Ling 423/640G: Cognitive Linguistics           

Ben Bergen

 

Meeting 12: Mental simulation II

October 2, 2008

 

Experimental methods for simulation semantics

 

Experiments in this area typically present participants with:

á      Some piece of language that they have to process

o   A word

o   A sentence

á      A perceptual or motor task, e.g.:

o   Categorizing an object as a circle or square (when it appears in different places on the screen)

o   Deciding whether a depicted object had been mentioned in the preceding sentence

o   Pushing a button, which is either close to their body or far from their body

 

The dependent measure is usually reaction time (but need not necessarily be), e.g.

á      Time to press a button indicating whether they saw a circle or square

á      Time to press a button indicating that a sentence is meaningful

 

The effect they look for is either compatibility or interference.

á      Compatibility: Faster responses when perceptual/motor processes, sentence are compatible

o   After processing a sentence like You gave Andy the pizza, people are faster to press a button if it requires them to move their hand in a direction compatible with giving someone pizza (away from their body).

o   After processing a sentence like The ranger saw the eagle in the sky, people are faster to press a button indicating that they read a sentence about an eagle when the eagle has the appropriate (spread-winged) shape.

á      Interference: The response is faster when the perceptual or motor processes are incompatible with the sentence

o   After processing a sentence about an object in the upper part of the visual field, categorizations of an object in the same location are slower.

á      Compatibility effects appear when there is some time between the two tasks, while interference seems to occur when they happen at the same time.

o   This makes sense – you can't do two things with one part of your brain at the same time. If processing language about visible objects uses your visual system, then processing such language should interfere with – be incompatible with – simultaneously using the same system to see.

o   But if there's a time delay between the processes, it should be facilitatory priming

 


Case study – Zwaan et al. (2002)

 

This paper compares predictions of two theories of language understanding.

á      "Amodal propositional representations" is the conventional view. This is the idea that the meanings of words and sentences are:

o   Amodal, meaning they don't use specific modalities (like vision, motor control, etc.)

o   Propositional representations, meaning that they are basically just rephrasings of the meaning, in terms of some "language of the mind"

o   These are views like the "features" or "truth-conditional semantics" views we talked about at the beginning of the course.

á      "Perceptual symbols" is the view aligned with the idea that meaning uses mental simulation

o   Basically, the idea is that words and sentences activate perceptual and motor systems

o   People internally (re-)experience the sights, sounds, and actions language describes

 

The two theories make different predictions

á      Amodal propositional representations doesn't say anything at all about whether or not people perform mental imagery of perceptual properties of described objects

á      Perceptual symbols theories make a clear prediction: when people process language about objects, they should mentally represent their perceptual properties, like shape and orientation

 

The two experiments reported in this paper test for the prediction that people mentally simulate objects when they hear them described, in particular whether they build mental images of what those objects are implied to look like.

 

Participants read sentences, which mentioned objects in one of two locations.

á      The ranger say the eagle in the sky

á      The ranger saw the eagle in the nest

 

Then they saw a picture depicting the object (in this case, the eagle) in one of two shapes (in this case, either with outstretched wings or with tucked-in wings)

 

Participants had to either decide as quickly as possible whether the depicted object had been mentioned in the preceding sentence (Exp 1) or just name the depicted object (Exp 2).

 

The predicted effect (the experimental hypothesis) was that responses would be faster when the object was depicted in the same shape implied by the sentence:

 

faster

 

slower

 
 

 

 


"eagle in the sky"

faster

 

slower

 

 

 

 

"eagle in the nest"

The key independent variable, Condition, was categorical and had two levels (Match or Mismatch). There were also two other independent variables – Picture Version and List, neither of which are directly relevant to the experimental hypothesis.

 

Both experiments showed a significant main effect of Condition (using repeated-measures ANOVA)

 


In Exp 2., there was also a neutral condition, where the sentence didn't prime one shape or the other. This provides a basis for comparison, and shows that the difference between the Match and Mismatch conditions seems to be due in part to slower responses in the Mismatch and faster responses in the Match condition.

 

 

 

Condition

 

 

Match

Mismatch

Neutral

Experiment 1

697

761

 

Experiment 2

605

638

617

 


 

The finding that responses are faster in the match condition supports the claim that people automatically and unconsciously evoke mental images of described objects, and that these objects are mentally simulated with detailed perceptual properties, even when these perceptual properties are just implied by a sentence.

 

This supports the idea that understanders perform mental simulation when understanding language.