes could be dangerous. As Veblen put it, even if this sort of inquiry' should bear no colour of iconoclasm, 'its outcome will 'disturb the habitual convictions and preconceptions on which they rest' (Veblen, 1957: 136). Given 'the exigencies of competitive academic expertise in America, 'with 'businessmen' as executives of the new universities, there was little choice but to domesticate and de-fang this style of holistic social science. Accordingly, he continued, 'the putative leaders of science' 'enlarge the commonplace,' put aside questions of causes in favor of questions of use, 'on what ought to be done to improve conditions and to conserve those usages and conventions that have by habit become imbedded in the received scheme of use and wont, and so have been found to be good and right.' The result was 'a "science" of complaisant interpretations, apologies, and projected remedies' (ibid.). As it turned out, the new defense of empirical philosophy could not have been better suited for the new professionals.

On my view, World War I was decisive in the victory of positivism. In a stunning consensus, American social scientists enthusiastically encouraged American entry into the war and then enthusiastically cooperated with the government in realizing America's self-defined mission 'to make the world safe for democracy' -even when this meant putting into abeyance both their democratic and their scientific principles (Gruber, 1975; Manicas, 1989). For Anglo-Americans, the defeat of Germany represented, as well, the defeat of 'metaphysical,' 'statist,' historical and holistic German social science. Long suspicious of it in any case, the war proved to them that older British and French empirical philosophies, continuously represented in the 'old' political economy and in British utilitarian theories of government, had been right all along.

The ASSA and Society

We must here pass discussion of both the explosion in capitalistic
development after the Civil War and the character of the American state. With these assumed as key features structuring choices, we can give some institutional flesh to the account by providing some details about the American Social Science Association. Its creation, in 1865, marks the first self-conscious organizational effort by educated Americans to aid the development of Social Science, and to guide the public mind to the best practical means of promoting the Amendment of Laws, the Advancement of Education, the Prevention and Repression of Crime, the Reformation of Criminals, and the progress of Public Morality, the adoption of Sanitary Regulations, and the diffusion of sound principles on Questions of Economy, Trade and Finance. (ASSA Statement of Purpose, quoted from Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 40-41).

The immediate precedent for this was the British Association for the Promotion of Social Science, organized in 1857. A comparison of its goals and composition is here apt. Most of the leadership of the ASSA 'pursued careers as elite cultural workers': college presidents and faculty members, clerics, lawyers, doctors and editors. Some 17.5% were in commerce or manufacturing and only 5% were public officials (Silva and Slaughter, 1984). This contrasted sharply with its British inspiration, whose council included thirty-one peers, forty-eight MPs, nineteen Doctors of Law, fourteen Fellows of the Royal Society and 'numerous, baronets, knights, ministers of the Church of England, professors and Fellows of the London Statistical Society (Abrams, 1968). In middle-class America, this contrast might be expected, but it also exposed a basic flaw in the American association. This comes out if we look at the assumptions and goals of the two organizations.

As the ASSA statement of purpose shows, it followed an older British 'ameliorist' tradition in which the social science which people had in mind was British political economy. More important, it suggested that 'the social problem' could conveniently be defined as a moral problem. It is surely the case that such a view, ceteris paribus, is ideally suited to a capitalist social order: If you're so smart, why ain't you rich? And it is true also that this has been a continuing feature of social 'analysis' -as more recent strategies of 'blaming the victim' confirm. Still, in the naked form in which it first emerged, it seems to have been too simple-minded. After all, if laissez-faire capitalism worked so well and the social problem was a moral problem, then, presumably, all that is required is less state and more effective preachers and moralists. But even with the recent (and quite stunning!) resurgence of these ideas, especially in the US and Britain, there were many who recognized that more and better preaching
would not suffice, especially since, in an increasingly secularized world, preachers had an increasingly difficult time sustaining their claims to authority.

It is hard to judge the impact of the efforts of the ASSA, but surely the members helped fuel a growing recognition that the problems needed the attention of persons with 'sound opinions.' They published the *Journal of Social Science*, were important in the creation of the National Civil Service Reform League, involved in the planning of the Ninth US Census, and perhaps more important, they came before numerous legislative committees, town meetings and public forums in their efforts to provide their 'sound opinions' on 'the great social problems of the day' (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 42-50). Nevertheless, they had little support from either business or government -and after all, they were 'amateurs.'

An 1874 editorial in *Popular Science Monthly* could not have been more blunt:

Recognizing that the aim of this organization is excellent, and much of its work highly commendable ...we are of the opinion that it falls short of what should be its chief duty ...So far from promoting social science, we should rather say that social science is just the subject which it particularly avoids. It might be considered as a general reform convention. It is an organization for public action, and most of its members, hot with impulses of philanthropy, are full of projects of social relief, amelioration, and improvement. Of pure investigation, of the strict and passionless study of society from a scientific point of view, we hear but very little. (Quoted from Furner, 1975: 31).

Silva and Slaughter write that the ASSA leadership became increasingly sensitive to the uses and claims of expertise, and in the late 1870's, they opened their ranks, meetings and publications to the new 'Doctors' returning from Germany. Henry Carter Adams, Henry W. Farnum and Edmund J. James became officials of ASSA. In 1878 the ASSA offered to merge with the newly created first graduate center in America, the Johns Hopkins University; but Daniel Coit Gilman, then president of both the ASSA and Hopkins, declined the offer (Haskell, 1977: 144-167). In his 1880 presidential address, he affirmed the goals of ASSA, but argued that ASSA needed more specialization if it was to generate the needed facts and opinions. He proposed as well that another department be added. Inspired by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, it would specialize in 'historical sociology.' Indeed, the sort of investigation Gilman seems to have envisioned called not only for specialization, but for resources which he saw could be provided by the new university, working hand in glove with
both business and government. Gilman knew, of course, that the University of Berlin had established an organizational model for the industrializing of natural science. And he knew full well that this was becoming the cutting edge of Germany's rapid modernization. The new university in America could assemble the resources, money, and people to industrialize social science. Indeed, as early as 1875, contemplating the future Hopkins, Gilman had written:

I incline more and more to the belief that what is wanted in Baltimore is not a scientific school, nor a classical college, nor both combined; but a faculty of medicine, and [following the German model] a faculty of philosophy ...that each head of a great department. ...shall be as far as possible free from the interference of other departments ...that advanced special students be first provided for (Quoted from Vesey, 1965: 160).

Gilman was not alone in this conception. It was shared by other leaders, for example, Andrew White of Cornell (founded in 1868) and Samuel Eliot of Harvard, as well as by Michigan's Angell and, after its creation with Rockefeller money in 1892, by Chicago's William R. Harper. 'Departments' with 'head professors' won autonomy at Cornell and Hopkins in the 1880's, at Harvard after 1891 and at Chicago at its inception. No doubt this vision of the university was shared by many both in and out of the university.

At the heart of these educational manager's vision was specialization. Systematically organized, specialized knowledge would place university-based experts in a position of advantage in answering the full array of technical and social questions facing industrial America. Legitimate monopoly would follow successful solution of problems and the university -not regional culture, traditional religion or corrupt party politics -would develop "scientific" criteria for national decision making. (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 71).

Up to this time the idea of specialized social sciences had not been institutionalized; but as suggested, it seems likely that the Americans got the idea from German 'institutes' in the natural sciences, and especially the medical specialties. In America, propelled by the American ideology of 'freedom,' Lernfreiheit was early on transformed into the elective system, first at Eliot's Harvard in 1869. The idea that students should be free to choose in the academic 'marketplace' was easily joined to the new demand to specialize.

The success of this project required that 'progressive' leaders in big
business and national politics see that it was an idea which could easily serve their interests. And, of course, it required the cooperation, perhaps leadership, of the Doctors of *Staatswissenschaften* returning from Germany. But before turning directly to them, three further developments should be noted. They help us to see how converging interests outside the university structured an outcome which professors cooperated in producing and how, looking back, the outcome had all the feeling of the inevitable.

**The NCF, the NML and American Empire**

Leaders in business, labor, government and education had sensed that the problems being generated needed some creative and imaginative response. The National Civic Federation (NCF) was remarkably successful in this regard. Organized in 1900, its founding statement compares with that of ASSA. The NCF aimed

> to organize the best brains of the nation in an educational movement towards the solution of some of the great problems related to industrial and social progress: to provide for the study and discussion of questions of national import, to aid thus in the crystallization of the most enlightened public opinion; and when desirable, to promote legislation therewith. (Quoted from Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 186).

But the membership of the NCF stands in stunning contrast to the membership of the old ASSA. From business came Marcus A. Hanna (its first president), Andrew Carnegie, Cyrus McCormick (tractors), George Perkins (J.P. Morgan) and George B. Corteyou (Consolidated Gas), to name but a few. By 1903, there were representatives in the NCF from one-third of the 367 corporations with capitalization of more than $10 million. Organized labor was also represented in its council. Seated were Samuel Gompers (the First Vice President) and John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers, along with heads of the major railroad unions and the American Federation of Labor. The executive committee included future and former presidents of the US: Grover Cleveland, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson. Not forgetting its mission, of course, it included prominently in its leadership the new educational managers, including Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia) and serving as president from 1908, Seth Low, the man who had transformed Columbia College into Columbia University, Benjamin Ide Wheeler (California) and Harvard's Eliot.
Weinstein judges that the NCF was ‘the most important single organization of the socially conscious big business men and their academic and political theorists’ (1968: 6). Indeed, the NCF Review reported some twenty NCF projects ranging from mediating agreements between unions and employers, to stimulating welfare programs in factories, to investigations aimed at influencing legislation regarding trusts, public utilities, regulation, immigration, currency reform, workmen’s compensation and child labor. Remarkably, thirty-six university and college presidents played roles, along with some twenty-one additional ‘educational managers,’ some forty-five leaders of the very recently organized disciplinary associations and another forty-four academics from the new social sciences (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 188-192). The direction of these activities, both substantive and ideological, is clear enough. The NCF ‘stood in opposition to what it considered its twin enemies: the socialists and radicals among workers and middle class reformers and the “anarchists” among the businessmen (as it characterized the NAM)’ (Weinstein, 1968: 6).

The members of the NCF, of course, were ‘progressives,’ and they were not wrong in their recognition of their ‘twin enemies.’ On the right were the small businessmen, the ruling class base of traditional urban America, along with their ideologists: the clerics, lawyers, schoolteachers and physicians—the people who promoted the ‘old economics’ and the idea that the social problem was fundamentally a moral problem. On the left was a very broad and largely disorganized range of ‘radicals,’ from genuine socialists, e.g., Eugene Debs, to single taxers, Bellamyites and anarchists, to genuine progressives, e.g., Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, to ‘middle class reformers,’ including the most progressive elements of the new academics.

The men of the NCF shared with the ‘radicals’ and ‘reformers’ in seeing the relation between capital and labor as the central problem for the emerging order. An active member of the Massachusetts Civic Federation, Louis Brandeis, remembered for his critical judicial role in progressivism, identified the issue in terms of the most pressing policy problem. Collective bargaining, he insisted, was essential if capitalism was to survive and prosper. Indeed, unions were ‘a bulwark against the great wave of socialism’ (quoted from Weinstein, 1968: 17). The problem was to absorb the right, squash the radicals, and domesticate the reformers. As suggested, the university played a critical role, defining itself in terms which satisfied its sponsors, beautifully represented by NCF.
Central to this was realization of the idea which oilman and the other educational managers had so clearly articulated, an industrialized social science of specialists.

There was a second related development which also helps us in grasping the outcome. With the largest immigration in the history of the world in full force and with infra-structural demands on cities accelerating monumentally: housing, harbors, streets and railways, water supply. Electricity, sanitation, and fire control, city politics in the US was creating opportunities for both new possibilities for graft and corruption and, even less agreeable to the older oligarchy, grass roots ethnic politics. On this, the businessmen, journalists, and reformers of WASP America could join hands; but as above, the solutions were not all equally agreeable to the older oligarchy or to the new corporate liberals. German-educated Frank Goodnow put the problem: 'It has been felt that city government must, to be efficient, be emancipated from the tyranny of the national and state parties, and from that of the legislature --the tool of the party....[But] to avoid tyranny and preserve control is not easy' (quoted from Silva and Slaughter. 1984: 219). The ideal solution had been articulated earlier by John H. Patterson, the founder and president of Dayton's National Cash Register Company. For him, 'a city is a great business enterprise whose stockholders are the people,' Ideally, 'municipal affairs would be placed on a strict business basis. They would, accordingly, be directed 'not by partisans, either Republican or Democratic, but by men who are skilled in business management and social science (quoted from Weinstein. 1968: 93). Commission and council manager government was the 'natural' solution. This development goes very far in explaining the assertion of autonomy by political scientists in the American university. 'Public administration' could be a 'scientific' subdiscipline of the new 'political science.'

There was one final development. America had also begun a quest for empire. But in contrast to Great Britain and even to Germany, it lacked an imperial civil service. Here then was another developing structural place for academic expertise. This opportunity was exploited in Panama, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Mexico. Indeed, at its 1898 annual meeting, 'the AEA [American Economic Association] ratified the expansion of American capitalism by appointing a blue ribbon committee under the chairmanship of [J.W.] Jenks, with the assistance of [E.R.A.] Seligman and [C.H.] Hull to work out the best means of administering colonies' (Furner, 1975: 276). Jenks 'guided the reorganization of
Philippine finances,' Hopkins' economics professor Jacob Hollander became nothing less than treasurer of Puerto Rico, and Samuel Lindsay of Pennsylvania's Wharton school, 'organized and administered the Puerto Rican school system from 1898-1902' (ibid.: 286). Most interesting perhaps was the role social scientists played in the US's first response to 'democratic' China. Following the revolution of 1910, Harvard's president Eliot, touring China on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) --by no means a party lacking distinct and not always benign global interests --agreed to petition the CEIP for a list of experts to be sent to assist Chinese political reform. As a consequence, Frank Goodnow sailed to China to become constitutional advisor to the new regime. He was replaced, in 1916, by W.F. and W.W. Willoughby, both Doctors of Staatswissenschaften and leaders in the American Political Science Association. Woodrow Wilson, himself, of course, a 1886 Hopkins's Ph.D., appointed Ely-trained Paul Reinsch as ambassador. Goodnow, interestingly, embarrassed Wilson when he advised the regime that China was not ready for sophisticated democratic forms. President Yuan Shai-Kai was pleased to act on his advice. He reconstituted the monarchy with himself as emperor (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 231)!

**The Development of the 'Disciplines'**

The materials for a reconstituted disciplinary social science were thus at hand, but the final outcome depended upon what key players within the academy would do with these materials. The new Doctors, employing these structured resources, conceptual and institutional, did not engage in a conspiracy. They did not need to. Like actors anywhere, they acted with a variety of purposes. And, as anywhere, their cumulative activities had consequences which outran their intentions. Given their specific structured situations, sketched in the foregoing, the outcome was a set of new social science disciplines, each shorn of German metaphysics and the 'heat' of philanthropic impulse; each committed to the 'strict and passion-less study of society from a scientific point of view.'

The process was to take two generations, beginning with creation of graduate programs in the social sciences. Columbia's School of Political Science, established under John Burgess in 1880, compared with Herbert B. Adams's Graduate Program in Historical Studies at Hopkins. While the names of the two program differed, there was no appreciable
difference in their offerings. These included courses in history, politics, economics and geography. Educated willy nilly in all, the first generation of American social scientists moved easily from one topic to another. The process of abandoning a German-inspired, comprehensive conception of social-scientific inquiry in favor of pragmatically and professionally defined, narrowly disciplinary discourses may be highlighted by way of a brief account of intellectual and institutional developments in two key disciplines, namely economics and sociology.

Economics

The relation of political economy --or since Marshall's *Principles of Economics* (1890) simply 'economics'--to history and political science is complicated. Political economy had been taught as part of the curriculum in 'moral philosophy' in America's schools. Its teachers had included Francis Wayland, a Baptist minister and later president of Brown, Henry Carey, a business man with extensive Pennsylvania mining and manufacturing interests, and clerics, Francis Bowen, John Bascom and Arthur Latham Perry, to name but a few. In the 1870's, this tradition, representing a melding of laissez-faire British economy and Puritanism, had a firm grip on the posts in political economy in the older college curriculum in America (O'Connor, 1944; Dorfman, 1949). Although this is usually not much noticed, the problem in America was that the new doctors returning from Germany had deeply imbibed German historical economics (4). It was by no means guaranteed that in challenging the older tradition, the German brand would lose out. It was not merely that these men had the authority of their decrees, but that they were reformers in a period when reform was very much in the air.

The theoretical issue was joined when in 1884 Richard Ely published 'Past and Present Political Economy,' in Adams' *Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science* (Furner, 1975: 60). There was nothing surprising about what he said. The 'old' political economy was deductivist, hypothetical, abstract; it glorified the baser emotions and selfishness and made it seem that competition was divinely ordained. The 'new' political economy, anchored in concrete history, had a firm grip on reality and it could show how the state could be used to advance the interests of people in society. Ely's attack earned a response. It came from Simon Newcombe, author of *Principles of Political Economy* (1885), also a professional on the Hopkins faculty, but not all
that surprisingly, a mathematician and an astronomer! Newcombe confidently and ably defended
the apriorism of British political economy, and while Schumpeter (1984: 866) asserts that his
book is 'the outstanding performance of American general economics in the pre-Clark-Fisher-
Taussig epoch,' he did it, unsurprisingly, without any of the qualifications or restrictions which
I.S. Mill's evidently ignored 'Unsettled Questions' had tried to make clear.

Mill, it may be remembered, defended political economy as an 'essentially abstract
science'; but he went on to argue that its conclusions, 'like those of geometry, are only true, as the
common phrase is, in the abstract' (Mill, 1974: 144). Accordingly, 'it does not treat the whole of
man's nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is
concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth...' (1974: 137) --just as Ely
had charged. Mill had concluded that the problem for practice was how to go from 'abstract
truths' to the 'facts of the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has
surrounded them' (1974: 148). That Mill did not settle the 'unsettled questions,' of course, is
exactly why there was a Methodenstreit in Germany, why Durkheim rose to challenge French
political economy, and why, in America, Ely and Newcombe were at war. The critics shared in
believing that the real world did not answer to the abstractions of the classical school and thus
that they could not be used to grasp concrete social life (5).

Nearly coincident with the opening shots, Edmund I. James and Simon N. Patten had
begun planning for an organization, modeled on Schmoller's Verein für Sozialpolitik. It would
combat the widespread view that our economic problems would solve themselves, and that our laws and
institutions which at present favor industrial instead of collective action can promote the best utilization
of our material resources and secure to each individual the highest development of all his faculties.
(Quoted from Dorfman, 1949, Vol. 3: 205)

Ely grabbed at the chance to professionalize political economy along lines that he and his
German-influenced colleagues had set out. Since the enemy camp had established chairs in
universities, this complicated matters considerably. The original statement of principles had been
blunt, asserting that 'the conflict between labor and capital has brought to prominence a vast
number of problems, whose solution requires the united efforts, each in its own sphere, of the
church, of the state, and of
The problem, plainly, was the implicit and explicit socialism which these men endorsed (6). When in 1885, Ely had published an essay, 'Recent American Socialism,' and a book, The Labor Movement. Sumner was led to call Ely a 'charlatan.' In an unsigned review, Simon described the book as 'the ravings of an anarchist and the dreams of a socialist.' He concluded that 'Dr. Ely seems ...to be seriously out of place in a university chair' (quoted by Dorfman, ill, 1949: 163).

The assessment was wildly unfair. Still, it surely served the wider purpose for which it must have been intended. The events of the period, including the boycott by Yale and Harvard of the AEA, but more importantly, 'unprecedented labor violence and vicious capitalist retaliation,' and then, in 1886, the Haymarket affair, led to a break in the ranks. In a critical essay in Science, Henry C. Adams, himself in difficulty with his split appointment at Cornell and Michigan, capitulated. As Furner puts the matter: 'Professional economists were not going to be permitted to make ethical judgments that challenged basic values or threatened entrenched interests. To avoid catastrophe for his emerging profession, Adams proposed giving up any claim to moral authority' (1975: 101). From the other side, Charles F. Dunbar, head of economics at Harvard, was prepared to offer concessions. In the first issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which he edited, Dunbar offered that 'revisionist' political economy was 'no revolution, but a natural reaction, probably salutary', and destined to promote ultimately a rapid but still orderly development of the science, upon the lines laid down by the great masters of what is called the deductivist school' (quoted by Furner, 1975: 110). This was so much nonsense, but because it was a hand eagerly taken by the 'revisionists,' the fundamental differences in the two conceptions of political economy have since been obscured (7).
Ely surely had a conception of his science which differed from Dunbar's; but he had never been a radical in any useful sense of the word. Two years previously he had himself denounced 'rebels against society' who stood for 'common property, socialist production and distribution; the grossest materialism,... free love ...and ...anarchy' (quoted by Herbst, 1965: 9). Ely called himself 'a progressive conservative;' but red-baiting was already a potent weapon in America. In 1892, Ely was forced to resign from his long-held position as secretary of the AEA. The year of the Pullman strike (1894), he was charged with speaking and writing 'in favor of socialism and social violence' (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 89). He disavowed any such sympathies and eventually was acquitted. By the time that he was elected President of the AEA in 1900, he had changed his mind sufficiently to endorse almost everything he had once opposed. In his presidential address, he offered that competition was both natural and beneficient. On his more considered view, what was needed was a balance between 'the socialist extension of government activity ...and that of conservative demand' (quoted by Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 147).

It is of considerable significance to note that the 'orderly development' to which Dunbar had referred included John Bates Clark's enduring answer to the moral implications of the idea of surplus value. Summarizing Clark, Silva and Slaughter write, 'if socialists could prove that capitalist society defrauded workers of their product, then all good men would join them.' Accordingly, said Clark: 'I wish to test the power of recent economic theory to give an exact answer to this question' (quoted by Silva and Slaughter: 111). Marginalism, of course, exactly did this. Schumpeter notes that Clark must be given credit for 'subjective originality,' in that while Thünen, Jevons, Menger and Walras preceded him in arriving at marginalism, Clark quite independently had arrived at similar conclusions. Schumpeter offers that American economists took slowly to the marginalist message. Perhaps in America, the rout of the challengers could have been accomplished even without it? The outcome, in any case, is clear. Rid of its Germanisms and formally fitted with differential equations, economics was securely in the hands of descendents of 'the great masters of the deductive school.' As for the others who stayed, they were, like Veblen, derisively termed 'sociologists,' or perhaps more kindly, as with Commons, Wesley Mitchell and his descendents, 'institutional economists.'
Sociology

A fallout from the debate over the character of economics was the emergence of the first department of sociology in the world, in the new University of Chicago. Chicago had institutionalized de nova, with separate departments in the social sciences. Political economy was the largest. It was led by I. Lawrence Laughlin and included Veblen. History, led by I. Franklin Jameson and German-born von Holtz, was next. Political science was the smallest, with Harry Pratt Judson as its head. It included E.J. James, professor of public administration, who left in 1902 to become president of Northwestern, and Ernst Freund, associate professor of jurisprudence and public law. Charles E. Merriam, joined the department in 1900. Significantly, his was the only appointment designated as 'political science' (Karl, 1974: 44-45). John Dewey headed the department of philosophy, psychology and pedagogy, which included G.H. Mead. Albion Small's sociology department numbered four. It included Vincent and W.I. Thomas. Thomas's year in Germany had been spent studying Wundtian 'folk psychology,' and like Vincent, he taught while he earned his Ph.D. Karl writes that Small's department 'dominated in spirit.' At that time, he perceptively writes that sociology could be viewed 'as a modernization of the reform sciences' (ibid.). Speaking generally, by this time, courses in 'social science' were residual in the colleges and universities of the US and included a host of subjects which were not covered in the standard offerings in history, politics and economics. Indeed, along with courses called 'municipal sociology,' even up-to-date Hopkins offered a course entitled simply 'Charities and Corrections,' taught by Jeffrey R. Brackett, the Chair of the Board of Charities and Corrections of the city of Baltimore (Bernard and Bernard, 1943: 643).

The conventional wisdom has it that the conceptual framework of American sociology is rooted in Comte, mediated by Lester Ward, and in Herbert Spencer. Though it was plainly self-serving for Small to argue that Ward 'improvised an entirely mistaken interpretation of cause and effect when he led Americans to believe that they owe sociology to Comte,' he was not wrong in insisting that there was an 'efficient cross-fertilization' which had come 'from the German tradition' (Small, 1924: 315). This was, of course, a tradition, which along with so many others, he had represented. It included a host of scholars who had identified themselves as political economists, including E.A. Ross, author of the
influential 1901 _Social Control_. Perhaps, Ross's professional trajectory speaks volumes about the emerging discipline of sociology. In 1897, Ross wrote to Ward that the president of Stanford, David Starr Jordan, 'took occasion after the horror excited in the East by my free silver advocacy to remove me as far as possible from all connections with Finance by making me Prof. of Sociology' (quoted by Faris, 1967: 6).

There were, then, at least three streams in these early years: the Comtean, through Ward, the Spencerian, developed, as Small says, by Sumner and Franklin H. Giddings, and the German. Ward was quickly marginalized within the academy. Not only was he an imperializing sociologist, but his style of technocracy must surely have frightened the corporate liberals. For almost opposite reasons Sumner too was marginalized. His individualism was too ragged for the emerging mainstream. Because it was a hybrid of Greek and Latin, Sumner evidently disliked the word 'sociology.' He died (in 1910) as Professor of the Science of Society.

The German roots of so many of the reformers help us to explain how the force of Small's presence at Chicago critically impelled the particular professionalization of sociology in America. Not only was Chicago a model, but Small was editor of _The American Journal of Sociology_ (founded in 1894), the only professional journal of sociology until 1921. He was senior author of the first textbook in sociology (written with George E. Vincent), a book which had wide use in America. Finally, along with Ward, Giddings and Ross, already leaders in AEA, he was one of the organizers of the American Sociological Society which, in 1905, broke off from the AEA (Silva and Slaughter, 1984: 162).

In his 1907 _Adam Smith and Modern Sociology: A Study in the Methodology of the Social Sciences_, Small articulated the main point: 'Modern sociology,' he wrote, 'is virtually an attempt to take up the larger program of social analysis and interpretation which was implicit in Adam Smith's moral philosophy, but which was suppressed for a century by prevailing interest in the technique of the production of wealth (quoted by Becker, 1971: 12). This was an accurate description of the way Smith was read after Ricardo isolated what Schumpeter and others identified as the 'analytic core' of economics. And it suggested, as Small knew, the substance of the 'Menger-Schmoller debate,' which Small treated extensively in his _Origins of Sociology_. There was, however, a serious flaw in his original conception. It was a flaw which he shared with Ward and which he came quickly to
acknowledge: If the social process was the outcome of many concurrently operating causes, nothing was irrelevant to understanding what was going on. But if so, didn't that make sociology an imperialist inquiry, subsuming all the others? As Becker writes: 'Who would transact with such a monster: Who would welcome its meetings? Who would be comfortable with its aims and findings, if these aims and findings were in explicit defiance of what one was doing oneself?' (Becker, 1971: 18).

There were some alternative possibilities. One had been realized by Richmond Mayo Smith, who at Columbia had aligned 'social science' with demography and vital statistics. The titles of his two main books are significant: *Statistics and Sociology* (1895) and *Statistics and Economics* (1899). Not irrelevantly, Giddings had been invited to replace Mayo Smith while he was on leave, and in 1894, president Seth Low created a chair in sociology which Giddings filled. Giddings seems to have been deeply method conscious, getting from Lewe's *Problems of Life and Mind* the positivist's idea that laws were but relations of 'antecedents and consequences.' He adopted Mill's methods, and in the late nineties, he discovered Mach, and Pearson's new 'correlation coefficient,' little $r$. These influences were developed in his *Inductive Sociology* (1901), which called for a rigorous quantitative sociology. This found little favor with Small, not surprisingly. On his view, and perceptively, Giddings vacillated between a method which was 'essentially Baconian' and one with stressed 'first principles,' 'a picturesque yoking together of the scientific ox and the speculative ass' (quoted by Bannister, 1978: 73). (8).

Gradually, perhaps without conscious design, Small retreated from his original vision. Later, he explained his imperialist enthusiasm as the 'sin' of 'amateurish ambition.' By 1924 he had arrived at the following quite agreeable position: 'A sociologist, properly speaking, is a man [sic] whose professional procedure consists in the discovery or analysis of categories of human group composition or reaction and behavior, or in use of such categories as means of interpreting or controlling group situations' (Small, 1924: 348).

*Professional* sociology was, first of all, method. This allowed that sociology could be thought of as disciplined social research, the qualitative and quantitative description of society. Second, sociology concerned 'groups,' all sorts of groups: families, criminals, ethnic groups, peasants, etc. This gave sociology a critical role to play in the new division of labor and allowed it to exclude all those important social questions which had so annoyed the patrons of the educational managers. Indeed, without
notice, it made sociology consistent with the dominating methodological individualism of political science and economics. How many today think of 'groups' in identifying 'the social?'

Third, sociology would have a particular 'theoretical' component --very much in keeping with the later misreading of Weber's 'sociology': 'the discovery and analysis of categories' (Manicas, 1987: 127-140). Gone and quite forgotten was the original causal thrust of Small's earlier vision. The construction of typologies would replace this. Finally, and not unimportantly, sociology had a practical role: As Ross had urged, it was 'a means of interpreting and controlling group situations.' Professional sociologists were neither charlatans nor muck-rakers. Nor were they professionalizing social workers or untrained reformers. But in identifying a domain consistent with the recently articulated domains of history, political science and economics, they could still participate in the reformist liberal corporate order. As Silva and Slaughter conclude, 'in 1904, sociology was beginning to establish its monopoly of knowledge from reformist European social theory and the ASSA's leftovers' (1984: 174).

The Great War was decisive. Led by Small until his death in 1926, Thomas, and journalist-turned-sociologist Robert E. Park, the Chicago department of sociology had fostered a rich qualitative if psychologistic approach in their studies. But in the terms of the 20's and later, it was dubiously 'science' (9). We can, perhaps, use 1929 to date the maturation of empirical sociology in the US. That year, funded by the Rockefeller foundation with support from the SSRC and the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Herbert Hoover assembled a distinguished group of social scientists 'to examine into the feasibility of a national survey of social trends...to undertake the researches and make...a complete impartial examination of the facts' (quoted from Gerstein, 1986). The report, known informally as 'the Ogburn Report,' after sociologist William F. Ogburn, contained over 1600 pages of quantitative research. Perhaps it was fitting that in 1930, Ogburn, a spiritual descendent of Giddings, left Columbia to go to Chicago.

Conclusion

This chapter has made the effort to give an explanation of the particular institutionalization of the social sciences in America, a model which, I believe, is now dominant in the world. One would like to think that this is because the disciplines represent natural kinds and because reigning
empiricist methodologies are the surest way to truth. The argument here suggests otherwise. Briefly, as anything in the social world, the social sciences are social constructions. Thus they were constituted by specific, often nameable persons operating in concrete situations with specific resources at hand. I have tried to argue that the political and economic conditions of late-nineteenth-century America structured possibilities for institutional changes in higher education, that these were exploited by educational managers and then by academics well placed in the new universities. I have argued, as well, that particular outcomes depended critically on the conceptual materials at hand, materials which themselves have a social history. All of this could have been otherwise. Most important, perhaps, by understanding this, we may be clearer about what, as social scientists, we should be doing.

Notes

1. I have in mind here most especially those characteristic perfunctory 'histories' which form the introduction of all modern textbooks in the social sciences. The pattern is the same, however, even when the history is given a full-dress treatment, especially if the author is a competent professional of the discipline. Indeed, this is the case even where the result is a very useful study. Outstanding examples are Boring's classic, History of Experimental Psychology (1929) and Schumpeter's monumental History of Economic Analysis (1954). [Due to space limitations space, accounts of psychology, history and anthropology were omitted in this final version. For an account of psychology, see my 'Whither Psychology' in Margolis et al (1986). For American psychology, see my 'Dewey and American Psychology,' Journal for Theory of Social Behavior.]


Public institutions, excepting Michigan and Wisconsin, played very small roles in establishing the pattern of the American university. Vesey comments, 'by 1900 only a handful of states had provided outstanding public universities, fit to be compared with the leading private establishments' (p. 15). Ezra Comell, whose Western Union Telegraph boomed during the Civil War, generously endowed Cornell, but his machinations with the legislature set back public higher education in New York State for many decades. See Bishop, 1962. There are good histories of the leading institutions which each provide valuable detail.

Vesey remarks that it is false to assume that the competitive style of American development spurred innovation and fluidity (pp. 330-331). This was likely true initially, but once institutions collectively discovered that the now-familiar pattern suited the new environment, it became suicidal to risk innovation. Clark, for example, began in 1889 as an all-graduate institution, dedicated to 'pure science', e.g. natural science, mathematics and psychology. Clark quickly became disillusioned and president G. Stanley Hall failed to secure ancillary funds. For decades, the institution languished until the 'experiment' was
abandoned. More recently, Vesey’s own University of California at Santa Cruz is a good example.

3. The empiricist philosophy of science of these writers should be contrasted not to neo-Kantian philosophies, e.g., the philosophy of Hertz, which also restricted science to the empirical, but to ‘realist’ philosophies, rightly associated with the ‘English’ physicists Thomson and Maxwell, with Helmholtz and then later with Planck and Einstein (Manicas, 1987). It is important to notice that Vienna positivism, surely impelled by the War, owed much to these earlier views. The use of Principia logic enabled the Vienna positivists to generate a powerful- and incredibly influential-view. Vienna positivism would powerfully influence the generation of the late 30’s and thereafter. It would do so, however, because the basic orientation had already been established.

4. I recognize differences, of course, between the so-called ‘first generation’ of historical economists, Roscher and Knies, e.g., the second, Schmoller, and the third, Weber, but for present purposes, I do not here try to separate influences of these. I believe that most Americans were most influenced by the Schmoller school. Weber made no impact—until Americans got Talcott Parsons’s imaginative version.

5. These critics were to include Veblen, who joined the argument somewhat later. Veblen was not trained in Germany. Indeed, he was a ‘philosopher,’ who encountered C.S. Peirce at Hopkins and wrote a dissertation on Kant at Yale! Veblen thoroughly controlled classical and neoclassical economics and wrote still-valuable critiques of these. For him, they were ‘taxonomic.’ He believed that while ‘the Historical School’ did attempt ‘an account of developmental sequence,’ they followed ‘the lines of pre-Darwinian speculations,’ ‘They have given a narrative survey of phenomena, not a genetic account of an unfolding process’ (“Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” (1987), reprinted in Veblen, 1961).

6. As American ‘socialists of the chair,’ of course, even those who endorsed socialism were in no sense radicals, still less revolutionary socialists. Ely was a Christian Socialist. The ideas of socialists like Daniel De Leon were out of the realm of academic debate. De Leon, who could not be promoted at Columbia after he supported Henry George in the New York mayoral race (1889), left the academy to become a leader in the American Socialist Party (formed in 1903).

7. Characteristically, Furner (1975) does not appreciate this. She offers that both sides exaggerated differences and that the motivations of Ely and Simon, the original contestants, were more personal than theoretical. Accordingly, ‘moderates’ came to prevail. To see what was at issue one needs only to consider the list of figures discussed by Schumpeter as worthy of discussion and to see who is omitted (1954: 865-873). Included are Dunbar, Hadley, Newcomb, Sumner, Clark, Taussig and Fisher. ‘Exemplifying’ those who ‘neither contributed to the development of our apparatus of analysis nor proved themselves masters in its use’ are Ely, Henry C. Adams and Seligman. The ‘institutionalists,’ Veblen and Commons, are but mentioned.

8. Nor did this version of ‘science’ find favor with philosopher of science C.S. Peirce. As Bannister cites him: ‘Giddings, like Gabriel Tarde, copied "the phraseology of mathematics, as if that possesses, in itself, a secret virtue of'
rending vague ideas precise” (Bannister, 1987: 76-77). Is it unfair to say that the 'yoking together of the scientific ox and the speculative ass' remains a key feature of mainstream sociology?

9. The dilemma is beautifully expressed in the 1937 SSRC assessment of *The Polish Peasant*, Thomas and Znaniecki's five-volume work. It was named by an SSRC poll of leading sociologists for a conference as 'the most significant piece of research in American sociology' (Paris, 1976: 17). Herbert Blumer, also of the Chicago Department, led off the assessment. Blumer concluded that 'the massive materials on the Poles did not, and could not, constitute a test of any of the propositions of the Methodological Note' (*ibid.*: 18). Faris summarizes: 'Although it was never put this bluntly, it would seem that *The Polish Peasant* consists of two little-related parts. Concrete data [four volumes] on the peasants themselves were but slightly used by the authors and perhaps not at all by other sociologists; the contribution of this part perhaps was to inspire successors to undertake labor of data gathering on a massive scale. The Methodological Note, on the other hand, which stood apart from the rest of the study, launched an important and enduring discussion of the attitudes and values, contributed to the weakening of the instinct theory by the formulation of wishes, and helped to give sociologists the courage, in defiance of the growing vogue of behavioristic psychology, to find a place for subjective aspects of human life' (*ibid*). Of course, Ogburn, Chapin, Lundberg and the methodologists found little, if any, science in this. What remained, then, was a disconnected 'social psychology' and the 'labor of data gathering on a massive scale.'

References


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