Riggs' political development metaphors are not pairs of variables balancing great social processes,
or moral opposites civilizations move from and toward, but rather people -- prominent and
obscure -- interacting. He examines politics cum economics, dependencies, institutions cum
culture, and semantics. But above all he explores us. How malleable is human nature? What
safeguards -- cultural and institutional -- do we need to protect us from our own basest urges? As
we blend modernity with tradition, he keeps our eyes on the best and worst in both, and our focus
on the most basic human problems, through a prism more Hegelian than Kantian or Marxist. Like
each of us, all institutions -- entrepreneurial and governmental, formal and informal, national and
global -- contain both good and evil and affect one another. The ball of frazzled, intertwined rope
he unraveled is messy, but domestic and familiar, often closer bound to today's policy inquiry than
grander, tidier formulations of the 1950s and 1960s.
When political scientists parted company with sociologists in 1903 to form their own American Political Science Association they turned largely to descriptions of laws, institutions, and procedures -- some of which they preferred over others. Their "preferred" institutions of the Weimar Republic were never formally repealed by Hitler, who simply burned, mocked, or ignored them. When World War II ended American political scientists (kicked off dramatically by David Easton's The Political System 1 and Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism 2) took heed of the fact that their prewar approaches did little to explain why Hitler could get by with deviating so far from the rules; they began to search for new approaches. Among those interested in comparison, that search largely took two paths. One of these was behavioralism. Another centered around concepts of development.
Spurred by The American Voter 3 political scientists began to ask citizens their opinions, and devised theories to predict their behavior on the basis of those responses. The Civic Culture 4 and its sequel sought to explain differences in behavior of several political systems this way. The prewar arguments often suggested (but with little examination) that structure affects culture. Now the hypothesis was reversed: civic culture attitudes among citizens should cause structures to function more democratically. These works did not succeed in proving that hypothesis. Voters in democracies did not always exhibit attitudes or behavior more conducive to informed participation, compromise, legitimacy, or legal protection than those in countries where institutions were deemed to function in a less democratic manner. Having shown that, the works (continuing the vapid curiosity about causation among political scientists in the prewar years)did not proceed to examine why that might be the case. It was clear that more work needed to be done to determine how attitudes formed, and how attitudes relate to political structure.
Another approach of the era centered around creating scales of development. Scholars rooted in
Marxist theory were already used to dialectic, and the introduction of new states and economic
relationships of the era lent themselves to such theory -- generally focusing on the continuance of
class economic relationships even in the wake of independence for the new states. Their models
examined in detail the dichotomy and dynamic relationships between those with economic
strength and those with economic weakness, and what forces might disrupt and transform those
relationships 5. As with Marx, for whom the actual process of dialectical transformation was a
mysterious leap, they did not examine in detail how such transformation might take place. They
were content to propose stages or degrees of interaction (e.g., First, Second, Third and Fourth
World; undeveloped, now-developed, and underdeveloped), and identify social, economic, and
perhaps political activities which might affect movement from one stage to the next.
Non-Marxists exploring the "development" process took special note of popular mobilization,
political structures and processes, changes in technology and communications, and changes in
society. Their models posited the conditions that might exist before development and afterwards,
sometimes indicating forces that might move the process forward. Those forces -- such as an
imbalance between social mobilization and assimilation (Karl Deutsch 6), "modernizers" (Karl
Kautsky 7) with the will to transform imbalances (Manfred Halpern 8), or achieving a balance
between coercion and information (David Apter 9) or between mass mobilization and
governmental institutionalization (Samuel P. Huntingdon 10) -- often floated in space. It was
difficult to understand how the transformation would take place because little attempt was made
to examine the process in the context of particular political systems.
Fred Riggs brought three important perspectives to this debate: a deep commitment to
understanding why humans behave as they do, interdisciplinarity, and public administration. If
there was economic exploitation, he wanted to know how it affected people. If there was to be a
transformation, he wanted to know how it would take place. Crossing disciplinary lines, he
immersed himself in sociological writing about Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 11, and Agraria
and Industria 2. He carefully explored scientific method, noting the importance of bringing values
to the surface, of identifying the most important variables, and following up to see how they
interact in particular countries and settings 13. Two variables (popular with many at the time)
soon stood out in his mind -- structure and function. Rather than starting out with an
"explanation" of how function depends on structure, or structure on function, or one function
upon another, he started with a more fundamental question: What value conflicts relate, or fail to
relate, structure to behavior? And he turned to the point where those two variables actually meet
-- not at the point of legislative decisions, or executive orders, but in the implementation of public
administration.
Why did the Filipino administrators allow street hawkers to regularly and illegally block the road,
so on that fatal day fire engines could not get through to stop the conflagration 14? Here was a
conflict between two values, safety and commercial convenience. Why would that formalism,
divergence of prescribed behavior (the law forbade blocking the road) from effective behavior,
not have occurred in the villages from which these urban dwellers had come? And why would this
dynamic play out differently in a more industrialized society, with interest groups publicly arguing
the correct approach? Was that former society more organic -- Ferdinand Tonnies' Gemeinschaft?
Is the industrial society more patterned on a machine -- a Gesellschaft? Does the Philippines share
some of the characteristics of both? To what degree is it different from both Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft, and is it inclined to change? Is it inherently moving from the one to the other? Most
importantly, how did it get into this situation and what could people do to remedy the problems
the situation presents?
Riggs understood that organisms transform into machines only in literature and films. For a model that could better explain transition he turned to the diffraction of fused light in a prism 15. In fused societies formal power over markets often lies in the same hands as formal political power, in ruling groups closely tied to society. In diffracted societies, markets have great independence from political control. Inside the prism, however, markets have begun to achieve independence but are still held back by political elites that cannot entirely control them. Business people must buy protection from those with power. The result is negative development. A large share of the total gross national product is used for reciprocal gifts among a narrow elite. More money can flow, but it will not spread widely because it is being used for tribute rather than investment.
Since 1993, international agencies have given over U.S. five billion dollars to Vietnam 16. Elite
residents of Hanoi received $25 each for every $4.40 spent on those in the Central Highlands.
Only 5.5% is going for basic social services, and the Prime Minister told the National Assembly
that 80 percent of local investments were lost to corruption. Edouard Wattez, the United Nations
Development Program representative, says: "In some respects, the past five years might appear to
have been rather a period of reform on paper, often without effective and systematic
implementation." Mr Wattez is pointing to formalism and negative development deriving from
Riggs' dependency syndrome. The fact that the international agencies have given this much money
in this way shows the extent to which Fred Riggs was both prophetic and outside the loop. It has
been far easier and more comfortable to turn to theories surmising that by throwing money at
problems, and increasing GNP, societies will develop. In my The Developing Nations 17 (which
evolved in the 1960s from a class on political development I taught jointly with Riggs' former
colleague Joseph Jiang and David Gibbons, a student of Riggs' colleague Myron Levy, Jr.) I
characterize Riggs, Immanuel Wallerstein 17, Andre Gunder Frank 18 and S.N. Eisenstadt 19 as
scholars who emphasized the need for those who are harmed by development to recreate cultural
institutions capable of giving them a degree of autonomy. That key factor is often ignored when
development is seen as a movement from a lesser to a better state, and assistance is given only to
those forces helping in that movement
Today, neo-institutionalists are focusing attention on the people and political processes that
sustain and change institutions, and how control (Rigg's informal power, which he distinguished
from authority, or formal power) is distributed among societal and governmental institutions,
often to the detriment of the authority of the latter. They are standing back from concepts that
emphasize the inevitability of modernization, separation of core from periphery, or political
culture distinct from state institutions. Instead, they see these as aspects of a continuous whole
potentially swayed in multiple directions. In all these regards, they can look to Fred Riggs as a
forerunner. Joel Migdal's 21 triangles of accommodation among leaders, middle level officials,
and local strongmen remind us of Rigg's dependency syndrome, which exacts tributes allowing a
large portion of the national product to be consumed by a small number of elites, resulting in
informal control taking precedence over formal authority. Riggs emphasized that institutions were
not timeless, but composed by multiple concerns of humans. He emphasized that existing
institutions control every aspect of human life, and cannot be understood apart from all those
aspects -- cultural, ideological, economic, and political.
Like Migdal, Riggs gave detailed attention
to the processes surrounding these interactions. Between overturns of
ruling circles came realignments, readjustments and consolidations among
cliques and factions, triggered by critical events and resulting in
counter circles to challenge the rulers. He looked at officials, and
created elaborate charts of clique (in Administration in Developing
Nations he would call this "clect") interaction to show how "pariah
entrepreneurship" results in negative development by diverting investment
into the hands of officials and relaxing regulation 22. He concluded from
this that the Thai cabinet had an effective constituency of civil and
military cliques while the assembly did not -- a "bureaucratic polity"
which is in a sense a nameless system "because no one dares ascribe to it
a basis of political legitimacy which corresponds to the facts of
effective control...Who is brash enough to declare openly that a
government derives its just powers to rule from the interests of the
rulers?"23 Whereas the traditional view in Thailand was that just power
derives from royal mandate, and of returning students from the West that
it derives from popular mandate in elected assemblies, "there seems,
however, to be some basis in Thai culture for legitimizing the authority
of those who rule simply because they actually hold power...those who rule
must in some way have earned their success; their power is its own
justification"24 Highly-qualified productive idealistic young people who
enter this ruling group soon learn that their income and even survival
depends on building a support base within the agency, which requires that
they not work hard or conscientiously at their formally assigned tasks or
challenge the system. Hence the civil service, created in 1892 on Western
models, and the cabinet and assembly introduced in 1932, do not function
in Thailand as they do in the West. The upper stratum of Bangkok society
has become more Westernized than the rest of Thai society; they, in turn,
have developed "neotraditional" doctrines to remake the past more in
keeping with their own claims to rule. All this contributes to formalism,
where formal statements prescribing governmental and social behavior do
not match actual behavior.
For Thailand to move from its present "prismatic" state and become "diffracted" (and thus truly
democratic) it would need effective constitutional restraints on the key authority figures in
government by the rise of powerful institutions outside the formal government and the official
state bureaucracy. He regretted that technical assistance was not accompanied by investing in the
building of co-ordinative institutions capable of integrating the new specialized units through
which aid was dispersed -- coordination which cannot emanate from the prime minister, who
"heads a power structure in which the bureaucracy is the primary constituent." Those advocating
modernization have consciously or unconsciously accelerated the rate of differentiation of
structures within the bureaucracy (thus strengthening the power of its institutions and prismatic
tendencies of the system) without compensatory growth of co-ordinating institutions outside the
bureaucracy 25. The bureaucratic polity will actively resist the creation of autonomous centers of
power in interest groups and political parties outside the state apparatus. If it is well integrated, as
in Thailand, it can resist for a long time, with some realignments to adapt to new economic elites
as economic growth continues. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs among rural migrants,
intellectuals or cliques might induce malintegration, perhaps realigning the system but not
necessarily moving it in the direction of diffraction. Thai policy-makers need to take this into
account in their policy making and forward planning, thinking about how the process can be
brought under control of extra bureaucratic political institutions so as to reduce formalism.
Riggs gives us a unique political culture perspective on rational choice theory as well. Elinor
Ostreum 28 revives the dilemma of the peasant approaching the village common land -- whether
to maximize the family's herd of sheep and overgraze the common, or opt for the community's
good by holding back the size of the family's herd. Riggs offers some basis for analyzing this
dilemma. What is rational in a clique is not necessarily so in a sect. Arena factors require different
strategic calculations than market factors. Peasants in a fused society might have a different
rationale than those in a prismatic or diffracted society. As those with actual control over the size
of herds move away from exclusive family or community concerns into pariah clects with
reciprocal obligations in widening arenas, they are likely to change their conception of what is
rational in this situation.
Today, those who study public administration are renewing interest in comparative politics and in
public policy. Fred Riggs offers them a means to apply some concepts with which they are familiar
to situations in unfamiliar countries. Riggs' works are filled with comparative analyses of chief
executives, party systems, constitutive systems, elected assemblies, and the external relationships
of bureaucracies with all of them. In all these situations, he is alerting us to something we too
often forget: The path he is charting is not a run from evil to good, from irrational tradition to
rational modernity. Modern public administrative techniques are not inherently superior to old
court politics. Democracy does not inherently protect rights better than kingly rule. Economic
transformation in the global economy can degrade life as well as improve it. If we are to get it
right, we must keep our focus on those who are affected by change. How will the peasant, the
rural migrant to the city, the student, the storekeeper, the widowed or abandoned woman, or the
factory worker be affected by the policies we propose? In answering that question, he reminds us
that we must consider not just one or two variables; we must look at societies as a whole,
engendering their own rationales. But our focus must be on individuals and the social forces and
institutions surrounding them.
Today's political scientists have also been rediscovering theory, the study of which declined in the
profession during the 1960s and 1970s. In its attempt to be "objective"27 the profession has, in an
unconscious manner, adopted a Kantian precept about knowledge and morality. For Kant 28, the
world of things was to be comprehended by generating in our mind words with which we
construct hypothetical imperatives about cause and effect. Moral imperatives, meanwhile, are
accessed through our intuition more than our minds, and are unrelated to the world of
phenomenon and our attempt to comprehend the phenomenal world; they are categorical and
unchanging. Hegel 29 found this disconnect distressing, and sought moral imperatives instead in
the interaction of individuals and historic institutions like the family and civil society. Instead of
being abstract and universal, his moral imperatives were imbedded in reality. We are born into
families, whose good we pursue until we seek our own independence and begin our own families.
The state is the sum total of individual goods pursued by individuals within changing collectivities.
Moral imperatives change as our position in society, and society itself, changes. Those charged
with the administration of justice in modern states are assigned to find balance between the
interests of those in the agricultural sector and those in the industrial, and rationally control
collective life; by so doing they enlarge personal freedom, which is the disciplining of passions by
understanding of the collective rationality. Law is bound by custom, whether of Confucian
hierarchies or India's caste system or Greek ideas of citizenship -- a tribal expression of the group
mind. Consciousness and will, especially of leaders, help drive history, shaping law and
institutions. The future is not predestined, but shaped by individuals with the foresight to note
both possibilities for and limitations on change. This is a very different view of change from the
notion of laying out clean abstract blueprints, the imposition of which will cause reality to take
new forms. Change must proceed in conformity with social righteousness and the spirit of a given
people. Individuals are part of a complex social whole that must be taken into account when
change is effected and justice is administered; because individuals help sway the direction of
change the future is not predictable. This lies at the heart of Riggs' theory; his prism caught the
entire spectrum of the ray of light, which may pass through with great variation in the display of
color. Unlike Hegel, Riggs can never be accused of glorifying the state or war! But he is close to
Hegel on this point. Marx fixed his attention on the production and distribution of goods, and the
class role individuals play in those processes. By giving attention to a few key variables, and
arguing that they would determine an individual's contributions to change by fixing his or her
point of view, with one class always in control of political institutions and ideology, he was able
to chart both the past and future course of history. The cliques, factions, and clects Riggs found in
control came from a variety of Marx's classes 30 and directed production and distribution in
oblique ways Marx's theory does not encompass. No clear dialectical path can remedy the
situation.
In The Political System David Easton suggested that in the nineteenth century social scientists
were caught up the belief in progress; "the task of scientific reason quickly became one of
discovering the exact course of this development and the means to smooth the path."31 The Civil
War brought disillusionment with the notion of progress and that reasoned scientific method can
solve social problems; they returned to emotion and spirituality as a moral base.32 Some turned to
what he called "hyperfactualism," a gathering of facts with inattention to theory, hoping that "the
facts, once discovered, will themselves suggest the kind of political or social life men ought to
lead."33 It was argued that whenever social science showed patterns of behavior individuals were
free to change their habits and prove the generalization wrong.34 "
And, finally, scientific reason excludes from its scope and skill the discovery of the kind of
ultimate values a society ought to pursue. It thereby removes from its competence a crucial area
of human affairs."35 None of this discouraged researchers, who were now largely studying the
structure and processes of government institutions, from seeking principles to guide society in
revising those structures and processes. "Theory" came to be associated with those suggestions,
often derived from hypotheses that if structures were arranged in certain ways, certain results
would follow. Easton called this applied or reformative, rather than causal or conceptual, theory.
He suggested that such theory often engages in circular reasoning by assuming the premises it sets
out to prove. Riggs notes: "Apart from pre-judging the results of research, descriptive studies
carried out to support prescriptive demands tend to suffer from a sense of urgency which prevents
careful checking and verification of conclusions; the choice of variables for inclusion in the model
tends to be limited by prior judgments of what is likely to be relevant."36
The behavioralism that followed World War II often finds itself mired in hyperfactualism or used
in applied ways. The development theory (with which Riggs is more closely associated) was more
prone to remold Marx or other theories of progress from his era, discovering the exact course of
this development and ways to smooth the way. But in a Kantian vein, fearful of criticism from
skeptical contemporaries, it stood back from acknowledging value biases. Riggs feared that such
approaches were incapable of uncovering the confusing complexity of political actions in the new
nations, and often became an excuse to export American biases and solutions into situations for
which they were inappropriate. "...our inquiry leads us to suspect that statements of dichotomies
and sharply differentiated classifications proposed for the comparative analysis of public
administration are based on models poorly adapted for the purpose in view. They often indicate
different degrees, often polar extremes, of a single variable; sometimes bundles of differentiated
variables; and frequently formal distinctions which correspond, with varying degrees of formalism
to effective behavior...A useful model...will differentiate formal from effective behavior, plot the
degree of formalism in their relationship, and seek to establish scales measuring the behavioral
variables."37
Introducing structural changes can increase the degree of formalism, and can carry high social
costs and revolutionary tensions. A slower rate of structural change, he suggests, might allow
time for behavior to come into line 38. He welcomed prescription, but felt it must take into
consideration the values of those for whom the prescription is intended, and include variables
appropriate to the country. And it must make room for choice by the participants themselves.
Arguing that economic growth sometimes does, and sometimes does not, lead to balanced
polities, he proposes: "the determinants of forms of government are historical...they depend on
certain happenstances of institutional history...If one grants at least the plausibility of this view,
then one opens the door to the possibility of choice, the chance that conscious decisions taken by
political leaders, both those in and those out of power, can have a significant impact on the shape
of governmental institutions ...the view taken here is antideterminist in the sense that Marxism is
determinist. This view stresses the primacy of politics, the importance of choice, and makes the
economy more of a dependent variable. But it also recognizes that choices have to be made within
the limits of ecologically shaped constraints."39 In Administrative Reform and Political
Responsiveness 40 he explored ways by which international experts could aid in reform. After
propounding a number of general theories about how to balance various governmental structures,
he concluded that general theories are limited in their application to particular countries. "Clearly,
we should expect that an appropriate goal and strategy for reform in one country would be
completely inadequate and even dysfunctional for another"41. Referring to general theories and
the particulars of their own case, reformers and leaders in each country have to recognize what
needs to be done and start promoting appropriate changes. He argued that "political
scientists...have consistently failed to produce valid theories that help us understand how a
government works as a total system" and have neglected structure while focusing on functions.42
Suggesting a search for dynamic balancing of governmental and nongovernmental institutions he
hoped that "some attention might now be given to the question of how, by different means, each
adapted to the particular needs of a concrete situation, diverse strategies can be found which will
succeed in promoting, in each case, more balanced structures of government, thereby increasing
the administrative effectiveness of each polity in its own society."43 That challenge should remain
alive and amenable to new generations of researchers returning to a focus on comparison and
acquainted with neo-institutionalism, non governmental organizations, and civil society debates,
yet chastened by post-modernism from adopting simplistic models and solutions.
Riggs himself has been using his prismatic model in conjunction with some of the newer theories
to show that development does not proceed in one direction, and can bring deterioration as well
as progress. Focusing on 44 subvisible industrial parks (the special economic zones on the
Mexican border and spotted around Asia and other Third World countries) studied by Jeffrey
Winters in Indonesia -- which had 100 of them by 1994 -- he makes the case (citing Joel Migdal)
that modern industrial cartels are developing more power than states in many parts of the world,
leading not to a fused society where formal and informal power have their own clear domains, but
to a meta-prismatic society with a high degree of formalism and dualism. In Front, government
joins international organizations to receive technical and humanitarian aid and fight border
interventions, drug trafficking, and illegal migrations, while in Back corporate cartels and
syndicates control capital and information, operating behind the walls of these estates which house
management in self-contained environments open to the outside only through one gate, where
workers (but no reporters, academics, government inspectors, or union activists) are bussed daily
-- paying off the government in exchange for tolerance, and blocking the transformation of weak
government into a viable regime. So, while up front the formal world system works with the
formal leaders of these countries to promote free trade, democracy, regulation of industrial
production, environmental protection, and legal/administrative accountability -- making their
weak states even less competitive and the formal industries less viable -- in the background the
international cartels make money under a veil of unregulated secrecy, avoiding taxes and
deteriorating the social base. Over time, the "colorless men in black" who run these subvisible
estates may develop an "archipelago of power," weakening the strongest states from behind the
scenes and creating a post modern planet composed entirely of weak states with low taxes and
mounting social and environmental problems. Subvisible industrial parks willing to pay high wages
and support the environment could lose out to estates that do not, leading to revolts and a further
weakening of formal states. Rather than a world divided between East and West or North and
South, the whole world will share the division between Front and Back -- with the Back gaining
ground everywhere. There is nothing inevitable about this, just as there is nothing inevitable about
utopian scenarios. These are possibilities that he feels need to be explored.
Benjamin Barber dubbed part of this process "McDonaldization" of the world.45 I have pointed
to a similar potential scenario, which I call"corporate interdependence"46. Emerging consumerism
across national boundaries allows corporate economic entities to deal with one another directly
over the heads of governmental authorities. In corporate-consumer systems where many are
assimilated into interacting economic and political institutions this direct dealing might augment
satisfying personal environments (when individuals have enough food to eat, health care,
satisfying housing and cultural opportunities, and adequate education and jobs), technical
education, and cross-cultural contacts for the large portions of populace employed by such
institutions. However, it might weaken social benefits for those outside the corporate system, and
weaken physical infrastructure, and personal initiative and efficacy, for everyone; with diminished
control over taxes, borrowing, imports, productivity, and other economic factors, states might
find the best jobs moving elsewhere, ultimately reducing satisfaction with personal environments.
Expanding markets may vastly increase the wealth and personal consumption of a few individuals,
while others -- especially in patron-client systems of the Third World -- remain or become poor.
In those regions, some corporations may work closely with governments that suppress
participation, civil rights, and equality of rewards but keep markets open for foreign trade; that
can promote parochial, inward-looking dominance of some ethnic groups over others.
Modern economic enterprises need a strong state to enforce contract law and order. But some
large economic enterprises will prefer to weaken states, and their control by broad segments of
the populace, in order to avoid regulation. By so doing, they may unintentionally undermine the
basis for their own prosperity. "As long as a nation-state has limited authority and an economy
that encompasses most of its citizens [i.e., is a corporate-consumer system] modern business
enterprises can benefit the personal environments of broad segments of the populace. When such
bases for widespread influence are lacking, a nation-state is easily captured by patrons, and
business enterprises cannot benefit the personal environments of many people -- or thrive
themselves."47
These are not possibilities generally discussed by journalists or essayists. Nor are they common
fare among political theorists. They do not fit tidy formulations, and raise questions about
premises we may hold dear. Indeed, they are gloomy prospects. Fred Riggs challenges us to move
outside the comfortable to explore the uncomfortable, arguing cogently that valid scientific
inquiry calls on us to do this. He suggests that the future is not preordained, but malleable. If a
concerned citizenry does not infuse its values into public policy others will, with potentially
far-reaching effects on all concerned. To do so sensibly, those citizens must examine the potential
consequences of alternative policy initiatives, which can set in motion forces that transform
polities in bad directions as well as good.
Notes:
1 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953, 1971).
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951).
3 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1963).
4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); _____, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980).
5 e.g., Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
6 Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, 2d. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966); _____, Nationalism and Social Communication, rev. ed.(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).
7 John H. Kautsky 7, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley, 1972)
8 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Rand, 1963.
9 David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); _____, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," American Journal of Sociology 64 (November 1958):221-237.
10 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); _____, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 17 (April 1965): 386-430.
11 Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, tr. by C. P. Loomis (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1957); Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, tr. by George Simpson (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); Gideon Sjoberg, "Folk and 'Feudal' Societies,"American Journal of Sociology 58:231-239; C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, Rural Social Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1950).
12 Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," in William J. Siffin, Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Ind. Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 23-116.
13 Fred W. Riggs, "Models in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Fred W. Riggs and Edward W. Weidner, Models and Priorities in the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Papers in Comparative Public Administration Special Series: No. 1, Comparative Administration Group (Chicago: American Society for Public Administration, 1963), pp. 33-43; Fred W. Riggs, Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing, Comparative Politics Series 01-010: 1, Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1970), pp. 600-605.
14 Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), pp. 98-102.
15 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).
16 Ken Stier, "Cash Handouts Slow Economic Reform Process," South China Morning Post (November 25, 1998).
17 Robert E. Gamer, The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective 2d ed (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982), pp. 226-285.
18 op. cit.
19 op. cit.
20 S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: Free Press, 1963); _____, Tradition, Change, and Modernity (New York: Wiley, 1973).
21Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)
22 Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966), pp. 211-241.
23 Idem., p. 323.
24 Idem., pp. 324-325.
25 Idem., pp. 377-378. Theorists like Samuel P. Huntington advocated such differentiation within government institutions to promote political stability.
26 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
27 "statements which are basically prescriptive often masquerade as descriptive-analytical forms." Riggs, "Models," p. 34.
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason tr. by Max Muller (New York: Macmillan, 1927).
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit tr. by J. B. Baillie (New York: Macmillan, 1910).
30 e.g., he classifies the eminent into the select, the wealthy, the informed, etc. Riggs, Ecology, p. 28.
31 Easton, op. cit., p. 15.
32 Idem., p. 19.
31 Idem., p. 23.
34 Idem., p. 28.
35 Idem., p. 35.
36 Riggs, "Models," p. 33.
37 Idem., pp. 23-24.
38 Riggs, Ecology, p. 142.
39 Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," in Fred W. Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), p. 413.
40 op. cit.
41 Idem., p. 601.
42 Idem., p. 602-603.
43 Idem., p. 605.
44"Price Indeterminacy in a Meta-Prismatic Context" on Riggs' web site: <a href=" www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr">Home Page </a>
45 Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. MacWorld," The Atlantic 269, 3 (March 1992): 53.
46 Robert E. Gamer, Governments and Politics in a Changing World (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), pp. 479, 488-494, 537, 545.
47 Idem, p. 491.
See linked pages: [] Riggs Panel || Intellectual
Odyssey ||Chapter 3 []
Updated: 14 February 1999
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