DRAFT: 2.4.98

The Persian Gulf: Containment or Engagement?

U. S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been fluctuating between two contradictory doctrines: containment and engagement. Containment was the paramount doctrine of the Cold War initially proposed by George Kennan in his well-known Mr. Xs Foreign Affairs article. It managed to limit the expansion of the Sino-Soviet bloc beyond its own borders. But old ideas, particularly successful ones, never die. They continue to overshadow and cloud our understanding of new realities.

The realities of the post-Cold War era are radically different from the Cold War years. Soviet Union has disappeared. China has opened its gates to foreign investment and international trade. Although the United States is the single superpower around, it cannot dictate to the rest of the world. We are in a multipolar world in which Europe, Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, and India each have different policies to pursue in their own spheres of interests. Even small powers such as Israel, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya can thumb their nose at the United States and get away with it.

Yet, U. S. foreign policy continues to be caught in the contradictions of post-Cold War perspectives and policies. During the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the world often persuaded U. S. allies to go along with its policies. They did so sometimes despite grave reservations. In the post-Cold War era, there is no such compelling reason. Therefore, trying to contain the enemies by engaging the allies does not work. In the post-Cold War era, there is no Soviet Union and therefore no allies or enemies left vis-¦-vis a clear and present adversary. The concepts have thus lost much of their efficacy.

Such contradictions are well demonstrated in the Persian Gulf. Following the successful rallying of the United Nations against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, the United States has tried to follow a policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq. That policy has failed to a degree that the State Department is now too embarrassed to continue using the phrase. Nevertheless, the substance of the policy continues to be pursued rather unsuccessfully. The Persian Gulf War allies and supporters are no longer willing to follow a policy that leads nowhere. Russia and China have refused to sanction a renewed bombing of Iraq while Europe is expressing misgivings. Unless the United States has an effective plan to remove Saddam, bombing does not appear capable of achieving its declared objectives: forcing Iraq to comply with UN inspection and getting rid of weapons of mass destruction.

In the case of Iran, United States finds itself alone in pursuing a policy of isolating that country. That policy has denied the U. S. companies access to Iranian oil and markets while the West Europeans, Russians, Japanese, and Chinese have continued their trade and investment. The partial success in denying Iran full access to Western capital and technology and Caspian oil passage through Iranian routes is a mixed blessing. It impoverishes the country while strengthening the hands of the extremists against the moderates.

The time is ripe for a fundamental rethinking of the premises of such policies. In the post-Cold War era, engagement presents a far more realistic approach to world problems and trouble spots than containment. As the case of China is amply demonstrating, U. S. and other nations have been able to influence the Chinese leadership much more effectively by entering into trade and dialogue with that country than containing it. Economic development in any country generally empowers new sectors of the population which, in turn, call for broader political participation in decision making. By impoverishing Iran and Iraq through economic sanctions, the United States has managed to provide ammunition to those that have labeled it as the Great Satan. It has also turned a vicious dictator such as Saddam Hussein into a martyr in the eyes of some Arab nationalists.

A policy of engagement in the Persian Gulf would call for the United States to play an entirely different role in that region. Comparable to the role that Britain played in the 19th century world affairs, that role could be that of a balancer of power. In the words of one statesman, Britain had no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests. Instead of isolating Iran and Iraq, the two most populated and resourcerich countries in the region, the United States should act as an honest broker. It should immediately call for a Regional Security Conference under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors of any agreement. The aim of this conference should be to conclude (a) a regional non-aggression pact, (b) an arms control pact dealing with all weapons of mass destruction, and (c) a regional cooperation pact including an agreement on long-term stability in the flow and price of oil as well as consideration of a regional common market.

The oil producers and consumers in this region have strong long-term economic interests that outweigh their present political differences. They are or should be all concerned with the long-term stability of price and flow of oil. They are or should be all committed to preserving the existing borders. Finally, they all should be committed to a peaceful resolution of their disputes rather than wars that serve no purpose except the desire to dominate or the thirst for vengeance.