HUMAN SECURITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:1
Power Shifts and Emerging Security Regimes

Majid Tehranian

Paper presented at an

International Conference on Human Security and Global Governance

Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research

Honolulu, Hawaii, June 6-8, 1997

"When the forms of an old culture are dying, the new culture is created

by a few people who are not afraid to be insecure." -- Rudolf Bahro

Introduction

Aloha and welcome to the first international conference of the Human Security and Global Governance (HUGG) Project. On behalf of the Toda Institute and the other conference co-sponsors, the School of Politics of La Trobe University, and the Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace at the University of Hawaii, it is a special pleasure and privilege for me to thank you for your gracious acceptance of our invitation. For the next three days, we have here an embarrassment of riches. As I look around this room, I see many distinguished peace scholars and policymakers from all over the world coming together to set our research agenda for the next four years. This conference promises to be a major intellectual landmark in a project that aims at promoting a dialogue of civilizations on the normative and empirical aspects of global rule-making for the attainment of human security in all of its complex dimensions.

June 6th is the 126th birthday of Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871-1944), the founder of Soka Gakkai, the lay Buddhist organization that has established the Toda Institute. By scheduling this conference on this particular date, we are honoring the life of a pioneer of peace in Japan who bravely fought the Japanese military regime during the 1930s and who, as a consequence, was imprisoned for his struggles for peace, human rights, and religious freedom. In 1944, Mr. Makiguchi died in prison. The Toda Institute was established in 1996 by Daisaku Ikeda, the third president of Soka Gakkai, in order his mentor Josei Toda. Toda was Makiguchi's disciple and fellow prisoner, who following the conclusion of the war, led the Soka Gakkai into a great successful expansion. As you have noted from our Mission Statement, "The Toda Institute is a an independent, non-partisan, and nonprofit organization committed to the pursuit of peace with peaceful means and a complete abolition of war."

Some Conceptual Quagmires

The concepts of "human security" and "global governance" can raise perplexing questions. They stand at the extremes of micro and macro polarities. Whereas human security is concerned primarily with individual welfare conditions, global governance focuses on generalized rules of international regimes. To juxtapose these two concepts into a single thematic sweep may be considered too ambitious at best, or foolhardy at worst. However, it is a sign of our own era of globalization that a project such as the Toda Institute's Human Security and Global Governance (HUGG) has already received considerable scholarly collaboration. In practical politics, the threats to basic human security such as the famines in Africa, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and human rights violations elsewhere have already prompted United Nations humanitarian interventions, albeit awkwardly and haphazardly. It is timely therefore to ask the question: What rights of intervention does the international community have when threats to human rights and security cross certain thresholds?

This question cannot be answered in the abstract. Global governance is not global government. Whereas global government, conspicuous by its absence, suggests a centralized political system of rule-making, rule-enforcement, and rule-adjudication, global governance implies a far more complex, explicit, implicit, and evolving system of interlocking unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral body of rules that only partially govern the world. These rules have been primarily focused on matters of international peace and security. But globalization of the world economy and society is increasingly demonstrating the inadequacy of such an approach; it calls for a broader consideration of security to include such human rights as political, socio-economic, cultural, and environmental security (UNDP 1994; Haq 1995; Falk 1995; Tehranian & Reed 1996). We are at a critical juncture in human history in which the forces of globalization can tip us toward either more humane forms of governance or growing global gaps that will turn the world into islands of riches in oceans of structural poverty, resentment, and violence.

The opening of a new century has always served as a symbolic turning point in human history. The twenty-first century is not an exception. The world stands at a historical juncture between the roads to self-destruction and self-renewal. On the one hand, an environmental catastrophe, a nuclear holocaust, a population explosion of unprecedented magnitude, a protracted terrorist war between the rich and poor, armed by conventional and unconventional weapons, a war among ethnic groups (as in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon), or among powerful regional blocs (fortress North America vs. fortress Western Europe vs. fortress East Asia), all seem to be distinct possibilities. On the other hand, human achievements in science, technology, telecommunication, education, and social organization have made possible new heights in human civilization. The conquest of ignorance, poverty, and suffering, the achievement of a new harmony among nations and between nature and humanity, and the development of a new sense of world community for the exploration of the outer and inner spaces all seem within reach.

This essay emphasizes the second path by focusing on the variety of human rights and discussing how they can be more securely guaranteed by the international community through its emerging security regimes at the interlocking global, regional, national, and local levels. Following a brief discussion of human security issues framed as human rights, the essay maps the current power shifts and emerging regimes in terms of seven major megatrends: globalism, regionalism, nationalism, localism, feminism, environmentalism, and revivalism. The essay identifies the tensions within each of these trends and how emerging power shifts can or cannot contribute to the construction of more humane global governance.

From Human Rights to Human Care

The postwar discourse on human rights may be viewed as a dialogue of civilizations on human security issues. As embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, the first generation of human rights was primarily inspired by the ideologies of Western liberal democratic revolutions. It focused on civil and political liberties, including the right to life, liberty and security of person; to freedom from slavery or torture; the right to recognition as a person before the law and to judicial remedies and a fair trial; the right to leave any country, including one's own; and the right to marry, to found a family, to own property. Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion, expression and assembly, as well as the right to take part in the government of one's own country, are also cited.

By contrast, the second generation was primarily introduced into the international discourse by the social democratic and communist revolutions focusing on social and economic rights, including the rights to work and to equal pay for equal work; to education, leisure, social security and an adequate standard of living, as well as the right to participate in the cultural life of the community. The newly-independent states in the United Nations organs in alliance with the socialist countries helped, in 1966, to legislate these rights into the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The Covenant came into force in 1976. Together with the Universal Declaration, they form what is frequently called "the International Bill of Human Rights" (UN 1986: 302-4).

The third generation came to be recognized primarily through the struggles of the colonized peoples who viewed the domination of their former colonizers as a threat to their own collective life. Whereas the first and second generation of rights were primarily conferred on individuals, the third generation recognized the rights of collectivities. Among them, during the 1970s, the right to communicate (Fisher & Harms 1983) became an important category of rights recognizing the right to speak, to teach and be taught in one's own native language­ a right that continues to be violated by many dictatorial as well as so-called democratic regimes. Additionally, under article 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, when an officially proclaimed state of emergency "threatens the life of the nation," a State party may be temporarily released from some of its obligations under the Covenant. However, no departure may be made from provisions for the right to life, freedom from torture or slavery, freedom from imprisonment for failure to fulfill a contract, freedom from criminal charges for acts that were not illegal when committed, recognition as a person before law, or freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. On the other hand, an Optional Clause was inserted by which a State party agrees to allow individuals to address a complaint to the Human Rights Committee if they feel that their rights under the Civil and Political Rights Covenant have been violated by the State. As the UN reports, by June 1, 1985, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights had been ratified or acceded to by 84 States, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by 80 States. The Optional Protocol had been ratified or acceded by 35 States (UN 1985: 304).

Although not included in the international instruments of human rights, a fourth generation of rights associated with environmental issues has entered into the international discourse. In contrast to the first, second, and third generations of rights that focus on the present generation of humanity, the new rights are concerned with both present and future generations. The environmental disasters of recent decades (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Exxon-Valdez, Kuwait oil fires) as well as an increasing appreciation of the wisdom of indigenous civilizations, have emphasized that humanity cannot survive without a supportive environment. The hubris of the Enlightenment Project which put humans above nature has been challenged by an environmentalist view that places humanity in nature. The interdependencies of the natural and human worlds are, therefore, the focus of this fourth generation of rights.

We may even speak of a fifth generation of human rights, yet to be developed and articulated, that no longer speaks of rights, but of human caring, compassion, and love for all life forms. Emerging out of the most profound spiritual traditions of civility in the world, this generation of rights recognizes that human security cannot be ultimately achieved in its totality unless and until we see the individual as an integral part of the cosmos. The tradition of libertarian rights with its emphasis on individual rights, social contracts, and legal obligations has positioned the individual against society rather than in society. Two centuries of abashed secularization has also undermined the notion of the sacred. It has often led us to forget that humans do not feel fully safe and secure until they are loved and cared for while rooted in a cultural tradition of their own with unique but negotiable identities. A communitarian perspective on rights, therefore, would begin rather than end with satisfying the conditions of ontological security (Laing 1969). As children demonstrate unabashedly when they are left alone, ontological insecurity is the root cause of our most desperate cries. Humans can realize their full potential only in communities of caring, beginning with the family and going on to school, workplace, and retirement. As Hillary Rodham Clinton (1996) has aptly pointed out, it takes a village to raise a child. In our own increasingly interdependent world, it also must be recognized that it takes an entire world to sustain an adult. In fact, the survival of the human species vitally depends on a caring stewardship of the Planet Earth for this and future generations.

Mapping Trends and Tensions in Global Governance

Hence the concern with global governance for human security. To succeed, this concern must be both tough and tender minded. As Antonio Gramsci recognized, the dual prerequisites for this are pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will. Any such project must begin with a realistic analysis of the challenges we face and the opportunities that may pass us by if we do not seize upon them. The following analysis focuses on tensions and shifts-- two conceptual categories that suggest indeterminacy, opportunity, and human agency. The following seven megatrends are all characterized by inner tensions that could lead to cooperative security or competitive insecurity in international relations. Each trend opens up a different arena for negotiation of issues on human security and governance. Each trend also suggests a major power shift potentially leading to fundamental changes in the world as we have known it. The general trends are from concentrations to dispersions of power, from globalism to localism, from patriarchy to gender equality, and from environmental and spiritual carelessness to caring.

The general trend also appears to be toward greater democracy. But democracy itself has many possible modalities. It thrives best at the smallest and most intimate aggregations of human communities-- at neighborhoods, villages, and towns. The greater the distance between the elected and the elector, the higher the level of distortions in communication and representation. Representative democracy is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for devolution of power. New interactive telecommunication technologies have made direct democratic discourse and participation in the form of electronic town meetings entirely possible (Tehranian 1990). Despite the devolutionary trends and emerging technological opportunities, however, there are no guarantees for democracy unless each trend moves away from hegemonic and exclusivist to communitarian and inclusive modalities of power and participation.

Figure 1 maps the complex interactions of the seven trends in relation to the emerging patterns in global governance and security. The figure is inspired by James Rosenau's mapping of five world orders, including unilateralism, multilateralism, subgroupism, transnationalism, and fragmegration (Rosenau 1997). However, in order to emphasize trends and tensions in world development, the categories of analysis here are totally different from those proposed by Rosenau. The rows show competitive and cooperative security as the two most dominant orientations in international politics (Tehranian and Reed 1996), while the columns focus on integration and fragmentation as the twin directions of systemic change. The four spatial trends (globalism, regionalism, nationalism, and localism) are placed in the four quarters of the diagram to indicate their primary contribution to competitive vs. cooperative security arrangements as well as integrative vs. fragmenting effects. The three topical trends (feminism, environmentalism, and revivalism) are placed at the center to suggest their integrative as well as fragmenting, competitive as well as cooperative effects.

The figure should be considered as a heuristic device providing us with a point of departure for an analysis of the major factors in the emerging patterns of global governance and security regimes. Since nationalism and globalism are the older of the four spatial trends, the world system has largely incorporated them into its institutional structures through the nation-state system and the political economy of international trade. By contrast, localism and regionalism are relatively new trends that could undermine the dominant world system by new power centers challenging the centralized states and their intergovernmental institutions. The table also shows the main actors in each arena. Clearly, a major trend to note in this diagram is the increasing role of the non-state actors.

Figure 1. Human Security and Global Governance: Mapping Trends and Tensions

Globalism: Hegemonic vs. Communitarian

Globalism is perhaps the most apparent of all seven trends. It is particularly visible to the eyes of international travelers at world airports, hotel chains, fast food restaurants, and those ubiquitous signs of modern civilization­ the Big Mac, CocaCola, Madonna, and Michael Jackson. The Big Mac has conquered the old world (London, Paris, Moscow, Beijing) for the new. The CocaColonization of the world has reached the remotest places around the globe; Coke is sold on the Great Wall of China as well as in Timbuktu and Katmandu. Striking a pose and breakdancing may be edging out proletarian solidarity, nationalist fervor, and religious devotion. Commodity fetishism may be, in fact, the new global religion that binds all world inhabitants in the cash nexus. Its temples are to be found in the great department stores, supermarkets, and Cosco.

Dating back at least to the 16th Century if not before, modern capitalism has acted as the engine of globalism, tearing down the traditional barriers of feudal, tribal, racial, ethnic, and even national loyalties in favor of the internationalism of the world marketplace of ideas and commodities. Its carriers are the 35,000 odd transnational corporations (TNCs) typically operating in over 100 countries. TNCs typically follow a global strategy locating wherever low interests, wages, rents, and government regulation promise the lowest costs and the highest profits. The sales by the largest TNCs exceed the GNP of many medium-sized economies (Figure 2). In fact, TNCs constitute more than 50% of the top 100 economic units in the world. The chief technologies of economic expansion have been energy, transportation, and telecommunication, propelling the three successive technological breakthroughs that led to three successive long waves of global economic growth. The latest wave, the third industrial revolution, is characterized by the application of computing technologies to all facets of life in manufacturing (CAD-CAM), administration, education, travel, and entertainment. Without telecommunication, transborder data flows, and electronic fund transfers, the global economy and corporation would have been inconceivable. Globalism's strategies of conquest are horizontal, vertical, and spatial integration of the key world industries from oil to transportation and telecommunication. Its lubricants are the transfers of capital from centers to peripheries, orchestrated by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. Globalization mobilizes world capital, allocates it globally, and reduces the risk to private investors.

Figure 2. Total Sales of Major TNCs Compared to Medium-Sized States

Globalism has produced both majestic successes and grand failures. It has brought modern industrial civilization to the remotest regions of the world, but it has also created growing gaps and antagonisms between the rich and poor, humans and nature, dominant and repressed ethnicities, and centers and peripheries. Both originating in the Enlightenment Project, capitalism and communism have shown to be the twin faces of globalism, imposing upon the world a secular, scientific, and technological worldview that considers human progress in primarily material terms. This ideology of developmentalism is now worldwide. In the peripheries, where the processes of development have taken place piecemeal and unevenly, the social system is torn between a modernizing elite and a traditional mass. Frequently, the two sectors of the population live in separate quarters, if in separate countries and centuries. As bits and watts (indicators of information and energy consumption) increase in mass production and consumption, life is diminished under a system of modernized poverty.

Whereas poverty in traditional societies is made tolerable by relative equality, by the ethics of self-denial and mutual obligation, and by the bonds of community, modernized poverty is characterized by the ethics of relentless acquisition, conspicuous consumption, unabashed greed, and mutual irresponsibility. Modernized poverty thus breeds atomistic mobility, status anxiety, social envy, rising expectations, frustrations, regression, and aggression. The negative internalities of dualistic modernity (such as time-consuming acceleration, sick-making health care, stupefying education, counter-communicative mass communication, and information-void news) thus outpace the positive externalities of growth and development. This used to be primarily characteristic of Third World societies, but increasingly the inner cities of the First and Second Worlds of development also are plagued by class, racial, and ethnic dualism.

Globalism is torn between two hegemonic and counter-hegemonic trends. The politics of globalism is engaged in a ongoing debate on how best shape the new world order in the post-Cold War era. Four schools of thought seem to have emerged: neo-isolationism, unilateralism, trilateralism, and multilateralism. In the United States, neoislolationism has always lurked behind the postwar hegemonic discourse of liberal globalists. However, with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of economic globalization, neoisolationism in the form of protectionism against the onslaught of cheaply produced foreign imports from Asia and Latin America has taken on a new lease of life and may spread from the United States to other advanced industrial countries. On behalf of domestic capitalists and workers, Jesse Helms, Chair of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, and Richard Gephard, the Democratic Party leader in the House, have taken up the cause from the right and the left. The neo-isolationist discourse in the United States and Europe has also found new voices in the anti-immigrant sentiments of the domestic unemployed and the threatened sunset industries (Witness Le Pan in France). As the case of China amply demonstrates, the human rights violations of the cheap labor countries have also served as a convenient target for such voices.

The unilateralist school views the world in geopolitical and balance of power terms. From this viewpoint, as the only superpower left on the world scene with a global military reach, the United States must play the role of the balancer of power. From the Napoleonic Wars to the First World War, Britain played such a role. The economic corollary to this strategic doctrine is, of course, that the United States must also act as the champion of free trade and protector of investments. This view prevailed in the early post-Cold War years by the U. S. leadership in the Persian Gulf War and President Bush's discourse of "the new world order" aiming at exorcising the Vietnam syndrome. Francis Fukuyama's doctrine of "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1989) provided the ideological rationalization for this early phase of post-Cold War optimism. He argued that the great Hegelian battle of ideas has come to a conclusive end, liberal capitalism has triumphed over fascism and communism, and only the boring details of liberal capitalist institutions are left to be worked out throughout the world. An implication of that argument is that there is little need for public discourse on the fundamental goals and modalities of development. However, as the early optimism of the post-Cold War era gave rise to increasing pessimism about the limits of power of a superpower, the discourse of "the new world order" was replaced with a new discourse on "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993a & b), in which the United States is perceived as the defender of Western values against threats from other civilizations, in particular a Confucian-Islamic alliance. The new hegemonic discourse divides the world between "the civilized" and "the not-so-civilized." It promises not an easy victory, as the end of history discourse did, but a long and possibly bloody confrontation.

The trilateralists are embodied in the Group of Eight (G8) power configurations, including United States, Europe (now including Eastern Europe and Russia), and Japan. Meeting periodically to coordinate policies, the G8 are presumed to be able collectively to manage the rest of the world. That presumption, of course, is bound to be resisted throughout the next century as some of the most populous nations (China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil) begin to gain increased political power.

Multilateralists have a long tradition of advocating support for the United Nations and its specialized agencies against those who consider UN and most other multilateral arrangements a threat to the rights of a superpower. Acting through the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, multilateralism appeared as a long-term trend for a brief interlude during the Persian Gulf War. However, subsequent international crises in Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, and even the Persian Gulf War itself have proved too divisive to allow any coherent UN action. Multilateralism through other agencies such as NATO, CIS, EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN is still a viable option, but such multilateralism borders on regional rather than global security regimes.

Communitarian globalism, or globalism from below, is also a powerful force assisted by global communication networks and an emerging international civil society organized around non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are currently some 30,000 NGOs growing in numbers and diversity of functions from environmental protection (Greenpeace), human rights (Amnesty International), to relief (the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies). Both from above and below, the power of the state is thus being eroded by global forces. If we add ethnonationalist and localist forces to this equation, absolute state sovereignty may be considered on the wane. This shift of power is not necessarily a progressive trend unless it is employed to bring the states, large or small, under the rule of international law. Unfortunately, when their interests so dictate, big and powerful states disregard legal norms while zealously pursuing their enforcement in small states. During the 1980s, for instance, Libya abided by the ruling of the International Court of Justice to withdraw its forces from Chad while the United States refused to discontinue its intervention in Nicaragua.

Regionalism: Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary

Given the enormous heterogeneity of the world a global community is best achieved through an interlocking system of smaller and more homogeneous communities. Regionalism is one such trend. This may be called the Age of Regions. Regional formations such as the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, and others are establishing effective communities of interests, norms, laws and sanctions. There is a risk, of course, that these budding regional blocs would turn into intense economic competition and possible political confrontation rather than cooperation. Fortress Europe vs. Fortress America vs. Fortress East Asia is not an unlikely scenario. Regionalism, therefore, can be either exclusionary or inclusionary. It can foster a new type of regional chauvinism or it can provide a protective shield for its members against the global hegemonic projects while opening up to the rest of the world for mutual cooperation and benefit.

Regional formations, however, reflect the unequal structures of the world system, itself divided between centers, peripheries, and semi-peripheries.

1. At the apex of this hierarchy stands North America with its peripheries in South and Central America. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is the regional expression of this center. If extended into South America, this regional grouping will include some 800 million people and the largest world consumer market.

2. Following North America is Western Europe with its old colonial peripheries in Asia and Africa and its new potential peripheries in Central and Eastern Europe. As a regional organization, the European Union (EU) represents an evolving framework heading for monetary union.

3. Aspiring to the top position is Japan together with its peripheries in East Asia, some of whom are out-Japanizing the Japanese by remarkable rates of economic growth driven by export development strategies. These include South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore trailed by Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Due to e bitter memories of its imperialist past and postwar dependence on the United States military protection, Japan has not been able to exercise an effective leadership role in East Asia. Regional formations in this area have thus assumed broader and unwieldy forms, including the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences (PECC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

4. By contrast, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be considered as the second most successful regional organization behind the EU. It stands out as a unique combination of countries united in common efforts to attain economic growth and political cooperation. In addition to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei, the ASEAN also has recently admitted Cambodia, Burma, and Vietnam to its ranks.

5. Latin America, with its wealth of population and resources, presents yet another example of successful regional collaboration. United by a common Hispanic-Portuguese culture, divided by different types of political regimes, Latin America is a periphery on the rise. Mercosur (in Spanish; Mercosul in Portuguese) is a southern common market, established in 1991, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Reid 1996). It is clearly a powerful combination that might soon include also Chile and others. The Association of Caribbean States is another subregional organization. After decades of war, with declaration of Central America as a zone of peace, in 1996, prospects for regional economic formation are hopeful.

6. Leading the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia presents a new periphery for Western, Japanese, and North American investment while acting as a center in relation to its own Asian peripheries. However, traditional Russian hegemony keeps many of the newly independent states of Central Asia and Baltic Sea wary of such collaboration.

7. China plays a similar role as Russia for foreign transfers of technology and capital while acting as a center in relation to its less developed regions such as Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang. At its current rates of economic growth, China promises to be the largest economy in the world by 2020. Facing opposition so far to its entry to the World Trade Organization, it might seek a regional organization of its own in the future.

8. Through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India has served as a center for its multi-lingual subcontinent, including the smaller nations of South Asia. However, India's conflicts with its neighbors and the ensuing fears of its hegemonic role in the region have largely prevented SAARC from playing an effective role in regional integration.

9. Despite its unity of language, culture, and historical memories, the Arab world also presents a less successful regionalist project. A strategic military location, the possession of oil resources by some and not others, and traditional national and tribal rivalries have divided and weakened Arabs in their efforts towards such unity. The beleagued Arab League is the main regional expression of Arab unity. Because of their common fears of Iraq and Iran, the Arab gulf states have come together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to defends their common political and economic security.

10. Consisting of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) expanded its membership in 1992 to include the former Muslim Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizstan. If and when its civil war is settled, Afghanistan also might join ECO.

11. Due to its colonial legacy, tribal social structure, and political instability, Africa South of the Sahara has faced the greatest obstacles in economic development and regional cooperation. In the future, however, the post-apartheid South Africa might be in a position to lead the rest of Africa into greater regional cooperation.

To detour past hostilities, to achieve regional security, to obtain economies of scale and scope, to strengthen common cultural ties, and to protect against global or regional hegemonic projects, regionalism is a path that cannot be ignored by large and small states. Culture and communication play a central role in regional formations. A common cultural heritage as in Europe and Latin America, a common language as in the Arab world, common economic and security problems as in the ASEAN region, and close cultural backgrounds and aspirations as in the newly formed ECO, each have played a role. But regional integration is easier said than done. It requires economic complementarity, political trust, and cultural affinity. Even Europe, at the forefront of regional integration, is experiencing second thoughts on the pace of its movement towards monetary and political unification (Peet 1997). While smallness might be a handicap, big is not necessarily beautiful.

A comparative look at regional formations reveals a distinct power shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Table 1 provides comparative data on the present and future trends in regional economic power. According to this data, by the year 2000, the Pacific Basin countries are expected to produce well over 50% of the world GDP. The volume of trade in the Pacific has already surpassed the Atlantic by a great margin (Linder 1986).

Nationalism: Totalitarian-Aggressive vs. Democratic-Benign

In recent centuries, it has been easier to achieve national rather than regional integration. The entire history of nationalism is an effort to mold a state in the image of a single nation with a common language, culture, historical memories, economy, and political system. Nationalism has proved a relatively successful method of political organization in the modern world precisely because it is closer to the realities of human diversity. However, in the modern nation-states, nationalism has also fostered the fiction of cultural homogeneity. Most states in the past and present are, in fact, culturally and ethnically heterogeneous in population. The modern nation-state has been built on the premise of a nation "one and indivisible," as the American oath of allegiance would have us believe. The post-Cold War era has shown the falsity of that assumption. Witness the outburst of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Canada, and the United States.

Nationalism has gone through at least three distinct historical stages (Riggs 1997). In the first stage, from the Peace of Westphalia to the end of World War I, nationalism succeeded in integrating the European feudal principalities into a series of relatively homogenous nation-states with their own common languages. Following World War I, the promises of national self-determination in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, injected ideological fuel into the national liberation movements of the colonial world. At the end of World War II, the wars of national liberation intensified culminating in the fall of the European, Japanese, and American colonies.

Table 1. Past and Projected World Growth Rates and Projected Economic Gravity Shift

In the post-Cold War period, a third phase of nationalism has exploded into the open by the rise of ethnonationalism. With the decline of the universalist ideological pretensions of liberalism and communism, primordial identities have resurfaced as the most potent force in domestic and international politics. Long repressed by the dominant majorities, many ethnic minorities clamor for independence and statehood. For example, the Kurds, the Palestinians, the Qubecois. Of the 120 violent conflicts currently waged around the world, 72% are ethnic wars. There are currently some 27 million refugees in the world and over 150 million displaced people. Most of these dislocations are due to protracted ethnic conflicts erupting into violence.

There are approximately 4,522 living languages in the world, 138 of which have more than one million speakers. Many more languages have unfortunately died. The number of languages in the United States before the coming of Columbus in 1492 was over 1000. Today it is only 200 (Shah, 1992). "In the beginning was the Word," so declares the Gospel according to St. John. Every language represents human creativity at its noblest, the voice of gods breathing life into a dead world. It is therefore imperative to preserve those languages that live, revive those that are about to perish, and resurrect those that have died.

To defend and celebrate this cultural diversity is a great challenge. Much to the impoverishment of the world, the forces of colonialism, nationalism, and globalism have often homogenized and destroyed cultural diversity. Pan-nationalism, in particular, has been often used as the hegemonic project of a dominant ethnic group to repress the weaker. Nationalism can be therefore democratic and benign or totalitarian and malignant, externally aggressive and internally repressive. Swiss nationalism is an example of the former. Nazi German and Fascist Italian nationalism provide examples of the latter. More recently, the nationalism of the colonized peoples has demonstrated how the ideology can be a liberating force in history, while the nationalism of the colonizers shows how exploitation and repression of the subjected peoples can be justified under the noblest of moral claims such as "the white man's burden" or "manifest destiny." Nationalism has achieved much in art and culture, economic progress, and political unity. But it has also produced untold misery and genocide, as the near extermination of the native Americans and native Hawaiians in the United States (Stannard 1989), the Jewish Holocaust in Europe, and the repression of the Palestinians in Israel exemplifies.

National identity is often presented as a non-negotiable fact. Much of the violence of the modern world can be traced back to religious, national, or racial ideologies camouflaging material, economic and political conflicts of interest. Class, ethnicity, race, and nationality are so intimately intertwined in a hierarchy of wealth, income, and status that it is often easy to transform conflicting economic interests into racial, ethnic, and national passions and violence. While economic conflicts are negotiable, ethnic, racial and national conflicts tend to be treated as non-negotiable. Racism, therefore, is often constructed to provide a convenient ideological vehicle for class interests.

The debate on nationalism and national identity has produced three main schools of thought: primordialists, instrumentalists, and constructivists. Primordialists argue that national identity is based on some deep collective unconscious embedded in the structures of language, mythology, and cosmology of a national group. Instrumentalists, also known as Constructivists, try to show how nationalism and national identity have served as convenient ideological instruments for social and political mobilization in hegemonic projects of particular periods of history. For example, print technology has been found to have played a critical role in the rise of nationalism (Anderson 1983). Communitarians, by contrast, remind us that human history is a complex mix of freedom and necessity, human agency and determinism. National identity, therefore, is thus constructed out of existing historical memories passed on through oral and written literature but argue negotiated in interactions with "the other." As such, national identity is a malleable phenomenon that adjusts itself to changing historical circumstances.

History is replete with cultural policies that have tried to mold identities to suit the reasons of the state. Such policies have ranged from extermination to segregation, assimilation, amalgamation, and integration. Table 2 supplies examples of how some repressed groups have been treated in different societies and historical eras with respect to their democratic rights. Policies of extermination have been pursued in the cases of Native Americans in the early United State history, Jews in Hitler's Germany, and Muslims in Bosnia. Policies of de jure segregation were pursued in the southern United States until the 1960s and in South Africa until the dismantling of apartheid in the 1990s. But such policies continue in many parts of the world through de facto social and economic segregation of residential neighborhoods and workplaces. Assimilation has been the dominant policy of many societies in which a single group enjoys a position of privilege but is willing to assimilate and homogenize talented individuals from other aspiring groups. This has been the dominant policy in most European and North American societies in the post-war period. Individuals who are assimilated, however, must forego their own cultural heritage and adopt the cultural norms and practices of the dominant group(s). Assimilation policies begin with the premise that, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, "we do not need hyphenated Americans." Amalgamation policies represent the next higher level of tolerance. Since the 1960s, when cultural roots and identity were generally revived in the United States, hyphenated Americans have become an accepted norm. Instead tolerating cultural diversity, integration policies celebrate it. They require, therefore, a high degree of social and economic leveling. Such policies rest on the institution of equal opportunity laws and compensatory hiring and social welfare. Although such policies were once pursued in the United States and some European countries during the 60s and 70s, rising unemployment and resentment against have are currently placed the policies on the defensive.

Nationalism can be both democratic and tolerant of differences. At the risk of over-simplifying the complexities of cultural phenomena, Table 3 identifies the main features of cultural tendencies towards violence and peace, tolerance and intolerance. Human attitudes are classified here under seven major categories: attitudes towards life, self, others, society, nature, the supernatural, and death. The attributes given to them are clearly the opposite extremes of seven continuums. No human society, culture, or individual consistently possesses all of the attributes of one or the other extreme. Most human societies, cultures, and individuals show a complex configuration of these attributes. But each society, culture, and individual has the potential to move in one or the other direction. By strengthening the cultural tendencies towards peace, we may build societies that reward peace and prohibit violence.

Table 2. Cultural Policies with Respect to Diversity and Democracy

Localism: Parochial vs. Liberal

While nationalism has clearly been a prevailing historical force for the past two centuries, localism is a relatively new political trend pointing to a deepening of the democratic forces. The processes of decolonization and democratization that started with the American Revolution in 1776 have now expanded to all corners of the globe. The continuing world democratic revolution has gone through four long waves (Tehranian & Tehranian 1992; Tehranian 1997). The first wave, from 1776 to 1848, was primarily aimed at the overthrow of monarchies and independence for the colonies in Europe and Americas. The second wave partly caused by the First World War, 1914-1918, which led to the breakdown of the Russian, Austrio-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires and the weakening of European control over their colonies in the Middle East and North Africa. The Second World War in 1940-1945 led to the final breakdown of the British, French, Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish empires in Africa and Asia. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union may be considered as the fourth wave in a continuing revolution.

The new democratic revolution is focused on local empowerment. Localism is the ideological expression of this trend emphasizing local knowledge, local initiative, local technologies, and local organization. The torch of leadership has similarly passed on from the ideologues of the great revolutionary movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, to the technologues of the 20th century modern technocracies in government and business, and to the communologues of the grass-roots, localist movements who speak in the vernacular of local knowledge and epistemic communities. As the slogan of "Think Globally, Act and Dial Locally" also suggests, the global communication network has brought to the local communities the power to link with communities of affinity throughout the world. The local initiatives for nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) increased from 250 in 1982 to 5,000 in 1991 (Boulding 1991). There are already 24 countries in the world which have unilaterally declared themselves as NWFZs. There are also 5 formal NWFZ treaties signed among governments. A global idea thus depends for its implementation on local movements and organizations (Tehranian 1996). The organization of Municipal Foreign Policy organizations in many cities in the United States is another manifestation of how local communities are no longer willing to allow the US State Department to be their sole representative in matters of close international concern such as land deals or immigration.

Localism is caught in a tension between parochialism and liberalism. Parochial localism tends to be narrow-minded, bigoted, and persecutionary. The phenomenon of David Duke in Louisiana politics may be considered as an archetype of such trend. Unabashed racism coupled with local prejudices and organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan has proved a powerful tonic at times of dwindling resources and diminishing expectations. Le Pen in France is a similar phenomenon. The Rodney King case in Los Angeles also demonstrated the parochial power of localism. The jurors in Simi Valley in Southern California were acting in with their own local views of white policemen as protectors of law and order when they handed down a no-guilty verdict. A subsequent trial in a different locale brought forth a different verdict. However, when localism combines with racial conflicts, as demonstrated in the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the outcome can be tragic.

Table 3. Cultural Tendencies Towards Violence and Peace: A Schematic View

Hierarchies of inequality, which place women, minorities, and immigrants at the bottom of the social structures, ultimately can be corrected only through grassroots, local initiatives and actions. No matter how powerful the global, regional, and national forces, it is local conditions and power configurations that shape such routinized structures of violence as in the inner city ghettos. The communities in the U. S. South did not change the scourge of segregation for over a hundred years­ until industrialization came there and altered institutional structures at the local level. The same can be said of the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. The new segregation in urban America relegates one-fifth of the population to the conditions of an underclass whose chances for upward mobility are nearly nil. The post-industrial, information society of high technology and the fully-automated factories have turned this population into conditions of structural unemployment and unemployability. Unemployment among the black male population of the inner cities in the United States is about 50%. Such conditions cannot change until local, state, and national forces combine to seek remedies.

The United States presents one of the most advanced and violent cases of a post-urban world. More than 50% of Americans now live in small towns and suburbs. Only 12% of Americans live in big cities. But cities are defined in a peculiar way. As The Economist (May 9, 1992: 22) points out, "Beverly Hills, home of Hollywood's stars, is completely surrounded by the city of Los Angeles. Yet, it has its own mayor, government, police force and tax structure. So does Compton, a poor, largely black slum close to south-central Los Angeles. The consequence is that Beverly Hills has lavish municipal services and Compton rotten ones. Redraw the maps, make the areas that can afford to spend and share the burdens with those that cannot, and things may start to grow healthier."

Transportation and telecommunication are making it increasingly possible to live and work in small towns or what continues to be inappropriately called "suburbs." These "edge cities," as Joel Garreau (1991) calls them, are where the new high-tech industries, commercial services, and shopping malls locate. The city of Los Angeles is a patchwork of such autonomous suburbs, connected with the world's most sophisticated freeway system enabling their residents to bypass the "undesirable" neighborhoods while having easy access to urban beaches, theaters, museums, and other desirable facilities. While the business districts in the big city and the small edge cities experience revival and expansion, the inner cities decline. Philadelphia, America's fifth largest city, encapsulates this paradox. In the past decade, Philadelphia's skyline in the business districts has been transformed by architecturally exciting new skyscrapers while the ghetto areas have gone into a downward spin. Compared with 2 million in 1970, the city's population is down to around 1.5 million, but its suburbs are ever more populous. As The Economist (May 9, 1992: 24) argues, "the benefits of burden sharing are less than self-evident to the average suburbanite. Many people have left the cities to escape high taxes and soaring crime. It is hard to persuade them that it is in their interest to hand over some of their local taxes to the cities they have fled." In the meantime, the inner cities in the United States and many other parts of the world are burning­ both actually and figuratively

If conditions are to improve, a shift of power to localities must coincide with shift of resources. In Tajikistan, for instance, the southern provinces of Garm and Badakhshan were starved of resources during the Soviet period while the northern province of Khojand was industrialized. Following independence in 1991, Tajikistan sank into a civil war that reflects regional inequalities and grievances more than ideological differences. Such regional disparities are also present in other countries. In China, for instance, they are currently being accentuated by the rapid economic growth of the east coast regions at the expense of the interior and western parts. Unless corrected, power shifts can be a source of present and future conflicts.

Feminism: Patriarchy vs. Equality

As the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing demonstrated, the greatest revolution in all human history concerns the freedom and equality of women. Because patriarchies are resisting the feminist demands, the struggle will continue well into the 21st century transforming all aspects of domestic and international life. The 21st Century may be thus considered the Century of Women.

The signs of gender revolution are evident in most parts of the world. There are few countries left in the world today that deny women their rights of suffrage. Women's political participation in elections is increasingly decisive. Witness Iran's presidential elections in 1997 when women voters helped to give Mohammad Khatami, a moderate, a landslide victory; the U. S. presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 when women tipped the balance in favor of Clinton; and the British parliamentary elections in 1997 which the Labor Party a decisive victory due women's support. Women are moving into professional positions formerly closed to them. Equal pay for equal work is a principle that is increasingly being recognized worldwide. The special conditions of working women are being acknowledged by maternity leaves for pregnancy, delivery, and childbirth. Certain progressive countries are also making allowances for the child rearing homemaking jobs that have gone financially unrewarded for centuries. Moreover, advances in the technology of family planning, greater educational opportunities, and higher levels of employment have put women more in charge of their own lives.

Despite this progress, there is still great discrimination against women in both advanced and developing countries. There are also vast differences in women's status among and within nations. That is why feminism as a movement continues to be a sine qua non of any future progress. The Human Development Report of 1996 (UNDP) provides a balance sheet of women's progress in life expectancy, adult literacy, educational enrollment, share of earned income, and gender empowerment. As Tables 4 and 5 show, in most cases, the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) are lower than the Human Development Index (HDI). That constitutes an indictment against all patriarchal systems that continue to keep women's progress at bay.

Environmentalism: Exploitative vs. Protective

Since the 1960s, a new movement has surfaced on the world scene that focuses its attention on the global environmental pollution and degradation. Appearing first in the advanced industrial countries, the movement has succeeded in changing the national and international discourse in favor of environmental protection and sustainable development. As a result, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established in 1972 "to facilitate international cooperation in the environmental field; to further international knowledge in this area; to keep the state of the global environment under review; and to bring emerging environmental problems of international significance to the attention of the Governments" (UN 1985: 240). UNEP prepares an annual report on the "State of the Environment," and has held several international conferences, including the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. An unprecedented 178 countries, 115 heads of states, 1400 NGOs, 7000 delegates, 9000 journalists, and 20000 environmentalist world citizens participated in the summit (Shabecoff 1996: 160).

Pollution is a clear threat to human security worldwide. It comes in many guises. As The Gaia Peace Atlas (Barnaby 1988: 118) puts it,

"It can be injected into the atmosphere as a noxious cocktail of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, heavy metals and ozone; it can be dumped directly into landfill sites as any number of toxic compounds; and it can be flushed into the sea, either as industrial effluent or as agricultural run-off (fertilizers and pesticides). Whatever the route, the hard facts remain: pollution rarely stays put, and it does not go away. Slowly and insidiously, persistent toxins are entering into our food chains, accumulating in fatty tissues of animals, contaminating the air we breathe and posing unknown health risks both for us and future generations."

Pollution knows no borders. While the more developed countries (MDCs) have on the whole awakened to the facts of environmental degradation and taken some corrective measures, the less developed countries (LDCs) face an urgent need for rapid development and tend consequently to neglect environmental protection. Moreover, the MDCs are exporting their pollution-creating industries to the LDCs. This is rather short-sighted. Exported pollution eventually comes home, either indirectly via food chains, or directly in imported produce.

The notions of "Spaceship Earth" (Fuller 1978), Gaia Hypothesis (Lockwood 1988), sustainable development, and soft and appropriate technology, are not therefore to be treated as passing slogans. They all suggest a deepening of a global environmental consciousness. In a follow-up to their seminal study, Limits to Growth (1971), conducted twenty years later, Donella and Dennis Meadows (1971, 1991: xv-xvi.) have recapitulated their earlier conclusions:

"1. Human use of many essential resources and generation of many kinds of pollutants have already surpassed rates that are physically sustainable. Without significant reductions in material and energy flows, there will be in the coming decades an uncontrolled decline in per capita food output, energy use, and industrial production.

"2. This decline is not inevitable. To avoid it two changes are necessary. The first is comprehensive revision of policies and practices that perpetuate growth in material consumption and in population. The second is a rapid, drastic increase in the efficiency with which materials and energy are used.

Table 4. Gender-Related Development Index

Table 4 is extensive and can be seen in the following source: UNDP, World Development Report 1996: 138-140

Table 5. Gender Empowerment Measure

Table 5 is extensive and can be seen in the following source: UNDP, World Development Report 1996: 141-143

"3. A sustainable society is still technically and economically possible. It could be much more desirable than a society that tries to solve its problems by constant expansion. The transition to a sustainable society requires a careful balance between long-term and short-term goals and an emphasis on sufficiency, equity, and quality of life rather than on quantity of output. It requires more than productivity and more than technology; it also requires maturity, compassion, and wisdom."

There is a worldwide movement for sustainable development. In the face of the onslaught of relentless growth, the Green movement and parties have found in color "green" a symbol for their central ecological concerns. But destruction of nature is not the only problem. Destroying the delicate bonds of community is the other equally significant cost of rapid and despotic modernization. The traditions of civility and mutual obligation have eroded under the onslaught of acquisitive individualism and its fetishes of commodity and identity. There is a need therefore for a new balance between liberty, equality, and community­ the three axial principles of modern democratic revolutions. Since this balance has being undermined in a relentless pursuit of greed, a reinventing of democracy around ecological and communitarian values is called for (Tehranian, 1990a & b, 1991, 1992; Etzioni 1993).

A communitarian perspective on globalism sharply differs from hegemonic perspectives. It would call for non-violence, ecologically sensitive and socially responsible sustainable development, protection of human rights, the upholding of human responsibility towards all layers of human community from local to global, and a celebration of cultural diversity. Four elements seem essential to the construction of an effective world community: common interests, norms, laws, and sanctions. Threats to human survival by ecological disasters and genocides have raised the level of global consciousness of common interests. An emerging consensus on international norms recognizes the global political, economic, and ecological interdependence. The world community ultimately depends on a fragile moral community and world law. However, norms without laws and laws without sanctions will have little effect. The world community must take effective shape therefore through a community of interests, norms, laws, and sanctions.

Revivalism: Sectarian vs. Ecumenical

The world is thus desperately in need of a new ethics of social responsibility. The acquisitive society of the modern world has unleashed boundless human energies and dazzling technologies for production but it has failed to provide fairness or a sense of community. As gaps grow among and within nations, modernity also fails to provide security not only for the poor but also for the rich and the middle class. The response to this moral and political crisis has been the rise of a new religious revivalist movement in many parts of the world. The movement has, however, assumed two contradictory faces-sectarian vs. ecumenical.

During the past decade, countries as wide apart in geography, history, social structure, and culture as the United States, India, Iran, Israel, and Guatemala have come under the political impact of religious movements (Tehranian, 1993b & c). The last few presidential elections in the United States have been profoundly influenced by the rise of the new Christian movement particularly around the Bible Belt. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush each in their own unique style campaigned on a political platform pleasing to the Christian right on such social issues as prayer at schools, restrictions on abortion, ban on pornography, and a general bemoaning of the decadence of a liberal and permissive society. India's elections in 1991 marked by the spectacular successes of a militant Hindu party in a society constitutionally dedicated to a secular regime. Similarly, the Jewish religious parties in Israel have profoundly affected the balance between the Labor and Likud parties in favor of the latter. And in Guatemala, where 70% of the population is Catholic, a Protestant evangelist was elected to presidency in 1990. As a traditional ally of the ruling groups in Latin America, the Catholic Church itself has split into conservative and Theology of Liberation tendencies.

Religious revivalism appears to be primarily a reactive phenomenon-- to the unsettling effects of rapid social change (over-modernization in developing countries, post-modernization in the developed), to marginalization (of the ethnic majorities as in the cases of the Malay in Malaysia and the Hindus in India), to relative material or psychological deprivation (among the urban ghetto or yuppie fundamentalists), and to commodity fetishism as an antithesis to its own identity fetishism. It may or may not be a passing social phenomenon as it holds power (as in Iran), or is frustrated by the superior power of the state (as in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, or Algeria), or is gradually integrated into the mainstream of cultural life (as in the case of Moral Majority in the United States or the Welfare Party in Turkey), or is allied to the ruling elites in preserving the status quo (as in Guatemala and Saudi Arabia). Its alternative strategies thus consist of revolutionary militancy (to seize total power), withdrawal (from mainstream society), accommodation (with the rest of society), or a relentless conservation of traditional religious values and norms (Tehranian 1993a & b). One of its unintended consequences might be to pave the way for greater epistemological tolerance between religious and secular worldviews as each one softens its monopolistic truth claims. Alternatively, it may take over and rule with an iron fist until it too is chastened by the human facts of diversity and need for tolerance. In an election that led to the landslide victory of a moderate cleric against his officially endorsed and more conservative rival, the Iranian presidential elections of 1997 demonstrate the promise of the latter development.

The rise of religious movements in politics also signals a deeper yearning for a spiritual home in a cold and callous modern world characterized by ceaseless wants and anxieties. In this world, the individual is torn away from the ties of community and atomized by those anonymous technocracies of modernity rewarding him with commodities while robbing him of his soul. The secular ideologies of progress, nationalism, liberalism and communism, were thought for a while to provide a new, effective sense of community and social responsibility. However, the secular ideologies never addressed let alone resolved the human conditions of finitude, fragility, and evil. Primordial identities (religion, race, ethnicity, and gender), which were thought by such great social pundits as Marx, Freud, and Parsons, to be withering away in the modern world, have come back to the political arena with vengeance. Culture as the last repository of collective defense against the onslaught of globalism and its alien and alienating consequences, has assumed a new force and vitality.

Conclusion

The world is discovering a new sense of oneness. The continuing possibility of a nuclear holocaust, augmented by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the risks of a deteriorating environmental crisis, the spread of state and anomic terrorism against the innocent by-standers­ all seem to bring the more socially sensitive and responsible world citizens closer together into a new fraternity. The new spiritualism has no name, no rituals, no pope, no ayatollah, and no creed. But it is certainly in the air. It finds its inspiration in the totality of the spiritual heritage of humankind­ in all religions great and small, in all philosophies, secular or religious. The message has been perennially preached. It may be therefore called, philosophia perennia. The song of caring, compassion, and love has been sung time and again in Tao Teh Ching, the Upanishads, the Old and New Testaments, the Quran, and in Sufi poetry. No degree of technological advance also can hide the fragility of our lives and our home here on Planet Earth. Violence, manifest and latent, physical and structural, against humans or other life forms, is a cancer against the human soul. As Sting, a postmodern rock singer and poet, sings:

If blood will flow when flesh and steel are one

Drying in the color of the evening sun,

Tomorrow's rain will wash the stains away

But something in our minds will always stay.

Perhaps this final act was meant

to clinch a lifetime's argument

That nothing comes from violence

and nothing ever could

For all those born beneath an angry star

Lest we forget how fragile we are.

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