Perhaps VS was not aware of it, but had he searched the INTERNET, he would have found references to guide him to my work. As for Ferrel Heady, his magisterial text on Public Administration -- A Comparative Perspective, (Marcel Dekker) was first published in 1966 and is now entering its 6th edition. His opinions have long been a matter of record.
THE PRISMATIC MODEL AS A HEURISTIC DEVICE. Although there are major similarities between the way VS approaches problems of CPA and my own ideas, there are also significant differences which illustrate why I developed and continue to emphasize the prismatic model. Consider, for example, the way he uses the terms, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. On p. 7 (of the MS) he writes that "European society was already organized on the basis of functional associations (Gesellschaft) while Afro-Asian society was still based on natural communities (or Gemeinschaft). Later, p.17, he contrasts the way policy demands on government are made by "Gemeinschaft groups based on race, caste and religions and Gesellschaft interest groups based on business and commercial corporations, trade unions, etc."
Here we see the dichotomous way of thinking against which I have protested for almost 50 years. The Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft alternatives are discussed in my "Prismatic Society" book on pp.431-448. The classic applications of the G/G contrasts were within Western societies, not between Western and non-Western social systems. In fact, Gemeinschaft relationships have long prevailed in the West, even in the present day, while Gesellschaft patterns can also be found outside the West, historically as well as today. Moreover, although some groups are predominantly Gemeinschaft and others mainly Gesellschaft, what I observed in developing countries involved self-contradictory mixtures of the two orientations, a phenomenon I referred to as prismatic. People do not choose between them, but somehow try to be both at once.
Perhaps a different terminology would make my point easier to grasp. I consider that all traditional societies, including those of the Western world, were caste-based (Gemeinschaft), although they did not carry casteism as far as did the Caste system in India. Moreover, there were class-based elements (Gesellschaft) in all civilizations, although normally only in special areas. The essential point is that caste-like relations rest on a belief in the inherent (divinely-imposed) necessity of social inequality actualized by the inheritance of occupations and endogamy and the obligation to accept one's social status at birth. By contrast, class-oriented social systems presuppose the inherent equality of persons whose inequality is man-made. Differences are attributed to personal choices and socially constructed institutions. They are actualized by the right of individuals to choose their own occupations and mates (exogamy). The underlying premises of the former are sacred whereas those of the latter are secular. In the former, inherited relationships based in family, clan tribe or "kith-and-kin" prevail, whereas in the latter, voluntarily formed associations are dominant. In the former public offices are inherited whereas in the latter they are acquired.
IMPLICATIONS FOR BUREAUCRACY. In this perspective one can see that the earliest and most powerful class-like administrative structures were developed in ancient China, taking the form of an open examination system in which high-achieving candidates were given powerful bureaucratic posts. By contrast, in most societies, administrative functions were monopolized by members of noble families or their friends. On p.4 VS points to parallels between the ancient Indian and Chinese bureaucracies, suggesting, correctly, that in both societies Gemeinschaft relationships prevailed. He points out that Chinese bureaucracy "retained" its structure for centuries whereas Indian bureaucracies were "diluted." Although Chinese empires rose and collapsed, their ability to dominate a vast imperial realm can be explained by the persistence of a class-based (Gesellschaft) institution which recruited top officials on the basis of competitive generalist examinations. By contrast, the Indian system evolved ever more deeply in the direction of a caste-based (Gemeinschaft) social system based on the inheritance of offices and the political fragmentation of Indian society.
European public administration was traditionally also heavily caste-based, as exemplified in an extreme form during its Feudal period. Class-like relations, however, appeared in Western Europe with the institutionalization of a celibate priesthood in which the inheritance of office was forbidden. This evolved into appointed public offices when religious clerics were recruited as secular clerks. However, it was not until the 19th century that recruitment of a professionalized bureaucracy on the basis of examinations became well established. Interestingly, one of the first places where this change took place was in India under British rule: the Indian Civil Service was modeled on the Chinese Mandarin system with which the British East India Company was quite familiar. Without such a transformation, Englishmen in India often married local women and become entrepreneurial nabobs. Ultimately, of course, the British adapted their own Indian bureaucratic rules to the English environment, creating its famous Administrative Class.
The Americans, a few decades later, were able to borrow the British system, with a major adaptation that create specialized career services anchored in state colleges rather than elite universities. By retaining patronage for key positions, this weak system was relatively efficient and also compatible with the fragility of a presidentialist (separation-of-powers) constitutional system. Other presidentialist regimes, as in Latin America, were never able to make such a transformation and they perpetuated the same kind of retainer system (patronage appointees able to hold their offices indefinitely) that had prevailed earlier in England and America -- it was essentially prismatic, mixing some caste and class-like features. As Europe industrialized during this period, it was able to consolidate mandarin bureaucracies when imperial authority was replaced by democratic regimes. Both types of regime were able to exercise enough centralized power to maintain control over powerful generalist career bureaucracies.
In all these cases the transition from caste-like to class-based bureaucracies and public administration has always been traumatic, especially for established power-holders who naturally resisted the erosion of their special privileges. Although there are great variations in the specific details of such transformations, they manifest some common features that help us understand what does and can happen. Every case, considered by itself, is unique and different from all others -- which is what makes case studies so interesting and important. However, there are parameters that affect what can and must, eventually, happen in a world that is increasingly globalized and interdependent. Governments in every country are affected by external forces that impose constraints and also offer opportunities. Understanding these parameters not only helps us understand the dynamics of historical change, but it gives tools for helpful interventions.
I see the retention of caste-like social structures as a natural response of privileged communities and individuals as they face new forces pressing toward individualization, social justice, and norms based on equal opportunity. In its most dramatic form, this occurred when rising national movements pressed for independence against the weakening capacity of the imperial powers to retain control over conquered peoples. Economic forces released by the industrial revolution in Western Europe played a decisive role in both the rise and the fall of the great modern empires, a phenomenon I have discussed elsewhere and will not digress to say more about here. These same forces elevated nationalism and ethnic consciousness in the minds of millions around the world where, traditionally, marginalized communities had accepted their unhappy lot as fated and irresistible. Globalisation now provides both incentives and resources to support demands for equality of opportunity and social justice. Public administration reflects these forces and can block or accelerate their transformative effects.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MUST BE COMPARATIVE. Viewing Public Administration in a comparative and historical framework will help us understand and influence these processes. Unfortunately, we have been trapped by the redundancy of the term, Comparative Public Administration, as it evolved in America. Until we recognize that fact and change our way to talking about it, we will remain prisoners of our terminology. What Americans mean by "Public Administration" is only "American Public Administration." Most American writers on Public Administration adopt an essentially parochial point of view, assuming, paradoxically, that the principles and practices found in America have some kind of universal validity while they resist making a comparative analysis of the American system on the grounds that it is unique! Yet they cannot know how unique it is without first making a comparative analysis.
In fact, I believe, the only way to develop a widely relevant discipline of Public Administration involves using data on different countries to generate and test theories and explanations. In the context of such knowledge, those interested in any particular system will be able to develop and test descriptions, prescriptions and explanatory theories that help them understand and cope with the problems of that system. Naturally, most specialists will want to focus on administration in their own countries, but they will be able to do so more usefully to the degree that they are informed by general theories of Public Administration that are indeed comparative. In fact, any good theory of Public Administration must be comparative. The phrase, Comparative Public Administration, is actually, therefore, an oxymoron.
As for the Comparative Administration Group, it was a product of its historical niche in the United States and the world as it existed during the 1960s. CAG came to an end when its funds ran out, but interest in the comparative study of administrative systems persists, and I'm happy to say, despite the criticisms of my work offered by VS, that I have been able to continue studying and writing about the subject. Anyone interested will find my autobiographical narrative at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/autobio3.htm#3>
It contains an extended bibliography and explains how I came to be interested in this subject, and what conclusions I reached, as they have evolved up to the present day. The essay by VS contains important and useful information and I agree with many of his positions -- but I feel that the account of my work and thinking offered in the paper is rather superficial. I hope this commentary will help to set the record straight.
WHY USE TERMS LIKE SALA, BAZAAR, AND CLECT?
Note: Space limitations make it impossible to include this portion of my commentary on the VS paper, but by posting it on my Web Site,interested readers will be able to find it at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/subra.htm>.
Although VS acknowledges (p.4) that my "own later detailed research on specific countries in South East Asia was more insightful," he asserts that I failed to correlate this research with my "earlier theorizing but just stuck to his vocabulary." On p.3 he mentions two of my terms, "sala" and "bazaar," writing: "Riggs then constructed a new vocabulary to identify these diluted or fused prismatic bureaucratic and market categories with names like 'Sala' for bureau or 'Bazaar' for market." Without any explanation, however, his readers will scarcely understand why I used these terms in a special way.
I used "sala" to characterize public offices in countries caught between the caste-like and class-orientation discussed above. Traditionally, public offices, with notable exceptions as in the Chinese case, were family possessions and centered in the home, castle or palace where incumbents ruled and administered without making any clear distinction between these functions. In a modern system of differentiated (class-based) governance, administrative functions have been separated from political roles and incumbents work in specialized offices detached from their homes and family life.
In the sala, a word I borrowed from its Spanish, Arabic and Thai usages, one can find a self-contradictory mixture of these two orientations. Formalistically, the sala looks like a modern office, but in practice, its underlying dynamics are more personal, strongly oriented to family or patron-client relationships. Factionalization prevails as patrons strive both to protect and to exploit clients whose political and financial support keeps them in power. Corruption becomes endemic as officials learn to proclaim their adherence to universalistic norms rooted in equalitarianism, while in practice favoring those who are able to provide sub rosa benefits that enable underpaid officials to maintain their prestige and power while concealing violations of the norms they are pledged to uphold.
No doubt a sala resembles a modern office, but in practice, it works in a traditional way. We recognize the difference when we call payments offered officials for services rendered bribes rather than gifts. The difference is not in the transaction per se, but in our attitude towards its (il)legitimacy. What was once normal has become corrupt. Surely a sala, in this sense, differs from a bureau in which officials conscientiously uphold the rules they are pledged to implement. VS writes as though it would be possible to replace Gemeinschaft (caste-like) relations by Gesellschaft (class-based) social structures as a kind of smooth and rapid transition process. What I wanted to point out was that during transition stages, with no assurance of success, various kind of mixed structures evolve that cannot be understood by means of either the traditional or the modern models. By describing a hypothetical sala model, I tried to offer a framework in which to see and understand what has become a widespread phenomenon in many governments around the world.
The bazaar-canteen In the same sentence, VS refers to the 'bazaar' as though it were a synonym for 'market.' Of course, this word is not new -- it refers to traditional markets in which there are no set prices but buyers and sellers bargain to reach compromises that lead to different prices for the same commodity when sold to different customers. By contrast, in markets as this word is understood in a Gesellschaft environment, prices are pre-determined and every customer pays the same for the same product. I saw bazaars as a transitional rooted in traditional non-market situations in subsistence communities where money is not used, but goods and services are exchanged on the basis of reciprocity. In bazaars, price bargaining reflects the introduction of money as a means of exchange, but inter-personal relations, taking into account social, ethnic and political differences, lead to great variability in the actual price customers pay for any particular commodity or service.
Sad to say, VS did not quote the actual term that I used. It was "bazaar-canteen." The basic difference involves price indeterminacy. In a canteen, it is systemic, whereas in a bazaar it is individualized. Tributary canteens impose higher prices on their victims, whereas subsidized canteens offer lower prices to their members. The former penalizes the weak, compelling them to subsidize the benefits offered, through the latter to the powerful and privileged. Thus canteens are Janus-faced -- they impose tributes to pay for subsidies. Thus the two phenomena are linked and need to be understand as different aspects of a single phenomenon. In one canteen, marginalized people are always overcharged for something privileged people can get in a different canteen at a subsidized price.
I offered many examples in my writings. Here let me just mention a simple one that arises from efforts to control foreign exchange: privileged nationals are able to buy dollars, pounds or yen at an official (subsidized) rate, only to turn around and re-sell these precious currencies at a much higher (tributary) rate to marginalized merchants, typically belonging to ethnic minorities, who have to work hard in order to survive and are willing to pay black market rates. In the process, of course, they have to flout oppressive laws and endanger their own property in case any official decides to inquire into their businesses. When laws are so designed that business people who obey them must go bankkrupt, the stage is set for canteen behaviors. Such laws are possible when entrepreneurs are pariahs, not politically dominant. Our image of market systems are based on the prevalence of laws that protect property. The sala resembles a market except that its existence reflects the insecurity of private property.
The bazaar-canteen, therefore, is a model of how, under the conflicting pressures of caste and class orientations, exploitation of marginalized communities and the subsidization of privileged ones becomes institutionalized in a context where equalitarian norms have been officially accepted and promulgated but not implemented. It is, therefore, not just a market mechanism divorced from politics and social norms -- rather, it systematizes discrimination with official connivance in a way that is neither traditional nor modern. Although it resembles a "market," in fact it is a socio-political-administrative and economic structure that I found to be widespread, not only in countries undergoing the transitions we called "development," but it even erupts in the most advanced industrialized democracies. For more on the globalization of bazaar-canteen practices see: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/7-ipe8x.htm>
Here I have described how price indeterminacy in a global context has become a wide-spread phenomenon shared by people from the most and least developed countries. Let me add here that I think my concepts were novel because they pin-pointed prismatic conditions born at the fault lines where traditional and modern ways of life intersect. Like the zones where tectonic place impinge on each other and generate volcanoes and earthquakes, prismatic forces erupt in zones of uncertainty, conflict, and incompatible values.
What are clects? Although I normally chose established words to represent aspects of this prismatic condition, I did coin one word that is often mentioned as an outrageous example of my penchant for neologisms. This is clect, a word formed by fusing clique and sect.
The origin of the concept is easily explained. I noted in Thailand that ethnic associations play an important role -- the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was my inspiration. Under the cover of a nominally rationalistic Gesellschaft sort of business organization one could see a quasi-traditional clan-like social structure. The Chamber served as the main political weapon for the harassed Chinese minority, and it provided a wide range of services for them. It sought to protect business men from exploitation by public officials who could easily impose taxes and rules that would put them out of business unless they paid bribes in exchange for exemption from prosecution. I found that such organization are, indeed, widely scattered around the world, under many different covers -- sometimes religious, sometimes philanthropic, sometimes sportive, occasionally political, but usually economic in their facades.
In order to highlight the transitional (prismatic) dynamics shared by such organizations caught between caste-like Gemeinschaft and class-oriented Gesellschaft orientations, I felt we needed a specific term. It struck me that they resembled in some way the cliques operating in modern associations and the sects that perpetuate religious practices in an increasingly secularized world. However, neither term seemed appropriate to refer to the phenomenon I had observed, but I thought a new word formed by blending them might serve my purposes. Unfortunately, I soon learned that critics preferred to condemn the word as an unacceptable neologism rather than think about the phenomena that led me to coin it.
THE ROLE OF MODELS. To conclude this comment, let me point out that models are never descriptions of a concrete reality. This applies to something as simple as a triangle, an image that Geometry defines as a purely imaginary construct. It is useful, however, when applied to concrete situations that, in varying degrees, resemble the imagined model. I have used a triangle to talk about the complementarity of different facets of a political system -- you can see its use in a discussion of legitimacy at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/aladin.htm#_1_18>
Similarly, the prismatic model is just a model -- it is a hypothetical construct generated in my mind on the basis of concrete observations in Thailand and the Philippines. I did not know if it would be relevant elsewhere. I was, therefore, surprised and pleased when readers as far apart as Brazil, Egypt, Korea, Ethiopia and India told me that they found my ideas helpful in their efforts to understand and deal with overlapping administrative, political and economic problems in developing countries. Recently, I was invited to present a paper on "Exporting Government?" -- not my title -- to the Dutch Association for Law and Administration in Developing and Transitional Countries (Aladin). They told me that my work had helped them relate to the contemporary problems faced by Indonesia as it struggles to develop and democratize. Readers can find the full text of my paper at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/aladin.htm>
The triangle of legitimation, noted above, occurs in this text. As in the past, I argued that we should start with a deep understanding of the unique situation and dynamics of any country in which change is contemplated. That is essential before one can make any realistic suggestions that will be both acceptable and desirable. However, after one has acquired such an understanding, I argued that any change agent, domestic or foreign, should also have a broad theoretical knowledge based on widespread comparisons of what can work -- and, equally important, what doesn't work -- before attempting to offer advice. This needs to be done with great humility, however, because ultimately only those who are immersed in any situation, as local participants, are able to make changes that will have any lasting value.
What I had learned in the late 1950's was that foreign models, no matter how well they worked in their homelands, were apt to fail when exported to other places. I was particularly dubious about the American model which struck me as largely irrelevant to the needs of almost every other country.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CAG. This opinion was not popular in the Comparative Administration Group, which I chaired throughout the 1960's, under the auspices of the American Society for Public Administration. It was composed, for the most part, of frustrated American scholars and foreign advisers who felt that their advice had not been effective and they wanted to find out why. However, they refused to question the basic premise that we knew what ought to be done, using the American experience as a foundation.
We received grants from the Ford Foundation during that period that enabled us to conduct conferences and summer seminars, to publish working papers and books, but not to do any research. The Foundation had a firm policy not to support research organized by any membership association, like the American Society for Public Administration which was the sponsor of the CAG. Although my own ideas received a good deal of attention -- and were severely criticized -- during that period, they were never accepted by the majority of CAG members. Instead, a wide range of competing ideas and approaches were put forward in papers and books written mainly on the basis of field experience and logical reasoning, but not on field research. We stirred up a lot of interest, but we never reached consensus on any doctrine or formula for Comparative Public Administration.
Our Ford-financed projects necessarily came to an end when the Foundation said we were not eligible for a renewal simply because they wanted to use their money for innovation, not to maintain anything as well established as CAG had become! In fact, ASPA has continued to support voluntary efforts through its Section for Comparative and International Administration (SICA) which remains a vigorous group and has a home page where information about its activities can be found -- see: <http://www.uncc.edu/~stwalker/sica>
But SICA was never able to secure the generous funding that we had enjoyed earlier through grants from the Ford Foundation. Nevertheless, VS refers to the "failure" of the CAG and explains it by referring to its association with "Development Administration" (p.5). I would have said that the momentum of CAG during the 1960s has a much simpler explanation: we were able to publish a dozen or more books, convene summer seminars and hold conferences because we had some money from the Ford Foundation. These activities had to halt when the money ran out and we were unable to find new sources. We did, however, get a few small grants, including support for a field research project organized by Richard Gable to study the administration of foreign aid projects designed to increase rice production in four countries of East and Southeast Asia. Local teams in each country carried out the research, and we sought to generalize from comparisons between their findings. The results can be found in Richard Gable (with Fred Springer) Administering Agricultural Development in Asia: a Comparative Analysis of Four National Programs Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976.
Not surprisingly, we were faulted for having sponsored such a narrow-gauge project from which, critics said, we could expect to learn very little. What I learned was that it is, indeed, exceedingly difficult to secure funding for comparative research that has any rigor. My own research in Thailand was financed by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the U.S. Social Science Research Council. Their program was designed to develop information about the political role of non-governmental interest groups, on the premise that they are ubiquitous in all countries. When I reported that such groups played a negligible role in Thailand, I received permission to focus instead on the political role of public officials, including military officers. That work resulted in my monograph on Thailand, cited above.
It is true that CAG, as VS charges (p.5) became linked to the study of "Development Administration." However, that was an expedient decision since the Ford Foundation told us that, although our original intention, as reflected in our name, was to study Comparative Public Administration on a global basis -- including Europe and the U.S. as well as "third world" countries -- the Foundation stipulated that we would not receive any money unless we would focus on "Development Administration", a term that limited our efforts to what they called, optimistically, "developing countries." In the short run, that was a popular choice, but in the long run, it led to disillusionment because (as I had expected) most countries stoutly resisted any kind of swift replacement of ancient traditions by modern practices -- instead, they sought to preserve the most valued aspects of their socio-political heritage while adopting enough of the facade of westernization and modernity to gain acceptability and influence in the world, plus whatever material benefits these changes promised.
Neo-Marxist and dependency theorists were quick to point out the deep flaws in the optimism of the developmental efforts, but I do not blame them for the "failure" of the CAG. In fact, personally, I share with them many of their criticisms and we could easily have incorporated the best of their findings in the work of our group had our funding been continued. For the most part, however, American scholars and practitioners persisted in accepting the main stream doctrines which assumed that American practices provided good models for emulation in other countries -- I did my best to resist this idea and I surely failed.
Personally, I think CAG failed because we were unable to persuade most of our colleagues that we needed to accept fundamental changes in our ideas about Public Administration, to apply comparative methods to the study of American governance and to appreciate its limited relevance elsewhere. I blame myself for failing to make that point strongly enough. I believed it, but felt that I also needed a long period of analysis to establish the proof. That required both an understanding of the prismatic contradictions, and a deeper insight into the uniqueness of the American political system.
To conclude, I'm afraid Professor V. Subramaniam has oversimplified and unfairly trivialized an important chapter in the history of Comparative Public Administration. He has also misrepresented my personal role and ideas. However, readers of his interesting article who can overlook these defects, will find much of value in his thinking and I hope they enjoy and benefit from his analysis.
See: [] Riggs papers || Autobiography || Exporting Government? The Aladin Paper || Sites for Public Administration []
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Posted 22 August 2000
