Some Basic Choices.  Although often dismissed as an unimportant distinction, the choice between presidentialism and parliamentarism does, I believe, raise fundamental issues for modern representative governance.  However, the question presupposes answers to several prior questions, first the choice between traditional forms of monarchic or imperial rule and the modern idea of representative governance; and secondly, whether there are viable alternatives to representative governance for countries that have already rejected the traditional forms.

Although a few countries, like Saudi Arabia, Bhutan, and Brunei retain monarchic absolutism, it is safe to say that modernity has closed the door on governance based on legitimacy from above, derived from Heaven or supernatural powers.  But if so, what is to replace it?  One answer, the one espoused by Lenin and Sun Yat Sen, accepted the ultimate validity of democratic self-government, but called for a transitional stage based on the "dictatorship of the proletariat," or the "tutelage of a benevolent party." Unfortunately, such transitional stages have often degenerated into one-party dictatorships or military authoritarianism.  It would be fascinating to take up questions about how the transition from traditional monarchic rule to modern representative government can best be made, but that is not what I was asked to do -- nor do I feel that I have any good answers.

Rather, on the premise that, somehow, a country has made this perilous journey, there remains the question, which form of representative government is likely to work best? If all existing forms have grave difficulties, as they surely have, then can we think of a better solution? Do the miracles of modern technology, including the INTERNET and instantaneous communication at long distances, offer opportunities for better political formulas?  As the world has become increasingly interlocked, may we not also be entering a phase in which the very idea of a "sovereign state" has become an anachronism and we need to look for new ways to harmonize administrative self-government at local levels with global integration and responsible interdependence.

Historical Background.  All these are fascinating questions, but let me focus my attention on the narrower issue: if we assume that representative government in a sovereign state is both necessary and preferable to other options, then how should that government be organized? Before taking up the substantive arguments, let me inject a bit of historical narrative.  The forces of modernity may be dated from the Peace of Westphalia in the middle of the 17th century when the notion of state sovereignty was legitimized in Western Europe by contrast with older imperial notions, shared by Europe, China, the Muslim world, ancient Rome and many other empires.  The post-Westphalian states claimed sovereignty, the authority to govern all the people living within their boundaries.  Efforts to consolidate these boundaries, to annex weak states and create stronger ones, preoccupied the kings who ruled these domains, forcing them to look for more resources to pay for a long sequence of wars.

They discovered that a rising class of merchants, the "bourgeoisie," based on port towns (called "burghs"), had accumulated enough wealth to support the more ambitious kings -- but only in exchange for privileges which continued to increase until, eventually, the burghers began to challenge the kings whose greed for power and wealth had no limits.  Eventually, the bourgeoisie, as represented in elected assemblies (parliaments) were able to strike bargains which forced the kings to respect their rights and the rule of law.  Ultimately, during the nineteenth century, the European kings lost control over their states, and they were either superceded by elected presidents in the republics that replaced some of the monarchies, or they retained the right to "reign" as titular heads of state while surrendering the power to rule to governments formed by the parliaments, using the familiar form of a cabinet headed by a prime minister.  This form of government --which now prevails in all the industrialized democracies except the United States -- is called "parliamentary." Constitutional monarchs remain in some of them, as in the UK, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia, whereas republics, headed by a titular president, have been established in others.

The remarkable American exception has created the contemporary puzzle which I will now discuss.  Historically, this exception was created in 1789, more than 200 years ago, while the transition from monarchic rule to parliamentary governance was still under way.  In England, which provided the context for the American founding fathers, the struggle between king and parliament had yet to be resolved.  Various compromises were struck and civil wars were waged, but when the American colonies revolted and demanded their independence, the king was still able to rule but only with the advice and consent of parliament.  Although this pattern often led to serious crises between the ruler and the assembly, it was viewed as normal by the American revolutionaries.  They simply had the idea of replacing the king with an elected president, and they tried to regulate the relations between the Executive and Legislative branches of governance by establishing a complex set of "checks and balances," calling upon a Supreme Court to serve as umpire.

They could not imagine how rule by an elected assembly could be institutionalized without leading to the kind of disaster and terror that rule by an elected Convention brought about in the first French Republic.  They saw purely representative government as a recipe for disaster, as a way to deprive minorities of their rights and lead to the "tyranny of the majority."   Moreover, prior to the Industrial Revolution, they expected the functions of governance to be minimal, they thought the largely rural population could manage their own affairs through local councils and town meetings, and they expected an intervening layer of sovereign "states" to take responsibility for most of the essential functions of governance.  In their minds, therefore, the risks of tyranny were greater than those of political indecisiveness and they were content to establish a federal system of government based on the "separation-of-powers."  Although we typically call this system "presidential," the term is misleading because it may include all republics (many of which are parliamentary) or, at the other extreme, it may refer to rule by "presidents" able to dominate their legislatures.

The ambiguities caused by these usages which identify "presidentialism" with both weak and strong presidents lead me to mention the "separation-of-powers" or use "presidentialist" to designate a system in which presidents share power with an elected assembly (the Congress). Because of the subsequent expansion, growth and power of the United States, its constitutional system has been emulated in some 30 countries, mainly in Latin America, but also to some extent in Asia (think of the Philippines, South Korea and South Vietnam) and also a few African states.  In many of these cases, external factors, including American influence, led to the choice of a presidentialist constitutional system.  In all of them, except for the U.S., the constitution has at times been suspended, congress has been dissolved, and dictatorial rule has followed.  Since, eventually, dictators die and cannot easily be replaced, or pressures for responsible government mount, representative government is restored.  However -- without exception, I believe -- governments that were presidential in form before they broke down have, when they were restored, re-established the separation-of-powers principle.

When presidential regimes are compared with parliamentary ones in the new states created by the collapse of the industrial empires during the past 50 years, it is apparent that parliamentary regimes have a greater chance of surviving than presidentialist ones.  A recently published statistical analysis by Przeworski et al (1996) reports that "...parliamentary systems in the poorest countries, while still very fragile, are almost twice as likely to survive as presidential democracies, and four times as likely when they grow economically" (p.49).  Statistically speaking, "...democracy's life expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years" (p.45). This reinforces my own finding based on a more simple minded survey conducted several years earlier (citations).  How can we explain this striking conclusion?

Institutional Factors.  My first line of inquiry is structural: how can a representative form of government be governed most effectively?  The main answer seems to be that when governmental authority is fused in the hands of a cabinet whose members are accountable to an elected assembly, the regime's ability to make decisions and to manage a bureaucracy powerful enough to administer public policies effectively is enhanced.  Such governments are more likely to last than when political responsibility is divided between separate branches.  Persons preoccupied with the protection of civil liberties and human rights often protest that the separation of powers offers more protection against tyranny than does parliamentarism.  That argument may be valid -- but it presupposes the ability of representative governments to survive.  When democratic governments collapse and are replaced by dictatorships, does it matter how good their principles were?

As societies have become more complex because of the industrial revolution, the need for decisiveness and effective administration has vastly increased and ineffective governments provoke popular outrage and revolts. No doubt parliamentary regimes are not all equally viable. For example, those that have too many political parties are compelled to work through fragile coalition governments which give small minorities the power to disrupt government and cause cabinet crises when their special interests are not well served.  Moreover, as the American exception illustrates, presidentialism can be made to work even though, in general, it is a formula for disaster.  As far as citizen preferences are concerned, I suspect that most people would prefer a responsible government that can govern effectively and survive to one that is ineffectual and likely to collapse, leading to brutal authoritarianism.

Even if presidentialist regimes could protect civil rights more effectively than parliamentary systems, would one willingly pay the price of risking their collapse? Attempts to answer such questions lead to a second line of inquiry that is functional: it looks at the main problems faced by all modern societies and asks how well they can be handled by different forms of government.  I shall focus on three such problems and, in each case, my conclusion is that parliamentarism offers greater chances of success than separation-of-powers presidentialism. These problems involve: (1) representativeness and human rights, (2) industrialization and the complexity of modern society; and (3) legitimacy and the basis for state sovereignty.

Representativeness and Human Rights.  It is easy to confuse human with civil rights, and governments that respect one are also likely to honor the other -- but not necessarily so.  The American founders were preoccupied with civil rights, essentially those of individuals who owned property. Arbitrary governments are able to confiscate property, imprison individuals, and violate laws intended to protect individuals.  Constitutional rules anchored in respect for legal safeguards and the authority of judges were built into the American constitution, especially through the first amendments (the "Bill of Rights).  Similar safeguards can, of course, be included in any Constitution, parliamentary as well as presidentialist.  I fail to see that the presidential/parliamentary distinction is very relevant to the fate of individuals and their civil rights.  Consider also that individual civil rights are most valued by property owners and corporations.  These are the people who pay more taxes and are most able to organize politically to defend their interests.

Different questions arise, however, when we think about human rights, taking into account not only ethnic (or "racial") minorities, but also poor people (usually a majority) by comparison with the rich, women by comparison with men, or the very young, the very old, and the handicapped as contrasted with those more able to defend themselves.  How can representative institutions be established in such a way as to enhance the likelihood that their special needs will be taken into account?  They are the least likely to organize politically and to have much property to defend.

In all systems of representative government, the main political organ entrusted with this responsibility is an elected assembly.  When they are chosen in single-member districts, members of the dominant groups in each district are usually elected and various minorities are left voiceless.  To overcome this problem, electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR) in multi-member electoral districts have been designed and they are widely used.  They permit some minority groups in each district to gain a voice in the elected assembly and thereby enhance the likelihood that their interests will be taken into account by the government.

There is a large literature on the various ways PR systems can be organized and assessments of their various advantages and disadvantages. I cannot discuss them here, but let me make two points.  Because minorities have a better chance of gaining representation through PR systems than through single-member districts, they also have a stronger incentive to vote.  That means that more people will vote and the assemblies will, therefore, be more representative.  By contrast, in single-member districts, many citizens feel that their special interests will never be represented by those who speak for dominant majorities -- disillusioned, they may even refuse to vote.  In general, when more citizens vote and secure representation in an assembly, they are more likely to accept the legitimacy of the regime and voluntarily accept its policies.

Although there is widespread acknowlegement of this fact, members of dominant communities who are mainly concerned about the government's ability to govern support single member districts because they are more likely to produce a cohesive majority in the assembly that can reach consensus on major public policies.  Since parties representing smaller minorities are unlikely to win, pressures arise in such systems to form pre-electoral political coalitions so that one of them can win decisive power in the assembly. Sometimes minority groups join such coalitions in exchange for promises that their needs will be accommodated. Whenever such a coalition is able to remain in power for a long time, it becomes hegemonic, even though opposition parties are permitted.  Because their members do not worry a lot about electoral defeat, they often become complacent and abuse their power.  The point is that although single-member districts may lead to party systems that provide stable government, this is often at the expense of minorities who cannot secure representation, and even the general public because of increasing corruption and mismanagement.

The costs and benefits of single-member electoral districts apply equally to presidentialist and parliamentary systems.  However, the ability of parliamentary regimes to adopt PR and multi-member districts as a remedy is much greater than that of presidentialist polities.  No doubt there are always risks in PR systems, especially if the number of parties winning assembly seats multiplies unreasonably.  However, by setting a minimum for representation in the assembly, it is possible to avoid extreme polarization of power.

The important point, I think, is that when used with discretion, PR is compatible with parliamentarism but it is destructive of presidentialist regimes.  Many actual cases, especially in Latin America, demonstrate this point empirically.  Without taking up any such cases, let me offer a suggestion about why it must be true.  Under cabinet government, parliamentary minorities have a chance to participate in ruling coalitions through which their special needs can be accommodated.  Their members in parliament also find that their chances of being invited to join a Cabinet are enhanced by cooperative behavior on many issues that are marginal to their main concerns.

By contrast, under the separation-of-powers principle, minority parties in congress can never be represented in a government ruled by an elected chief executive.  Such presidents normally select cabinet members who are not members of the elected assembly and typically represent interests quite different from those of any small congressional group.  To gain support for their legislative proposals, these cabinet members must reflect the concerns of powerful forces in the legislature, not usually those of any minority parties.  Since they cannot win power or support for their causes by cooperative behavior, minority representatives in a presidentialist congress have every reason to use obstructionist tactics that will appeal to their constituents even though they will never win legislative support. However, such tactics may also block the formation of a majority for many legislative proposals. Thus the tendency of PR in presidentialist (separation-of-powers) regimes is to fail in securing support for the human rights of important minorities while hampering the ability of the system to work.  My conclusion is that the electoral rules which can secure effective political representation for minority groups in a parliamentary regime are likely to fail in any presidentialist system.

This is only a hypothesis that needs further research, but if my guess is right, then it follows that many different minorities, for diverse reasons, will become seriously disillusioned with presidentialist regimes -- although they may not combine to overthrow them, they will scarcely be inclined to defend them when they come under serious attack.  By contrast, more such minorities will feel disposed to support parliamentary governments. Cumulatively, minorities can add up to a majority during severe crises.  I believe this is an important reason why, during such emergencies, presidentialist regimes are more likely to collapse than parliamentary regimes.

Industrialization.  To understand the links between industrialization and governance, whether presidentialist or parliamentary in structure, we need to remember that in all pre-industrial societies, social structures and the economy were largely self-sustaining -- the functions of governance were limited and auxiliary but not fundamental. Industrialization changed that in two fundamental ways: first, by rewarding productive investments and profit making, it strengthened secularism and rationalism, undermining the sacred authority of kings.  It made it seem reasonable to rely more on rational human choices and political processes than on supernatural forces to promote society's health, wealth and safety.  By contrast, in pre-industrial societies, natural forces were seen as more decisive of human welfare and most subjects expected little by way of concrete help from government.

Second, industrialization and the increasingly important role of governance made bureaucratic performance of administrative tasks more necessary.  It also gave powerful new tools to appointed officials, especially to military officers.  During a time of severe crisis, they could use their control over the weapons of violence to subdue opposition and establish themselves as rulers.  In the past, victims of misrule sought to replace kings and emperors with better men, with persons who could indeed invoke a "mandate from Heaven."  Industrialization made human decisions more important, and appeared to justify the direct seizure of power by officials who made no supernatural claims to authority.

Consider also that with industrialization, the economic basis for public service was transformed.  Instead of depending heavily on gifts from their clients, civil servants came to rely on salaries paid by governments whose rulers found them to be excellent levers of power to motivate and control officials.  Moreover, because industrialization increased national production, tax revenues grew enough to cover these higher payroll costs.  Industrialization created increasingly complex problems that called for more public works, social services and regulations  -- as a result, having experienced and dependable civil servants become increasingly necessary, even in very poor countries.

The economic changes that made government services more necessary also expanded the income base available to pay for them.  The same processes which made increased bureaucratic power necessary also required governments to exercise greater control over public officials -- elected politicians had to replace hereditary monarchs, and the way they were organized to perform this task became increasingly important.

Reciprocal relations between officials and rulers are always problematical.  Even rulers who might distrust the loyalty of their staff have no choice but to employ them. As the bureaucracies of industrialized countries expanded and their services became more necessary, their capacity to revolt and seize power also increased.  Although such revolts are led by military officers, civil servants experience the same pressures and many of them support a coup and work for the new regime.  Moreover, since military rulers need the help of experienced civil servants, they also have to rely on their support.

Regime failures, during crises, increase popular discontents and generate support for anyone able to dislodge current political elites.  This includes revolutionary movements that want to replace bureaucrats as well as the ruling elites.  When incumbents recognize this threat, they often join military groups seeking to preempt a revolution by means of a coup.  No doubt authoritarian regimes are as vulnerable to coups as democracies but I shall not discuss their problems.  Rather, let me focus on how democracies can best survive and handle the problems and opportunities caused by industrialization, including the prevention of military coups that might overthrow them.

Major Problems to be Solved.  Both constitutional and bureaucratic design affect the viability of democracy in any industrializing society.  I shall focus on the constitutional aspect, but also say something about the administrative system because the two aspects are closely linked.  As noted above, the empirical evidence shows that presidentialist regimes are more likely than parliamentarist ones to experience coups.  The explanation that I propose depends not only on structural arguments about the way these systems are organized, but also on their ability to solve fundamental problems, especially those caused by the massive economic transformations of our times.  Consider the following three propositions:

1.  Industrializing societies require high levels of administrative competence that can only be achieved by powerful bureaucrats, i.e. officials with long experience, high qualifications, and dedication to the public welfare.

2.  The maintenance of democracy requires institutions of representative government able to control bureaucracy effectively.

3.  Parliamentary regimes are able to maintain control over more powerful bureaucracies than presidentialist regimes.

The main reason seems apparent:  the fused (cabinet) power of parliamentary regimes enables them to maintain more effective political control over their bureaucracies than the disjointed power of ruling elites in a separation-of-powers (presidentialist) system.  This bold proposition can be evaluated both empirically and theoretically, by looking at historical cases and by thinking about the structural differences.

Consider, first, the contrast between the Japanese and German experience, and that of the Philippines, South Vietnam and South Korea.  The most spectacular success stories for contemporary industrialization are those of Germany and Japan.  In both of them,  despite their utter devastation after military defeat in World War II, spectacular industrial growth has occurred.  In both cases, and despite the influence of American military government -- which would, presumably, have promoted presidentialist solutions, as it did in South Korea and South Vietnam -- parliamentarist regimes were installed and they have successfully managed rapid industrial growth.

In both Korea and Vietnam, the areas under U.S. military control adopted presidentialist constitutions and both inherited mandarin traditions, first from China and, later, from Japan and France. In both cases, military coups terminated these regimes.  Rapid economic growth was, subsequently, promoted by military regimes in Korea that were able, for a while, to control a mandarin type bureaucracy.  Eventually, the rising Korean bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy led movements that have restored a semi-presidentialist regime in South Korea.  My guess is that this country, which already has a "prime minister," might evolve in a parliamentarist direction -- for more details see Riggs, (1996b).

The failure of American support for South Vietnam's highly corrupt military regime was followed by the triumph of single-party rule -- it remains to be seen whether in that country, as in China, free enterprise and communism can co-exist, leading to rapid industrialization.  In the Philippines, under extended American tutelage, a presidentialist constitution was adopted when independence came in 1946, but it led to the Marcos dictatorship in 1972. Although he proclaimed a nominally parliamentary constitutional regime, it was in fact a personal autocracy that lasted until 1986.  There is a strong political movement in the Philippines to replace presidentialism with parliamentarism, but it faces stiff resistance -- in fact, I do not know of any presidentialist regime that has successfully transformed itself into a parliamentary system, but both the Philippine and South Korean cases might become the exceptions.

At the theoretical level, I think the most important difference involves the capacity of a unified cabinet system of government to provide a coherent focus for the integration and management of a complex and powerful bureaucracy.  Such a bureaucracy can be organized on the mandarin model, as adapted from the Chinese prototype which all readers of this paper know about.  It is inherently better qualified and motivated to administer highly interdependent and technologically advanced public policies than a non-mandarin bureaucracy, i.e. one composed either of patronage appointees or functionists as found in the American case. To explain this point, I must now say something about why, unlike other presidentialist regimes, the U.S. has been able to manage a relatively strong and well qualified bureaucracy.

The U.S. Exception.  For historical reasons that I have explained elsewhere (Riggs 1997, UNESCO) it became possible for the U.S. to adopt a non-mandarin career civil service oriented to specific positions and functions rather than the generalist roles of a humanist mandarinate.  It gradually replaced patronage appointees in most lower- level posts.  I call these officials functionists because of their long- term preoccupation with particular professional and administrative functions - - they became specialists and were not allowed to occupy top level posts which continued to be filled by patronage.  The result was a bureaucracy inherently incapable of organizing its members to seize power, but  much better able than the patronage appointees it replaced to do a reasonably good job of managing the complex policies needed in a highly industrialized society.

By contrast, in all the other presidentialist regimes established before the 20th century, patronage appointees who were normally able to retain their positions for extended periods of time occupied most bureaucratic positions.  Their fear of losing their jobs led them, eventually, to organize informally to protect their interests, first by resisting reforms that would produce career bureaucracies and, ultimately, to seize power in a coup d'etat.  The social cost of this situation is evident in the obstacles to effective industrialization experienced in all presidentialist regimes except the United States.

Much more can be said about the details of both the political and administrative structures found in presidentialist and parliamentarist regimes as they affect and are affected by industrialization, but perhaps enough has been said to make the point that, in general -- with the notable exception of the U.S. -- presidentialism poses serious obstacles to successful industrialization whereas parliamentarism facilitates its management and makes it possible.

Legitimacy and the Basis for State Sovereignty.  A third fundamental difference between presidentialist and parliamentarist democracies involves the basis for achieving legitimacy.  All public policies work better when citizens accept the right of the government to make and implement them: by contrast, the more the legitimacy of a regime is challenged, the more it has to resort to coercion and other sanctions to secure compliance with its policies, thereby raising the costs of governance and rendering it less efficient.  High levels of resistance generate violent responses: the police power and even armed enforcement typically create a vicious circle that further increases the costs and ineffectiveness of governance.

It is inherently easier, I believe, for parliamentarist regimes to achieve legitimacy in governance than for presidentialist regimes, enabling the former to solve the major problems of modernity more successfully.  We should remember that the legitimacy of traditional monarchies rested on supernatural premises, the ability of the regime to use rituals and sacrifices to influence the spirit world so as to enhance the health, wealth and security of all its subjects.  As secularization spread, however, the sacred premises of monarchic authority were eroded, leading kings to rely increasingly on coercion by their expanding police forces -- the costs of wars designed to expand their domains was mentioned above.  These costs led them to tax their subjects more heavily, a trend that reinforced the vicious circle of declining legitimacy and reliance on threats of violence.

Increasing coercion and rising costs contributed to the political pressures for shifting the basis of governmental sovereignty and authority from monarchs to the people, through their representatives.  However, when popular sovereignty emerged as an alternative foundation for governmental authority, it created fundamental questions about how design public policies and win the support of citizens.  Questions about how sovereignty should be organized became critically important.  Several factors that complicated the transition from royal to democratic sovereignty may now be mentioned.

The role of a Head.  First, and quite naturally, attention focussed on the role of head of state.  Increasingly, as secularization undermined traditional religious beliefs, kings came to be viewed in the West as mere symbols of authority rather than as vehicles for the exercise of divine powers.  As this transformation occurred, it seemed increasingly reasonable to replace bad kings with better kings and, finally, to elect presidents as their surrogates. This was almost all that happened when presidentialism as a proto-modern system was invented in the United States: the contentious relation between the chief executive and the elected assembly that had evolved in England was perpetuated in the American republic.

At first, as during the presidency of George Washington in the U.S., the ceremonial functions of head of state and unifier of thirteen fractious colonies seemed more important than the functions Washington also exercised as head of government -- he had a tiny federal bureaucracy and minimal administrative duties.  Since most governmental functions, under the federalist constitution, remained with the states, and the industrial revolution had scarcely begun, it seemed reasonable to assume that a popularly elected head of state could replace the king as a basis for legitimizing the regime.

Increasingly, however, all presidents in presidentialist systems, must take stands, as head of government on controversial issues which, cumulatively, multiply the number of their opponents.  In late-modern times the presidential agenda has become so monumental that superhuman energy, intelligence and patience would be required for success, leaving little time for the less urgent tasks performed by a head of state.  So long as the same person must handle both roles, the ceremonial functions of a reigning figurehead are bound to suffer.

Moreover, the electoral competition used to select a president produces harsh enemies so that incumbents typically had many opponents who challenged their capacity to speak for the "nation."  Since its early days, quite ordinary men have often won the elections to the U.S. presidency, men who were scarcely able to make controversial decisions and perform their ceremonial functions with equanimity and grace.  It should be clear that the role of president could not really replace that of a king as the focus of legitimacy for a sovereign state.  A more potent basis for legitimizing a secularized democracy was needed.

The Role of a Parliament. Such a foundation for public authority emerged in Europe during the nineteenth century as kings increasingly devolved their ruling powers to parliaments.  Concurrently, the focus of legitimacy also moved from the throne to the elected assembly -- instead of the supernatural powers of a king, regimes rested their authority on the idea that citizens could make collective choices as a basis for governing themselves.  Ideally, as in the ancient city states,  they could reach consensus by means of direct democracy, but with the increased size of all modern states, a substitute was found by electing representatives to act for the people in assemblies.  The authentic surrogate for royal sovereignty, therefore, would be the voice of the people, as expressed through representative bodies, rather than any performances by a chief of state.

Parliamentarism decisively moved the legitimacy of state power from kings to parliaments -- sovereignty was transferred from the monarchy to the people as represented in elected assemblies.  Significantly, parliaments are not just legislative bodies capable of making laws, but they are also constituent bodies with the authority to write and revise constitutions.  Frequently, a distinction is made in parliamentary regimes between the simple parliamentary majority required to approve an ordinary law, and the special majority needed for making a constitutional reform.  This may include numerical majorities of significantly more than 50% of the members, and/or endorsement of a constitutional change at two or more sessions.  By contrast, the congress in presidentialist regimes lacks such authority -- it may propose amendments but they need to be ratified by the citizenry, or by state governments.  Thus, the constitutional authority of any Congress is significantly less than that of a Parliament.

The most conspicuous difference between a Parliament and a Congress, however, lies in its ability to discharge the government (its own executive committee, created by the assembly itself, without without claiming the authority granted to a popularly elected president).  This structural relationship makes the executive function in parliamentary regimes continuously subject to public accountability.  By contrast, although presidentialist regimes usually give Congress the right to impeach a president (because of malfeasance in office), presidents normally retain their offices until the end of a fixed term, even when they have lost the support of the people's representatives in Congress.

I mention these differences to emphasize the point that Parliament is a genuine focus of legitimacy and accountability for any democracy whereas a Congress is not. Moreover, this basic distinction is reinforced by some other considerations which typically make Parliament a more effective legitimizer of governance and focus of sovereignty than any Congress can ever be.

First, consider the fact that there is no structural difference between the Legislative and Executive branches of government under parliamentary rules.  The government is, actually, a component of Parliament -- something we often forget.  Since a Cabinet can stay in office only so long as it retains the support of a parliamentary majority, and because it must resign after losing a vote of confidence, parliamentary governments are able to secure popular support for their policies in a way that is not assured for Presidents in their adversarial relations with Congress. Since parliamentary governments can usually dissolve the assembly and call for new elections after losing a vote of confidence. Even members of the majority parties who may not personally approve a government bill are strongly motivated to support it in order to avoid the costs of new elections. Parliamentarism, therefore, enhances the ability of democratic governance to reach decisions, whereas presidentialism encourages dissent and prolonged controversy.

Second, a paradoxical consequence of party discipline arises from the freedom it offers members of parliament who are outside the government to speak freely about their views: "back benchers" who belong to majority parties but are not cabinet members -- they are often among the government's most vocal critics.  Because basic policy decisions are made in cabinet, with the advice of senior civil servants, the parliamentary agenda is lighter than that of a congress. This means that although the effective day-to-day political influence of MPs is less than that of members of Congress, their ability to speak openly and forcefully on major philosophical and policy issues is much greater. The net effect is that Parliament offers better "political theater" than Congress -- it not only supports lively and much publicized debates on major issues, but all government policies must be announced in Parliament, rather than by media releases or press conferences.  Taken together, these practices make parliaments the authentic focus of legitimacy in a way that no congress can achieve -- nor, I believe, can any elected president.

Third, because of the separation of powers, there is no institutional focus for political legitimacy in a presidentialist regime.  The congress is merely one of the branches of government and, in that role, as vulnerable to criticism as the president or the judiciary.  Consequently, no branch can act effectively as a center of legitimacy for building popular loyalty to a regime.  Instead, therefore, the archaic trunk from which all three branches sprang is just a document, a written Charter which, somehow, is supposed to represent the long-term popular consensus on which the regime rests.  It may even be expected to resolve such modern dilemmas such as whether a dying man should be able to get a doctor's help in committing suicide or how the principle of free speech can be reconciled with the new opportunities given to INTERNET users.  Such issues could not have been imagined by constitution writers in the 18th century.

In parliamentarist regimes such issues are viewed as public policy questions to be decided, ultimately, by parliamentary votes in the light of changing conditions. Written charters cannot speak.  Instead of a representative institution as the living organ of popular sovereignty, therefore, presidentialist regimes must depend on the courts to decide how their "founders" would have decided contemporary moral dilemmas: appointed judges, in the seclusion of their chambers, become the ultimate arbiters of what is or is not legitimate public policy.  How ironic for a polity based, ostensibly, on the polyarchic principles of representative governance!  Because of the unprecedented new problems generated by modernity, we face the paradox that the older the constitution, the more legitimacy it possesses and the more anachronistic it becomes.  New presidentialist constitutions may be more relevant to contemporary issues, but their very newness limits their authority as a basis for the legitimacy of highly troubled regimes.

Since the American Constitution is now more than 200 years old, it has acquired a sacred character that appeals to all parties in most controversies, and gives the Supreme Court a kind of ultimate authority that rests, not on their wisdom as elder statesmen, but rather on their claimed ability to make final determinations of what the Constitution "really means" or its authors had in mind. Nevertheless, this charter is held in such high respect by Americans in all walks of life that it helps explain the viability of the system in the U.S.  In most presidentialist regimes, by contrast, frequent constitutional revisions, especially after catastrophic authoritarian interludes, generate cynicism about whatever Charter happens to be the latest version.

Conclusion.  To reassert the logic of these two forms of democratic government, recall the following points:

1.  The transition from hierarchic authority under monarchies to representative government based on the will of the people flows logically from the throne to the parliament and makes parliamentary regimes more stable than those caught in a transitional phase of power sharing between the ruler and a representative body, i.e. in separation-of-powers presidentialism.

2.  As modern states become increasingly complex, and fundamental differences between many kinds of minorities arise, the ability to rely on multi-member electoral districts enables proportional representation to be used to strengthen popular participation and to empower minorities that otherwise are regularly neglected.  However, this important electoral technique is workable only in parliamentary regimes -- it is more likely to disrupt and destroy presidentialist systems.

3.  Overwhelmingly, the industrial revolution has created a host of new problems that require far more complex governmental policies and institutions than were ever needed in pre-industrial societies.  The ability to manage the kind of powerful and experienced bureaucracy needed to deal with such problems is far more likely to arise in parliamentary regimes than in presidentialist ones.

Remember that these are broad generalizations, and there are exceptions -- the U.S. presidentialist system has worked pretty well, and some parliamentary regimes are disasters. The differences, therefore, are statistical and are easily affected by additional variables.  It is also very difficult to transform regimes -- especially presidentialist systems create strongly entrenched interests that stoutly resist fundamental changes, making it almost impossible to shift to parliamentarism after the original choice has been made. Countries already committed to presidentialism, therefore, need to think about the kinds of measures that will enable their type of democracy to survive -- the American experience can provide some useful lessons about what will and will not work for presidentialist regimes -- but that is another question that cannot be discussed here.  Moreover, it is assuredly a secondary issue -- the most important point is for us to have a clear understanding of some of the fundamental differences between the two main forms of democratic governance.

Return to top of this page
Updated: 13 August 1996

See linked pages: [] Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism || Coping with Modernity []