Without mentioning other cases, it seems clear that colonial migrants cannot make ethnic claims for sovereignty and, therefore, they do not establish ethnonationalist movements. Instead, they face a variety of options between expulsion and integration, revolutionary violence and non-violent politics. Sometimes they can become economically dominant while accepting a marginal political status. The imperial domination that led to their migration and the inequities and insecurities associated with their precarious status in new states makes the complex problems of ethnic plurality worthy of serious study. The options confronting these communities seem to block integration under conditions of diversity and demands for sovereignty as seen in ethnic cleavages. Although Uganda, Guyana and Fiji illustrate some of these options, there are others which need to be recognized as a third type of modern ethnicity. Diaspora. To close, let me comment on the relation of diaspora communities to ethnic nationalism. Almost every ethnic nation contains not only a core of people living in the territory they think of as their home land, but also others who have migrated, sometimes as refugees but often as emigrants seeking better opportunities elsewhere. However, members of such diasporas do not forget their homeland -- they often send financial contributions ("remittances") to their relatives and friends, and quite frequently become involved in political movements designed to make fundamental changes in their homelands. They frequently support revolutionary or secessionist movements, more rarely they support governments resisting such movements. They also intervene politically in their host countries in order to influence foreign policy and international relations on behalf of their allies and friends. Ethnic nationalism sometimes originates outside a home territory among members of a diaspora who feel obligations and see opportunities that can arise as a result. The extent to which members of a diaspora involve themselves in the politics of their homelands is influenced, of course, by the attitude of neighbors in their hostlands who may help them integrate or repel them by prejudice and discrimination. Internal rivalries between rival factions within a diaspora further complicate the dynamics of diaspora politicsIn order to talk clearly about this phenomenon, we need to make a distinction between the totality of an ethnic nation and its main components, its diaspora members and those who remain home: I think of them as ethnonationals. Sad to say, this is not an accepted usage but it enables us to focus on the main components of ethnic nationalism and distinguish between them and to study their activities and effects. It also enables us to link ethnic diversity with ethnic cleavages because, quite often, individuals who integrate as citizens in a country to which they have immigrated become (or remain) activists in the ethnic politics of their homeland. This "janus-like" pattern of dual ethnicity is increasingly common, I think, and needs to be recognized as an aspect of ethnic nationalism that will increase as the number of refugees and free migrants made possible by the evolution of our modern world system grows.

The migration of peoples around the world is surely increasing as a continuing result of all three aspects of modernity: industrialization, democracy and nationalism. This means that the number of ethnic minorities in almost every country of the world will also increase. In addition to all the domestic problems created by this process, students of ethnicity need to examine the role played by diaspora peoples in the rise and progress of ethnic nationalism.

Perhaps the creation of Israel in response to the tragic experiences of Jews in many countries is the most notable example of a diaspora creating a nation. However, in virtually all the ethnonational conflicts now raging around the world, members of a diaspora play important roles. Thus, the role of diasporas in international politics is stunningly important, I believe, yet has received precious little attention: Ryan's book on ethnic conflicts in international relations, for example, writes that "States that have close affective links with ethnic groups in another state will often not remain indifferent to the fate of these groups" (Ryan 1990: p.35). Although his examples reveal a concern by nation states for their own nationals in other countries, he does not portray the efforts by diasporas to influence the policies of the states in which they live, a dimension that needs to be added to our research agenda.

What's Mythic? To return, then, to the Bowen essay which provided the opening text for this chapter, let me say that its title, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," is true but misleading. I agree that primordial rivalries between different communities do not explain the contemporary increase in violence attributable to ethnicity. However, it is wrong to imagine that global ethnic conflict is not a major world problem today, although it is true that this problem is not caused by ethnicity alone. A more balanced perspective would take the following matters into account.

First, modern processes of industrialization, democratization and nationalism have generated tragic para-modern consequences, including both the rise of ethnic nationalism as a violent force in contemporary world politics and the creation of post-imperial regimes that cannot satisfy the needs of their national minorities. The leaders of ethnonationalist movements often invoke ancient symbols and myths to mobilize their followers, but these legends to not explain their movements.

For example, when Jewish settlers occupy lands belonging to Muslims and claim that they have a just right to do so because, in Biblical times, God promised these lands to their ancestors, one need not deny their historical narratives in order to reject the contemporary injustices rationalized by them. The truth is that, for various contemporary political and economic reasons, the contemporary Israeli supports the taking of Arab lands for the use of its settlers and invokes ancient beliefs to justify this policy. That some Palestinians should react with violence and terrorism is not surprising. Comparable processes have occurred in many other countries.

Second, the world today is increasingly crowded with peoples having diverse cultural backgrounds and histories who live peacefully together -- if not always harmoniously, at least without violent confrontations. To the degree that states are democratic and responsive to the just needs of the peoples living within their boundaries they will, I believe, find non-violent solutions for their problems, including ways to integrate these minorities into the main stream of their political-economies. They will, I think, be able to protect the distinctive rights and practices of cultural minorities and also grant local autonomy to ethnonational minorities.

Nevertheless, many regimes are so inflexible about their boundaries and un- democratic in domestic politics that they cannot satisfy the legitimate needs of ethnic communities under their rule. The rise of ethnic nationalism and terrorism, therefore, is as much the result of the failures of recognized states as it is the result of claims for national unification (involving boundary changes) or for self determination (made possible only by secession from an existing state or by grants of autonomy within that state).

Third, in addition to the ethnic cleavages (based on ethnic nationalism) and the diversity (based on civic ethnicity) that constitute the most salient forms of modern cultural pluralism, there is an important third form that needs to be studied as a different and very serious problem: it involves the communities formed by colonial migrations ("plural societies") in which many minorities continue to experience prejudice and discrimination but cannot, because of their lack of territory and historical myths, make widely acceptable claims to national identity.

One option open to their leaders is to promote revolutionary violence designed to transform the polity under which they are living. A second option is surrender -- to flee as refugees and, perhaps, organize in diaspora to stage a future come-back. A third option involves corruption -- by bribery and deceit they can secure the protection or connivance of officials with illegal activities. All too often, the policies themselves are oppressive measures designed to compel their victims to pay ransom.

A fourth option, open to minorities living under more democratic conditions, involves cooptation. They can then gain power legitimately within the framework of the existing constitutional system. The problems of ethnic plurality, therefore, differ significantly from those of ethnic diversity (pluralism) and they do not generate ethnic nationalism (cleavages). They deserve separate and detailed analysis, something that is not possible here.

Finally, I agree with John Bowen that it is an error to think of modern ethnic protests and ethnonational movements as a "revival" or "resurgence" of ancient struggles rooted in historic myths. However, "Global Ethnic Conflict" is real and increasingly jeopardizes world peace. It outdates conventional theories of international relations based, primarily, on the history of conflicts between rival empires -- these conflicts have preoccupied the world for two or centuries but their collapse has radically transformed the global arena. Among other para-modern phenomena, we need to see that ethnonational conflicts are fueled by all the forces of modernity. They are and will increasingly become a major concern for the world community of states and their leaders, a generator of global tensions and, perhaps, an incubator for new forms of international organization and public policy.

ENDNOTES

1. As Stephen Ryan correctly writes, "ethnic conflict...refers to the form the conflict takes, and is not meant to suggest that ethnicity is the cause of the conflict." Among these causes he mentions expulsion from power, a sense of injustice, and fears that an identity is under threat (Ryan 1990: p.xvii).
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2. "Greater ethnic diversity is not associated with greater interethnic conflict," Bowen writes (p. 10). This does not mean, however, that the conflicts which are generated by ethnic diversity can easily be solved. Laurie Rhodebeck's summation of a book of essays comparing the status and prospects of ethnic minorities in the industrialized democracies concludes that, "Ethnic minorities currently participate in economic and/or political markets as disadvantaged actors... the intervention of the state and government in ethnic conflict is not always productive or benign... and such conflict will not significantly abate in the foreseeable future" (Rhodebeck, 1992: p. 279). However, the existence or even the growth of conflicts rooted in ethnic diversity does not contradict the fact that a great deal of inter-ethnic integration and harmony exists and will surely increase in the industrialized democracies. By contrast, however, the violence of ethnonational conflicts in the contemporary world greatly exceeds that associated with ethnic diversity and it will surely increase.
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3. A comprehensive account of contending politicized communal groups can be found in Gurr (1993). He claims that "Nearly three-quarters of the 127 largest countries in the world had at least one politicized minority in 1990... 233 groups in 1990 had an estimated 915 million members, 17.3 percent of the global population." They are all listed in an appendix where they are classified as: ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses, militant sects, and communal contenders (Gurr, 1993: pp. 10, 326). Gurr uses ethno- political as a generic term for all these communities -- most of them, I think, can be conveniently grouped under the heading of ethnic nationalism. Gurr's updated data can also be found on his Web Page: MINORITIES
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4. Ethnic conflict should not be viewed as a purely domestic (intra-state) phenomenon -- it has strong inter-state causes and consequences. Complaining that the international relations literature has neglected ethnic conflict, Ryan writes that "ethnic conflict can have a major impact on the interstate system..." (1996: p.xv). Much of his book is concerned with the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict, and he elaborates on the role of the international system in resolving such conflicts and protecting minorities (pp. 119-173). Unfortunately, he does not explain how the modern inter-state system, centered on the ambitions of rival empires, created the context in which ethnonational conflicts have emerged as a salient problem in world affairs. Nor does he discuss the influence of diaspora communities in world politics, an aspect that deserves much more attention.
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5. Ernest Gellner, a pioneer in the study of nationalism, claimed that "nations are products of modernization and could not have existed before the advent of modernity," to which Anthony D. Smith has responded by pointing to the "collective memories" which buttress them and assure their projection into the future. "Because nations have navels, and because those navels, and the memories and traditions, myths and symbols they represent, mean so much to the people that have them, we are unlikely to see the early transcendence of nations and nationalism" (Smith, 1996: p.373, 387). Clearly the past does not predetermine the present, but the present sets parameters for the future and, surely, modern nations are constructed, but they are not constructed out of whole cloth. Pressures generated by modernity, notably industrialism and democracy, incubated nationalism. Whether or not nationalism had a "navel," as Smith argues, it surely had a "womb" from which it was born and it created progeny in the form of ethnic nationalisms that now proliferate throughout the world: see Gellner, 1983. These relations are circular, not uni-directional: thus nationalism can sometimes promote industrialism and democracy, but it can also hamper their progress -- similarly, industrialism and democracy can both promote nationalism. We need to think about the consequences as well as the causes of ethnic nationalism which can contribute both to benign and vicious causal circles.
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6. A clear recognition of this fundamental distinction can be found in Francis (1976). He speaks of primary ethnic groups as communities which, following "their transfer from the parent to the host society, tend to continue to function...as closed subsocieties" (p.397). Ethnic nationalism is born, under modern conditions, in such groups. By contrast, Francis wrote that secondary ethnic groups are those that participate directly in the host society in some dimensions, particularly on the level of commercium" but also at the levels of "commensalitas and connumbium" (p.396). By "commercium" Francis means cooperation for practical purposes, especially in the economic sphere; by "commensalitas" he refers to convivial activities such as those of visiting, eating, and playing together; while by "connubium" he understands affinal relations based on intermarriage. I think of civic ethnicity as the kind of relationship characteristic of secondary ethnic groups, using the intention to become a citizen as the crucial test of identity.

Unfortunately, Francis' comprehensive and informative work on ethnic relationships has been largely neglected, perhaps because his terminology is somewhat forbidding. The distinctions he stresses, however, help us distinguish clearly between ethnic diversity (based on "secondary" relationships) and ethnic cleavages (formed by "primary" ethnic groups). Insensitivity to this distinction handicaps many subsequent works on ethnic relations -- a good example is Thompson and Ronen (1986), which contains many excellent studies of ethnic politics but fails to recognize the great differences between the two levels identified by Francis a decade earlier. Unfortunately, most research on ethnicity fails to make this crucial distinction, and writings on nationalism often fail to link the phenomenon to its ethnic foundations.
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7. Violence should, I think, be viewed as a likely but not a necessary consequence of ethnic cleavages --certainly as a common symptom or sign of it but not as its defining characteristic. Ryan (1990) writes that "Protracted and violent ethnic conflict can be defined as conflicts between ethnic groups which have been going on for some time, which may appear to be insoluble to the parties caught up in them, and which result in a significant loss of life or in a serious denial of basic human rights" (p.xvii). He contrasts it with ethnic conflicts that are not protracted or violent.

I would rather draw attention to the fact that ethnic nationalism generates protracted and violent conflict in situations where ethnic cleavages prevail, whereas ethnic diversity is not associated with such high levels of conflict - - there are exceptions to both generalizations, but we should try to explain prolonged ethnic violence as a symptom of cleavages, not as its cause or as a defining property.
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8. An extensive literature discusses the role and problems of "middleman" or "trading" minorities, often with a focus on Jews in Europe. A good example is Zenner (1991) which also indexes the relevant literature on many other alien trading minorities. An overview of the role of traders ("capitalists") in world history can be found in Curtin, 1984. Furnival (1948) offers an explanation for this phenomenon in the context of modern imperialism where, following the collapse of the modern empires, its consequences are pervasive. I also discussed this syndrome over 30 years ago under the heading of "pariah entrepreneurship" in Riggs (1964) pp. 189- 193.
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REFERENCES

Bowen, John R. 1996. "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict." Journal of Democracy. 7:4, 3-14.

Curtin, P. D., 1984. Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Enloe, Cynthia, 1972. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown.

Francis, E. K., 1976. Interethnic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory. New York: Elsevier.

Furnival, John S., 1948. Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, Ernest, 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gurr, Ted Robert, 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: U.S.Institute of Peace Press. Updated records available on Web Page: MINORITIES

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley,CA: University of California Press.

Lijphart, Arend, 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Polanyi, Karl, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Peareson, 1957. Trade and Market in Early Empires. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Rhodebeck, Laurie A., 1992. "Conclusion" in Anthony M. Messina, Luis R. Fraga, Laurie A. Rhodebeck, and Frederick D. Wright, eds., Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Greenwood Press. pp.279-296.

Riggs, Fred W., 1964. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

----, 1994. "Ethnonationalism, Industrialism and the modern State." Third World Quarterly. 15:4, pp. 583-611.

----, 1995. "Ethnonational Rebellions and Viable Constitutionalism." International Political Science Review. 16:14, pp. 375-404.

----, 1996. "Turmoil among Nations." Available on World Wide Web at: TAN

----, 1997. "Coping with Modernity: Constitutional Implications." Paris: UNESCO, MOST Policy Paper. In press and on Web Page, soon.

Ryan, Stephen, 1990. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Aldershot: Dartmouth

Smith, Anthony D., 1996. "Nations and their Pasts" and "Memory and Modernity." Nations and Nationalism. 2:3, pp.358-365, 371-388.

Thompson, Dennis L. and Dov Ronen, eds., 1986. Ethnicity, Politics and Development. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zenner, Walter P., 1991. Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

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Updated: 7 February 1997

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