The peoples discussed in the second session do not necessarily invoke this term, but both sessions of the panel will focus on ethnic communities whose political claims (for autonomy or independence) are resisted by states within which their domains are enclosed. Unfortunately, no familiar term conveniently embraces this broad concept. Jean Laponce has used enclosed nation for this idea and I think it is a good term. However, my own preference is for enclave which is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary (AHD) as "a country or part of a country lying wholly within the boundaries of another country."

In ordinary usage, this word points to "parts" of a country that seek unification with an existing state but this is only one of one use of the term. Frequently, today, enclaves claim the status of a "whole" country and seek autonomy (self-government within a state) or full independence (recognition as a sovereign state). When it is important to distinguish between types of enclave, we can use suffix terms as in enclave nation, and enclave sub-nation. Both are enclaves, however. In this context, I shall use "enclave" to refer to "enclave nations", not to sub-nations.

However, the case study of Kosova which I append to this memo shows how the two concepts overlap -- Albanians, who constitute 90% of the population of this Yugoslav province, are ambivalent about becoming part of Albania or becoming an independent state -- they may, therefore, view themselves as a "nation" or a "sub-nation.". The defining characteristic of an enclosed (enclave) nation is that it refers to any encircled people without trying to say that they want to be recognized as a whole nation or only as part of an existing nation. Actually, the people in some enclaves are happy with the status quo and make no demands for change. Normally, however, we focus on enclaves whose members are dissatisfied with the status quo. Their demands may range from political reforms that would enhance their status and influence within the existing state, to autonomy within that state, to union with another country, or to full independence, as noted above. As examples: Amish communities accept the status quo, Hispanic Americans seek to enhance their political influence, Scots and Catalonians demand autonomy, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Quebec separatists demand independence, while residents of Nagorno Karabakh want to become an "exclave" of Armenia.

Exclaves. The word, "exclave," is an antonym for "enclave": it's AHD definition reads, "a portion of a country which is isolated in alien territory." West Berlin before the unification of Germany was an exclave of West Germany, and Hong Kong was an exclave of the British empire until its unification with China. If Azerbaijan were to accept the demands of its enclave in Karabakh, this place would become an exclave of Armenia. These antonyms are useful even though a given enclave may, from a different point of view, be considered an exclave. Many citizens of Hong Kong before its recent status change viewed their colony as an enclave of China, whereas others preferred to remain a British exclave. West Berlin was, in a sense, an enclave in East Germany, while many West Germans saw East Germany as an enclave of "Germany."

Here I propose to use exclave as an antonym for enclave when discussing national aspirations for self-determination and independence. The term permits us do distinguish easily between exclave nations (national communities belonging to a country but physically separated from it) from enclave nations (those enclosed within a state). Virtually all the colonial possessions that have gained their independence during the last half-century, following the collapse of the industrial empires, may be classed as exclave nations. Their birth marks not just the end of the"Cold War," but the collapse of the global imperial system based on industrialism.

By contrast, very few enclave nations have gained their independence: Slovakia is one of these few. We might class Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia as Yugoslav enclaves that have gained their independence -- but one might also class them as Serbian exclaves. Parallels can be found, of course, in the former Soviet Union. The important point is that we are now entering a new stage of post-imperial conflict in which the main contenders for independence or "autonomy" are enclaves rather than exclaves.

The indigenous peoples of the Western countries are increasingly well mobilized and urgent in their demands for justice and respect for their ancient cultures. However, they constitute only part of the phenomenon of enclave nationalism, a movement that is spreading throughout the globe among the new states of the Third World and the successor states of the Second World, as well, of course, as within the industrial democracies of the First World. We need, therefore, to see the problems of indigenous peoples in the broader context of many enclaves scattered throughout the world.

Enclave Nations. The first session of our panel will focus on enclave nations who claim to be "indigenous". Their situation and problems deserve to recognized, but not as something unique in the world today -- rather, I see them as typical for many enclaves whose members do not claim to be indigenous. No doubt, many of them are indeed indigenous, but since they were not conquered by European settlers, they are not attracted by this term which, for some, also has pejorative connotations. Minorities in Nepal who were marginalized by Hindu settlers, for example, may not think of themselves as "indigenous," do Tibetans found their political aspirations on this notion. Instead, they may claim independence or autonomy on the basis of the right to self- determination on the basis of the Wilsonian rhetoric and the successful liberation movements of exclave nations. Often we view them in non-comparative, area-specialist terms, pointing to the unique historical features that distinguish each case from all others, and no doubt every situation is, in some respects, exceptional and unique. However, the goal of our panel, as I see it, involves an effort to place the rising tide of enclave nationalism in an historical world-system context, enabling us therefore to develop testable explanations and more reliable predictions.

To illustrate this approach, I append excerpts, with my own comments, taken from a current report by the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) of a remarkable roundtable in which Serbs and Albanians (from Kosovo) talked about their future. The complete text is now available on the WWW as the PER Report on the Kosovo Roundtable . It has also been published as The New York Roundtable, Project on Ethnic Relations, 1 Palmer Square, Princeton, NJ 08542. To get a copy write Livia Plaks and explain why you want it. A digest is available here for use by members of the "Enclave Nations" panel.

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THE NEW YORK ROUND TABLE:

TOWARD PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION IN KOSOVO

Preface

Serbs and Albanians are locked in a dangerous interethnic struggle over the future of Kosovo (or Kosova, as Albanians prefer to call it, or Kosovo and Metohija, as Serbs refer to it). Both claim the region, which is currently a part of Serbia, as their b irthright. Serbs insist that Kosovo is the cradle of their nation, inseparable from Serbia. Albanians, who now constitute more than 90 per cent of the population in Kosovo, demand territorial independence. The dispute not only threatens to erupt in open hostilities between Serbs and Albanians but may yet involve other countries in the Balkans as well. ...

--------------NOTE: Questions about origins and precedence haunt much of the contemporary debate about ethnic nationalism -- perhaps because the conventional criteria for ethnic identity have involved genealogy and ancestry. In places like Kosova or Palestine, such questions are have little more than rhetorical value. Clearly, Jews occupied Palestine before Muslims, but the establishment of Israel displaced Palestinians, a process perpetuated by settler policies. This thought provokes a question about the process that generates enclaves -- we use indigenization for such a process when primordial roots are claimed, but for most enclave nations, public policies have created barriers.

Traditionally, this took the form of ghettoization, but this term connotes mainly urban enclaves whose residents rarely sustained nationalist revolts -- Warsaw may have been an exception. We could also mention "reservations" but "reserve" can scarcely be used to talk about the policies that create them. We need a new term for governmental policies that cordon off a people and, in our times, assuredly lead to resentments that provoke resistance and enclave nationalism. No doubt historical (primordial) myths can inform such movements, but they do not really explain them. Better explanations will arise, I think, when we focus on public policies that produce enclave nations.

It will be easier to talk about then if we accept a suitable neologism to designate this process. My own best suggestion goes back to the root of "enclave," i.e. cleave as a verb meaning to split apart: this is a different word from "cleave" meaning to cling together -- there are separate dictionary entries for these two words. We are familiar with such derivatives as "cleaver," "cloven," and "cleft." The root form in"enclave" is "cleave," ("clave" is its archaic past participle) and it would be etymologically correct, therefore, to use encleave as its verbal equivalent. To encleave a people, therefore, is to confine them to a reservation or other restricted area. Use of this term enables us to talk about how policies designed to encleave communities have backfired, under modern conditions. They empower enclave nationalism, as Israeli policy is provoking Hammas terrorism today. One might think they could have learned from the South African experience about the folly of creating"bantustans." Are the Serbs in Kosovo not encleaving the Albanians? If they understood the counter-productivity of such policies, they might more easily see the handwriting on the wall that prefigures a coming disaster. Another verb for this process could be enclose, a good term for those who follow Jean Laponce in using enclosed nation. However, they should avoid saying that enclosures are a result of such policies since this word already has several quite different meanings.-------------------

The question of Kosovo is of course greatly complicated by the political context in which it is being played out: the breakup of Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia, instability in neighboring Albania and Macedonia, and the collapse of the democratic opposition in Serbia(confirmed by the conduct and results of the September 1997 elections). However, even under less gloomy circumstances, the head-on collision of two contradictory principles--the preservation of international borders and the concept of self-determination--guarantees that there will be no easy way out.

Indeed, as the reader of this report will see, a good deal of the discussion and debate that took place in New York revolved around arguments about which of these principles should prevail in the case of Kosovo. To be sure, the international community, including the United States, has for the time being taken the position that the Kosovo problem ought to be resolved by means of some formula (various forms of autonomy have been suggested) that would not lead to changes in the external borders of Yugoslavia. However, the Albanians have repeatedly rejected this position, and did so again in the New York meeting, appealing rather to the principle of self-determination, which they claim had been applied to others when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated. ...

--------------NOTE: The U.S. position is shared by virtually all contemporary states, each of which seeks to protect its borders and, therefore, can be counted on to cooperate in order to resist movements for autonomy or independence by enclave nations. By contrast, as the following discussion illustrates, leaders of enclave nations usually demand independence and suspect that their aspirations cannot be met under any forms of autonomy. Since both responses result from policies which, in our times, have put borders around states, provinces, and enclaves, we might well ask whether or not more basic questions about the rationale of encleavage policies and how new processes might limit their negative consequences.

Notably, third world countries will often support UN policies and international declarations supporting the claims of "indigenous" enclaves, but not those of "non-indigenous" enclaves. The reasons are transparent: the former mainly challenges countries established by European colonists, whereas the latter applies to everyone else. -----------------------

Summary of Discussions

...The opening statements of some of the Serbian participants did articulate a number of principles for discussion. One stressed human rights, self-determination, the role of the international community, and the need to resolve constitutional questions. He spoke of the need for"compromise-oriented dialogues" that would produce "a solution more or less acceptable to everyone. "Another Serb stated that a resolution of the disputes was possible only on a democratic basis and that this required a democratic Serbia. But he also argued for a particular substantive result by insisting that, while Kosovo should be granted "complete territorial autonomy," it must remain part of Serbia. An ethnic basis for sovereignty, he declared, was a contradiction of democratic principles. He pointed to the United States as "a model for us--all different peoples accepting the same state." This participant called upon the Kosovar Albanians to"participate in elections--local, republic, and especially federal--in order to help create a democratic Serbia/Yugoslavia."

However, the continuation of Kosovo as part of Serbia was explicitly rejected by several Albanian participants. One argued that "Albanians are not a national minority, and one cannot apply European standards of' minority rights' to them. No solution is possible based on autonomy within Serbia; that would be a continuation of slavery, which sooner or later would result in a bigger tragedy than Bosnia." Another seconded this view and said that the right of self-determination required recognition of the will of the Albanian people in Kosova to have an independent republic. But, he added, "it is still possible to begin a process leading to a peaceful solution."... Still another Albanian participant rejected theU.S. model that had been proposed by a Serbian participant. The United States, he said, was "an immigrant society," whereas "Albanians have always been in their own territory."Albanians, he continued, "sooner or later must have their own state," and it was not their responsibility to democratize Serbia.

---------------------------------------NOTE: The U.S. model, as noted here, hinges on having dispersed ethnic communities and also on the fact that immigrants who choose to migrate to any country implicitly accept its sovereignty and typically welcome naturalization in order to enjoy its benefits. Often, in fact, U.S. policy deliberately supported dispersal of immigrant populations and sought to prevent the rise of ethnic enclaves. By contrast, conquerors often encleave conquered peoples, thereby eventually enhancing their inclination to reject the authority of their conquerors. Whether or not they can substantiate their claims for recognition as an enclave nation, however, may hinge on the extent to which their members constitute a majority in the enclaves where they live, or are dispersed among non-members in diaspora. Information provided in this report shows that most residents of Kosova are Albanians, but it does not indicate how they are distributed (enclaved) in relation to the Serbian population. Nor does it explain their relative power position, but I imagine the Serbs area dominant minority and the Albanians find themselves to be an unfairly marginalized majority regardless of where they live. ------------------------------------------

A Serbian participant responded by saying that the Albanian participant"shows no concern for the other side, the Serbian side.... He wants Serbs to be concerned about Albanians, but both sides have to be concerned about both sides." This participant insisted that "existing borders must be retained, and we must make the best solutions within them," though, he added, that may have to be done in stages, over a long period of time.

An Albanian participant returned to the subject of what he called the"Wilsonian right to self-determination," and he expressed the belief that"if there would be goodwill on the Serbian side, with support from a third, international party... the settlement of the Kosova issue seems achievable." It was not sufficient, he said, to speak about human rights;"collective national rights must also be addressed." He, too, repudiated the idea that Kosovar should take action toward the democratization of Serbia, though he acknowledged that "a democratic Serbia is in our interest" and indeed that "the correct, just position of Serbia toward Kosova is a test for a democratic Serbia." In his view, the Kosovar leadership had already offered a proper solution: "Kosova joining Albanian a national state with all other Albanian territories."

--------------NOTE: This statement covers a basic ambiguity in the position of a few enclave nations faced with choices between demanding independence for themselves or accepting union with a neighboring state of the same ethnicity, as noted above. Thai Muslims, for example, face this dilemma in choosing between independence or union with Malaysia. Some Taiwanese seek independence but others support union with China. Turkish Cypriots are similarly ambivalent about their relation with Turkey, but Greek Cypriots appear to have little desire to become part of Greece. The situation in Northern Ireland is even more complex. However, in most cases, the goal of enclave nationalists is clear: they simply want autonomy or independence (i.e. self-government within a federalized state, or their own state). These cases confirm the utility of using enclave broadly to include both sub-nations and nations. When the distinction is significant, we can add these terms to show which category is intended.---------------------

...Another focus of discussion was the role of Kosovar Albanians in the political life of Serbia. One Serbian participant urged the Albanians to take an active part, because, he said, "if Serbia democratizes through action by the Serbs alone, the position of the Albanians will be weakened"Another declared that "self-determination is the right of people to choose their own government, not necessarily to have their own state." Serbia, he went on, should confer on Kosovo "all human rights and constitutional rights." And another suggested that, in return for Albanian participation in Serbian elections, "all national cultural institutions of the Albanians" should be restored, and that there be "Serb-Albanian cooperation in police and the judiciary in order to guarantee rights."

Furthermore, the participant proposed that Serbia be decentralized, meaning that, among other things, there would be "realistic and wider authorization of the provincial [i.e., Kosovar] parliament, authorization that exceeds simple autonomy, although the word 'autonomy' has to be retained in order to retain popular support in Serbia." The participant added that "the international community supports the borders of Yugoslavia and calls for autonomy for Kosovo within it."

An Albanian participant supported this point of view. He said that all could agree on full and immediate respect for human rights and on the return to majority rule in Kosova. The problem now, he added, "is how to enable the majority of the population to rule itself." Other members of the Albanian delegation, however, were less willing to proceed on those premises. "We have tried all forms of autonomy," one declared. "Autonomy is no longer acceptable to the Albanians. The central question is the question of power. If you want trust between people, you cannot offer us what Tito offered us. Mankind has not developed anything better than the state as a means by which to secure self-development. Albanians must be accepted as independent subjects and as equals before entering into discussions of the nature of the state."

------------------NOTE: In South Africa, a dominant minority finally surrendered power through constitutional reform to a marginalized majority. Could such a power-shift occur in Kosova? Clearly, Albanians in Kosova doubt it. Rather, they seem to view "autonomy" as little more than a fraud designed to perpetuate the power of the Serbian minority. Only by having their own state will they feel confident that justice for their community can be secured.------------------

Several of these participants firmly rejected any solution in which Kosovo would remain part of Serbia or of the Yugoslav federation. In the words of one, "Kosova as a republic [in a Yugoslav federation] is not a compromise. "A Serb participant took a different tack by stating, "We are not against your state, but it is not a realistic option now. An independent republic would lead to destabilization." He seemed to be implying that the Serbian opposition could not be expected to express open sympathy for Kosovo so long as such an expression would not bring electoral support. An Albanian participant then asked, perhaps replying to this implication, "What do the Serbs ask of us?"

... On the other hand, one Serb participant who had consistently maintained that Kosovo was a part of Serbia now said that Serbs could not be asked to change the country's borders "in advance of discussions." Another Serb spoke of a "step-by-step formula, " consisting of confidence-building measures and resolutions of specific issues, leading eventually to a solution of the dispute over Kosovo's status. Still another suggested that the agreement between Milosevic and Rugova about schools amounted to "de facto recognition of Rugova as leader of Kosova,"implying that Kosovo had already achieved equal status. An Albanian participant said that "if supporting Kosovar aspirations is politically impossible for the Serbian opposition, then a coalition government would be impossible and a solution would be impossible. Therefore the whole approach is wrong." Another said that Serbian insistence that Kosovo is part of Serbia "makes negotiations, let alone agreement, impossible." He also emphasized the difficulty for Kosovar leaders of entering into any agreements on specifics in the absence of agreement on the larger issue. ...

------------------------ NOTE: This argument illustrates the classic dilemma of modern states in which national identity is expected to correspond to citizenship. Albanians in Kosova are no doubt Yugoslav citizens, but they reject Serb nationality. The same paradox applies to many indigenous peoples: they may, for example, accept U.S. citizenship but reject the status of"Americans" -- perhaps unless qualified as "Native Americans." In fact, in most of the world's states today there are substantial minorities who are citizens but not nationals (as members of enclave nations) and when they mobilize, as they will in growing numbers, their pressure for the rights of self-determination and independent statehood will increase, leading to growing turmoil. I have written a paper called "Turmoil among Nations" that elaborates on this point and it may be found under this heading at <a href="http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/tan-f.htm">concept records. A revised version of this paper has been published in Injustice Studies, and may be viewed at

<a href="http://www.ptproject.ilstu.edu//pt/is/newcontents.htm"> Turmoil... </a>.----------------

Conclusions

Toward the end of the meeting, an Albanian participant set forth several points that he thought all participants might be able to agree on. These were: 1. Kosova is a problem, and it must be solved. 2. The solution must be reached democratically, peacefully, and on the basis of mutual respect.3. All possible outcomes should be allowed for. 4. Kosovar institutions should be transformed in the direction of democracy. 5. The principle of territorial integrity should be respected. 6. A dialogue should be commenced looking toward negotiations on a permanent status for a democratic Kosova and a democratic Serbia, with the help of a third party.

-------------FINAL NOTE: These principles are noble but bland and may offer little concrete guidance, but starting a dialogue is surely the most important first step, and the PER project has made a notable contribution by facilitating this step. Thinking about the ISA/ENMISA panel on enclave nations at next year's ISA convention, I hope we can formulate some more concrete guidelines based on comparative analysis that could be helpful to members of many enclave nations and their "host countries," including Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia as they wrestle with these urgent and perplexing problems.----------------------------