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soup, covering the EU, EFTA, NAFTA, APEC, and ANZCERTA. Regional arrangements, he concludes, are evolving toward a mode of ‘policed or monitored decentralization’ involving broad areas of harmonization agreed upon internationally. Within these areas, mutual recognition and limited policy harmonization can coexist with a degree of national autonomy. In a world where international pressures penetrate deep into national economies, the effective harmonization of policies toward international transactions can be highly intrusive. Assigning extensive powers to an international organization would therefore create a structure that would be resisted by member states and rob the arrangement of credibility. The preference for limited GATT-like monitoring and policing follows from this insight. By implication, the IMF of the future is more likely to encourage modest policy coordination among countries than to enforce their participation in a rigid exchange rate arrangement like the pre-1971 Breton Woods System. Similarly, the WTO is likely to bear a closer family resemblance to its immediate progenitor, the GATT, than to its distant relative, the stillborn International Trade Organization.

The European Union is at the same time a source of support and a challenge to the author’s hypothesis of a trend toward monitored decentralization. The European Union vests significant decision-making power in its Council and Commission, a tendency that is reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty and the European Central Bank for which it makes provision. At the same time, the treaty and the Union, with their emphasis on subsidiarity, seek to cultivate local support through devolution. If the European Union is a model for other international institutions, it suggests that the question is not whether such arrangements will be centralized or decentralized but how different issues will be dealt with simultaneously, with different degrees of delegation, without undermining the coherence of decision making.

The European Union is the inspiration for many of Kahler’s other particularly provocative insights and conjectures. He shows that the effectiveness of international institutions presupposes links to national interest groups, citing Europe’s farmers and Common Agricultural Policy as an example of how such linkages can be constructed. He suggests that the success of the European Union owes much to its capacity to link issues of interest to different countries, a conclusion that is less than encouraging for international organizations that are function-specific and whose structure offers little scope for cross-issue trade-offs.

Kahler’s book contains much more that prompts reflection about the prospects for effective governance of the global economy. It is hard to think of another volume on the subject that covers so much ground, both positive and normative, in such short compass. This one deserves a wide audience.

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The Convention on the Rights of the Child has three parts: "Establishing the Convention," which provides the historical background; "Defining Children’s Rights," which analyzes the content of the convention, and "The Committee on the Rights of the Child." The analysis of the convention’s content, based on a general framework devised by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard, distinguishes among survival, membership, protection, and empowerment rights.

The few criticisms that could be made about LeBlanc’s presentation apply not only to his work but to the human rights field generally. For example, he sometimes speaks of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as the implementation mechanism of the convention. However, Article 43(1) makes it clear that the committee is established for the purpose of "examining the progress made by States Parties in achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken in the present Convention." LeBlanc recognizes, in his conclusion, that "the primary responsibility for the implementation of the convention falls first and foremost to the legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions of the individual states that ratify it" (p. 286). Analysts of human rights should be consistent in describing the states parties as the primary agents for implementation of human rights conventions, not the treaty bodies in the United Nations. The UN treaty bodies such as the CRC are best understood as instruments of supervision and monitoring, that is, accountability, overseeing the states parties to assure that they carry out their responsibilities under the agreement. Much too often, people place blame for failures of implementation on the United Nations when the fundamental responsibility lies with national governments.

Also, there is an important omission common in the human rights literature. International governmental organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the World Bank undertake activities that affect the human rights of children and others. These organizations are rarely held accountable with regard to international human rights law in any explicit way. It should be recognized, however, that these organizations are not autonomous. Though they may sometimes seem to act as if they had to answer to no one, they are in fact instruments of their member states. To the extent that these member states are accountable under international law, including international human rights law, these organizations should be held accountable as well.

LeBlanc reports on what representatives of the non-governmental organizations have described as the "amazingly low level of protection" the convention gives to children in armed conflict situations. For most purposes, the convention defines children as persons under 18 years of age (unless, under local law, the age of majority is attained earlier) but makes an extraordinary, anomalous exception. Article 38 states that parties are to ensure that persons under 15 years of age do not take a direct part in hostilities and are to refrain from recruiting anyone under 15 to serve in the armed forces. Thus,
Article 38 makes a point of allowing children under 18 to take direct part in hostilities and to be recruited into a nation's armed forces. With support from Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, the United States played a leading role in insisting on this shameful exception.

It would be most useful if LeBlanc, using his earlier book, *The United States and the Genocide Convention* as a model, now did a detailed study of the United States' performance relating to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As he points out, the United States' peculiar behavior showed up early in the negotiating process when it blocked consensus on the financing of the working group and forced the decision to the General Assembly itself. During the negotiations, the United States insisted not only on retaining the right to recruit children under 18 into armed forces but also insisted on the right to execute people who had committed capital crimes before the age of 18. Only six countries executed minors in the 1980s (Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United States, and Barbados), and the latter has since abolished capital punishment for people under 18 years of age. While LeBlanc provides a good deal of information on the United States' negotiating positions on a variety of issues, he does not describe its position on some important issues such as the right to education.

The United States could ratify the convention with reservations about service in armed forces, capital punishment, or other issues; but it has not. Children's advocates in the United States were pleased when Bill Clinton was elected president, especially because Hillary Clinton had been active with the Children's Defense Fund. The advocates expected that the convention would be signed early in the Clinton administration and were deeply disappointed when it was not. Finally was signed on 16 February 1995 by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright. However, rather than serving as a great cause for celebration, the signing seemed done in stealth, with no notice in the press, almost as if the administration was ashamed that it had signed it.

At the beginning of the Clinton administration, the prospects for ratification of the convention were as good as they have ever been; but the prospects under the now Republican-controlled Senate are dim. The United States' performance with regard to children, both its own and the world's, needs to be examined more closely. As LeBlanc shows, the RC constitutes an important advance in the strengthening of human rights around the world. It is a tragedy that the United States has so frequently pushed in the opposite direction.

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GEORGE KENT


The last decade-and-a-half of historical-structural studies (including those on long cycles) saw two insights established among the basics of world politics: the existence and the centrality (over the past half-millennium) of the role of global leadership and the distinctiveness of global (or systemic) wars—of which there have been only a handful (maybe only four or five) over that same time span.

The authors take these insights as the premises of their analysis and ask, What explains these global wars, and how were global wars related to the rise and decline of global leadership? To answer these questions, they construct a causal „structural-transition” model of close to 30 variables. But the crux of it is the relationship between leadership and challenger, which they interpret, in the relevant time span, as one between global (or naval) power and regional (or West European army) power. They test parts of the model (among eight of the variables) and statistically confirm a number of hypotheses, such as the relation between naval and army concentrations (that, interestingly, they find to be alternating in their peaks); and they also dismiss the significance of others such as causal connections between overconsumption, overextension, and „decline.” They conclude that global leaders’ concern to suppress threats to the central region before they become global threats was and is critical to understanding world politics and that it is too early to write off transitional (global) warfare among the great powers: „Its demise within the next generation or two is less than a sure thing” (p. 191).

This work is notable for among other things, its careful attention to a number of literatures, an eclectic approach to theory building (the authors co-opt the Organski-Kugler transition model, and give it a new test), and a sustained concern for the empirical validation of propositions—in part, with systematic evidence of their own collection. Of value are Appendix B, „On Identifying Systemic Wars” and the new data on West European army sizes, clearly showing four peaks (Spain, France I and II, and Germany) and forming a clear counterpoint to the Modelski-Thompson series of sea-power concentration. This makes it possible to draw a clear contrast between the role of global leadership and that of challenger rooted in the central region and to present a new perspective on regional politics, thus raising the important question, Is the central region of world politics, which in the past half-millennium resided in Western Europe, now moving to East Asia?

This is a carefully crafted book, and repays close study, even if some of it is not light reading. While much of this has already been presented at conferences and published in international relations journals between 1988 and 1994 (and some will be familiar to specialists), care was taken to integrate the material, and the work as a whole represents a significant contribution to historical-structural world politics and to the long-cycle research program. As with all good research, it also points the way toward more work to be accomplished. To begin with, the model needs testing not just against the West European episode of international affairs but also against what went before it and what has followed it in global politics (Thompson has already begun to write about the entire past millennium as a unit). Also, should not the analysis be extended to all world regions, and not just to the central one? Might there not be room, among the variables, for democratization? Could not the structural-transition model be made more parsimonious, maybe in such a way that it begins to explain not only one case at a time of transitional warfare but also a sequence of transitions with or without warfare that might be shown to be evolutionary?

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