supposing truth is a woman
philosophers like love-sick suitors who don’t understand the woman-truth
central problem of philosophy is Plato’s error:
denying perspective, the basic condition of all life

On the Prejudices of Philosophers

1) questioning the will to truth
who is it that really wants truth? What in us wants truth? Why not untruth?

2) origin of the will to truth out of the will to untruth, deception
can anything arise out of its opposite?
A dangerous questioning?
Nietzsche sees new philosophers coming up who have the strength for the dangerous “maybe.” Note in general Nietzsche’s preference for the conditional tense, his penchant for beginning his questioning with “perhaps” or “suppose” or “maybe.” In many of the passages throughout this book Nietzsche takes up a perspective which perhaps none had dared take up before, a perspective to question what had seemed previously to be unquestionable. He seems to constantly be tempting the reader with a dangerous thought experiment. This begins with the questioning of the will to truth and the supposition that, perhaps, the will to truth may have arisen out of its opposite, the will to untruth, ignorance, deception.

3) the supposition that the greater part of conscious thinking must be included among instinctive activities
Nietzsche emphasizes that consciousness is a surface phenomenon
conscious thinking is directed by what goes on beneath the surface
contrary to Plato’s notion of pure reason, the conscious intellect, Nietzsche supposes, is not necessarily in control

4) supposition that untruth is a condition of life
thus the falseness of a judgment is not necessarily an objection
What counts is whether it is “life promoting, life preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species cultivating.”
This thought experiment of untruth as a condition of life can be traced back to the early essay “On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense”: truths are illusions that we have forgotten are illusions and to the Apollonian art drive in The Birth of Tragedy
the creation of beautiful illusions which are necessary to life
the capacity to create necessary fictions without which we could not live

5) criticizing philosophers who think they have purely discovered their truths, those who think they have obtained some ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ standpoint
challenging this assumption Nietzsche suggest they are all “wily spokesman for their prejudices which they baptize ‘truths’”
calls out Kant in particular, for thinking he has obtained such a standpoint with his ‘categorical imperative’

6) important passage focusing on Nietzsche’s psychology of the unconscious drives
every philosophy a kind of personal confession and unconscious memoir
this echoes the Preface to The Gay Science in which Nietzsche suggests philosophers philosophize out of
their sicknesses (himself included!)

9) questioning the Stoics and their vow to live “according to nature”
Nietzsche challenges this view by suggesting there is nothing “stoic” about nature:
“nature” Nietzsche suggests is wasteful beyond measure, indifferent, without purpose, without mercy and
justice,
perhaps living is wanting to be other than this nature
thus untruth as a condition of life
Nietzsche criticizes what he sees in the Stoics: their attempt to read into “nature” their own image
but all philosophers have done this
all philosophy “creates the world in its own image”
“Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to ‘the creation of the world’”

10) first reference to “nihilism” in his published writings
criticizing the metaphysical opposition between “the real and apparent world”
also criticizing the quest for certainty which has been the dominant theme in modern philosophy
the reference to nihilism is to the
“puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something”

11) criticizing Kant for thinking that he had ‘discovered’ a new faculty in man,
the faculty for synthetic judgments a priori
Nietzsche proposes replacing Kant’s question: How are synthetic judgment a priori possible?
with the question: “Why is belief in such judgments necessary?”

12) rejection of materialistic atomism
Kaufmann’s footnote informs us that Nietzsche’s reference here is to an obscure 18th century Jesuit
philosopher, Boscovich, who defined atoms as only centers of force and not particles of matter
Nietzsche takes up Boscovich’s view with his notion of the will to power as play of forces
before Einstein, Nietzsche is thinking through the notion of matter as force

13) questioning whether the instinct for self-preservation is really the most basic drive
“A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation iss
only one of the indirect and most frequent results.”

14) supposition that even physics is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world
to what extent is Nietzsche’s supposition about physics correct? Is even physics only an interpretation?
reference to Plato’s thinking as a noble way of thinking
Plato’s thinking was an overcoming of the world (really what all philosophy does according to
Nietzsche’s hypothesis about philosophy as the most spiritual will to power)

15) the previous passage suggest Nietzsche’s rejection of realism
this passage shows his rejection of idealism
Nietzsche’s position then evades the dichotomy of realism/idealism

16) criticizing the “immediate certainties” of philosophers
especially Descartes “I think, therefore, I am”
and Schopenhauer’s “I will”
17) taking up further this critique of Descartes’ certainty
Nietzsche suggests that a thought comes not when “I think” but when “it” wishes

18) it is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable
the hundred times refuted theory of “free will” owes its persistence to this charm

19) now takes up his own refutation of the theory of “free will”
for Nietzsche the will is not the best known thing in the world, but something complicated
“Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word”
the will is thus not a unity but a plurality
and what is strangest: we are at the same time the commanding and obeying parties
we deceive ourselves with the concept of “I”
grammar deceives us in thinking that the will is a unity
there is a deception, then, even in the notion of the “I”

20) further exploration of the falsifications of grammar
strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing
can be traced to common family of Indo-European languages
suggests that philosophers of Ural-Altaic languages (such as Japanese) might have a different view
perhaps it is the common grammar of Indo-European languages with their noun based language
which leads to a metaphysics of Being, the view that reality is unchanging

21) questioning the notion of the causa sui (the self-cause)
this passage illustrates further Nietzsche’s supposition about the necessity of untruth
“It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in-itself’ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically. The “unfree will” is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills.”

22) Nietzsche uses his experience as a philologist to criticize a common failing of philosophers:
the attempt to read into “nature” what one really wants to find in “nature”
for the philologist, this is a “bad mode of interpretation”
“somebody might come along who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same “nature,” and with regard to the same phenomena, rather the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power—an interpreter who would picture the unexceptional and unconditional aspects of all ‘will to power’ . . .”

23) all previous psychology got stuck in moral prejudices and has not dared descend to the depths
Nietzsche dares to descend to the depths (opening up depth psychology)
“To understand it [psychology] as morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power”
Nietzsche clearly is warning the reader here that this descent into the depths is a dangerous descent:
“And yet even in this immense and almost new domain of dangerous insights; and there are in fact a hundred good reasons why everyone should keep away from it who—can.”

24) again the theme of the necessity of illusions
the will to knowledge arises out of the will to ignorance
the will to knowledge is not the opposite of the will to ignorance but its refinement

one might notice a theme drawn from the teaching of evolution
just as it was shocking when Darwin showed that the human being arose out of what was animal
the human being not as the opposite of the ape but its refinement
Nietzsche suggests a similar evolution of knowledge
man could not live without a constant simplification and falsification
even science “at its best seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world—at the way in which, willy-nilly, it loves error, because, being alive, it loves life.”

25) warns philosophers to beware of martyrdom
to sacrifice oneself for the sake of truth
such philosophers take their truths too seriously
Nietzsche finds more truthfulness in question marks than in solemn gestures
necessity of the good solitude for the philosopher
Nietzsche is especially critical of the stupidity of moral indignation
such indignation is a sure sign one has lost his philosophical sense of humor

26) this “good solitude” further explored
“every choice human being strives for a citadel and a secrecy where he is saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority”

27) Nietzsche calls attention to the difference in tempo of his thought
it is hard to be understood when one thinks quickly (like the current of the Ganges)
while everyone else thinks like the tortoise
Nietzsche admits he does everything to be “hard to understand”

28) again the problem of tempo is considered
“a German is almost incapable of presto [rapid tempo]”

29) on esoteric writing
against the modern disposition toward equality and equal rights
Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity of the esoteric for the philosopher
the esoteric looks down from above
the philosopher should aspire to such heights
not seek what is common
“What serves the higher type of man as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison for a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might perhaps signify vices and weaknesses in the philosopher.”

32) a hint of his project concerning the self-overcoming of morality

33) the morality of self-denial is questioned
along with the aesthetics of disinterestedness (Kant’s aesthetics)

34) important passage on Nietzsche’s perspectivism:
Forgive me the joke of this gloomy grimace and trope; for myself I have learned long ago to think differently, to estimate differently with regard to deceiving and being deceived, and I keep in reserve at least a couple of jostles for the blind rage with which the philosophers resist being deceived. Why not? It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is even the worst proved assumption there is in the world. Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of some philosophers, one wanted to abolish the "apparent world" altogether well suppose you could do that, at least nothing would be left of your "truth" either. Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance different "values," to use the language of painters? Why couldn't the world that concerns us be a fiction?

36) important passage taking up an experiment (Versuch) concerning the drives: thinking is merely the relation of the drives to each other

Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire drive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force universally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else.

38) raising the problem of interpretation on the one hand criticizes the many interpretations of the French Revolution the event so widely interpreted “that the text disappeared under the interpretation” yet his concluding remarks suggest it is questionable whether one can ever discover the text behind the interpretation

39) “Nobody is very likely to consider a doctrine true merely because it makes people happy or virtuous” wonder what Nietzsche would have said of the pragmatist William James? “Something might be true while being harmful and dangerous in the highest degree.” Thus, once again, the experiment concerning the necessity of untruth or “we have art lest we perish of the truth” (WP, 822)

40) important passage on the mask “Whatever is profound loves masks. . . . Every profound spirit needs a mask”

41) importance of not remaining stuck (being attached) to a person, a fatherland, or even science, not even to one’s own detachment

42) the new species of philosophers A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name that is not free of danger. As I unriddle them, insofar as they allow themselves to be unriddled for it belongs to their nature to want to remain riddles at some point these philosophers of the future may have a right it might also be a wrong to be called (at)tempters (Versucher). This name itself is in the end a mere attempt (Versuch) and, if you will, a temptation (Versuchung).

43) will these new philosophers still love truth? Are these coming philosophers new friends of "truth"? That is probable enough, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their
truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman—which has so far been the secret wish and hidden meaning of all
dogmatic aspirations. "My judgment is my judgment": no one else is easily entitled to it—that is what such a
philosopher of the future may perhaps say of himself. . . .

44) these new philosophers, these “free spirits,” take up a questioning “beyond good and evil”

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What is Religious

This chapter develops Nietzsche’s critique of religious values or ‘what is religious.’ While the general
subject here might include ‘what is religious’ in the broadest sense, and thus might be applicable to any
religion, the central target is, of course, Christianity. The main theme of Nietzsche’s critique is that so
far, and especially in Christianity, everything that is ‘religious’ has been a symptom of a weariness with
life. Could there be a life-affirming religious life?

46) this section develops a critique of religious ‘faith’

One might compare this with the letter to his sister written when he was 22 (see notes for first class)
Nietzsche begins by making a distinction between the faith of
‘original Christianity’ and that of ‘a Luther or a Cromwell’ (in other words ‘Protestantism’)
in any case, from the beginning Christian faith has been
“a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time enslavement and
self-mockery, self-mutilation”
Nietzsche describes the “god on the cross” as a revaluation of the values of antiquity
this revaluation was the revenge of the slave against Roman nobility
Nietzsche attempts a revaluation of the values of Christianity

47) on religious ‘neuroses’ or religious asceticism—solitude, fasting, chastity
Nietzsche wonders how the denial of will in ascetic ideals even became possible
this leads Nietzsche to question the whole phenomenon of the saint
this passage anticipates his examination of ascetic ideals in On the Genealogy of Morals

51) the “will to power” of the saint
in questioning how the saint became such a powerful figure that even the most powerful human beings
bowed worshipfully before him, Nietzsche refers to the “will to power” of the saint
this suggests that Nietzsche’s notion of the “will to power” should not be taken as
a desire for power which could be contrasted with the saint’s desire for holiness or whatever. . .
every interpretation of existence, even the saint’s, is an expression of the “will to power” or “life force”
the question for Nietzsche in examining various interpretations of existence
is not whether this “force” is there, but rather what kind or what quality of “will to power”
expresses itself in that interpretation of existence
generally, Nietzsche’s perspective is to ask whether the “will to power” expresses
an affirmation or a weariness with life

55) on religious cruelty
Nietzsche writes of a “ladder of religious cruelty, with three principle rungs:
   1) once one sacrificed human beings to one’s god
   2) then, “during the moral epoch of mankind” (Christianity), one sacrificed one’s own strongest
      instincts
   3) it became necessary to sacrifice God himself (the death of God as the outcome of the
      Enlightenment)

56) ‘eternal recurrence’ as a counter-movement to world-denying interpretations of existence
in this important passage Nietzsche suggests that it was thinking through pessimism to its depths
which led him to open his eyes to the opposite ideal:
“the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to
terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated
into all eternity”

59) further examination of pessimism
it was a suspicious fear of an incurable pessimism that led whole millennia to the religious interpretation
of existence
a fear that man is not strong enough, not artist enough

61) the philosopher as Nietzsche understands him also will use religions
in his project of cultivation and education
here he acknowledges that asceticism can be a means of self-overcoming
a means of ennobling a people
refers to the Brahmins—thus the asceticism of ancient India
suggests a common sort of overcoming in Christianity and Buddhism
both taught the lowliest how to place themselves into an illusory higher order of things

62) concluding section of this chapter emphasizes his condemnation of Christianity
the passage begins emphasizing the theme that “man is the as yet undetermined animal”
this obviously one should recognize as the idea of the Übermensch from Zarathustra
the Overhuman Zarathustra speaks of is the one willing to continually overcome him or herself
I think perhaps one should not think of the Übermensch as something already accomplished
this perhaps would be one thing to think about in comparing and contrasting Nietzsche’s Übermensch
with the notion of Enlightenment in Asian traditions
in India, especially in the Vedanta notion of the jivan-mukta, the idea is of one who has already
completed the task of becoming enlightened
the project of self-overcoming has been completed
this notion is also there in Buddhism with the notion of the ‘Buddha,’ the one who has been ‘awakened’
I think of the Übermensch as the goal of continual self-overcoming
necessary to this process of continual self-overcoming is that aspects of the self must perish
this is a common theme in Asian traditions of self-overcoming
the great Zen master Hakuin spoke of “the Great Death”

the problem with the “above mentioned two greatest religions”
(here he is obviously referring to Christianity and Buddhism mentioned at the end of the previous
section)
is that their concern to ease suffering leads to the desire to “preserve whatever can possibly be preserved”
the problem is that this leads to the preservation of “what ought to perish”
this thought certainly leads to the dangerous, “wicked” thoughts Nietzsche takes up at the beginning of
the final chapter
thus it is crucial to see the context of this thought-experiment
Christianity, Nietzsche suggests, worsens the European race
it has led to the preservation of what should have perished
and that is the self-destructive, life-denying will to power of the sufferer
the Christian revaluation of the values of antiquity inverted
“all the love of the earthly and of dominion over the earth into hatred of the earth and the earthly”
Christianity is thus ‘the most calamitous arrogance’
in not seeing man strong enough to “form man as artists”
in other words, in not seeing humankind as an artistic project
not seeing man as the undetermined animal
not seeing humankind as noble enough for an order of rank
have thus led to the preservation of man as the herd animal

*Natural History of Morals*
this chapter takes up a ‘natural history of morals’
the notion of such a ‘natural history’ already challenges the Christian conception of morality
as something that has no history in the natural evolution of humankind
but as something that comes to us already completed on tablets from God
this project Nietzsche takes up more fully in the *Genealogy*

186) a general critique of previous moral philosophy
all moral philosophy so far only aimed at providing for a rational foundation for morality
thus it missed the problem of morality itself

another mention of the will to power in the concluding paragraph
what he suggests here is that the very attempt to provide such rational foundations for morality
doesn’t make sense “in a world whose essence is will to power”
the point here is that there are no rational foundations for morality
morality has always been the “voice of the will to power” as Zarathustra put it
the values of a people express the quality of their will to power
in other words, the values of a people are the product of the hidden drive-life,
the hidden psychology of the people
the attempt to provide rational foundations is just an attempt to rationalize
what this ‘soul’ at first desired
192) another passage emphasizing the artistic process in all ‘knowing’

Just as little as a reader today reads all of the individual words (let alone syllables) on a page—rather he picks about five words at random out of twenty and “guesses” at the meaning that probably belongs to these five words—just as little do we see a tree exactly and completely with references to leaves, twigs, color, and form; it is so very much easier for us simply to improvise some approximation of the tree. Even in the midst of the strangest experiences we still do the same: we make up the major part of the experience and can scarcely be forced not to contemplate some event as its “inventors.” All this means: basically and from time immemorial we are—accustomed to lying. Or to put it more virtuously and hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly: one is much more of an artist than one knows.

This passage continues the theme of the necessity of Apollonian illusions
also a continuation of the ideas expressed in the early essay “On Truth and Lie”
also one might note the implications this might have for painting
interesting that Nietzsche writes this at the same time the Impressionists
developed a style of painting which emphasizes just this process of approximation

198) moralities as recipes against the passions
they generalize where they should not
Nietzsche’s preference for the conditional should be remembered
he never puts forth a morality for everyone
Nietzsche does not seek to provide an answer for the problem of morality
he seeks instead to pose the problem which has never been posed

199) important passage as the notion of “bad conscience” is introduced
thus calls out the moral hypocrisy of the moral commanders of Christian morality
they “command” as if they merely “obeyed”
the point here again emphasizing that Christianity pretends its morality
comes from God and not from themselves
compare this passage to the 1886 Preface to The Birth of Tragedy
in which Christianity and art are opposed
Christianity denies art in the sense that it denies that there was anything artistic about morality
in other words, it denies that morality is a human product
Christian morality as herd morality
reduces human beings to herd animals who are capable only of “obeying” not “commanding”
not capable of taking responsibility for their morality
not capable of overcoming their morality
thus not capable of self-overcoming
Nietzsche esteemed Napoleon for his strength as a “commander”

201) further developing the notion of Christianity as herd morality
“everything that elevates the individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil”

202) the problem with European [Christian] morality
is that it thinks that the problem of morality has been solved
“one now knows in Europe what Socrates thought he did not know and what the famous old serpent once promised to teach—today one ‘knows’ what is good and evil.”
Nietzsche goes on to say that “the democratic movement is the heir of the Christian movement”
to what extent is Nietzsche’s critique of the herd morality of Christianity applicable to our democracy?
Nietzsche closes the chapter with a sketch of the new types of philosophers he sees coming if the previous sections were all parts of his critique of the past. The lion-stage of saying ‘no’ to the values of the past (from the first chapter of *Zarathustra*) then this passage would be the child-stage, the capacity to create new values.

We Scholars

This chapter looks forward to those new philosophers.

204) at first, however, it begins by criticizing philosophy reduced to theory of knowledge. It is often said that modern philosophy begins with Descartes putting epistemology or theory of knowledge as primary. Many philosophers today still consider epistemologically centered philosophy as the only legitimate philosophy. It criticizes the “philosophers of reality” or the “positivists.” ‘Positivism’ was a dominant trend in late 19th early 20th century philosophy. The early Wittgenstein was a ‘Logical Positivist’. The later Wittgenstein rejected this ‘positivism’. Much of analytic philosophy could still be regarded as epistemologically centered philosophy.

205) The genuine philosopher is the one who “feels the burden and the duty of a hundred attempts (Versuchen) and temptations (Versuchungen) of life—he risks himself constantly, he plays the wicked game—”

208) A passage important for its political implications. “The time for petty politics is over: the very next century will bring the fight for dominion of the earth—the compulsion to large-scale politics.” It is certainly obvious that the next century to which Nietzsche referred, which many have called “the American century” due to the ascendancy of the U.S., was indeed such a fight; but it is equally obvious that this struggle is far from over. If the 20th century is indeed “the American century” then one might ask what did indeed triumph? Was it the triumph of democracy and freedom or corporate control and private wealth?

210) the philosophers of the future again emphasizing the philosopher as attempter and tempter.

211) An important passage on will to power begins by emphasizing a difference between the genuine philosophers those who take up the wicked game of experimenting with knowledge and engaging with tempting, dangerous thought-experiments with philosophical laborers and scientific men. I suspect most academic philosophers today would still be classified by Nietzsche as ‘philosophical laborers’ Nietzsche contrasts these laborers with genuine philosophers: *Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, “thus it shall be!”* They first determine the Whither and For What of man, and in doing so have at their disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical laborers, all who have overcome the past. With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.
212) these genuine philosophers will be the bad conscience of their time
his point here is that the genuine philosopher will always be the one to question the established values
he will always find himself in contradiction to popular opinion
in this way the genuine philosopher is untimely
this obviously develops a main theme of Nietzsche’s writings from the mid 1870's

213) drawing further comparisons between the philosophers of the future and artists
emphasizes that there is an order of rank among states of the soul
and the order of rank of problems accords with this
the problems which preoccupy philosophical laborers correspond to a lower rank of soul
to the problems which concern the genuine philosophers

Our Virtues
This chapter takes up further Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values by examining ‘our virtues’

214) what are the virtues of these philosophers of the future?
Nietzsche begins answering this question by directing the reader to “look for them in our labyrinths—where, as is well known, all sorts of things lose themselves…”
the labyrinth is an important metaphor for Nietzsche
obviously the reference is to the story in Greek mythology
in which Theseus must find his way in and out of a labyrinth to slay the minotaur
we find the same reference in the crucial passage of Zarathustra
in “The Vision and the Riddle” when Nietzsche addresses his readers
in other words, the ones who will be able to read him
the attempters and tempters who “do not want to grope along a thread with cowardly hand”
Theseus found his way out of the labyrinth by leaving behind a thread on his way in.
Nietzsche’s texts are a kind of labyrinth
I guess I’m trying to lay down some threads for you to make your way through Nietzsche’s labyrinth
reading Nietzsche requires courage for the labyrinth
taking up the difficult questions and not groping along a thread with cowardly hand

the next few sections take up some of Nietzsche’s revaluations
216) in response to the Christian virtue of loving one’s enemies
Nietzsche recommends something else: despising when one loves
what is he getting at here?
let’s say you find a weakness in your lover
does one’s love lead one only to comfort the beloved and not challenge them to overcome this weakness
or does the true lover challenge the beloved to self-overcoming?

220) one of the virtues celebrated by modern philosophers is that of disinterestedness
especially one thinks of Kant, for whom this virtue is important in both morals and aesthetics
Nietzsche ridicules this disinterestedness as masking from itself its interestedness
at the end there is again a reference to truth as a woman
the emphasis here is that this woman-truth should not be violated

225) another traditional virtue up for revaluation is pity
this obviously poses a central problem in developing a comparison
between Nietzsche’s thought and Buddhism
Nietzsche suggests here that there is perhaps something amiss with the goal of abolishing suffering. I think one has to keep in mind here Nietzsche’s own experience with suffering (remember the preface to *The Gay Science*). Nietzsche’s experience lead him to recognize the value of suffering as a stimulus to self-overcoming.

228) all moral philosophizing has been a soporific. The same point made in *Zarathustra* regarding the teachers of virtue who taught one how to sleep well. Points out that as there is an order of rank between human beings, there will also be an order of rank of moralities. This emphasis on an order of rank indicates that Nietzsche’s perspectivism should not be regarded as a nihilistic relativism where all is just a matter of opinion and everyone’s opinion is as good as another’s.

229) even a revaluation of cruelty? This passage obviously takes up a disturbing thought. But before one simply dismisses this one might consider the history of Christianity and cruelty. One might consider all the implements of Christian cruelty. How this manifested in the dark ages through implements of torture in order to “save souls.” And the much more subtler forms of cruelty still employed by Christians today. Nietzsche makes reference to the cruelty of the Spanish inquisition—“the Spaniard at an auto-da-fe.” The last paragraph turns to the kind of cruelty Nietzsche is perhaps recommending: it is the cruelty of the philosopher toward himself. When one “forces his spirit to recognize things against the inclinations of his spirit. . .” in other words, forcing oneself to face ‘terrible truths’ taking up the dangerous, wicked game. Such a seeker after knowledge “acts as an artist and transfigurer of cruelty.” “in all desire to know there is a drop of cruelty.”

230) an important lengthy passage explaining further what he means by spirit and thus what kind of spiritual development Nietzsche encourages.

231-232) this begins a number of troubling passages in which Nietzsche claims to state a few truths “about woman as such.” It is important to keep in mind here that in the system of oppositions which structures Platonism woman is connected with the artist, and to appearance, and illusion, the lie, etc. A major part of Nietzsche’s whole project is to get philosophers to recognize themselves as artists. Thus he is critical of the movement of woman wanting to become scientific (that is, not artists).

*Nietzsche & Asian Philosophy* 

Most of this chapter takes up Nietzsche’s critique of German culture.

240) the first section begins with some reflection on Wagner.

241) against Wagner and so much of German culture which emphasized duty to the fatherland Nietzsche identifies himself as a “good European.”

251) important passage for those who still think Nietzsche was an anti-semite. Here he acknowledges the Jews as the “strongest and purest race in Europe.” The Nazis who tried to appropriate Nietzsche obviously ignored this passage. Nietzsche suggests it “might be useful and fair to expel the anti-semite screamers from the country.”
252) some harsh words for the English
“what is offensive even in the most humane Englishman is his lack of music, speaking metaphorically (but not only metaphorically): in the movement of his soul and body he has no rhythm and dance”

wonder what he would have made of the Beatles?
I suspect he and Lennon would have got along famously
of course their rhythm and dance came from American rock and roll which came from the rhythm and blues which came from Africa...

254-256) has high praise for the French
“the seat of the most spiritual and sophisticated culture of Europe”

contrasts Bizet, “the south of music,” with Wagner and German music
while living in Genoa, thus southern Europe, Nietzsche frequents performances of Bizet’s opera Carmen during these years

What is Noble
this chapter brings all these reflections to a culmination
some of these passages contain some of Nietzsche’s most dangerous and wicked thoughts
one has to make one’s way through his labyrinth very carefully if one is not to get lost
one might also remember what he said earlier at §229
the “spiritual cruelty” he recommended in which one forces oneself to face difficult truths
he now takes up in examining ‘what is noble’

257) every enhancement or further evolution of man has required an aristocratic society
“and it will be so again and again—a society that believes in the long order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other”

well, just in exactly what sense is slavery needed?

Nietzsche inquires about the origin of a noble culture

the hard, terrible truth Nietzsche emphasizes here is that

every higher culture began as a consequence of a barbarian conquest of a weaker, more peaceful people

the nobles were always originally the barbarians

their strength, Nietzsche emphasizes, was not merely physical, but a “strength of soul”

258) probably the most troubling passage

every good and healthy aristocracy

“accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments”

how is one to respond to this?

Is this simply where Nietzsche goes over the edge and where we must leave him?

Interesting choice of metaphor follows:

an aristocracy accepts that society must not exist for society’s sake

the point, again, is that humankind as it is today or “society” is not an end

if the goal is the continual self-overcoming of humankind

then all of what we are now should be a sacrifice for the humankind of tomorrow

[our society today seems to have the opposite value of sacrificing the future of humankind to come for the comfort and pleasure of society today]

now the interesting metaphor: the society of today must be like the oak tree which is but the scaffolding for the tropical vine (the Sipo Matador) to reach the heights
259) one of the most important passages on will to power
“life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker...”
It is naive to think that the “exploitative aspect” can be removed from human beings
that is like inventing a way of life that would dispense with all organic functions

“Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of
what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of
life.”

260) important passage on distinction between master and slave moralities
this will be further developed in the Genealogy
by “master morality” and “slave morality” Nietzsche means two basic types of moralities
or like opposite polarities of moralities
and between these extremes there may be many different moralities
modern moralities are mixtures of these two basic types
the two basic types may exist alongside one another even in a single soul

268) what is common
here Nietzsche examines a number of forces which compel human beings into what is common
or, in other words, into being herd animals
communication in language itself requires having common experiences
thus the average “common” person has the advantage

270) more on how suffering makes one noble

289) important passage on the philosopher’s text
the philosopher as a hermit (certainly not one who is common, but one who stands outside the herd)
does one not write books precisely to conceal?
every word a mask

294) there is an order of rank among philosophers depending on the order of rank of their laughter

295) the return of Dionysus

296) written and painted thoughts
in this last passage Nietzsche addresses what he has just written
see my essay “Written and Painted Thoughts” extracted from my dissertation on the course web page