John Locke made significant contributions to the History of Modern Philosophy in both epistemology and political theory. He was influenced in many ways by Descartes, but in opposing Descartes’ Rationalist epistemology he established the starting point of Empiricism. Though Descartes wanted to provide a solid, indubitable foundation for knowledge, Locke viewed Rationalism as resting upon still unquestioned assumptions, like the assumption that the mind is born with ideas at birth, and the further assumption that clarity of concepts can give accurate knowledge of reality. Locke reasoned that it was important to begin with a better awareness of the limitations of human knowledge before engaging in metaphysical speculation. Though Descartes may have opened up the door to the Enlightenment, this emphasis on gaining a more critical awareness of the limitations of knowledge, and thus more rigorously rooting out unquestioned assumptions, made Locke the central figure of the high point of the Enlightenment during the 18th century. Locke’s distrust toward metaphysics and his emphasis on the problem of knowledge proved to be most influential in shaping the character of most English-language philosophy up to the present day.

In the introduction to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke unveils this critical agenda in setting out to inquire into the “extent of human knowledge.” In the first section of the book Locke (not included in this selection) refutes Descartes’ notion of innate ideas. Then, at the start of the second book, (included in this selection) Locke establishes the starting point of Empiricism. According to Locke, the mind at birth is a tabula rasa, a blank tablet or clean slate, or, using another metaphor, an empty cabinet. There are thus no innate ideas; all ideas originate in the mind through experience, through either sensation or reflection upon the ideas obtained through sensation. As a result of this starting point that all knowledge must be traceable to ideas given in experience, Empiricism developed with a much more modest agenda than the Rationalist philosophers with their objective of establishing certain foundations for all knowledge. Rather than arriving at certain conclusions from deductive reasoning, the Empiricists would have to content with the much more tentative conclusions of inductive reasoning.

Locke would still have to solve, however, the epistemological problem set up by Descartes, of establishing how any of the ideas in the mind can be determined to be accurate representations or resemblances of an objective reality existing outside the mind. Locke’s attempt to do this is mapped out at the beginning of Chapter VIII of the first book (included in this selection). Locke begins by making a distinction between ideas in the mind and the qualities of bodies which the ideas are supposed to resemble. Locke makes a further distinction between the primary qualities of bodies, by which he means extension, figure and motion, and the secondary qualities of bodies, by which he means all the colors, sounds, and tastes, etc. that we normally take to be the product of sensation. Locke’s argument is that the ideas of secondary qualities, which are constantly changing, cannot thus be accurate resemblances of the unchanging substance. The ideas of the secondary qualities are thus not resemblances of the things themselves, but are only in the mind, caused by the action of the primary qualities upon the organs of sense. Only the ideas of primary qualities can thus be true resemblances of the things themselves. Locke puts forth a causal theory of perception in which the primary qualities of sometimes even imperceptible bodies press upon the sense organs leaving impressions that would make their way through the mechanism of the body to become ideas in the mind. Locke’s epistemology provided the starting point for Empiricism, but it certainly did not solve the fundamental problem of knowledge set up by Descartes. The problem with Locke’s argument would be revealed by his immediate Empiricist successor, George Berkeley.
INTRODUCTION

1. *An Inquiry into the Understanding* Pleasant and useful.—Since it is the *understanding* that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

2. *Design.*—This, therefore, being my purpose—to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of *human knowledge*, together with the grounds and degrees of *belief, opinion*, and *assent*;—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any *sensation* by our organs, or any *ideas* in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have; and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

3. *Method.*—It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:—

First, I shall inquire into the original of those *ideas*, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what *knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of *faith* or *opinion*: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.
4. What Idea stands for.—Before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word idea, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking: and I could not avoid frequently using it.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas in men's minds: everyone is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.

1. Idea is the Object of Thinking.—Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, How he comes by them?

I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind;—for which I shall appeal to everyone's own observation and experience.

2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.—Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:—How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. The Objects of Sensation.—First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

4. The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them.—Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furniseth the understanding with ideas is,—the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got;—which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding,
with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds;—which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5. *All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these.* —The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects* furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and *the mind* furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let anyone examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted;—though perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

6. *Observable in Children.*—He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. It is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come into the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them. And if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or not, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere, when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind;—but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster, or a pineapple, has of those particular relishes.

23. A man begins to have ideas when he first has sensation. *What sensation is.*—If it shall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, —when he first has any sensation. For, since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the
senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with
sensation; which is such an impression or motion made in some part of the body, as produces
some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by
outward objects that the mind seems first to employ itself, in such operations as we call
perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.

24. The Original of all our Knowledge.—In time the mind comes to reflect on its own
operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of
ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions that are made on our senses by
outward objects that are extrinsic to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from
powers intrinsical and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects
of its contemplation—are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity
of human intellect is,—that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either
through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This
is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon
to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime
thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and
footing here: in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it
may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection
have offered for its contemplation.

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CHAPTER VIII.

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF
SENSATION.

7. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.—To discover the nature of our ideas the better,
and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas
or perceptions in our minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause
such perceptions in us: that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are
exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of
sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the
names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to
excite in us.

8. Our Ideas and the Qualities of Bodies.—Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is
the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power
to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a
snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round,—the power to
produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are
sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas; which ideas, if I speak of
sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the
objects which produce them in us.

9. Primary Qualities of Bodies.—Qualities thus considered in bodies are,

First, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; and such as
in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly
keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to
be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to
make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v.g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two
parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains
still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain
still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any
other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either
solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct
separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses,
reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call
original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in
us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

10. Secondary Qualities of Bodies.—Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in
the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary
qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours,
sounds, tastes, &c. These I call secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort,
which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as
those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction,
secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency, in wax or
clay,—by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me
a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before,—by the same primary
qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

11. How Bodies produce Ideas in us.—The next thing to be considered is, how bodies
produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive
bodies to operate in.

12. By motions, external, and in our organism. —If then external objects be not united to
our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these original qualities in
such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence
continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat
of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the
extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at
a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to
the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we
have of them in us.

13. How secondary Qualities produce their ideas.—After the same manner that the ideas
of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary
qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For, it
being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that
we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion,—as is evident in
the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those; perhaps as much
smaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are smaller than
peas or hail-stones;—let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk and
number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those
different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies; v.g. that a violet, by
the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different
degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent
of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive that God
should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he
should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which
that idea hath no resemblance.

14. They depend on the primary Qualities. —What I have said concerning colours and
smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities;
which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts as I have said.

15. Ideas of primary Qualities are Resemblances; of secondary, not. —From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,—that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

16. Examples.—Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say—that this idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

17. The ideas of the Primary alone really exist. —The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them,—whether anyone's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.


Questions
1. What does Locke mean when he says that the mind is like a blank tablet of white paper? How does this notion establish the starting point of Empiricism?

2. What is the difference between Rationalism and Empiricism? Why must Empiricism have a more modest agenda than Rationalism?

3. What is Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities? Using this distinction, how does Locke try to solve the epistemological problem set up by Descartes?