The “Efficient” Public Administrator:
Pareto and a Well-Rounded Approach to Public Administration

Christopher Grandy
Associate Professor
Public Administration Program
University of Hawaii (Manoa)
631 Saunders Hall
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
(808) 956-7060, (808) 956-9571 (fax)
grandy@hawaii.edu

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Abstract

Efficiency has long played a central role in the contested terrain of public administration values. The new public management movement was only the latest demand that public organizations promote efficiency by adopting business methods. There again followed reactions from those who argue that other values (such as equity, citizen participation, and democracy) are at least as important. This article suggests that an economic, rather than business, perspective on efficiency may usefully contribute to the conversation. Interestingly, the contribution lies in emphasizing the importance of clarifying public values, thereby contributing to an emerging public value management paradigm.
Biography

Christopher Grandy is associate professor of public administration at the University of Hawai‘i (Mānoa). After completing a Ph.D. in economics at UC-Berkeley, Grandy taught in the economics departments of Barnard College and the University of Hawaii before working as an economist for the State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism. Grandy specializes in public policy and public finance issues, particularly taxation and public budgeting. He was a member of the 2005-2007 Hawaii State Tax Review Commission.
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Introduction

Almost from the beginnings of the field, efficiency has been a source of contention in public administration. As George W. Downs and Patrick D. Larkey (1986, 237) observed two decades ago, “[e]fficiency ranks with motherhood, apple pie, citizen participation, and balanced budgets as a fundamental American value.” And yet fairly quickly in public administration’s history, challenges to efficiency as a primary public value were articulated by those acknowledging other values such as equity, citizenship, and public deliberation. In concluding a review of the “rational model” of public organizations, Robert B. Denhardt (2004, 87), observes that, despite decades of challenges, the model’s emphasis on “technical rationality (often translated as ‘efficiency’)” continues to dominate as a primary criterion for the evaluation of public organizations.

Much of the controversy over efficiency within public administration revolves around a definition that Downs and Larkey (1986, 6) term “managerial efficiency” and Denhardt (2004, 25) calls “technical rationality.” This notion of efficiency envisions managers pursuing the least cost means of achieving given ends. Or, from another direction, “efficiency dictates that choice of alternatives which produces the largest result for the given application of resources (Simon 1976 [1945], 179).” Herbert Simon (1976 [1945], xxviii-xxx) softened the implied dictate to public administrators by recognizing the bounded, rather than full, rationality of human beings and by acknowledging the appropriateness of satisficing, rather than optimizing behavior. Yet, as observed by Hendriekje van der Meer and Mark R. Rutgers (2006, 3) technical efficiency still dominates the field: “The most encompassing or general meaning of efficiency as used in the
public administration literature is represented by the term ‘technical efficiency.’ Technical efficiency can be defined as the ‘ratio between input and output.’ The difficulty with applying this definition to the public sector is that the “problem” can rarely be framed so easily. Instead, ends are multiple and shifting.

This article began as an economist’s reaction to the critique of efficiency central to the arguments of those critical of the new public management (NPM) paradigm. As a new member of a small public administration program, I viewed the efficiency-focus of NPM as a sensible, if somewhat obvious, goal for public organizations. The suggestion by those skeptical of NPM’s orientation, that efficiency is only one of several values that public managers might appropriately pursue struck me as odd, at best. For the view implies that a manager might sacrifice efficiency in order to advance other values. Yet (I thought) given a particular goal, wouldn’t one always want to pursue it efficiently?

The literature on efficiency within public administration has modified my initial reactions, and I argue here that, using an unconventional focus, the economist’s notion of Pareto efficiency can be useful in this debate. In the words of Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 9), “a more limited interpretation of efficiency as technical efficiency will not do.” Ironically, Pareto efficiency’s usefulness lies in a direction that many, suspicious of economic thinking in the public sector, advocate—becoming clearer about values.

1. Efficiency in Public Administration

Efficiency was privileged at the beginnings of the field as Progressive Era reforms sought to systematize and rationalize the administration of the public’s business. The Progressive movement that ushered in the notion of professional public management was, in large part, a reaction against the inefficiencies of the spoils system that went before (Waldo 1952, 86; Hood
Appeals to efficiency justified centralizing public functions, the rise of bureaucracies, and executive budgeting.

Two early public administration writers who held a broad view of efficiency were Morris Cooke and Frederick Cleveland. Citing Hindy Lauer Schachter’s (1989) work, Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 10) note that Cooke and Cleveland thought of efficiency as a means of promoting public responsiveness to citizen demands in a democracy. Curiously, however, both Schachter (1989: 76, 99) and Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 10) interpret this perspective as implying that efficiency is a secondary, rather than primary, value. One might instead note that the Cooke/Cleveland view implies that efficiency is a basic value—one that undergirds and supports the broader values of government activity. We shall return to this interpretive difference below.

Public administration scholars came to question the preeminence of efficiency as they challenged the Progressives’ separation of politics from administration. That separation was a defining feature of the first phase of professional administration. As Dwight Waldo (1952, 87) noted more than fifty years ago, separating politics from administration did not square with the observation that agencies were as much enmeshed in political maneuvering as were legislatures. Thus, if administrators effectively make value decisions, then they cannot be seen as simply choosing the “optimal” method of implementing policy decisions.

These critiques of efficiency also objected to separating means from ends (Waldo 1952, 90-91). Critics noted that “means are relative to ends,” that administration is not an end in itself, and that students of public administration must abandon the notion that “efficiency and economy are objectives superior to any others that may be sought” (Kingsley, 1945, 89). This directly challenged the technical meaning of efficiency as finding an “optimal” method of advancing
given ends. If, as Aaron Wildavsky (1966; 292, 298, 299-300) suggested, means and ends are jointly determined, then in what sense is a criterion of “efficiency” well-specified that focuses on the many means by which an end could be attained? Moreover, as Denhardt (2004, 150) observes, concentrating on efficiency alone draws attention away from ends, and in doing so “we might fail to fully examine and participate in decisions that are of importance to us, thus failing to meet our democratic obligations.”

Another source of suspicion came from efficiency’s association with private—that is, business—administration (Waldo 1952, 83-34). Businesses, in a competitive environment, must be primarily concerned with maximizing profit. Being efficient implies pursuing activities most likely to increase profits. Besides being somewhat distasteful, many within public administration simply found this notion of efficiency inappropriate for public institutions. The analogy was inapt. Public agencies do not have a single, well-specified objective that all agree they should pursue. Instead, as discussed below, public agencies face multiple objectives reflecting multiple values. In this context, it is not even clear what public efficiency would mean.

The controversy over efficiency re-emerged with respect to the new public management and reinventing government movements. In spite of Waldo’s (1952, 88) suggestion that fifty years ago public administrators were rejecting efficiency as a criterion for public action, “efficiency” has hung on. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s popular book, and the wave of writings known as the new public management (NPM), raised again the call for government to “get more bang for the buck;” that is, to be more efficient. The New Zealand reforms that ushered in the NPM discussion, and the U.S. federal government’s reinvention efforts, even harked back to the business metaphor of efficiency that appealed to the Progressives.
response, many in public administration have reacted with skepticism to the call for greater efficiency.  

2. Multiple Values and Pareto

Perhaps the primary objection to “efficiency” as a guiding principle of public administration is that it seems so narrow. Being efficient suggests selecting one, or at most a handful, of values at the core of public agencies. It connotes single-mindedly pursuing an objective with little attention to external effects. Thus, Waldo (1952, 93-94) suggested that economy and efficiency are about “getting things done,” with little attention to how they are done. Yet how things are done—and, in particular, how people are treated as we get things done—is of principal interest to many. One can imagine a modern Taylorite suggesting to the manager of a state tax department that we measure the number of returns processed, with the implied goal of maximizing that number per unit of time. Skeptics might worry about the values sacrificed in pursuing such a goal.

The prescriptions of reinventing government and the NPM literature seem similarly narrow. In several places, Osborne and Gaebler (1993; 35-36, 77, 79) focus on lowering the costs of public services and of minimizing waste (78, 81, 119). In advocating “mission-driven” public organizations, the authors (14, 113) attacked public agency rules that stifle effective delivery of services. Osborne and Gaebler’s book talked of putting the customer first; of making public managers more entrepreneurial, presumably with the intention of finding innovative ways to provide services—perhaps on a paying basis; and of eliminating rules that lead to higher costs. The authors did not explicitly advocate a single goal. Indeed, in some places, they recognized that there may be multiple goals. But the overall sense of their prescriptions was to weed out the “inefficiencies” of public activity by re-focusing on something like “core” values. Similarly, the
federal government’s reinvention efforts, reflected in the National Performance Review (1993, Ch. 3-2), urged Congress to simplify the responsibilities of public agencies in order to enable management accountability. In general, Denhardt (2004, 140) notes, NPM sought to impose a new set of values, coming from the business sector.\textsuperscript{11}

Critics of NPM point out that the efficiency prescriptions of government reinventors excluded important, but not necessarily measurable, public values. Thus, Demetrios Argyriades (2003, 523) argues that the rise of efficiency in the hierarchy of public organization values has been accompanied by a lowering of the rule of law and of due process. In his view (526-527), privileging efficiency undermines debate, consultation, and public deliberation. Linda deLeon and Robert B. Denhardt (2000, 93-95) see the reinvention movement as devaluing collaboration, the public interest, and citizenship. Suzanne J. Piotrowski and David H. Rosenbloom (2002, 646) note official concern with efficiency well before the New Public Management ideas took hold, quoting a 1972 Supreme Court decision which observed that the due process clause may be interpreted as a mechanism to protect citizens from the overly-rigorous pursuit of efficiency by competent public servants. Rita Mae Kelly (1998, 201) asserts that others go further, arguing that “[p]rocedural due process, substantive rights, equity, and protection of minority rights … are values that have precedence over efficiency.” Michael Spicer (2007) argues that NPM advocates ignore the intended role of politics in managing conflict over values and thereby threaten harm in promoting simplistic solutions to complex problems.

Denhardt (2004, 8-9) provides a useful example of efficiency-motivated, narrow goals. Two experienced managers were tasked with quickly establishing a housing loan program. As the supervisor, John was under considerable pressure, from both within the organization and from potential clients, to process applications rapidly. His co-manager, Carol, recognized the
need for quick action but also had more direct contact with potential clients. To speed things along, John asked Carol to have clients sign blank application forms, which could later be filled in as information arrived. Carol objected, wanting to provide clients full information and concerned about potential illegality. Denhardt (9) observes that John seemed “most concerned with the efficient completion of the task.” Here, Denhardt uses efficiency to refer to the quick processing of loan applications. Implicitly, getting “work out the door,” that is, loan applications completed and filed, is the agency’s primary work. Anything that interferes with that task threatens to make the program look inefficient.

In the “real world” public decision makers face multiple values, and these values come from multiple sources. Assuredly, legislative bodies give public agencies a variety of marching orders. But the executive (mayor, governor, president) may take a somewhat different perspective on these instructions, urging more movement in one direction rather than another. Moreover, the media and constituents express their own views and demands—sometimes requiring the administrator to respond in ways that differ from what the executive or legislators might choose.

The point of this article is that the existence of multiple values is consistent with a definition of efficiency that comes from economics rather than business. For example, if we believe that our society must value citizen participation, the fulfillment of minimal physical requirements for all, universal education, and economic growth—to propose a necessarily abbreviated list—then an efficient use of resources would require that it be impossible to advance some of these values without reducing others. If such advancement is possible, then currently we are not using our resources efficiently—we could further some of our goals without reducing the level of others. Those familiar with economic welfare analysis will recognize this
as a particular application of the Pareto efficiency principle. \(^{12}\) Rather than being applied to the allocation of goods and services, however, the suggestion here is that the public administrator apply the criterion to the public values at play in a particular issue. Notice that the definition does not require specifying the overall objective to be advanced—it is sufficient to list the component elements (in this case, public values) that contribute to the objective. Of course, there may be much discussion about that list.

Pareto efficiency differs substantially from how “efficiency” is commonly used in the public administration literature. Thus, it is offered here not as a refutation of the concerns about technical rationality raised by critics of NPM so much as a way of looking at efficiency that is both consistent with a broad perspective on public management and, ironically, more consistent with efficiency’s standard definition in economics. We have seen that technical efficiency (a.k.a. technical rationality and managerial efficiency) is the usual efficiency concept in public administration, understood as pursuing “given objectives with the least cost,” or as a ratio of output to input. \(^{13}\) Moreover, many express concerns about proposals, such as those implied by NPM advocates, to focus on efficiency because “efficiency is a value chosen from among a larger set of values and … the adoption of the value of efficiency precludes attention to any other, such as equity and participation” (Denhardt 2004, 105). In contrast, the concept of Pareto efficiency leaves goals, and their underlying values, unspecified, explicitly allowing for multiple goals and values. Pareto efficiency is attained only if it is impossible to advance any of the goals without impairing at least one of the others. In this sense, Pareto efficiency is value-neutral, or, as Luther Gulick (1937, 192-193) implied, it is efficiency as meta-value. \(^{14}\) As applied here, Pareto efficiency is therefore broader than the concept of technical efficiency commonly used in public administration.
The difference may be illustrated by returning to the example of the housing loan program. John’s suggestion to have clients sign blank forms advances one goal: getting applications into the pipeline as quickly as possible. But if John and Carol applied the Pareto efficiency concept, they would explicitly consider whether other goals exist. There may be trust-building and education functions fulfilled by communicating frequently with clients and in going over information submitted on their housing applications. Signing blank forms may advance the goal of getting applications processed quickly, but it impairs the communication and trust-building goals. From this perspective, an exclusive focus on fast processing does not advance (Pareto) efficiency because it promotes one of the agency’s goals while reducing others.15

Public administration scholars have occasionally commented upon Pareto efficiency, but usually in a cursory fashion. For example, in his deconstruction of efficiency, David John Farmer (1995, 199) briefly mentions the Pareto concept and notes that it does not guarantee a just allocation of goods and services. While Patricia D. de Lancer (1999, 536) uses the term in her description of a specific technique for evaluating efficiency in public organizations, the concept of Pareto efficiency is much broader than the technical application she presents. Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 5) suggest that because a Pareto-efficient, or Pareto-optimal, allocation of resources means that it is impossible to improve the welfare of one person without reducing that of another, the “welfare of society is at its maximum.” They unfortunately characterize the concept as a synonym for “optimality,” which thereby falls outside the scope of the concepts of efficiency with which public administration deals.16

Peter Self stands out as a sustained public administration critic of what he called the “absurdly revered ‘Pareto principle’” (1985, 70) as a criterion for public decision-making. It is important to understand that Self addressed the Pareto concept as it is usually applied in
In recent years there has been an effort to define a new paradigm for public service management centered on identifying (or, indeed, “creating”) public values. Stemming from the work of Mark Moore (1995), this public management perspective is seen as a reaction to the dictates of NPM—including the preeminence of (technical) efficiency. Instead, Moore, Gerry Stoker (2006), Janine O’Flynn (2007), and others suggest that the function of public managers is to identify and pursue the creation of public value. “Public value” remains somewhat vaguely defined, but includes anything that a community, subgroup, or the public manager, articulates as being appropriate for the expenditure of public resources. Because “public value” is loosely defined, it might include caring for the disadvantaged, being responsive to public input, and paying attention to the cost of public services. The focus of public management is thereby changed to give greater weight to politics and less to economics in public decision-making.17

As discussed in the next section, a positive consequence of using the Pareto efficiency concept is the implied need to be clear about which values are legitimately “public.”

3. Pareto Efficiency as Necessary, But Not Sufficient, Meta-Value

When an administrator makes a decision in our multiple-value environment, s/he may be hard-pressed to explain the process. The political and economic forces that emerge in a particular problem are varied and complex, and the values put forward come from many quarters with differing intensities. Thus, the administrator of a tax compliance unit, attempting to determine whether a business tax credit should apply in a specific case may face several sources
of influence: Legislators who voted for the credit on the grounds of diversifying the local economy; legislators who opposed the credit with concerns about the fiscal implications; businesses who may qualify for the credit; businesses who clearly do not qualify and wonder where their tax break is; and taxpayers who are concerned about the upward pressure on rates that might result from the negative revenue implications. The values implicit in these perspectives are legitimate, and the administrator who ignores many of them will find life unpleasant.\textsuperscript{18}

However, to say that an agency faces the task of managing multiple values does not imply that all values are legitimate. In a general sense one can imagine values put forward to cover as many interests as there are people in the community. Clearly, not all can receive equal weight when allocating public resources. The business person whose activities obviously fall outside the scope of a tax credit’s legislative intent may argue that all businesses—including his—should get a break. But the administrator is not likely to have much trouble denying the claim; the value of upholding the authority of the legislative mandate overrides the claim of the business manager.

The contest over values also evolves. At one point, public decision makers deemed it appropriate to expend resources segregating public facilities by race. Today, we would consider such a use of resources inappropriate—that is, illegitimate (not to mention illegal). This reflects an evolution of values toward the “universal equality framework” that Kelly (1998, 203) notes took nearly 200 years to achieve. Similarly, decisions in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that conflict with our understandings of civil liberties may be seen as wholly inappropriate twenty years from now.\textsuperscript{19} This observation is consistent with Charles E. Lindblom’s (1959)
incremental model of public decision-making, which stresses the complex and varying nature of promoting public values.\textsuperscript{20}

Lindblom’s (1990) more recent work expands on the idea of evolving values. In Lindblom’s framework, individuals in society are, to one degree or another, engaged in probing their world in order to figure things out. Such probing may be impaired in various ways—including by professional social scientists. Yet he sees a society in which many (all?) members participate in the process of advancing knowledge and understanding; Lindblom calls this a self-guiding society. This guidance presumably applies to all aspects of knowledge—including the identification, modification, and acceptance/rejection of legitimate values. Exploring the process by which such values are agreed upon lies beyond the scope of this article. However, as discussed below, the public administrator is in a unique position to participate in such probing and, indeed, to advance or hinder values by his/her decisions. The Pareto efficiency criterion, applied as suggested here, provides public administrators with a conceptual framework that can improve the quality of their decisions in ways that are consistent with Lindblom’s vision.

From the Pareto efficiency perspective, to say that an agency acts inefficiently is to say either (a) that it pursues some values that are not legitimate, or (b) that it neglects to pursue some legitimate values that it can affect. Thus, the tax compliance administrator who approves the application of the business tax credit to his brother’s firm, despite having rejected similar claims by others in the past, is acting inefficiently. The inefficiency lies in promoting a value (the support of his brother’s company) that is not legitimate from a public perspective. Similarly, should Carol, the housing loan program co-manager, make no effort toward moving applications along she would be acting inefficiently.
Of course, the word “efficiency” is often part of the contest over the legitimacy of values. Downs and Larkey (1986, 13) observe a tendency to label as “inefficient” the pursuit of goals “that differ from one’s own.” “Efficiency” is a powerful word, whose use can bestow legitimacy on the ideas to which it is attached. Thus, the early public administration writers who sought to incorporate business methods, such as formal hierarchical organization, into the public sphere did so in large part by appealing to efficiency (see, e.g., Denhardt 2004, 77). As has been noted, promoters of NPM, explicitly utilizing business concepts, made similar appeals to efficiency. Downs and Larkey (1986, 186) observed that “efficiency is [often] less a goal of reorganization than a justification for it.”

Virtually all of the critiques of NPM prescriptions can be seen as examples of the contest over which values to include in the “legitimate” set. For example, Argyriades’s (2003, 523) implicit critique of the “3Es (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness)” is a defense of the values of rule of law, due process, debate, and public deliberation. deLeon and Denhardt’s (2000) critique of reinvention’s market, customer service, and entrepreneurial orientations, emphasize the values of collaboration, the public interest, and citizenship. Here, “efficiency” is seen as one value that is advanced at the expense of others.

Yet, these critiques apply to the technical, or managerial, efficiency concept of Denhardt (2004, 87), Downs and Larkey (1986, 6), and Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 3) rather than to the Pareto concept. The objections come down to insisting that pursuing (technical or managerial) efficiency neglects other, valued goals that an agency might legitimately pursue. In contrast, Pareto efficiency characterizes a relationship among values: given the set of legitimate values, efficiency is defined in terms of whether some must be sacrificed in order to advance others.
Stated another way, the tradeoff among values cannot apply to the concept of (Pareto) efficiency. If, by “efficiency,” we mean “technical rationality” or “managerial efficiency,” then such a tradeoff makes sense: one could imagine consciously incurring higher-than-minimum costs in order to advance another value, such as due process. But Pareto efficiency is defined in terms of tradeoffs among values: We have acted efficiently if it is not possible to advance any of our legitimate values without accepting a reduction in another. If all legitimate values are considered, then it would be tautological to propose a trade off of Pareto efficiency for another value. This point emphasizes the very different meanings between technical rationality or managerial efficiency (a value that can be conceptually weighed against other values as in Torben Beck Jorgensen and Barry Bozeman (2007, 367)), and Pareto efficiency (a statement about a particular set of values).

Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006: 9-10, 14) discuss related issues that serve to emphasize the meta-value status of Pareto efficiency relative to other definitions. The authors (9-10) remind us that Dwight Waldo famously observed that it does not make sense to advocate “being efficient” in the abstract. To be operational, efficiency must be related to the pursuit of some particular value or goal. Because efficiency can only be understood with respect to other values, Waldo (1984, 193) concluded that efficiency could not be fundamental to public administration. Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 14) adopt this perspective with respect to technical efficiency, arguing that “[e]fficiency can be seen as a second-order value.” Yet, as suggested in this article, if one instead adopts the Pareto efficiency criterion with respect to public values, then, although efficiency continues to be defined relative to other values, the concept takes the superordinating status of meta-value rather than a subordinating, second-order status. For the Pareto proposition is to “efficiently” pursue the set of values deemed relevant in a particular situation (where, of
course, this means taking actions that advance at least one value without impairing others). In this interpretation, efficiency is neither a second-order value as a result of its relationship to other values, nor can efficiency be seen as merely one of many values without priority, since it makes no sense to think of trading off Pareto efficiency for another value over which it is defined. Rather, the notion of Pareto efficiency with respect to public values raises “efficiency” to meta-value, even beyond where Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 15-16) place their concept of “substantive efficiency” (defined as a general assessment of well-functioning administration) as equal with other values.

And yet, I do not propose that Pareto efficiency can be relied upon as a sole guide for managerial action. Many combinations of public values may be consistent with the Pareto criterion. Moreover, public managers must often make decisions that violate the Pareto criterion. That is, they are compelled to make decisions that advance some legitimate values at the expense of others. Making those decisions is not a matter of efficiency as defined by the Pareto criterion. It lies beyond efficiency. That is, the concept of Pareto efficiency gets the administrator only so far as a guide to action. It tells the administrator to be on the lookout for the multiple values in play in a given situation. But the likely course of action will have to be taken on grounds other than efficiency itself.²¹

Given that managers must make decisions that choose among values, it seems desirable that as many legitimate values as possible be included in the decision maker’s calculus.²² Otherwise the manager will make decisions that neglect some legitimate values. For example, the tax compliance manager who focuses only on the number of returns processed each month may neglect the values of fairness and accuracy in taking more time with particularly complicated cases. Similarly, John’s proposal to have clients sign blank application forms may
have been made without regard to the trust-building and communication goals of the unit. For these reasons, a grounding in common knowledge and shared values, to which Kelly (1998, 202) refers, assures that, within a specific context, the manager does not exclude important values in play. Schachter (2007, 807) notes that acquiring such a grounding requires that the public manager engage with the community’s citizens.

Of course, literally considering all values is impossible, and an attempt to do so is likely undesirable. Again, Lindblom’s (1959) work is relevant in that he argued against an analytical model that attempted to specify a rational policy-making process featuring, in part, a complete listing of alternative methods for achieving a given end. Lindblom’s apt objection is that constructing such a list is impossible in most cases and undesirable to the extent that valuable resources are used in constructing a list, most of which would be irrelevant to the actual decision made.

Thus the set of “all” legitimate values must be read as all values that the administrator, upon self-reflection and in consultation with colleagues and the public, can reasonably identify as being related to the question at hand. The goal of such reflection (a form of Lindblom’s probing) is to cut short the urge to quickly identify a course of action at the cost of negative unintended consequences. If the administrator will take the time to identify relevant values in play, then s/he is more likely to be prepared for challenges to the policy proposal and to anticipate further developments. Acting in this way is consistent with acting (Pareto) efficiently.

It is instructive to understand Peter Self’s critique of Pareto efficiency and why it has less force in the context suggested here. For Self, the major objection to Pareto efficiency as applied to goods and services is that it essentially conserves the status quo. If adopted as a policy criterion, Pareto efficiency requires permitting only changes in the distribution of goods and
services that make at least one person better off and no persons worse off; thus, implicitly the existing distribution of goods and services is privileged (Self 1977, 26, 143; 1985, 70; 1993, 248-249). Moreover, strict application of the criterion to public policy would virtually guarantee that nothing gets done—since the criterion essentially gives veto-power to anyone who may claim harm from a change in policy (Self 1985, 76; 1993, 249).

While these are strong arguments against the adoption of Pareto efficiency as a general criterion for public policy decisions, they have less force in the context suggested here of an administrator’s considerations of the relevant public values in a specific issue. I suggest that a public decision-maker can be said to be acting efficiently with respect to a public issue if she has reached a point where it is impossible to further at least one public value relevant to that issue without impairing other relevant public values. Once that point is reached, the administrator will have to make decisions that involve trading off at least one value against others, and so those decisions lie beyond efficiency. If we forbade the administrator to act beyond the Pareto efficiency criterion, then Self’s critiques would apply here; for then, Pareto efficiency would be of little help to the administrator. However, once an administrator has exhausted efforts to advance relevant public values where no impairment of others is implied, then the requirements of efficiency have been satisfied. The administrator may then move on to consider the (probably more difficult) issues of which public values to advance at the expense of others and by what criteria to make those choices.24

The adoption of this application of Pareto efficiency by public decision-makers offers both (1) a modest improvement in the immediate allocation of energies by administrators with influence on public policy, and, (2) a significant step forward in the quality of public decision processes. First, in the short run, to encourage public managers to take actions that will advance
some goal(s) that do not impair the attainment of others seems common sense. The more frequent, and more difficult, problem facing an administrator involves choosing among actions, all of which require sacrificing some desirable goals in order to advance others. Thus, the problem facing John and Carol is not simply how to minimize processing time—it is how to get the housing loan program going quickly while promoting the trust-building and educational goals of the agency. Application of the Pareto principle at least satisfies the goal of using available resources efficiently—making sure that actions are undertaken that promote some values which do not threaten other values.

Second, and more importantly, the public manager’s utilization of the Pareto principle as applied to public values at play in a particular issue compels explicit consideration of those values. In this sense, conscious application of the Pareto principle can promote a transformative, value-regarding approach to public administration. As mentioned, such an approach is consistent with Lindblom’s call for “probing” societal issues. The application of the Pareto principle by public managers is a concrete step toward assuring that public managers engage in, and support, such probing either within the walls of a public institution or in the broader community. Thus, as John and Carol develop the habit of asking themselves what public values are at play in a given situation, and whether some of those values can be advanced by actions that do not impair others, they continuously remind themselves of the larger context of their work. And they regularly remind themselves of the boundaries at which further pursuit of some values requires accepting the diminution of others. The managers thereby open themselves to the option of seeking public input about those choices and of participating in dialogue about both the set of relevant values and how their constituents weigh them.
While potentially connected to public performance measurement and indicators, this application of the Pareto efficiency principle to public values is more flexible. Performance measurement was an important part of the National Performance Review (1993, Ch. 3-2). The development of performance indicators can help identify measures of public values, track progress toward their attainment, thereby suggest policy direction, and hold public managers accountable for results. In principle, public managers could use the Pareto efficiency criterion to take those actions that promote one or more of such measures without reducing others. While the performance measurement process of identifying public values is probably worthwhile, the approach suggested here provides the public administrator with a flexible decision framework that avoids some of the drawbacks of formal indicators. The process of identifying, maintaining, and utilizing indicators to hold managers accountable, or to make public decisions, can be expensive, time-consuming, and of unclear benefit after the fact. By locating the “efficiency” characteristic of public decisions with the manager, the approach suggested here permits administrators to remind one another (and the public) of values that may have been overlooked in the construction of an indicator index, and it permits them to identify potential “new” public values as a result of consultation with the public and colleagues. Moreover, the process is ongoing and thereby mitigates the problem of outdated management performance contracts or indicators that do not easily adjust to shifting public policy emphases.

Finally, the Pareto efficiency approach envisions a role for public administrators that is philosophically distinct from that of NPM’s advocates. Vice-President Al Gore is quoted in the National Performance Review (1993, Ch. 3-2) with respect to values as follows:

There has to be a clear, shared sense of mission. There have to be clearly understood goals. There have to be common values according to which decisions are made. There has to be trust placed in the employees who actually do the work.
While these might be desirable features of a well-focused public agency, getting to this point is nontrivial. In the real world of most public agencies that manage complex issues with multiple facets, the costs of seeking value-consensus should be weighed against the likely success. Alternatively, if managers are imbued with the mind-set to consider the range of public values raised by a particular issue, then the sense of shared mission and values becomes an on-going, negotiated process within and among agencies and the public. This description of process may be a more realistic guide for public managers than the end-state envisioned in Vice-President Gore’s remarks.

It is worth noting characteristics of the public decision-making process that are likely to be consistent with, if not necessary to, the use of the Pareto principle proposed here. First, the approach presumes the existence of a degree of openness to discussion and issues exploration (Lindblom’s probing) within the public agency. In an autocratic, closed organizational environment, it may be impossible to even pose the question of which values are in play in an issue—because the question suggests that other values might be considered. Of course there are different degrees of openness, and even in strongly hierarchical organizations, it may be possible for managers to find ways to pose thought-provoking (thought-promoting?) questions in the guise of loyalty to the organization: For example, “How should we expect constituent group X to react to our proposed course of action?” Such questions at least open the door to a strategic, and possibly substantive, discussion of other values in play.28

A second institutional feature implied by the explicit adoption of Pareto efficiency with respect to public values relates to public forums. If public administrators begin to practice the accounting for public values that the Pareto principle requires, then they will find themselves compelled to seek direct information about such values in conversations with constituents,
meetings with community groups, public hearings, legislative committee meetings, and so on. Efforts to seriously identify public values in play demand such input. And the conversation goes both ways. For the public administrator must also be able to articulate his or her reasoning in arriving at a decision. If such reasoning explicitly acknowledges public values that are relevant, but which have not been advanced by a particular decision, then the administrator may have at least signaled awareness of those values and accepted their relevance. That may not appease the ardent activist, but it may prove helpful in subsequent encounters. Thus, adoption of this application of Pareto efficiency both contributes to an improved (inclusive) decision-making process and it provides a framework within which to legitimate decisions once made.

We should note here, Lindblom’s (1990, 109-114) concern about public officials using their position and authority to impair the probing process. The public administrator described here is one of many who has some decision-making authority with respect to public issues. Lindblom expresses concern that the official might choose to make his/her life easier by suppressing discussion and conflict over values. Yet this would violate the maintained assumption that the administrator wishes to act efficiently; if that is not the case, then the implied management issues lie beyond this article’s scope. In the framework described here, the administrator must explicitly consider other views and values in order to act efficiently. Moreover, that consideration by the administrator may be the most constructive result of her effort to be efficient.

Herein lies the value of adopting the Pareto definition of efficiency in public administration: It forces the decision maker to identify the values in play. This may lead to recognition that some of the values are not legitimate, in which case the course of action becomes relatively clear. In cases where many conflicting values are legitimate, explicit
identification may help the decision maker embark on a process that will determine a decision. But the administrator will not be able to justify that decision on the basis of efficiency. In most cases, all the administrator can do is to start from a position in which s/he is using resources well (Pareto efficiently) and then make decisions in awareness of the value tradeoffs.

In the housing loan example, ultimately John’s direction to sign blank forms might be defensible. If John was well-aware of the potential negative impact on client trust and, in light of that, still felt the overriding need to get some applications processed immediately, then the decision might not be gainsaid. Perhaps more likely, reflecting on the negative impact on client trust and the possible long-term impairment of the client base, John might look for ways to ameliorate those effects—perhaps by making the signing of blank forms temporary.

4. Mutual Adjustment and Civil Association

We note here the connections of this line of thought to ideas about the course of society’s path that are less directive in their implications for the actions of public administrators. Two such ideas are Lindblom’s “self-guiding society,” and Spicer’s (1998, 2004) discussion of the distinction between a purposive state and a civil association.

Lindblom offers an alternative to the vision of society offered by classic public administration that provides “expert advice,” emphasizing rational analysis and careful policy prescription. Lindblom (1990, 213) calls this the “scientific society.” While Lindblom is concerned with harm that can come to a society by virtue of excessive reliance on “experts,” the relevant point for this article is that the scientific society can be seen as the natural environment from which a vision of technical, or managerial, efficiency emerges as the ultimate goal of public administrators and public policymakers. This is a view against which Waldo argued and that Lindblom challenged as being impossible in his classic 1959 article.
In the place of a scientifically-guided society, Lindblom offers a self-guiding society. Here, all citizens have a role in contributing to the analysis (probing) of social issues. Expert advice may contribute to the discussion, but it is critical as a process that individual citizens think for themselves and develop the capacity to make their own decisions. The self-guiding society is less orderly and more chaotic. In particular, the path to resolutions of social problems is unlikely to be a straight line from the expert’s head to the administrator’s decision. Instead, it is likely to be a meandering walk as arguments and interests on many sides contend with one another. Resolutions emerge in a process that involves “mutual adjustment”—the taking account of positions, arguments, and decisions of many players.

From this perspective, it is particularly important for a public administrator to be efficient in the Pareto sense. Precisely because the administrator cannot hope to grasp the full dimensionality of most of the problems s/he faces, the administrator must be diligent in considering the values raised in a particular issue. If citizens are probing, making arguments, and jostling for position, the administrator must seek to identify the values that are being put forward. Thus, by urging public administrators to achieve efficiency with respect to public values in the sense of Pareto, this article provides a conceptual framework for facilitating, and participating in, societal probing, thereby contributing to the process of mutual adjustment.

Spicer (1998, 2004) comes at these ideas from a slightly different perspective. Using the work of Michael Oakeshott, Spicer distinguishes the vision of society as a “purposive state” from its vision as a “civil association.” In the purposive state, official actions are directed toward particular goals or ends. There is something to do and the state is going to do it. This vision also gives natural prominence to managerial efficiency or technical rationality: If there is a purpose
to be accomplished, then one can hardly object to the proposal to pursue it (technically) efficiently—that is, at minimum cost.

Yet Spicer notes that, at least in the United States, most government action is more consistent with a view of society as a civil association than a purposive state. A civil association suggests a community composed of individuals pursuing their own particular callings (volitions, to use Lindblom’s term). Citizens are held together by a recognition of the value of collective activity that is maximally respectful of individual goals and aspirations. By implication, a civil association must travel a path that is also characterized by Lindblom’s mutual adjustment process. And it is likely to entail a role for the public administrator as facilitator and enabler rather than hard-charging problem-solver. Again, this is likely to be an administrator aware of the various currents of thought in the community, able to identify principles and understand when they are being honestly advanced rather than used as guises for narrow interests. The public administrator in a civil association is a participant, not dictator. In other words, the administrator in the state-as-civil-association would be expected to act efficiently, not in the “technical” or “managerial” sense, but in Pareto’s sense.

A legitimate concern, especially for public administration educators, is whether this vision of a (Pareto) efficient public manager is feasible. Does it ask too much of humans as we know them? The single goal of technical efficiency has the virtue of simplicity. Yet as critics might note, its implementation is likely to lead the administrator into a hornet’s nest of objections and contention, as those whose values are not advanced react, object, stall, and sabotage. The single-minded pursuit of one, specific goal does not even provide the comfort that the decision-maker has acknowledged the existence of other values—thereby, only leaving objectors such options as converting the administrator or replacing him/her. In contrast, it is in
the interest of the public manager applying Pareto efficiency to evaluate and acquire information about an issue’s values landscape. Doing so, does not require that the administrator be omniscient—only that s/he be willing to listen, dialogue, and learn. While Pareto efficiency requires a more open-minded approach to public management than the single-minded focus of the technically efficient manager, the administrator is more likely to survive and positively engage the complex public environment.

Finally, we might also note that Laurence E. Lynn’s (1999) description of policy analysis connects to these ideas. Lynn’s (412-413) observation of the growing importance of administrative discretion is fundamental to the view of the administrator offered here of someone who must thoughtfully and intelligently consider her decisions in light of the relevant legitimate values. In order to do that the administrator needs to have the flexibility that discretion provides. Moreover, in recounting the history of the development of policy analysis, Lynn (413) tangentially observes that, to the extent that administrators have discretion, then they become policymakers. They must, therefore, be open to the kind of argument and empirical evidence that is the province of policy analysts. I would argue that this implies they must engage in the kind of ethical thinking that is at the heart of applying Pareto efficiency to advancing public values. Also, Lynn (419) observes that postpositivists seem to want to focus on analyzing values. While a major purpose of Lynn’s article is to critique the postpositivists, I share the view that values must be explicitly considered and weighed by administrators. Rather than embarking on a meaningless theoretical journey, however, I see this as the essence of injecting some of the thoughtful pragmatism into the administrator’s life that Lynn calls for.
Conclusion

This article argues that public administrators act in ways that are consistent with “efficiency” when they make decisions while aware of the multiple, legitimate values at play. Their decisions may not be explainable in terms of maximizing a well-defined function that indexes the component legitimate values. But if the administrator can provide a coherent explanation for why some values are pursued more fully than others, and can do this for the relevant legitimate values, then she has succeeded in implicitly weighing those values in some way.\(^{31}\) This approach may be thought of as an extension of the “let managers manage” philosophy—by adding the requirement that managers be prepared to explain their choices.\(^{32}\) And the manager has satisfied the economic definition of efficiency: Using available resources so that it is not possible to advance some values without impairing others.\(^{33}\)

Denhardt (2004, 153) argues that practitioners want a public administration theory that provides them understanding from which new approaches to their work can be constructed, as well as a conceptual framework within which to interpret their experience. In this light, the long-standing public administration debate about efficiency must be particularly frustrating. The approach suggested here may offer the practitioner some clarity that is consistent with an important version of efficiency:

Accept that you will be placed under demands from many sources and that you will have to weigh the values implied. Some of these values will carry more weight than others, and these weights will shift over time. When presented with the (probably rare) opportunity to advance some values without impairing others, pursue it vigorously. Most of the rest of the time you will have to choose among
competing values; do so with awareness for what is being advanced and what is not.

If this advice does not seem particularly startling, that may be a good thing. For it suggests an approach to administration that is consistent with the view that an important part of the work of public managers is to “express the values of our society” (Denhardt 2004, 192).³⁴

The argument offered here is not that efficiency is unimportant, nor that some values are more important than efficiency. Indeed, the concept of Pareto efficiency places it in the position of meta-value. The argument here is that managers need not run the risk of being accused of inefficiency when they entertain contending values. Pareto efficiency requires that they do so. Nevertheless, managers will often have to justify decisions on grounds that go beyond efficiency. In this sense, efficiency is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sensibly and responsibly carrying out the work of public organizations.
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Notes

1. As expressed, for example, in Gulick (1937, 192). Schachter (2007) provides a recent overview of the role of efficiency in public administration from the Progressive Era through New Public Management. Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006) provide a more extended review of the concept in the process of distinguishing “technical efficiency” from “substantive efficiency.”

2. See Dwight Waldo (1952) for a survey of public administration’s origins as part of his call for a theory of “democratic administration.”

3. Similarly, Denhardt’s (2004, 71-72) discussion of Robert Dahl’s early work emphasizes the public administrator’s involvement in both ends and means, making adherence to technical efficiency logically and ethically problematic.

4. This is a time-honored conversation; see Denhardt (2004, 15 and passim) and Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 11) for valuable discussions. Downs and Larkey (1986, 242) observe that public institutions will necessarily seem inefficient when goals of due process or redistribution “consume resources that a private organization would spend on the primary mission alone.”

5. Schachter’s (2007, 800) recent review of efficiency in public administration notes that, in actual administration, efficiency is as preeminent a criterion as it has ever been.

6. Osborne and Gaebler (1994; 15, 35, 80). Kaboolian (1998, 190) notes that each of the government reform movements labeled as part of NPM sought to “maximize productive and allocative efficiencies.”
7. On New Zealand see, for example, Schwartz (1997, 412 and 416). For the U.S., see National Performance Review (1993, Ch. 2).

8. For example, see deLeon and Denhardt (2000), Argyriades (2003), and Spicer (2004, 2007). The emerging public value paradigm in public administration shares this skepticism (O’Flynn 2007; Rhodes and Wanna 2007).

9. See the National Performance Review (1993, Ch. 3-1) for an explicit example of such a goal.

10. Hood’s (1995, 95-97) review of NPM’s characteristics contains similar elements. In particular, Hood (97) notes NPM’s “stress on discipline and parsimony in resource use” (emphasis in original).

11. Similarly, Kelly (1998, 202) argued that NPM attempts “to apply private sector and market concepts to the public sector.” The appeal to the business sector as a model for public management was explicit in the federal government’s National Performance Review (NPR 1993, Chs. 2, 2-3, and 2-4). Some language in the National Performance Review (1993) suggested that agencies should focus on a single objective, for example the Agency for International Development’s trouble in accomplishing its “real mission” of promoting international development because of the more than 40 other objectives imposed by Congress; or, more generally, the reduction of federal “bureaucratic hoops” to allow state and local governments to focus on “customer needs” (NPR 1993, Ch. 1). Other examples include instructions to place customers first, implying a shift of attention from other goals toward customer service (NPR 1993, Ch. 2 and 2-1); the proposal to restructure the Air Traffic Control system into a government corporation, thereby allowing the FAA to focus on safety issues (NPR 1993, Ch. 2-3); and the proposal to establish a Real Property Asset Management Enterprise to seek the highest return possible on federal property, which would relieve the
General Services Administration of that duty while it attempted to find office space for federal agencies (NPR 1993, Ch. 2-3).

And yet NPR also contains language mitigating the single-goal focus. For example, the proposed actions to create a system of “one-stop, career development centers” and to require “collaborative efforts across the government” to meet community needs appear to recognize that, at least with respect to direct services, there are many types of citizen demands, and that government should find ways to address them all (NPR 1993, Ch. 2-1).

12. Named for the Italian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, the concept is fundamental to neoclassical economics. See Lockwood (1987) for a discussion. Economics entertains several notions of efficiency, some that appear to go well beyond the conceptual requirements of the Pareto definition. Still, as Downs and Larkey (1986, 7) suggest, the Pareto criterion is the economist’s preferred definition of efficiency; perhaps for this reason, these authors label it “economic efficiency.” Moreover, Lockwood (1987, 813) observes that within mainstream, neoclassical economics, all other concepts of efficiency eventually reduce to Pareto-efficiency. This observation suggests an irony in Van der Meer and Rutgers’s (2006, 7, 8) association of technical efficiency (a relationship between inputs and output) with economics; Pareto efficiency goes well beyond technical efficiency.

13. See Denhardt (2004, 148) and Van der Meer and Rutgers (2006, 3). Also see Denhardt’s (25) discussion of Weber’s view of “technical rationality (i.e. formal efficiency),” emphasizing private ownership and managerial control of productive resources; p. 43 (discussing Woodrow Wilson’s businesslike approach), pp. 51-53 (Frederick W. Taylor’s scientific management), and pp. 61-65 (efficiency as the measure of success).

14. Also see Downs and Larkey (1986, 256).
15. In the language of welfare economics, John’s proposal is Pareto inferior. A policy that would advance at least one of the agency’s goals without impeding others would be called Pareto superior relative to the existing situation.

16. Van der Meer and Rutgers correctly observe that the phrases “Pareto-optimal” and “Pareto-efficient” are used synonymously, however the concept does not imply that society’s welfare is at a maximum in the sense that the value of a social welfare function has peaked. Lockwood (1987, 811) notes that a particular allocation of resources is only Pareto-optimal “in the limited sense that not everybody can be made better off,” and for this reason “the word ‘Pareto-optimal’ has gradually been replaced by ‘Pareto-efficient.’”

In any case, the Pareto efficiency concept suggested here relates not to the allocation of goods and services in society (the usual definition) but instead to the relevant public values involved in a particular issue. In this sense, this article transfers the Pareto efficiency concept from the economic realm to the realm of applied public decision making.

17. The political nature of defining government efficiency is a key aspect of Schachter’s (2007, 806) analysis. There has been some reaction against the suggestion that public managers should actively pursue public values; see Rhodes and Wanna (2007).

18. The multiple and conflicting values that managers face is Behn’s (1998, 215 and passim) primary explanation for why public managers must lead. For an effort to identify and systematically discuss public values, see Jorgensen and Bozeman (2007).

19. Denhardt (2004, 16) defines the field of public administration as the management of the “change processes” necessary to pursue “publicly defined societal values.”

20. The perspective also connects to Behn’s (1998, 213) notion that public managers as leaders often must guide a “groping along” process.
21. Joseph Schumpeter (1965, 131) observed that Pareto made a similar point: “Pareto pointed out that welfare judgments that cannot be salvaged in this manner [that is, justified by the Pareto principle] must be explicitly based on extra-economic, e.g. ‘ethical,’ considerations.” Here I interpret Schumpeter’s phrase “extra-economic” as meaning beyond efficiency.

22. This assertion is consistent with Denhardt’s (2004, 124) argument that managers of public organizations “bear a responsibility to examine, understand, and interpret public values to the best of their ability.” Lindblom’s (1959, 81) discussion of the “method of successive limited comparisons,” or incrementalism, makes the important point that it is not possible to identify literally all the values at play in a policy decision. Still, the argument presented here is consistent with Lindblom’s rejection of what he called the “root” approach to analysis which would require weighting and aggregating all relevant values prior to considering alternative policy options.

23. Lindblom (1990, 148-149) makes similar points. Although Lindblom appears to share Self’s criticisms of the Pareto criterion, it is interesting that the conserving aspect of the criterion is consistent with Lindblom’s interest in the incremental accretion of knowledge and policy development.

24. In an article that offers a “public failure” model to supplement the existing market failure model central to public policy analysis, Bozeman (2002, 147) suggests that Pareto efficiency is equivalent to “conventional utilitarian calculus.” I believe this misstates the Pareto criterion: Rather than promoting the interpersonal comparisons of utility that are a major drawback of utilitarianism, the Pareto criterion specifically avoids such comparisons by focusing only on changes that do not reduce any individual’s welfare level. In the context of
this paper, the criterion would have the administrator look for opportunities to advance at least some public values without impairing others.

25. Of course, this example abstracts from the existence of other goals and values that might be at play in the housing loan program.

26. The approach is also consistent with Daniel J. Fiorino’s (2001) description of U.S. environmental policy as a learning process, with significant communication among government agency decision-makers and the public as a “social learning” stage of the process.

27. For example, in the context of sustainability indicators, Mitra (2003, 35) and Besleme et al (1999, 39) acknowledge the time and resources required to develop indicators, and Cobb and Rixford (1998) and Innes and Booher (2000) note the tenuous connection between indicators and policy decisions.

28. Note that National Performance Review’s advocacy of decentralizing decision-making power is also consistent with the suggestion here to give managers latitude to question and challenge the underlying values promoted (and ignored) by a particular course of action.

29. Smith and Huntsman (1997) suggest a role for citizens as co-investors in public assets in an effort to create or enhance public value. “Public value” takes on a more (though not exclusively) prosaic, monetary aspect in the Smith-Huntsman framework than in that proposed here. For example, with respect to citizen “co-investors,” I would hope that administrators would consider whether taking the Smith-Huntsman approach would raise a problematic expectation that citizen-investors would receive preference or priority in the use of such assets or for the attention of public decision-makers. Obviously, this would complicate the public value of equal access to public resources. There are interesting issues
of citizen participation models raised by this discussion, but they lie outside the primary focus of this article.

30. As with Bozeman’s (2002; 150, 157) proposed model of public failure in advancing values, this approach does not require agreement on public values—merely attention to them. This point partially addresses Bohte’s (2007, 812) question about what an administrator is to do when faced with conflict over desired outcomes.

31. It might be emphasized that the manager’s success in articulating a decision’s rationale is critical to Kaboolian’s (1998, 191) observation that getting citizens to accept a choice by their public agents, which violates their personal preferences, is “key to the maintenance of a democratic state.” Articulating choices and explaining decisions is also central to Behn’s (1998; 210, 212, 215, 218 ) notion of the public manager as leader.

32. See Kettl’s (1997, 447) discussion of letting, versus making, managers manage.

33. There is some irony here: While many public administration writers have urged the consideration of multiple public values in addition to, or to contest the primacy of, (technical) efficiency, this article suggests that the public administrator use Pareto efficiency in order to insure the consideration of relevant public values.

34. It might be noted that this prescription is distinctly more modest than Moore’s (1995, 21) suggestion that managers look for ways to “create public values.”
References


