is impressive for its detailed accounting of the history of Floridian cartography and for its articulation of how aspects of Florida's natural history affected geographical imaginations of the borders of the North American continent. On a deeper level, scholars of early America, the Atlantic world, and of settler colonialism more broadly will appreciate the book for its critical conversations about the meanings of topographical impermanence in colonial experiences of property and landed possession.

From a historical perspective, Navakas's primary contribution is her original analysis of how the porousness of Florida's swamps, reefs, mangroves, bays, islets, beaches, rivers, streams, and storms helped shape, define, and undermine colonial processes from the early modern era into the early twentieth century. On this score, *Liquid Landscape* provides a detailed account of how cartographers, naturalists, plantation owners, state officials, wreckers, fugitive slaves, and a wide variety of other historical actors comprehended and transformed Florida's lands and seas in ways that reverberated across the rest of the North American continent. For instance, in her discussions of how Spanish, French, British, and American authorities struggled to depict and control Florida's watery geography in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Navakas demonstrates that Florida's topographical indeterminacy forced colonial officials to confront European assumptions about land and property that undergirded not only settler colonialism but also modern understandings of selfhood and ownership. If Florida's rocks and reefs, for instance, were not permanently ownable, then neither could ships lost at sea or commodities recovered by wreckers maintain their fictive lives as property. When fugitive slaves escaped to the swamps and marshes, their maroon communities persisted as alternative geographic spaces beyond the grasp of the plantation economy. The cultural and environmental history of Florida that Navakas offers us is a narrative of a liquid landscape never fully conquered; one that remains generative of possibilities. In short, Navakas's book provides American historians with a new set of reasons to bring Florida in from the periphery of early American history.

In addition, *Liquid Landscapes* offers American historians a useful model for how to more fully incorporate geographical questions into our studies of place and identity. Navakas's exciting unification of the disparate voices who sought to comprehend Florida's shifting and seeping spaces reveals a history of geographical subjectivities spanning the activities of both human and nonhuman actors. *Liquid Landscapes* demonstrates that there is no clean division between land and sea, nor distinct separation of nature from culture. Rather than getting hung on these points, however, Navakas simply proceeds with a rich and sophisticated historical study of the relationships between colonialism and geographical ambiguity in early America. Anyone interested in the interstitial places where land and water meet will find this book fascinating.

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Transforming Hawai'i: Balancing Coercion and Consent in Eighteenth-Century Kānaka Maoli Statecraft. By Paul D'Arcy. (Canberra: Australian National University, 2018. xxx, 310 pp. Paper, $55.00.)

Paul D'Arcy's *Transforming Hawai'i* is a significant contribution to Hawaiian statecraft. D'Arcy argues that while scholars have altered their stance that "Hawaiian polities were archaic states by the time Cook arrived, [they fail] to discuss how these structures enabled Kamehameha to unify the islands, while his rivals, with similar structures of government and power, could not" (p. 58).

There are three main themes under which D'Arcy comprehensively and convincingly outlines the reasons for Kamehameha's success: "the balance between coercion and consent; between structural trends and individual leadership qualities and historical events, and between indigenous and European factors" (p. 1). D'Arcy, however, omits a crucial element of foreign influence that was a significant contribution to fortifying Hawaiian statecraft—the

British influence. Kamehameha's rivals were not British.

On February 25, 1794, Kamehameha, before consolidating the leeward kingdoms, joined the British Empire as a protectorate and not as a colony. As a British protectorate, Kamehameha remained king and Hawaiian statecraft was not altered except for recognizing King George III as liege and lord and acknowledging themselves as British subjects (George Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean* [1798], p. 56).

After defeating the Maui kingdom in 1796, Kamehameha incorporated and modified aspects of British governance to his own. These modifications included the office of prime minister or premier and the establishment of governors. Aligned with English custom, Kamehameha established three earldoms over the former kingdoms of Hawaii, Maui, and Oahu, and governors to preside over them. The Kaua'i kingdom did not have a governor because it became Kamehameha's vassal state by agreement in 1810.

D'Arcy acknowledges Kalanimoku's title as *pu'uku* or "chief treasurer," but he does not explain the term's origin (p. 183). In Hawaiian statecraft, the title *kālaimoku* is more akin to head of government, which was the official name of Kalanimoku. The treasurer as head of government is an English invention that came about as result of King George I's numerous retreats to Hanover that left the British government in disarray. Of the king's ministers, the secretary of the treasury, who held the strings to the government's purse, gradually came to be known as the main or prime minister. Eventually, the British prime minister became the head of government, while the king became head of state.

S. M. Kamakau explained that by this appointment, Kamehameha recognized that the "laws determining life or death were in the hands of this treasurer; he had the charge of everything" (*Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i* [originally written in the 1860s and 1870s and translated and published in English in 1961], p. 175). Foreigners also referred to the Hawaiian premier as Billy Pitt, the name of King George III's prime minister at the time, William Pitt the Younger.

The successful maintenance of Kamehameha's consolidation of the island kingdoms was due not only to his leadership and diplomacy, which D'Arcy covers very well, but also to his appropriation of British governance into Hawaiian statecraft and the recognition of his leadership by foreign countries. British influence reinforces D'Arcy's argument. It does not undermine it.

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Russian Colonization of Alaska: Preconditions, Discovery, and Initial Development, 1741–1799. By Andrei Val'terovich Grinëv, trans. Richard L. Bland. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. xiv, 327 pp. $70.00.)

The Russian discovery of Alaska in 1741 and the years prior to the establishment of the Russian-American Company in 1799 are not subjects explored in exhaustive detail by American historians. That is all the more reason, then, to welcome this interesting monograph, written by one of Russia's preeminent specialists on Russian America, Andrei Val'terovich Grinëv, and translated by Richard L. Bland.

Grinëv sees Russia's colonization of Alaska as an extension of Russia's conquest of Siberia and of the formation of the Russian state. The book's first chapter covers the development of Russia's and Siberia's sociopolitical system, identified by Grinëv as politarism—essentially feudalism stood on its head, or a subtler version of Asiatic despotism as defined by Karl Marx. The sovereign of a politaristic state owns the services of all his subjects, who pay him tribute and taxes, and are rewarded with use of the sovereign's lands. In the case of Alaska, the Russian-American Company would own the services of all natives within its purview and use them to exploit the region's natural resources. That description barely scratches the