Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C. (February 16-20, 1999).
DRAFT: Please do not quote without authors' permission
ABSTRACT: Migration dynamics have critically shaped and simultaneously been affected by globalization and democratization. As these processes are reinforced by technological innovations (i.e., jet planes, internet, faxes) which facilitate travel and communication, they pose a potential challenge to traditional concepts of sovereignty and national hegemony. One of the nascent forms of this challenge to the definition of the nation-state is presented by the impact on domestic politics of diaspora communities, immigrants, and other non-resident minorities. In this sense, politics is 'globalized' beyond traditional nation-state borders. The Israeli diaspora introduces complex variations on this important theme. Since the basis of Zionism is an "ingathering of exiles", the notion of a diaspora in this case seems contradictory. Yet, the estimate is that some ten percent of Israelis live abroad, and their behavior is potentially important for domestic politics. This article will explore ideological tensions between Israeli emigrants in the United States and their American Jewish counterparts, who form 'potential' citizens derived from the 1950 Israeli Law of Return. The ambivalent status of diaspora Israelis for Jews and Jewish organizations has evolved substantially since the formation of Israel fifty years ago, and needs to be interpreted as a function of the Israeli state. The paper will assess the political and economic impact of these groups on the evolution of the Israeli state, by examining their role outside and inside Israel. Finally, the paper will draw implications for the democratic nature of a maturing Israeli state, which defines its 'demos' through religion.
Although the 'globalization' buzzword remains elusive, there is some agreement that the lines between international and domestic policy arenas have become increasingly blurred in the 1990s. One of the nascent forms of this globalization challenge to the traditional concepts of sovereignty and national hegemony is presented by the impact of international migration and diaspora communities, who may sit at the nexus of 'transnational' spaces, where the domestic politics of one state takes place in several states. In this sense, politics is 'globalized' beyond traditional nation-state borders. Indeed, the political implications of these movements have sparked a growing interest in the role of diasporas in world politics, which has been largely ignored by political analysts, and left to the domain of sociologists, anthropologists, and historians.,(1) The major question then is, what has changed to capture the attention of political analysts? More specifically, how do 'globalization' dynamics affect the political impact of emigrants and diasporas on homeland and host countries---in the domestic and international arenas? To a large degree, the impact of these groups may be measured by their cohesive and organizational strength.
The Israeli diaspora introduces complex variations on the important theme of diasporas in globalized politics. Should this newest and most growing of Jewish groups settling in America be treated as a subset of the larger Jewish diaspora--a globalized diaspora? Jews have often been regarded as the best example of a Diaspora society--what John Armstrong calls, an "archetypical Diaspora"(2) Despite the concept's derivation from the Greek words, dia (over) and speiro (sow), the use of the term, diaspora itself can be traced back to the Old Testament, and the experiences of the ancient Jews, and has loosely come to be associated with these peoples' victimized experiences. In this case, the role of Israeli emigrants as a subset of a larger Jewish diaspora is rather problematic, since there seems to be little in common between the contemporary emigration of Israelis and the mass emigration of Jews to America at the turn of the century. The latter entailed the exodus of approximately two million impoverished, persecuted refugees from Eastern Europe, while the former, currently leave their country with professional skills and considerable financial resources, seemingly ready to surrender their status as members of the dominant majority in exchange for the status of hopeful immigrants.(3) The increasing numbers of those born and raised in Israel who depart mainly for the United States shatters a basic cleavage differentiating Israelis and Diaspora Jews--that between religious and national identification. Israeli emigrants introduce a revision to the definition of and categories of Jews in the Diaspora. On the one hand, they openly repudiate Jewish tradition, assuming instead a superior Hebrew culture; on the other hand, they have forsaken the Jewish homeland and cradle of the culture which they claim to represent.(4) Furthermore, since the basis of Zionism is an "ingathering of exiles", the notion of a diaspora in the Israeli case seems contradictory. Yet, the estimate is that some ten to fifteen percent of Israelis live abroad, and their behavior is potentially important for domestic politics, and for the survival of the larger Jewish community to which they belong. The notion of Jewish loyalty has been questioned since the separation of church and state in 19th Century France and underscored by the notorious Dreyfus affair, which helped stimulate Zionists, such as Theodore Herzl, the founder of the World Zionist Organization (1897).
By the turn of the 20th century, the Zionist movement successfully reached its goal of changing the place of residence of the world's Jews from the Diaspora to Zion. , In 1882 there were 24,000 Jews in Eretz (the Land of) Israel, or 0.31 percent of the world's Jews. By 199 5, Israel's 4.4 million Jews constituted 34.2 percent of the 13 million world Jewish population.(5) While Zionism provided a ready ideology for immigration to Eretz Israel, most Jews who moved and who had other options however chose not to come to Israel. That was especially true of the mass migration from Russia and Poland to the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, and it was equally true of those Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union near the end of this century. Thus, while Zionism was successful in reversing the 2000 year 'diaspora' characterized by the dispersion of many sizable Jewish communities throughout the world (particularly in Europe, the lands of the Middle East and North Africa), by the late 1990s, a shift from Zion to the Diaspora from the center to the periphery may be seen to take place with the consolidation of two sizable diverging Jewish communities.
A trend towards a concentration of Jews in two free and democratic countries seems inevitable. * Compared to the 32 percent of Israel's world Jews in 1995, the 5.7 million Jews in the United States made up 44 percent of the Jewish people. The next largest community of Jews in the world are much smaller than the 5.7 millions of Jews who live in the US, and the 4.4 million in Israel. Only two other countries (France and Russia) have communities larger than a half million, and an additional four (Argentina, Canada, Ukraine, and United Kingdom) have Jewish communities between a quarter million and a half million people. The changing demographics of the two co-ethnic communities pose a competitive potential between "Jews from the Promised Land" and those from "the Land of Promise".(6) With only two major communities, friction between them will have immediate significance since the stakes will get higher from crisis to crisis. . While these two co-ethnic communities have shared a unique relationship, over time, processes inherent in their different experiences threaten to leave a persistent gap between them. The evolution of this complex relationship between the two groups poses a number of problems not only for the relations within and between the two communities, but also for both Israeli domestic politics and its relations with its chief ally, the United States. At the forefront of these developments is the future of a maturing, democratic Israeli state, which defines its 'demos' through religion.
* While more than a third of the world's Jews live in Israel, the boundaries of Israel's political system are often difficult to identify because the spiritual and material influence of Jews who are not Israelis is often felt. * The role of the State of Israel for Jews who do not live in Israel has been translated into practice by the 1951 Law of Return policy, which entitles every Jew automatic citizenship. This policy has been the concrete expression of the prophetic vision of the "ingathering of the exiles", and has made the Jewish diaspora an integral part of Israel's relations. Since its establishment in 1948, the Israeli state has encouraged diaspora Jews to settle in the 'Holy Land' and has sought to facilitate their absorption. This has been part of a broader demographic strategy to build a strong, democratic state through population-building, and discouraged Israeli emigration. How the Israeli state has managed to pursue these interests and yet, set its boundaries in context of increasing globalization may be measured in changes of migration patterns and the relationship between the Israeli and American Jewish communities as interactions have increased.
How the Israeli state, whose demographic raison d'être has been to promote Jewish immigration and inhibit Israeli emigration responds to these challenges is of fundamental importance to the evolution of a democratic Israeli state. The role of Israeli émigrés is riddled with a series of conundrums which are tied to the preservation of the Jewish people, to the democratic nature of a state, which defines its 'demos' through religion, and to the larger question of identity, which is always near the surface. If Jews were persecuted in the Middle Ages for having a distinct religion, in modern times, this dilemma is compounded by the existence of the State of Israel, and the difficulties this raises regarding both religious and national loyalties.(7) How have the dynamics of globalization and democratization affected the relations between Israelis and their larger Jewish diaspora, and their participation and political impact both inside and outside of Israel? Furthermore, how have these dynamics affected and been affected by the Israeli state?
This paper focuses on the relationship between Israeli emigrants and
their American Jewish counterparts, who form 'potential' citizens derived
from the 1950 Israeli Law of Return, in context of more general
attitudinal patterns between Israeli and American Jews. Our preliminary
findings suggest that it is likely that these groups will diverge,
supporting our thesis that while groups who live outside of the Israeli
state are physically important, they will have only limited impact on
Israeli domestic politics. Some of this is a result of brutish policy
battles, such as the law of conversion or the status of the Reform and
Conservative movements in Israel. Beyond policy issues, there are social
forces at work that separate the communities. Despite and because of
increasing globalization, which promote technological innovations (i.e.,
jet planes, Internet, faxes) and facilitate migration and communications,
factors related to the Israeli state and national identity mitigate the
relationship between the two groups. The ambivalent status of diaspora
Israelis for Jews and Jewish organizations has evolved substantially since
the formation of Israel fifty years ago, and may be interpreted more as a
function of the Israeli state, responding to globalization and other
democratic pressures than globalization itself. Based on demographic and
attitudinal data, the following will attempt to locate the distance
between Israeli emigrants and the larger Jewish diaspora, in context of
the general relationship between the two communities. More specifically,
it assesses the political and economic impact of these two groups on the
evolution of the Israeli state, by examining their role outside of Israel,
in an age of globalization, where the lines between international and
domestic policy-making have become more elusive.
GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND THE ISRAELI DIASPORA
The basis of this analysis derives from the assumption that in addition to the communications and transportation revolutions, the globalization of domestic politics is driven by the confluence of two trends: increasing migration and increasing democratization of the world's states.(8) Democratization has not only facilitated international migration, by reducing the number of states willing to impose exit restrictions on their citizens, but has also increased the opportunities for emigrants to influence both their host and homeland politics. Simultaneously, the globalization of national economies more generally has meant more mobility of people, capital, and information, posing to reorganize boundaries institutions, loyalties, and most importantly who 'gains' and who 'loses'.(9) Interpreted at the extremes, the expected outcomes of these phenomena are more unified and cohesive communities--a global or homogenous culture rather than one of divisions. These factors have often been perceived to challenge the traditional notion of nation-state, as they transcend the locus of boundary-maintenance activity.
The effects of globalization on immigrant and diaspora participation are particularly difficult to measure in the Israeli case. From a simple starting point, the identification of an Israeli is difficult to operationalize. As a prominent Israeli demographer has posed, "The problem of 'Who is an Israeli' is no less, and probably quite more, complex than the issue of 'Who is a Jew'.(10) Reliable emigration data are not only impeded by this lack of a coherent definition, but are made more difficult by a general absence of data that democratic countries collect on'returns'. Furthermore, while someone who was born in Israel but now lives in the US is a clear cut case, a person who lived a significant portion of their life in Israel, but was born in another country is less obvious. Finally, it is also likely that a considerable number of U.S. residents who were born in Israel, are not Jewish, but Arabs.(11) Even if we accept the rough estimate of 10 to 15 percent of Israelis to be living abroad, the question of impact may be questionable for political analysts.
In an age of globalization and the emergence of transnational communities, however the simultaneous impact of immigrant and diaspora groups has rapidly changed the impact of even small fractions of a population. In the Israeli case, the maturation of the democratic state at the same time of the rapid disappearance of Jewish survival may be shown to hinge on even a number as seemingly trite as this. While figures vary because the Jewish community tends to use high estimates for political purposes and the Jewish federations take low estimates for fundraising strategies, * ...the numbers of Jews in the U.S. in 1990 totaled approximately 5.5 million, plus or minus the 590.000 who claimed to either have another or no religion. * Among the American Jewish diaspora, there has been a dramatic increase in the intermarriage rate over the past two-and-a-half decades; from 9% in 1965 to 52% in 1990.(12) Findings have also indicated a strong tendency of children of intermarriages not to be raised as Jews, to marry outside of the religion, and to abandon Judaism within one generation.(13) Such realizations have been met by * intensified drives of the Israeli government, in conjunction with Jewish organizations to attract young American Jews to Israel, as well as sponsoring immersion programs to tap into second-generation Israelis abroad
In this context, Israeli emigration patterns over the last 50 years constitute notable demographic changes, that may be roughly correlated to the evolution of Israeli state. In the Israeli case, these patterns are condensed to fit more general historical patterns posed by Zolberg which relate migration epochs, population structures and nation-state formation (Zolberg, 1981)(14). Zolberg's dyachronic analysis focused on the evolution of migration since the Age of Absolutism and the emergence of the Westphalian regime (when population was considered a scarce economic and military asset, and states contained emigration, a crime against the state) to the Post-War period (marked by globalization and the dramatic increase of market and technical competition that produce an increase of pool of people capable of moving, and thus states efforts to limit immigration). Demographic changes can thus be largely seen as a result of certain structural and ideological factors that relate to the evolution of nation-states in the world system. The Israeli case applies this historical framework to specific national-state-level developments rather than the more global context.
Demography has been inextricably linked to politics and public policy in Israel since the establishment of the state in 1948 (and even before). This is reinforced by two key issues on the Israeli agenda--security and national identity(15) (Meyers, 1998). Indeed, Israel's relationship with both neighboring Arab states and resident Arabs within Israel, as well as the international community for support has been critical to its national interest. Israeli national identity--as a Jewish and democratic state has also been closely linked to questions of immigration and the definition of Jewishness. The result of these concerns has been a permanent immigration policy, which is extremely liberal--a reflection of early state consolidation of a homogenous cultural population. The institutionalization of Zionist ideology in the newly independent Israeli state reflected these ambitions. The Declaration of Independence stated that "the State of Israel is open to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of Exiles." * According to Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion upon his presentation of the Law of Return and the Nationality Law to the Israeli Knesset (Parliament), "these laws reflect the central mission of our State, namely to fulfill the vision of the redemption of Israelby the ingathering of the exiles".(16) These Zionist goals were further institutionalized with the creation of a Minister of Immigration, and ideologically buttressed by references to Jewish immigrants as "Olim"(the ascending) and the stigma attached to emigrants as "Yordim" (the descending).
Israel's Zionist ideological goals were extraordinarily successful, as evidenced by its demographic structure, and its absorption of more immigrants, per base population than any other country in the world. With the exception of the 1950s when the government attempted to reduce the number of people through "rules of selection" policy, * ...mass immigration of Jews to Israel has been actively encouraged policy. Between 1948 and 1951, Israel admitted 666,000 Jewish immigrants, mostly from Mediterranean countries and survivors of the Holocaust from Europe, who joined a base population of only 600,000. Since 1989, almost 780,000 immigrants have arrived in Israel, mostly from the former USSR. Thus, Israel's demographic structure today mainly consists of first or second-generation immigrants.(17)
These demographic trends have clearly reflected national goals oriented towards the'ingathering' of Jews and the growth of population resources for security and ideological reasons. In this context, the simultaneous emigration of Israelis (albeit a natural phenomenon for any country) has been particularly problematic for a liberal democracy that cannot contain emigration. While figures have been difficult to accurately chart, and only significant in context of its political significance, it is known that a substantial number of Israeli Jews left the country between the 1950s and 1990s. Until the 1970s, the early 1950s witnessed the highest rate of outflow in Israeli history (see Table 4.1). The proportion of emigrants to immigrants was higher (although the absolute number was lower) in the 1950s than in the late 1970s, a period in which problems of emigration concerned the public .(18)(Clearly, while this newly established liberal democracy could not treat emigration as a crime, as in the early mercantilist period described by Zolberg, Israeli emigrants have been generally stigmatized, both officially and indirectly. * By the late 1970s, the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin denounced this emigration, calling Israeli emigrants "the fallen among the weaklings",(19) and the Israeli government openly admitted that this large demographic loss was a matter of serious national concern.
FInitial government plans to encourage residents to return were fairly unsuccessful.(20) These packages included benefits identical to those granted to new immigrants (mainly customs rebates and housing benefits) to those yordim who returned to Israel after being abroad for at least two to five years. In 1980, the Israeli government appointed the then Deputy Prim Minister, Simcha Ehrlich and the Director General of the Jewish Agency, Schmuel Lahis with the tasks of investigating the matter. * * Ehrlich and Lahis were concerned only with yeridah (emigration) to the United States, since it was clear that that country was the major destination for yordim. The Lahis Report, published in 1980, reported between 300,000 and 500,000 yordim in the United States (with the majority of them in New York and Los Angeles). That report reinforced by others at the time suggested that * the loss to Israel of many citizens (most of whom were young and skilled) was bound to have disturbing implications for the demography, economy, morale and defense of the country.(21) The Lahis report pointed out that the yordim themselves were greatly attached to Israel and that this feeling should be nurtured. The Israel Government Yearbooks ever since 1981 declared that measures would be taken to discourage emigration and to persuade the yordim to return to Israel, as well as to increase immigration from both eastern and western countries. The finding of the Lahis Report alarmed the Israeli Jewish public when they were publicized by the media, and the reaction of the government was evidenced by the transfer of activities to the Prime Minister's Office to deter emigration.(22) By the mid-1980s, the Prime Minister's Office along with a special appointed committee consisting of the Directors General of the Ministries of Defense, Education and Culture, Finance, Housing, Labor and Welfare, and chaired by the Director General of the Immigrant Absorption adopted recommendations to deter emigration, which aimed at young persons nearing the age of military service, recommending intensification of education in Zionist values. Despite the repeated government declarations that the problem of Jewish emigration was viewed as a deplorable trend, turn-around was fairly ineffective.
As the Israeli state has matured, and headed towards its 50th year
independence celebrations, the question of whether yordim in fact
lack Zionist values or patriotism has come to the fore, and several
changes in the population structure vis-a-vis nation-state
relationship have emerged. In an age of globalization, yerida
(emigration) has been increasingly related to ideological shifts and
social changes in Israeli society, that include the decline of the
pioneering spirit and the growing ideals of a consumption society which
have produced an identity crisis among Israeli(23) The majority of Israeli emigrants can no
longer be described as marginal members of society, or 'weaklings'. By the
mid-1980s, it had become clear that Israelis who were acquiring rights of
permanent residence in the United States were not only mainly from the
upper socio-economic strata of Israeli society, but also larger than
comparable positions than nationals of other countries whose total
population was far larger than that of Israel. Israeli government
officials altering their status to permanent residents of the US for
example (i.e., those on category A visas) contrasted dramatically to other
Western countries (see Table 1).
* Table 1: Total Number of Foreigners Altering their Status in the United States from Category A (government official) and Category H (temporary workers and trainees) Visas to Permanent Residents, 1982-1985.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1982-85; see Friedberg and Kfir.
* The numbers of Israeli academics and professionals who had settled abroad ('the brain drain') posed an important concern for Israeli policy-makers. They included senior scientists, medical personnel, engineers, technicians, and computer specialists who sought abroad professional advancement and increased earnings, not to mention Israeli students who, after studying abroad and graduating found greater rewards abroad.(24) The government has tried to target that part of the population which has been seen to be most apt to emigrate: young persons in their twenties who had completed their period of military service, and were experiencing difficulties in securing independent adequate housing and/or in supporting themselves while pursuing their studies in institutions of higher learning. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic complexity involving the Ministry of Defense, Labour and Welfare, Education and Culture, and Ministry of Construction and Housing, not to mention the Ministry of Finance for implementation have made access to special entitlements such as housing, employment, higher studies and income tax rebates for demobilized soldiers fairly remote.(25)
While these developments continued into the 1990s, the demographic stream has somewhat changed, as have attitudes. Although as mentioned above, there are significant problems with emigration data, the Israeli Border Police and the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics does record the exits and entrances of Israeli residents. While there is no legal definition of a "yored", as it is impossible to know who has left permanently and who is travelling as a tourist, student or on business, extrapolated data suggest that in the period between 1985-1996, there has been a significant rise in Israeli returns after residing 1 year and more abroad (the OECD definition of 'immigrant') over time (see Table 4.4). By early 1990s, several demographic trends were in evidence: a continuing stream of Israeli immigrants to the US, a rise in the number of Israelis returning to Israel to live, and the emergence of a new category of "transnationals"--individuals with footholds in both the United States and Israel. In the social and political sphere, Israeli émigrés showed evidence of growing self-acceptance along with signs of identification (albeit distinction) with American Jewish communal life. As argued here, these trends must be seen more as a product of the Israeli state, than those prompted by their new homelands in the United States.
First, the official Israeli view of yordim began to change in the early 1990s to a more symbolically favorable strategy of encouraging "re-aliyah" (return to ascension). In a 1991 interview, Yitzhak Rabin recanted his earlier statement: "The Israelis living abroad are an integral part of the Jewish community and there is no point talking about ostracism."(26) Government incentives to reverse the flow by encouraging residents to return appeared to be partially successful; those who have come back under this plan increased from 8,000 in 1991 to 14,000 residents in 1995(27). Indeed, the stigma attached to emigration decreased considerably over the 1990s. One result of the trend towards a more open and competitive society that have come with globalization, has been a growing acceptance of the fact that where one lives is a private decision as well as a public one.(28) When asked whether they were considering emigration, approximately 14 percent of the adult Jewish population in Israel, and about a quarter of those in their twenties reported that they were.(29) The other side of this acceptance is the decline of feeling that aliyah is essential to the country's future. In the 1970s, 85 to 90 percent agreed with that statement; in the 1988 and 1990 surveys, the number fell to 82 percent; in 1992 to 71 percent, and in the 1994 and 1995 surveys to 64 and 67 percent.(30) This trend has particular significance for the relations of the Israeli and American co-ethnic communities, as will be discussed in the next section.
These demographic changes have not only been prompted by the new Israeli attitude, but also by changes brought about by globalization, itself. Thus, initiatives to reverse the 'brain-drain' phenomenon has been embraced by technological and scientific industries who reinforce the state's interests to make Israel a competitive environment. The impetus for example, behind the establishment of the Center for Submicron Semiconductor Science as part of the Weizmann Institute was not only to stimulate new high-tech local industry, but also to bring Israeli emigrants back home and induce young graduates not to leave.(31) According to Professor Yoseph Imry, one of the chief nuclear physicists involved with this program:
I feel uncomfortable when I remember how many of my friends have left. I see them go one by one, first to study and then to stay. It gets harder and harder to hold on. The lack of jobs in academia and in industry, the poorly-equipped labs that do exist, as well as low salaries, push these bright people away. Native-born Americans are a minority in places like California's Silicon Valley. There are Israelis, Asiatics and even Arabs from various coutnriesScience is stagnating here. In half a generation, the damage will be irreversible unless we act now.(32)
In face of globalization, it appears that the pluralist interests of the Israeli state itself has been recruited in driving initiatives, as opposed to the traditional heavy-handed Israeli-state driving the economy.
* Israel's remarkable economic achievements in the global market have impacted significantly on emigration trends By the early 1990s, Israel attained the highest gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate among Western (OECD) economies (6.2% in 1991; 6.7% in 1992). A 1994 World Bank report of the standard of living of the nations of the world listed Israel in eighteenth place.(33) Moreover, with the partial lifting of the Arab boycott as a result of the Oslo accords with the PLO, the successful spin-off of technologies developed in military and defense-related industries, the recent influx of educated professionals from the former Soviet Union, and government subsidies for investors, Israel has provided an attractive option for foreign investors in the 1990s. Some spectators even go so far as to place Israel's potential comparable to that of Hong Kong or Singapore.(34) In 1995, a total of $2.3 billion was invested in Israel--a twenty-fold increase from 1992. Most opportunities were seen in high-tech industries, which included corporations such as Intel, IBM, Digital Equipment, Motorola, and National Semiconductor. The Intel Corporation, one of the world's major producers of integrated security and chips for microprocessors, for example, accepted a Ministry of Industry and Trade offer of a $380 million grant, conditioned on Israel being the site of $1 billion Intel expansion project. Venture capital in Israeli industry as well soared to $480 million in 1995 from $55 million in 1991.(35) More significant to the individual Israeli, have been government reforms on strict foreign exchange controls introduced on the eve of 50th Independence Day celebrations in April 1998. These reforms permitted Israelis to freely invest abroad an unlimited amount of foreign currency (in contrast to the previous $7,000). The reforms represented an effort to make the Israeli shekel a fully convertible currency on world markets and integrate Israel into the global financial community, by attracting foreign banks to Israel and attract investors to more open Israeli markets. In the aftermath, Merrill Lynch launched a bond offering valued at $47 million, while the International Finance Corporation issued an offering through Deutsche Bank of Germany worth $54.(36)
* It is very significant that as Israel has experienced rapid economic and military strength, its traditional economic support from the Jewish diaspora, particularly in the United States has declined. Israel's import of capital from Jewish organizations in the United States has experienced a notable decline, as a result of a shift in priorities that have coincided with the passing of the older generation of American Jewish community leaders whose formative years were spent during the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, in contrast to the younger generation of leaders, to whom Israel has been a fact of life.(37)
For these reasons, the responses of the Israeli state to globalization itself may be said to account for Israel's demographic trend than any external change beyond Israel's influence or borders.
* Finally, these trends explain both the rise of return immigration to Israel, as well as the emergence of a "transnational" Israeli community, who maintain social, cultural, economic and political links to both home and host countries. Indeed, a number of factors make the movement of Israelis to the United States fit the general description of a "transnational"group.(38) These include education level, occupational and cultural skills that are useful in both countries, and access to networks that provide a broad range of services.(39) In addition, Israelis are more likely to become naturalized (as has been evidenced above), and are among a select few groups to be allowed to have dual citizenship.(40) As a counterpart to this, the rate of Israeli 'returns' has increased both on a temporary basis (i.e., children on summer vacations) and more permanently, as the narrowing of economic disparities has occurred. Israeli government sources report that the number of Israelis returning home has increased substantially since 1992, the year that marked the election of the peace-oriented Labor party in Israel and a major economic recession in the United States. During 1985 1991, the annual average number of returnees was 5,500; during 1992 -194, 10,5000 returnees; and 14,000 returned in 1993 and in 1994.(41) In great part, this return migration has been reinforced by an intensified official outreach policy toward expatriates, and a booming economy in Israel which has encouraged this increased return migration.(42)
The evolution of Israeli emigration patterns can be interpreted as a
function of the Israeli state and its response to globalization. * When
economic disparities narrow between the two 'homes', ideological and
national factors related to the Israeli nation-state itself seem to
attract Israelis to return, to stay, or to create transnational spaces.
Their assimilation into a wider Jewish diaspora remains limited, as is
borne out and explained by significant attitudinal distances between the
Israeli and American Jewish communities in general.
ISRAELIS AND JEWS
As Israeli immigrants are rapidly becoming one of the largest new migrant groups in some of America's major cities such as Los Angeles and New York (see table 5), they join the ranks of the 2nd largest Jewish community in the world--their so-called, co-ethnics. The relationship between these two groups has raised a novel situation in the process of network migration, which assumes that former migrants and non-migrants in origin are connected to newer migrants through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin, which constitute a form of social capital that reduce the costs and risks of migration, and increases the expected net returns to movement(43). * How American Jews relate to Israeli immigrants is complex. While American Jews have a notorious record of supporting the Israeli state, they have long viewed Israelis coming to settle in the United States with ambivalence. While most American Jews have chosen not to participate personally in the 'ingathering of the exiles', they have seen themselves playing a vital role by contributing money and insuring political support for the Israeli state. The converse role of Israelis, in this view was to inhabit and develop the country and defend it. Leaving the Jewish state, therefore has been perceived as negatively to American Jews as to the Israeli state--a betrayal to the "unspoken compact between American and Israeli Jews."(44) If the American Jewish community denounces this type of migration, the typical Israeli retorts sound like these:
Listen, I lived 25 years in Israel. Served in the army. I've paid my dues. Why don't you Americans go pay yours while I stay here for a while and send money to Israel every year?(45)
It's much easier to give away money than blood. You offer money and expect in exchange that my children and I defend the Jewish state. You should understand that Israel is yours as much as it is mine. Now I've decided to change places with you. I'm going to make money and give some of it to Israel, while you and your children make aliya to Israel.(46)
These tensions have maintained a distance between the two communities, not only socially, but officially as well. Organized American Jewish federations have been very unreceptive to Israeli immigrants, as has been illustrated by the distinctions made between Soviet Jews and Israeli emigrants for assistance eligibility.(47) The ambivalent status of diaspora Israelis for Jews and Jewish organizations has becoming increasingly problematic as the demographic profile of Israeli emigrants has appeared less and less like 'the wretched refuse', and increasingly highly mobile. Israelis are not included in Jewish charities or service, though their constituency among large American Jewish communities (i.e., Queens and Brooklyn) has grown.
Although conflict between Israelis and American Jews have mitigated in the 1990s, and the relationship between the two groups have become warmer, partly as a result of the changing attitude of the Israeli government, processes inherent in the different experiences of the two groups promises to keep the two groups separated. Studies and polls conducted by the Council of Jewish Federations in the 1990s have revealed a dramatic shift in loyalty among American Jews to the Israeli state. Two major reasons include the role of religion which has become more pluralistic in the United States, and most interestingly, the role of the Israeli state, itself. Ironically, American Jews have loosened their bonds with Israel not because they consider it a lost cause, but because they are so sure of its success with a global economy, and a powerful army.(48) Assuming Israel continues to thrive economically, and American Jews remain fully integrated and increasingly assimilated (as evidenced by unprecedented 'outmarrying' rate of marriages), the impact of demography and the different roles of religion and identity will inexorably lead the two communities down two different paths.
Many Israelis--even those young able-bodied migrants who arrive to the US in the aftermath of their military service-- continue to perceive their national undertaking as providing a refuge for the world's Jews. Similarly, many Jews in the world show pride, concern, and anxiety (or other emotions) toward Israel in a manner unusual for citizens of foreign countries. Regardless of the distribution of opinion regarding Israel among diaspora Jews, the question of identity is always near the surface. If Jews were persecuted in the Middle Ages for having a distinct religion, in modern times, this dilemma is compounded by the existence of the State of Israel, and the difficulties this raises regarding both religious and national loyalties.(49)
* The major arena of conflict, though rarely expressed explicitly is in the field of personal and national identity. Of those who described themselves as Jews by religion in the United States, 80 percent expressed a denominational preference for the Conservative and Reform synagogue movements, while only some 6 percent identified themselves as strictly religious, Orthodox Jews.(50) In Israel, secular Israelis consider themselves Jewish regardless of their alienation from any form of Orthodoxy. They are usually unaware of American Jewry's attachment to Jewish religious traditions (i.e., Conservative and Reform movements) that constitute the majority of organized American Jewry, and that are often very different from those represented by Israeli Orthodoxy.(51) This religious pluralism fits in the American mainstream culture of denominational and communal association,(52) and is simultaneously alien to Israelis' perception of Jewish identity, which is an elementary component in the Israeli definition of citizenship and nationality. Israelis arriving to America discover the central role of the synagogue in the life of American Jews, while American Jews are stunned by the ignorance and complete withdrawal of Israelis from Jewish tradition and organizations.(53)
These religious and national conceptual differences are reinforced structurally. The role of the synagogues and community organizations to each group mirrors social and political culture differences of the Israeli and American systems more generally. While American Jewry has been claimed to be one of the most viable and resourceful ethnic communities in America, in striking contrast, studies have shown that Israeli immigrants not only disassociate themselves from active participation in Jewish communal and national organizations available to them, but also fail to initiate formal institutions of their own.(54) This could be interpreted as a reflection of deTocqueville's early claim of American associations as a way of life contrasting against an Israeli political culture, which has been said to depend on governmental agencies, and communal action which is based on shared security problems.(55)
These cleavages between Israeli emigrants and their American Jewish counterparts is reinforced by larger attitudinal distances between the two communities, which can be extrapolated from a polls undertaken on the occasion of Israel's 50th anniversary in spring 1998 by The Los Angeles Times and Yediot Aharonot of Jews in the United States and in Israel simultaneously.(56) Answers to questions of mutual interaction are indicative of the direction of affinity and/or familiarity (see Table 6). Not only have slightly more Israelis visited the United States than the other way around, but similarly do they outweigh the willingness to live in the US (albeit a surprising unwillingness does exist on both sides). Israelis have a higher rate of friends or relatives in the United States than the other way around. Many more Israelis agree with the proposition that all Jews should live in Israel; the plurality opinion in both countries is that the United States should have a sizable Jewish population.
Table 6: Interactions, American and Israeli Jewish Samples
Willing to live in the other country
Friends or relatives in the other country
1)The US should have a sizable Jewish population
2)All Jews should live in Israel
When it comes to politics, Israelis were more willing to consider the views of the American Jewish community than expected by the US Jewish sample. However, American Jews were more prepared to take public stands against Israel, if they disagreed with its policies. Asked to what extent, Israel should consider the views of American Jews when making policy, 60% of Israelis answered, "To a great extent" or "To a certain extent" compared with 37 percent of the American Jews. * Respondents were also asked if US Jews should publicly support Israel even if they do not agree with Israel's policies; 65 percent of Israelis said yes compared with 40 percent of Americans.
The other substantial attitudinal cleavage between American Jews and Israelis is unsurprisingly related to religious identification. This not only reflects the structural differences encountered by the Israeli diaspora in America, but also one of the largest political rifts confronting the two communities today. * At the heart of the political dispute are the issues of conversion, which currently exclude those of Conservative and Reform movements and restrict citizenship to conversions, marriages divorces, funerals to the sole legitimacy and auspices of Orthodox rabbis. The attitudinal polls, while reflecting real differences between the American and Israeli communities, suggest some structural if not ideological convergence. Thus, among Israelis who describe themselves as secular (54%), there is considerable support for pluralism, so that even many Israelis who would not turn to a Reform rabbi to marry them, feel that those rabbis should have the right to perform marriages. Interestingly, while it is important to note the similarities between the Jews of the United States and Israel regarding their synagogue attendance (28% report never attending), many more Israelis engage in religious or traditional practice. That is, 88% of Israelis say they always or usually attend a Passover Seder; 83% light Hanukkah candles; 72% fast on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement; and 63% light Sabbath candles at least some of the time. This is considerably lower among the American Jewish community, who tends to associate the synagogue to social and cultural activity than observance, per se (see Table 7).
Table 7: Religious Observance: American and Israeli Jewish Samples
Participate in Passover Sedar
Believe in God
Without a Doubt
Keep kosher at home
Fast on Yom Kippur
Light Sabbath candles
This variance may be partially explained by the cultural and social norms related to religion and identity. There are predictable differences stemming from the different social, cultural, legal and political circumstances in the US and Israeli.
While both groups reported that being Jewish was an important element of their self-identity (57% of Israelis compared to 54% of Americans), many more Israelis defined it as the single most important part of their identities (27% of Israelis compared to 13% of Americans). Furthermore, two-thirds of Israeli Jews objected to the suggestion of marrying a non-Jew, compared with 21 percent of the United States ample (see table 8). Another sign of marked difference is that 58% of the Americans said that they never had a Christmas tree in their house, indicating that 42% had one at least once. The question was not asked in Israel, but the rate of having one would be extremely low.
Table 8: Identity and Marriage: American and Israeli Jewish Samples
Importance of being Jewish as part of self-identity
Very important and important
Would marry a non-Jew
While these religious differences seem to be significant, it is important to underscore that while many Israelis observe and appreciate Jewish holidays and traditions, they connect these behaviors to "Israeliness" rather than "Jewishness". Israelis tend to have perceive their designation as 'Jews' a definition that implies submission to the superior status of the gentile host societies.(57) For these reasons, Israelis in America tend not to participate in organized religious activities and depend on public insitutions to socialize their children.(58) This ties into the differences of national identity and religion that exist in the diaspora, and underscores the struggles that the Israeli diaspora have to overcome in their transition from being part of a Jewish majority to part of a Jewish minority.(59) It is important to note that when comparing Israeli immigrants' observance of Jewish customs (i.e., lighting candles on shabbat and Hanukkah, attending synagogue on the High Holy Days and Shabbat, and fasting on Yom Kippur) with their patterns of practice in Israel, several studies of naturalized Israelis in New York and Los Angeles found that these practices increased in this country(60). This suggests that the distinctions between the two groups may widen even further as the Israeli diaspora confronts the American Jewish community.
These attitudinal differences that center on religion and national identity substantiate the traditional dichotomy that has long separated the Israeli and American Jewish communities, and that serve to distinguish the role of those who live inside and outside of the Israeli state. These divisions have been politically reinforced. With the globalization of the economy, and that of a diaspora community that includes increasing numbers of Israelis and Jews, the official position of Israel has consistently placed importance on human capital. Despite a considerable number of Jews who have chosen to live in the Diaspora, the Israeli government has always perceived human capital more resourceful than financial or political support from its citizens and 'potential citizens' abroad. . This is very significant, since it addresses the perennial assumption that Israel's policies are dependent and highly influenced by the support of Jewish fund raises abroad (particularly in the United States). The reality resulting from the seeming division of labor, which has Jews outside Israel collecting money and leaders within Israel deciding how to spend it has always followed the logic of Ben-Gurion's early thinking---that, "one who wants to influence Israeli policy should live in Israel".(61) This has been the persistent view of both left and right political streams. Thus, in the late 1980s, the then Labor Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated to the Conference of Presidents of major American Jewish Organizations: "We shall decide on matters of life and death in our Parliamentbut, not to listen to you, not have a dialogue, not to express a view--who wants something so disciplined, so un-Jewish?" Even these comments generated a debate with the right-wing Liked coalition partner, Prime Minister Shamir, who renounced Peres' comments as a "regrettable attempt to circumvent Israel's democratic process by appealing to friends abroad who do not vote in Israel".(62)
Such statements are more than rhetorical statements, and are reinforced by institutional constraints against participation by those 'citizens' who reside abroad. Israeli voting laws, for example, which would provide an outlet not only for the growing number of Israeli emigrants (an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 thousand) abroad, but also the broader Jewish community that could receive citizenship according to the Law of Return. Despite a controversial bill proposed in 1997, dubbed the Emigrants' Law, the majority of Israelis do believe that those who live outside of the country, devoid of consequences (i.e. terrorist attacks), should not play a crucial role in determining future election results. The bill, which failed was strongly supported by the right-wing Likud, which observers believe holds the affinity of the majority of expatriates (according to some estimates, 65%). In contrast, the left has been bitterly opposed to the bill, as explained by Yossi Beilin, a candidate for the Labor party leadership: "The cynicism of the ostensibly nationalist camp has reached new heights with a proposal which will allow former Israelis who abandoned us to send our children to the next war".(63) Many Israelis report "visions of hordes of religious Jews from the Diaspora touchig down at Ben-Gurion Airport, claiming instant citizenship under the Law of Return, and immediately returning to their Diaspora homes, only to remerge as Israelis at election time, when they are told to vote according to the predilection of their rabbis"(64)
* With the sole exceptions of official Israeli envoys serving in missions abroad, and members of the Israeli merchant marine, citizens abroad are prohibited from participating the elections because Israeli law does not provide for absentee ballots, and voting takes place only on Israeli soil.
The Israeli state's approach to narrow the growing divergence of the two communities is two-fold: it aims to target young American Jews and children of Israeli emigrants alike, by luring them physically to Israel, and it does so by cooperating with Jewish organizations and federations in the United States. To this end, * the Israeli government has recently agreed to co-finance together with major Jewish donors from North America and the Council of Jewish Federations, a $300 million program, called "Birthright Israel" that would sponsor any Jew in the world, between the ages of 15-26 to visit Israel.(65) The assumption of "Birthright Israel" is that even a spring break spent in Israel can form a connection to Judaism and Israel for young people who have little or no affiliation. It is also seen as an effort to mend the fraying ties among the 2 Jewish communities. These initiatives represent renewed and heightened efforts to increased youth travel which has over the last years aimed at young people through advertisements in magazines like "Seventeen" and "Teen People". The more recent campaign is more aggressive as it plans to use local Jewish Federations to notify every Jewish couple who have a baby that they have deposited a $180 check for every Jewish baby born in a special account.(66) These efforts attempt to mirror the success of government programs with second-generation Israeli youth in America. For example, Tsabar, the American branch of Tzofim (Israelis Scouts) sponsors youngsters aged 10-19 in eight states, and has a membership of approximately 1,500. Each summer, 200 Israeli-American youth spend a summer in Israel as part of Hetz Vakeshet, a program that combines elements of summer camp, Outward Bound, and army training,(67) which not only create a community bond between young Israelis with little familiarity with the country, but serve to socialize them into the 'pioneering' and security spirit of Israeli life.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITY-BUILDING: ONE DIASPORA OR TWO?
The role of Israel and its diaspora--whether it be a Jewish diaspora or the newer, Israeli one hinges on the relationship between those who live outside Israel and those who live inside of Israel.
The evolution of this complex relationship between the two groups serves as a suggestive test of a maturing Israeli state, which defines its 'demos' by religion. Our preliminary findings indicate that it is likely that Israeli Jews and American Jews will diverge. Some of this is a result of brutish policy battles, such as the law of conversion or the status of the Reform and Conservative movements in Israel. Beyond policy issues, there are social forces at work that inhibit communications and separate the communities, despite and because of globalization. The study of the Israeli diaspora, as part of the newest Jewish diaspora in context of more general demographic and attitudinal trends expose ideological and social tensions that differentiate the two communities, and that threaten to maintain a distance between the Israeli center, and its periphery--the diaspora.
Jews developed unique forms of communal governance throughout their long Diaspora history. Their communal organization was flexible and reflected the changing social, economic and political conditions under which lived. These communal arraignments were uniquely designed to preserve Jewish existence, and to sustain the moral imperatives shared by all Jews. Powerful tools for maintaining Jewish solidarity, identification and creativity were developed, included rabbinical writings, the daily and yearly prayer cycles, the holidays, the Zionist movement, as well as local and even international forms of group action. These tools remain accessible to contemporary Jews, but declining proportions seem to avail themselves of them. Large numbers of the two main Jewish settlements in the world today, in Israel and the United States, are at least partly alienated from Judaism as a religious practice, Zionism or the 'center' as the destination or the natural direction. While the relatively small but extremely cohesive sector of Jewish religious life is flourishing across great geographical distances, much of the Jewish population, not defined by their religious observance or commitment to 'Zion'--lack parallel tools for evolving and sustaining their corporate cultural and social lives.
In a world characterized by evolving technological means of communication and transportation, large segments of the community appear threatened as Jews by increasing discontinuity and long-term disintegration. The marginal role of the Israeli state to American Jews, and the distance to Israelis who reside among them mean that more than ever, the perception posed by Kass and Martin Lipset in the 1980s will be perpetuated--Israelis will remain marginal Jews, among the "proverbial marginal people"--the Jews, themselves.(68) Today, the growing gap between the traditional and the modern, between globalization and national identity, between the sorry state of Jewish communal action and the success and rapid growth of the Israeli independent state, place thee dilemmas in sharp focus.
The divisions that beset the Jewish people play out within each community and between them. With only two major concentrations of the Jewish people, the stakes for survival get higher. And yet, the tendency grows for the two communities to go their separate ways. Despite the social contact that stems from the technological and communications advances of globalization, members of the two communities increasingly become concerned spectators where the other is concerned. Since both communities prosper, albeit at different rates and in different senses, mechanisms of true mutual involvement are not readily at hand. The ambivalence between Israelis and American Jews is transformed into separatism, rather than hostility once Israelis arrive in America for an extended stay with the prospect of changing their citizenship.(69)
The challenges facing the Jewish and Israeli diasporas are enormous. Having successfully survived in the 20th century mass murder, large-scale immigration, and the struggle for the independence and security of Israel, the 21st century globalization holds hazards of its own. Manifestations of disunity abound in Diaspora communal life: modernism and assimilation , separatism and political alienation pose one set of threats; arguments over religious pluralism another; how best to secure Israel's existence a third. Though part of the global village in many senses, in another sense Jews seem to exist in two separate shtetls or ghettos.
Arian, Asher (1998). The Second Republic: Politics in Israel.
Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House.
Armstrong, John (1976). "Mobilized and
Proletarian Diasporas," American Political Science Review, Vol. 20,
No. 2: 393-408.
Barnett, Michael, ed. (1996). "Israel in
the World Economy: Israel as an East Asian State?" in Israel in
Comparative Perspective (Albany, NY: SUNY Press): 107-140.
Bauman, Zygmunt (1998). Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia University Press.
The Boston Globe (1998). "Israel's Star Fades in America," (May 20): p.1.
Cohen, Robin (1997). Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London and Seattle: University College London Press, and University of Washington Press
Cohen, Steven, (1986). "Israeli Emigres and the New York Federation: A Case Study in Ambivalent Policymaking for 'Jewish Communal Deviants',"
Contemporary Jewry, 7: 155-156.
Council of Jewish Federations (1990, 1998). National Surveys.
DellaPergola, Sergio (1998). "World Jewish Population," American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 98 (NY: The American Jewish Committee).
Dvirei Ha'Knesset (Parliament Records) (1950).
Esman, Milton (1994). Ethnic Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Friedberg, Asher and Aharon Kfir (1988). "Jewish Emigration from Israel," The Jewish Journal of Sociology (June): 5-15.
Gold, Steven and Bruce Phillips (1996) "Israelis in the United States," American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 51.
Goldscheider, Calvin (1996). Israel's Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development (Boulder, CO: Westview).
http://www.hamakom.com: Israelis in the US
Israeli Central Bureau of Statitistics (1998). Jerusalem.
Jasso, Guillermina and Mark Rosenzweig, (1990). The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United States (NY: Russell Sage Foundation)
Jerusalem Post (various).
Kass, Drora and Seymour Martin Lipset, (1982). "Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1967 to the Present: Israelis and Others," in Understanding
American Jewry, ed. M. Sklare (New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Press)
Koslowski, Rey (1999) "International Migrationa dn the Globalization of Domestic Politics: A Conceptual Framework" (Rutgers, NJ).
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Earl Raab (1995). Jews and the New American Scene. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Meyers, Eytan (1998). "Security and immigration Policy: the Case of Israel," Paper presented at the ISA Convention in Minneapolis, 17-21 March.
The New York Times (various).
Shain, Yossi (1986). The Frontier of Loyalty; Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, Press).
Sheffer, Gabriel, ed. (1986). Modern Diaspora in Interantional Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).
Shokeid, Moshe (1988). Children of Circumstances: Israeli Emigrants in New York (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).
Zolberg, Aristide (1981). "Patterns of International Migration Policy," Dahlem Conference: 229-246.
1. 0For some early insightful work of political scientists in the field, see Gabriel Sheffer, ed., Modern Diaspora in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Yossi S hain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
2. 0 John Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," American Political Science Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1976): 394.
3. 0 Moshe Shokeid, Children of Circumstances: Israeli Emigrants in New York (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 5.
4. 0 Ibid., p. 51.
5. 0 See Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Populatoin, 1996," American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 98 (New York: the American Jewish Committee, 1998); and Calvin Goldscheider, Israel's Changing Society: Populatoin, Ethnicity, and Development, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).
6. 0 Shokeid, x.
7. 0 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, NY, 1998): 10.
8. 0 Rey Koslowski, "International Migration and the Globaliztion of Domestic Politics: A Conceptual Framework," (Rutgers, 1999).
9. 0 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences. ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
10. 0 Quoted in Gold and Phillips, American Jewish Year Book, 1996, 51. The 'who is a Jew?' debate questions the inclusion of conservative and reform Judaism (as opposed to Orthodox), those born of Jewish mothers as opposed to those brought up in a Jewish home, those of Jewish descent, but who do not consider themselves Jewish, etc.
11. 0 Barry Kosmin, "New Data on Israelis in the United States Indicate that they are not as Numerous as Believed," Press Release, June 14, 1993.
12. 0 Council of Jewish Federations, 1990 National Survey; Jerusalem Post, "Intermarriage Rate of U.S. Jews Exceeds 50 Percent," June 9,1991. In 1990, whille the total Jewish popularion reported in the survey amounted to 8.2 million, 2.7 million of these Jews claimed Jewish descent, but did not currently consider themselves Jewish.
13. 0 Jerusalem Post, "Who Counts as a Jew?" February 19, 1991.
14. 0 Aristide Zolberg, "Patterns of International Migratoin Policy": 229-246.
15. 0 Eytan Meyers, "Security and Immigration Policy: The Case of Israel," Paper presented at the International Studies Association, in Minneapolis (17-21 March 1998).
16. 0 Divrei Ha'Knesset (Parliament Records), 6, 1950: 2035-37, Quoted in Bat-Ami Aucker, "Israeli Immigration Policy and Politics," in Micahel C. LeMay (ed.), The Gatekeepers: Comparative Immigration Policy (NY: Praeger, 1989), p. 120.
17. 0 Meyers, 1998: 2.
18. 0 Arian, 1998:31
19. 0 See Stephen Gold and Bruce Phillips, p. 52.
20. 0 Asher Friedberg and Aharom Kfir, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, June 1988.
21. 0 Ibid., 6.
22. 0 Ibid., 6.
23. 0 Shokeid, p. 7
24. 0 Ibid, p. 11.
25. 0 Friedberg and Kfir, p. 9
26. 0 Matti Golan, With Friends Like You: What Israelis Really Think about American Jews (NY, 1992) as cited in Gold and Phillips, p 52.
27. 0 Arian, 1998: 31
28. 0 Ibid.
29. 0 Figures cited from a poll of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research in Kass and Lipset, "America's New Wave of Jewish Immigrants."
30. 0 Minstiry of Immigrant Absorption, "The Absoprtion of Immigrants," (March 1996): p. 57
31. 0 The Jerusalem Post, "Reversing the Brain Drain" (June 7, 1989).
32. 0 Ibid.
33. 0 Ha-Aretz, 21 January 1994, I.
34. 0 Michael Barnett, (ed.), "Israel in the World Economy: Israel as as an East Asian State?" in Israel in Comparative Perspective (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996): 107-140.
35. 0 Hanan Sher, "Riding High-Tech," Jerusalem Report, 11 July 1996: 36-39.
36. 0 Avi Machlis, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 28 April 1998.
37. 0 Arian, 1998: 64.
38. 0 See Nina Glick Shiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blan-Szanton, "Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understaindg Migration," in Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and nationalism Reconsidered (NY, 1992), pp. 1-24.
39. 0 Gold and Phillips, p. 96.
40. 0 Guillermina Jasso and Mark Rosenzweig, The New Chose Peopole: Immigrants in the United States (Russell Sage Foundation, NY, 1990).
41. 0 Israel Shelanu, "Going Home" (supplement, 1995). Produced in cooperation with the Office of Returning Residents, Israel Ministry of Absorption.
42. 0 Gold and Phillips, 64.
43. 0 Douglas Massey 1989.
44. 0 Gold and Phillips, 52.
45. 0"Israelis in America," http://www.chosen-people.com/docs/curios/aboutus2/articles/MorningStar/Israelis.html (1/30/99)
46. 0 An Israeli single woman in her early thirities who emigrated to America in her teens, cited in Shokeid, p. 36
47. 0 Steven Cohen, "Israeli Emigres and the New York Federatio: A Case Study in Ambivalent Policymaking for 'Jewish Communal Devians,'" Contemporary Jewry, 7, 1986: pp. 155-65.
48. 0 Boston Globe, A18 (May 20, 1998).
49. 0 Arian, 1998: 10
50. 0 Council of Jewish Federations, US National Survey 1990.
51. 0 Shokeid, 40.
52. 0 Nathan Glazer, 1957.
53. 0 Shokeid, 40.
54. 0 Ibid., p. 44.
55. 0 Ibid. According to Shokeid's sociological study of Israelis in New York, there was not even one voluntary assocation in NY during the years 1982-84, despite the fact that Israelis are not divided by anything comparable to the regional, linguistic, and caste divisions common to Indian society, for example.
56. 0 "One People, Two Continents," Yediot Aharonot Supplement, (April 16, 1998: 2-11. It should be noted that every public opinon survey may be contaminated by methodological difficulites, and these surveys probably more than most, considering the notorious '"who is a Jew?" question. This applies to Israel as well as to the United States, since many immigrants from the former Soviet Union are not Jewish according to the rabbinical authorities.
57. 0 Shokeid, 5.
58. 0 Gold and Phillips, 86-87.
59. 0 Ibid., 88.
60. 0 Ibid, p. 89.
61. 0 Arian, p. 65.
62. 0 The New York Times, "Jews in U.S. to Use 'Restraint On Matters of israeli Security" (October 12, 1987).
63. 0 The Jerusalem Post, "Letting them have their say," (January 31, 1997).
64. 0 Ibid.
65. 0 New York Times, p. A* (November 16, 1998).
66. 0 The amount was determined by multiplying 19 times, 'chai', the Hebrew characters that represent 18 and also form the word, "life".
67. 0 Gold, and Phillips, p. 89
68. 0 Drora Kass and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1967 to the Present: Israelis and Others," in Understanding American Jewry, ed. Marshall Sklare (New Brunswick, NJ, 1982), p. 289.
69. 0 Shokeid, p. 35.
See linked pages:  || || 
Return to top of this page or click here for Home Page links:
|Personal Autobio||Prism GRD||Globalization Concepts||Ethnicity ETHNIC-L||COCTA Onoma.||COVICO Choices||Impeach