Ethnolinguistic Notes
New Series, Number 2
THE LANGUE
George W. Grace
University of Hawaii
June 9, 1978
This Note is concerned with a question that was raised in Grace 1977.
The question is: what is the object of linguistic description, or more exactly, what kind of counterpart
to a linguistic description can be discovered in reality? Or since we are accustomed to
saying that the object of linguistic description is the “langue”, what is a langue?
That question seems a very central one to any attempt to understand what should probably
be called the “foundations of linguistics”. I believe that we can reasonably begin with
the assumption that a langue exists just in that it is known by its speakers. I believe
that that assumption would be widely accepted among contemporary linguists. Although in
stating the assumption in this way I am deliberately disregarding certain questions which
must, in other contexts, be faced, I do not think they affect the argument to be presented
here.
The problem of the definition of the langue has more than one aspect. To be more specific,
the problem that concerns us is that of defining a particular langue--call it X--which is
to be made the object of a linguistic description. We have said that X actually consists
of knowledge possessed by the speakers of X. But not all of the knowledge possessed by
these people counts as linguistic knowledge, and of their linguistic knowledge, not all
counts as knowledge of X. The description of X which we are about to undertake is, of
course, responsible only for describing their knowledge of X.
However, as I tried to show in Grace 1977, not all of the speakers' knowledge of X would
actually be reported in a normal linguistic description. I there lumped together the omitted
aspects of the knowledge under the rubric “idiomatology”. If we were to identify the langue
strictly with the object of linguistic description then one aspect of the problem of defining
the langue would involve drawing the line between that aspect of the speakers’ knowledge of X
which is relevant to a linguistic description of X and those aspects (the idiomatology) which
are not. However, we will not be concerned with that problem here. I will assume that knowledge
of X includes knowledge of its idiomatology. What we will be concerned with is the problem of
distinguishing knowledge of X from knowledge of other langues, of defining X as opposed to Y, Z, etc.
For the purpose of linguistic description it is useful to think of the langue as defined as a
set of proper utterances--i.e., those utterances which are to be explained by the linguistic
description. In the case of ausbau languages the approximate limits of the set are widely
promulgated, of course, and are more or less accessible through direct inquiry. Except in
such cases, the process is presumably more complicated. From the point of view of the individual
speaker I think it is probably more realistic to imagine that the limits of the set of proper
utterances, instead of being perceived directly, are vouched for by a more readily identifiable
set of proper speakers. However, the set of proper utterances cannot be directly defined on this
basis since proper speakers may still speak sometimes in other langues or speak improperly, e.g.,
in jest. The definition must be derived from proper speakers speaking properly.
Before we proceed, I must add a further qualification. Although I have used the term “langue”,
the object which I hope to define is not necessarily a distinct language as opposed to a system
which is dialectally close to some other system. I need to make a few preliminary remarks about
linguistic variation before discussing this question.
First, linguistic variation seems generally to be perceived as falling into either of two types:
whole-system variation or part-of-system variation. Part-of-system variation involves what are
perceived as different ways of speaking the same language or dialect. Examples of such variant
ways are styles or jargons. They are not perceived as complete systems, but rather as variant
parts of a larger system. They are likely to be distinguished mainly by vocabulary and to share,
in the main, the phonology and grammar of the larger system. Whole-system variation, on the other
hand, involves what are perceived as different systems even though they may be quite similar to
one another (as closely related dialects under some circumstances). Each whole-system is a suitable
object for a linguistic description, but part-systems are not.
A second distinction needs to be made. Some variation is perceived as partitioning the set of
speakers in such a way that each speaker is identified with one of the alternative ways (e.g.,
language, dialect) of speaking. In cases of bilingualism or bidialectalism the individual will
probably be perceived as having an ambiguous identity. Let us call this kind of variation
“emblematic”. Other variation is perceived as partitioning the set of culturally relevant
situations, some ways being appropriate in some situations, other ways in others. It is
likely that all members of the community will be held generally responsible for commanding
this kind of variation.
We probably tend to expect an association between whole-system and emblematic variation,
on the one hand, and on the other, between part-of-system and situational variation.
Examples of the first association are dialects or different languages; of the second,
styles
in the sense of Joos's Five Clocks (1962) or linguistic etiquette as
in Geertz 1960.
However, diglossia (Ferguson 1959) is probably most often to be perceived as whole-system
situational variation, and technical jargons, argots, and the age-grading phenomenon in
general as part-of-system emblematic variation.
It is now possible to return to the original question and give it a more precise formulation.
The appropriate object of linguistic description is conceived of as being an entity of the
whole-system type (which I will from now on call the “langue”). Our question now becomes:
in what sense do such entities exist, and how are they to be identified?
As we saw above, we must assume that the langue has no existence beyond its existence as
knowledge of its speakers. The speakers have acquired their knowledge through observation.
The langue, therefore, is constituted through the observation which establishes the knowledge
of it in the minds of its speakers. It is constituted by being observed, and the process of
constitution through observation is, of course, a continuous one stretching backward and
forward in time.
As (and because) the langue is constituted by being observed, it is also defined by being
observed. Its definition is to be found in the perceptions of its observers.
The conclusion to which these considerations lead is this: any attempt to define the langue
independently of an observer is artificial and arbitrary. But how may it be defined even
with reference to an observer? I will propose what seems to me probably a typical scenario.
In this scenario the observer begins as a child. He observes speech activity around him.
Gradually, he begins to acquire knowledge which enables him to participate in this activity.
As he observes, he becomes aware of variation. Some of this variation he comes to perceive as
emblematic variation. From very early he has identified himself with some other individuals
as those who model the behavior he seeks to acquire. These may be called his "reference group".
As his perception of the emblematic speech systems evolves so does his definition of his
reference groups. The reference group for a particular emblematic system is the "set of
proper speakers" referred to above. The langue for this individual at any particular point
in his life is, then, the system manifested by the members of his reference group when they
are speaking properly as he perceives it to be.
How, then, has linguistics had the success that it has had while assuming the langue to
be a supra-individual reality? The answer, I think is that that success is due to tendencies
to coincidence in the perceptions of individuals. These tendencies, of course, receive special
reinforcement in the familiar ausbau
situation. However, in general it would be expected that the fiction of the langue
as a well-defined entity will be a useful approximation roughly in the degree that
there is a well-defined set of proper speakers associated with it--a set which offers
itself as a readily-identifiable reference group for all observers.
REFERENCES
Ferguson, Charles A. 1959. Diglossia. Word 15: 325-40.(Back up)
Geertz, Clifford. 1960. The religion of Java. Glencoe: The Free Press.(Back up)
Grace, George W. 1977. Language: An ethnolinguistic essay. ts. (Back up)
Joos, Martin. 1962. The five clocks. IJAL 28, no. 2, part 5.(Back up)
To go to other places in this website, click on one of the cells below
First put on the Web on 4 September 2006
