DIVERSITY VERSUS CLEAVAGES AND PLURALITY

Among the assumptions that John Bowen (1996) attacks is the notion "that ethnic diversity brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence." I fully agree with his claim that greater ethnic diversity is not necessarily associated with violence. However, Bowen's assertion presupposes an ahistorical context -- as though "ethnic diversity" has always had the same structure. In non-modern contexts, ethnic diversity was normal and not, itself, a focus for ethno- political movements. It has become such only in recent decades after ethnic nationalism and claims based on self-determination have gained legitimacy within the modern world system.

Bowen's use of the phrase, ethnic diversity, also presupposes a single phenomenon. In fact, however, contemporary ethnic diversity differs significantly from non-modern ethnic differentiation, and modern ethnic dissidence needs to be understood in terms of at least three major patterns. Earlier in this paper I suggested that there are three forms of modern ethnicity: civic, national, and plural. Civic ethnicity arises among members of marginalized communities who want to become integrated as citizens in the country where they live; ethnic nationalism prevails among communities who reject citizenship in an existing state and demand their own sovereignty; while ethnic plurality applies to situations in which citizenship is not available to people who also lack the historic and territorial basis for claiming sovereignty.

All three forms of modern ethnicity can be discussed under the heading of "diversity," but this term is also used to refer only to relations involving civic ethnicity. Ambiguity results when the same word is used for both the broader and narrower concepts. Because most of the literature on diversity actually deals only with civic ethnicity, I will avoid using this word to include all the forms of ethnic politics found in contemporary states. Rather, a new term like ethno- dissidence is preferable.

However, an even broader concept of multi-culturalism can be defined as a generic condition that prevails whenever communities with different cultural heritages co-exist and interact with each other. Historically, as noted above, multi-culturalism involved ethnic differentiation with separate statuses (niches, functions, strata) for diverse cultural communities in hierarchically structured societies where conflicts between rival groups were typically oriented to non-ethnic criteria and were rarely linked to states. In this form, polyethnic societies prevailed throughout the world in all historic civilizations and, most conspicuously, in trading communities whose members linked world-systems and were usually, if not always, ethnic outsiders.

The specifically modern form of multi-culturalism, by contrast, is linked to issues that involve the state -- notably whether or not minorities are, can, or wish to, become citizens. This distinction enables us to distinguish the modern forms of ethno-dissidence resulting from the cumulative impact of industrialism, democracy and nationalism from the non-modern forms of multi-culturalism that have existed for thousands of years.

The most widely studied form of ethno-dissidence involves ethnic diversity as a type of inter-ethnic relationship in which agreement on shared citizenship (existing or potential, as among aliens elligible for naturalizaton) is marred by prejudices that marginalize communities. In its most extreme forms, such prejudices lead to pogroms, genocide, and urban riots directed against minorities and those viewed as their enemies. However, these clashes do not involve nationalist claims for sovereignty. Moreover, modern democracies are capable, I think, of overcoming the prejudices and conflicts that generate these forms of violence. For a good background analysis, see Inglis, 1996. I expect that violence associated with ethnic diversity is, indeed, diminishing in the world, although tensions and misunderstandings associated with ethnic diversity will surely remain widespread. A summary report on the status and problems of ethnic minorities in the industrialized democracies can be found in Rhodebeck (1992).

Ultimately, I believe, "diversity" may refer mainly to inter-cultural relationships in which conflicts are minimal or non-existent. Scottish immigrants to the United States, for example, easily become well-integrated Americans yet cherish ancestral traditions that they joyously celebrate on special occasions. Words like "eclecticism" or "cosmopolitanism" can be used to discuss this form of hamonious ethnic diversity. Most of the literature on diversity, however, will not focus on eclecticism even when harmonious integration is seen as the ultimate goal. Perhaps acceptance of a term for harmony in diversity would lead more scholars to inquire into the conditions which make it possible --reports on Hawaii by Michael Haas provide a good example (Haas, 1996). Because inter-ethnic harmony may be even more commonplace than inter-ethnic tensions, it might be helpful to pay more attention to the conditions which make it possible.

In this paper, however, I shall not say more about ethnic diversity (whether in its dissident or harmonious forms). Rather, let me focus on the other modern forms of ethno- dissidence: "cleavages" and "plurality." Ethnic Cleavages. The most obvious form of cleavage involves divided nations, a people separated by international boundaries. Exceptionally, a few have been re-united -- Germany is the best known example. However, this happened following the collapse of the East German regime, enabling the Western part to absorb it. A few cases have been negotiated as a precondition for liberation: Cameroon and Togo, for example. A far more dangerous scenario confronts the divided Korean and Chinese peoples when and if they are reunified, and prospects for the reunification of the Kurds and Pushtuns appear bleak.

A far more prevalent form of ethnic cleavage prevails where ethno-political movements demand sovereignty. Such movements do not necessarily lead to violence. In many countries, especially those in which democratic institutions prevail, ethnic nationalism is accommodated in various ways. Sometimes, as in the former Czechoslovakia, non-violent means were found to permit the Slovak peoples to become an independent state by partitioning an existing state. When Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan, great violence did occurred, but since then, relatively peaceful relations have been established. In some cases de facto partitions have occurred without formal recognition of the separated nations: Cyprus and Somalia provide examples. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was accomplished without much violence, even though it was a highly traumatic and long-resisted transformation. However, violence erupted subsequently in some successor states of the Former Soviet Union.

Administrative autonomy within the boundaries of an existing state is a more desirable option than the partitioning of states. Since the rulers of all existing states feel threatened by border changes, they have an incentive for cooperation to resist them -- it would be helpful if they could also accommodate their domestic ethnonations by granting them administrative autonomy.

Some examples of non-violent solutions for ethnic cleavages illustrate the possibilities. In 1980, the Catalans and Basques were granted autonomy through the new Spanish parliamentary constitution under which 19 autonomous regions are now recognized. Although some Basques continue to fight for independence, Spain seems to have found a good accommodation with its Basque and other national minorities. In the United States, many indigenous peoples have virtual autonomy as self-governing nations -- but in other cases, as in Hawaii, the struggle for sovereignty on behalf of the Hawaiian people continues, but without violence. Tensions between the Maori people and New Zealand continue, but also in a non- violent way.

Comprehensive data on the ethno-political minorities now struggling for independence or autonomy can be found in the data compiled by Ted Gurr (1993). Almost all of the sustained violence and civil wars based on ethnic nationalism are concentrated among these communities, i.e. where ethnic cleavages can be found. Moreover, as noted above, the existence of cleavages does not always generate violence. Perhaps, overall, there are more non-violent than violent cleavages. All ethnic cleavages could probably turn violent but, if appropriate steps are taken to accommodate the needs and sense of injustice that prevail among ethnic nations, much of this threatening violence can assuredly be prevented. "Pluralness." In order to assess the legitimate claims of ethnic nations, we need to understand how they were generated by the main forces of modernity -- they are not, as Bowen correctly explains, a resurgence of age-old ethnic rivalries (Bowen 1996). To support his claim that political policies and partisan rivalries can explain why ethnonational violence is greater in some countries than in others, Bowen mentions an example described by Donald Horowitz (1996: pp. 12-13; and 1985: pp. 291-364) to show that despite the apparent threat of violence between Chinese and Malays in Malaysia, a peaceful accommodation has been achieved by democratic politics, whereas in Sri Lanka, what originally appeared to be a good prospect for peace between Tamils and Sinhalese, was turned by political partisanship into violent strife. I accept the validity of the political dynamics described by Horowitz and Bowen, but they tell only part of the story. The Malayan/Sri Lankan difference can be explained more clearly, I think, when we consider the distinction between ethnic "cleavages" and ethnic "plurality." A classic work by J.S.Furnival (1948, pp. 303- 312) has explained in some depth how colonial policy generated multi-cultural clashes that he refers to as typical of a plural society. Unfortunately, pluralism and pluralistic have come to mean multi-culturalism, including ethnic diversity -- cf. Lijphart, 1977. I think we need a different term to characterize the type of "pluralism" that Furnival described --it will help us understand the basic difference between the Malaysian and Sri Lankan situations. I shall use a similar word, ethnic pluralness, (or "plurality") to describe Furnival's "plural societies." We may describe any situation as plural (but not "pluralistic") in which ethnic groups coexist and interact in the same society, but only at the levels of "commercium" while avoiding "commensalitas" and "connubium" -- to use terms favored by E. K. Francis pp. 361, 396). Put differently, members of these communities can work together, in a buying/selling mode, but they do not eat together or intermarry.

Most of the Chinese (and the Indians) who live in Malaysia today are descended from immigrants imported by British rulers and capitalists to work as laborers on plantations and in mines created to meet the needs of modern industry (Parmer, 1960). Many of them went on to become capitalists, both in the cities and as rural shopkeepers in villages where they offered the commercial services that local people could not provide for themselves without violating the norms of reciprocity that prevail in virtually all traditional communities (Riggs, 1964: pp. 160-164). Migrants were brought by the imperial powers, mainly from China and India, but also from the "Middle East" (especially Lebanon) and elsewhere to meet a variety of economic needs generated by industrialization. Quite often they viewed themselves as "superior" to members of the indigenous population and refused to mingle with them socially. They sometimes created "golden ghettoes" for themselves in which they could live separated from the local people.

As settlers, such migrants were not concentrated territorially nor could they make ancestral claims to the lands where they settled. However, unlike "immigrants" who came as potential citizens to live in the more industrialized countries, these colonial migrants -- a phrase we might also use to talk about them -- often came as "indentured" or "contract" workers with the expectation that they would return home after their contracts had expired. Many, however, chose to remain, usually without the opportunity to become naturalized citizens of the hostlands where they occupied scattered niches as perennial aliens. Some remained as laborers under miserable working conditions while others became successful merchants, attracting the envy and hostility of local populations. Such differences reinforce ideological clashes between the more radical and the more conservative members of these communities, pulling them toward quite different policies and competing leaders.

Furnival's term, "plural society," points to the social distance that continues to separate these minorities from the indigenous populations. Most of the expatriate former rulers left when the empires collapsed, but most of the colonial migrants remained. This means that many of the new states need to cope not only with all the problems confronting indigenous people everywhere, but also with large numbers of outsiders. In the "Middle East," especially the oil- rich countries, large numbers of foreign workers are employed on terms that compel them to return home when their contracts expire. For many others, however, their original roots have been broken and they felt obliged to remain in their colonial hostlands where they can support themselves, often quite well. In a few countries, they have become citizens and integrated members of the host populations, often intermarrying with them. However, in many other cases, they could not (or would not) integrate and they remain ostracized, subject to hostile actions and political marginalization.

The Malaysia/Sri Lanka Contrast. To return to the contrast described by Bowen and Horowitz, let me say more about the contrasting situations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, starting with the former.

One response of colonial migrants has been to organize revolutionary movements, not to demand sovereignty for themselves but, rather, to overthrow and replace existing governments. This happened in Malaysia where a prolonged Chinese-led "emergency" (civil war) compelled the British and the new Kuala Lumpur regime to fight the revolutionaries. No doubt the furies of this "emergency" helped persuade the new Malayan political leaders to coopt some Chinese, especially wealthy merchants, who were willing to join them in forming the political Alliance that rules that country today. They easily saw that they had more to gain by cooperating with the Malay elite in exchange for protection of their properties than they could ever expect from communist revolutionaries, even if they were Chinese. There was clearly no territorial base for them to demand autonomy, except in Singapore.

Singapore, however, is a great trading city. I was built by imperial migrants and it was expelled from Malaysia after a brief flirtation with integration in 1963-5. Malay leaders in Kuala Lumpur quickly saw that the addition of Singapore's large well-organized Chinese population would undermine the political dominance of Malays on the peninsula. The peaceful resolution of Malaysia's ethnic plurality, therefore, is due not only to the political policies supported by its Malay elite, but also to the fragmentation of the Chinese community by communists on the left and Singaporeans on the right, leaving a moderate Chinese trading community in the middle to collaborate with the Malays.

By contrast, in Sri Lanka, the Tamil rebels, especially in the north where the Ceylon Tamils live, view themselves as indigenous peoples, not migrants, and they support the violent eelam (homeland) movement, the LTTE. A smaller population of Indian Tamils, brought to Ceylon under British rule to work on tea plantations, have not joined the eelam movement but many of them, instead, have supported the Ceylon Workers' Congress and collaborated with the government. In the face of strong opposition from Sinhalese nationalists represented by the People's Liberation Front (an extremist group given to terrorism against the government), the ruling People's Alliance regime continues its war against the LTTE, despite timid overtures for peace. Although party politics helps explain the Malaysian/Sri Lanka contrast, I suspect a more important difference arises from the contrast between the ethnic nationalism of long- established, territorially-based, minorities versus the tendency of colonial migrants to collaborate or support inter-communal revolutionary movements while resisting ethnic nationalism.

Other Cases. A broad survey of the political responses of colonial migrants will show that although they have not supported ethnonational movements, they have been profoundly discontented with their lot. However, no single path has offered them a promising solution for their problems. The rulers of newly independent countries formed by the collapse of the modern empires often treat these migrant minorities as scapegoats, blaming them for many of the country's problems. The most conspicuous case is that of Uganda whose Indian minority was brutally persecuted and eventually ousted by the Idi Amin dictatorship. As this case illustrates, newly marginalized or persecuted minorities (including workers and entrepreneurs whose parents had moved from their homelands to various imperial possessions) often have no roots in their original homeland and will choose to flee to their former imperial metropole rather than return to their original homelands -- for such pariah capitalists, economic opportunity weighs more heavily than cultural affinity.

A notable contrast can be found in Guyana, half of whose population is composed of Indians, most of whom arrived as plantation workers during the 19th century. About 35% of the population are descended from African slaves imported before 1800. Under the leadership of Cheddi and Janet Jagan, the People's Progressive Party was organized in 1950 as an anti- colonial inter-communal movement. Gradually, however, it became primarily an Indian party espousing a communist ideology. After Guyana gained its independence in 1966, Jagan has continued to lead the PPP. After abandoning his Marxist rhetoric, following a tumultuous history, he has finally gained international acceptance as president of that country following elections held in 1992. By contrast with the Malaysian situation, Guyana's main imperial migrants have combined the strategies of revolution and accommodation to become a leading force in that country's democratic politics.

The situation of Indians in Fiji provides an interesting contrast with the catastrophe in Uganda, the success in Guyana, and the accommodation in Malaysia. Following its independence in 1970, 50% of the population of Fiji consisted of Indians whose forbears had immigrated as indentured laborers under British rule. Nevertheless, real political power was monopolized by indigenous Fijians with about 44% of the population. When Indians had apparently gained power by elections held in 1987, a military coup led by Sitiveni Rabuka led to a confusing series of events in which, ultimately, the Indians seem to have become politically marginalized by a regime in which Rabuka now serves as prime minister and the long-term Fijian leader, Sir Kamisese K. T. Mara, is president.

Without mentioning other cases, it seems clear that colonial migrants cannot make realistic ethnic claims for sovereignty and, therefore, they do not establish ethnonationalist movements. Instead, they face a variety of unsatisfactory options between expulsion and integration, revolutionary violence and non-violent politics. Sometimes they can become economically dominant while accepting a marginal political status, as in Fiji. The imperial domination that led to their migration and the inequities and insecurities associated with their precarious status in new states makes the complex problems of ethnic pluralness worthy of serious study as a different type of modern ethnicity from the forms represented by diversity and cleavage.

The unsatisfactory options confronting these communities block their integration under the banner of diversity, and sovereignty based on ethnic cleavage also offers no hope for them. Uganda, Guyana, Fiji, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka illustrate some of the possible scenarios, and there are no doubt others. Perhaps because of the contrasting possibilities illustrated by these cases, we have not recognized ethnic pluralness as a third basic type of modern ethnicity, but Enloe (1972) provides an interesting account of several such situations. Diaspora. To close, let me comment on the relation of diaspora communities to ethnic nationalism. Almost every ethnic nation contains not only a core of people living in the territory they think of as their homeland, but also others who have migrated, sometimes as refugees but often as emigrants seeking better opportunities elsewhere. Members of such diasporas do not forget their homeland -- they often send financial contributions ("remittances") to their relatives and friends, and quite frequently become involved in political movements designed to make fundamental changes back home. They frequently support revolutionary or secessionist movements, more rarely they support governments resisting such movements. The best known diaspora is that of the Jewish people, and the creation of Israel in response to the tragic experiences of Jews in many countries is the most notable example of a diaspora creating a nation. Normally, however, members of a diaspora play important roles in ethnonational conflicts where a territorial base for the nation already exists. A well-organized Tibetan national movement led by the Dalai Lama provides an excellent example. More typically, diaspora peoples are divided into competing groups with different goals -- Iranians outside of Iran today might be a good example.

The reverse situation is also important: states often seek to influence members of their own diasporas, or they may use them as a pretext to support interventions on behalf of their own nationals living and travelling abroad. The role of diasporas in international politics is stunningly important, I believe, yet it has received very little attention. Exceptionally, Ryan's book on ethnic conflicts in international relations points out that "States that have close affective links with ethnic groups in another state will often not remain indifferent to the fate of these groups" (Ryan 1990: p.35).

Ryan's examples focus on efforts by a nation state to support their own nationals in other countries, but we also need to consider efforts by diasporas to influence the foreign policies of the states in which they live. Moreover, ethnic nationalism often originates outside a home territory, among members of its diaspora who feel obligations and see opportunities that can result from their activism.

The extent to which members of a diaspora involve themselves in the politics of their homelands is influenced, no doubt, by the attitude of their hostland neighbors who may help them integrate, or repel them by prejudice and discrimination. Often, I believe, well adjusted and successful immigrants choose to become leading activists in the politics of their homelands. Internal rivalries between rival factions within a diaspora also complicate the dynamics of diaspora politics -- it is very difficult for members of any ethnic community to organize so as to achieve consensus about what they would like to do or achieve. Moreover, diasporas are international or global in scope -- thus clusters of emigres in one country may or may not cooperate with fellow emigres in other countries -- barriers of space and politics hamper trans-state coordination among members of each global diaspora community.

In order to talk clearly about these phenomena, we need to distinguish between each ethnic nation as a whole, and its main components: i.e., the members of its diaspora and those who remain home. I have referred to them as ethnonationals (Riggs, 1996a)TAN, but it is not easy to maintain a distinction between "ethnic" and "ethno-". Consequently, a word that contrasts with "diaspora" might be useful: what could we call those who remain at home? The stem for 'diaspora' is 'speirein' meaning to scatter, and the prefix, 'dia' means apart. An antonym for 'diaspora' might take the form of anaspora, using the suffix an- or ana- , in the sense of "not" or "backward" as in 'anachronism,' 'analogy,' 'anonymous,' or 'anomaly'. Those who have not scattered from home are in anaspora. Use of these terms could help us compare the position and attitudes of the home people (anaspora) and those who have left home (diaspora) --those who have not dispersed and those who have dispersed.

Sad to say, 'anaspora' is a neologism, but using it could facilitate our discussion of ethno-dissent which normally refers to the behavior of anasporas (ethnonations) -- especially in relation to ethnic cleavages. All cleavages, however, typically involve anaspora/diaspora linkages that reinforce each other and buttress the homeland (anasporic) movements.

In situations of ethnic diversity, although most ethnic communities are based on migration, their status as residents supercedes their membership in a diaspora. Relationships between resident communities in a single country provide the focus for both dissidence and integration.

Imperial migrants face a more anomalous situation. Their status in diaspora is problematic, but they lack the roots needed to assert any anasporic claims. Normally, they cannot or will not return to the "homeland" from which they came, but they do not have a new domain to claim as their own. They are, literally, in limbo and cannot identify very well with either a diaspora or an anaspora.

Contrasts are also needed between those in limbo (people without a country of their own) and those who claim two or more homelands. These include persons who integrate as citizens in a country to which they have immigrated while remaining active in the ethnic politics of their homeland. This janus-like pattern of dual (or multiple) ethnic identity is increasingly common, I think, and needs to be recognized as an aspect of ethnic nationalism that will increase as the number of refugees and migrants stimulated by the evolution of our modern world system grows. There is increasing pressure for dual citizenship, a practice that permits individuals to live and work, to invest and fight, in more than one country. The old norm that one should be a citizen of only one country (at a time) is losing its weight as members of diaspora communities become cross-pressured in poly-national controversies.

The migration of peoples around the world is surely increasing as a continuing result of all three aspects of modernity: industrialization, democracy and nationalism. This means that the number of ethnic minorities in almost every country of the world will also increase, as will the size and activism of diasporas. In addition to all the domestic problems created by this process, students of ethnicity need to examine the role played by diaspora peoples in the rise and progress of ethnic nationalism.

ENDNOTES

1. Ordinarily, we think of authoritarian governments as powerful and effective, by contrast with anarchy as a chaotic condition produced by the lack of governance. In fact, however, many weak governments are authoritarian but unable to administer their domains effectively, leaving large ungoverned areas where local "war lords," "bosses," or "tycoons" rule arbitrarily and fight each other. In such an environment, we may assume that an internationally recognized regime commands little respect at home, its officials are vulnerable to corruption by gangsters and its authority is easily questioned by rival bandit or ethnonational leaders who build a local following and demand recognition of their own right to rule.

Political science lacks a term for the concept that links weak authoritarianism and anarchy, yet it identifies a pervasive condition in the world today that invites the rise of ethnonational resistance and self-determination movements. I have suggested anarchianism -- a blend of 'anarchic' and 'authoritarian' -- as an appropriate term for this concept (Riggs, 1996a)TAN/anarchianism. The condition itself, and its widespread existence, is well documented by Kaplan, 1996. I grew up in China in a provincial city dominated by a war lord, the prototype of an anarchian polity, so I recognized the phenomenon long before I thought of a term for it.

2. To briefly characterize each of these modes of modern ethnicity, consider that:

~~ ethnic nationalism involves the quest for sovereignty based on the premise that ethnic nations are entitled, by the principle of self-determination, to have their own states in the modern world -- it generates ethnic cleavages;

~~ civic ethnicity arises in marginalized ethnic communities whose members want to be citizens in the countries where they live but feel that they have been unfairly treated, producing ethnic diversity; and

~~ethnic pluralness characterizes inter-ethnic tensions afflicting marginalized communities whose members cannot become citizens of a country but they also lack any territorial basis for claims of statehood -- producing the ills of a "plural society".

3. The long and colorful history of world traders is described by Curtin, 1984. As politically marginalized communities, trader/merchants were always vulnerable to insecurity and oppression by the dominant elites who were also their main customers. An uneasy balance of convenience enabled them to survive and even to enrich themselves but never to hold political power except in marginal trading cities or towns (Polanyi, et al, 1957). Without power, even the most imaginative and purposeful capitalists cannot become industrialists -- to safeguard their investments (and also to secure capital, land, workers, raw materials and markets) merchants need governmental protection, not just the benevolent support of kindly (and greedy!) kings but the reliable backing and infrastructure they can only count on when they are empowered. They do not need to rule or to dominate governance, but they do need enough influence to assure the rule of law and the public policies that will protect their interests -- some historical perspective is offered in Zenner (1991).

No doubt there have been times in world history when indigenous merchants could flourish, as during the Southern Sung dynasty in China (1127-1279). At that time, proto- industrialization led by bureaucrats turned merchants appears to have evolved (citation ??). However, although renegade bureaucrats could, in the short-run, secure protection from their friends and relatives who remained in the bureaucracy, the erosion of administrative effectiveness caused by this violation of a basic rule of the Chinese mandarinate led to the eventual collapse of the dynasty and its replacement by invading nomads who created the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of the mid-13th century. There may well have been other possible periods of proto-industrialism in India, Rome, Greece, or Egypt. The point is they never lasted long enough nor covered a large enough area to generate a real "Industrial Revolution."

4. Industrialism is often associated with inanimate sources of energy, but pre-industrial societies have long used wind and water to power pre-industrial enterprises -- I grew up in China next to a large water wheel used for the irrigation of paddy fields and the milling of rice. Lewis Mumford has written that "Speaking in terms of power and characteristic materials, the eotechnic phase is a water- and-wood complex; the paleotechnic phase is a coal-and-iron complex, and the neotechnic phase is an electricity-and- alloy complex" (Mumford, 1934: p. 110).

Mumford writes that "the dawn age of our modern technics stretches roughly from the year 1000 to 1750... Most of the key inventions necessary to universalize the machine were promoted during this period; there is scarcely an element in the second phase that did not exist as a germ, often as an embryo, frequently as an independent being, in the first phase" (p. 111). In short, the technical basis for industrialization already existed in Europe long before the "Industrial Revolution" began -- what distinguishes modernity, therefore, is not industrial technology or capitalism but, rather, the political framework, rooted in democracy and nationalism, that permitted industrialization to grow and thrive. Comparable eotechnology also existed outside of Europe from even earlier times but the capitalists of these domains were politically marginalized, unable to secure the governmental protection and power needed for industrialization.

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SUNG [add a citation for Southern Sung period JAS ]

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Zenner, Walter P., 1991. Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. **************************************************************

FRED W. RIGGS, Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Hawaii
2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A.
Phone: (808) 956-8123; Fax: (808) 956-6877; e- mail:FREDR@HAWAII.EDU
Web Page: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/

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