RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE1

By Majid Tehranian
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research

Economic and Political Weekly, 32:50, December 13-19, 1997, New Delhi

"Those who would take over the earth
And shape it to their will
Never, I notice, succeed.
The earth is like a vessel so scared
That at the mere approach of the profane
It is marred
And when they reach out their fingers it is gone."

-Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 29

Theories of modernization and development have been largely grounded on secularist assumptions. From Marx to Freud and Parsons, industrial society has been assumed to be the graveyard of religious faith. Marx called religion "an opiate of the masses," a false consciousness which will be banished from historical stage by the rise of the proletariat's true, class consciousness, a socialist revolution, and the construction of a secular, rational, and scientific communist society. Similarly, Freud considered religion as an "illusion," catering to the infantile impulses of helplessness and need for protection that will be replaced by the growth of adult personality assuming rational consciousness and social responsibility. In a like manner, Parsons and a whole generation of postwar positivist social scientists also continued to propose that modernization correlates positively with structural-functional differentiation, secularization, and political participation.

The rise of militant religious and ethnic movements in the post Cold War era is a challenge to these secularist perspectives. It appears to have a dual origin. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the bipolar structure of world politics has unleashed an explosion of the long oppressed ethnic, religious, and social movements. In the Cold War era, the periphery power aspirations were either repressed or exploited by the two superpowers to achieve their own objectives. Ethnic claims to national sovereignty have now filled the power vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and partial withdrawal of the United States. Secondly and more importantly, however, the processes of modernization have been mobilizing and fragmenting traditional societies to such high degrees of atomization that identity insecurities and anxieties have become a permanent feature of the modern world. Mass nationalist, ethnic, and religious movements have emerged to provide a cultural and political home to the teeming millions of uprooted individuals stranded in the congested cities and countryside.

This chapter provides an overview of the religious types of discontent. It briefly reviews the different interpretations of the rise of the so-called fundamentalist movements, and analyzes the impact of militant religious movements on education and the media in India, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Guatemala.

Seven Models in Search of Fundamentalism

The voluminous literature on the rise of religious militancy in politics seems to present at least seven different although overlapping explanatory models of fundamentalism. Common to most of the movements studied under the rubric of "fundamentalism" is an Anti-Secularist stance. The corresponding explanatory model predicates a reaction against the worldwide penetration of the European Enlightenment and, from the religious perspectives, its most insidious consequence, namely, the displacement of the sacred from the center to the periphery of society. This marginalizing or trivializing of the sacred often corresponds to the marginalization of the masses under the pressures of rapid urbanization and modernization in periphery countries (e. g. Iran and Guatemala) and periphery regions (e. g. the Bible Belt in the United States). Thus an Anti-Elitist interpretation of the religious movements points to the fact that in some movements, especially in the Third World, religious militancy seems to appeal primarily to the marginal classes, including the lower middle class urban populations (as in Guatemala) as well as the intelligentsia from the same social backgrounds (as in most of the Islamic world), suppressed ethnic or religious minorities (as the Shiites in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine), and marginalized majorities such as the Hindu revivalists in India. In the closely related Anti-Imperialist model, religious militancy is mainly interpreted as a reaction against Western colonial and post-colonial forms of domination. Islamism in both its Shiites and Sunni variants is frequently cited as providing strong evidence for this particular interpretation. The Anti-Communist model provides a partial explanation of the North and South American Protestant fundamentalisms.

Anti-Modernism seems also to be a shared family resemblance for many militant religious movements. In this model, religious militancy is explained as a critical reaction against the consequences of modernity and its orientation to secular rationality. These consequences include the erosion of the religious tradition from within and the perverse applications of science and technology by a modern secular intelligentsia. One of the unsavory product of modernity to most religious militants is the liberation of women from traditional gender roles. Thus, an Anti-Feminist interpretation of religious militancy is useful in reference to a variety of fundamentalist movements. A reassertion of the patriarchal values against the modern feminist values is reflected in the militant religious discourses against abortion, co-education, unveiling, and more generally, women's full and equal participation in social, economic, and political life. In the perceptions of religious militancy across different traditions, the combinations of these insidious trends has led to a pervasive deterioration of the moral order and the traditional social nexus that presumably once governed societies. Accordingly, an Anti-Decadence interpretation sees fundamentalism as a cultural revolution against these deteriorations and an attempt to restore the spiritual and moral values of religious traditions.

These seven models converge in different configurations in specific interpretations. Religious militancy appears as a "reactive" phenomenon in all of these interpretations. But it does not appear to be "reactionary" in all cases (Marty 1988). As this schematic presentation suggests, there is no one single explanation of religious militancy equally applicable to all cases. Each case must be understood in terms of its own unique features. The following case studies provide therefore a necessary antidote to the generalizations of this overview analysis. Nevertheless, the case studies at hand present a sufficient number of recurrent themes in militant religionist discourses and practices in education and the media to warrant some generalizations. Given the diversity of causes and consequences of religious militancy, we may need a hierarchy of explanations.

As indicated above, militant religious movements are characterized most consistently as Anti-Secularist, that is, as an expression of a revolt against the so-called "secular humanist" projects of the European Enlightenment. The failure of the secular ideologies of progress to address (let alone resolve) the human conditions of finitude, fragility, and evil, has in our time reinforced the perennial longings for religion and religious ideologies. This is particularly the case in periods of rapid historical change of recent decades in such places as the Bible Belt of the United States, Eastern Europe, and many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The human conditions of ontological insecurity (Laing 1969)--of insecurity about being and existence itself-- have been deepened by the manifest insufficiency of social and political solutions to the persistent problems of transition from an agrarian to an urban, industrial society. In this context, religious sensibilities and solutions return to a level of credibility they had lost in the rationalist, secularist age of European modernization in the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the reaction to secularizing processes seems to be a necessary and not sufficient condition for the rise of religious militancy.

Wherever the secularist discourse converges with foreign domination tied to the hegemony of an indigenous secular elite, anti-imperialism has found its greatest ally in a revival of primordial identities, including nativistic religions, languages, and ethnicities. In the Third World, secular nationalism, communism, and national liberation movements represented the earlier responses to the challenges of foreign domination. But in the eyes of the natives, the moral and political decline of the West has depreciated the secular ideologies and valorized the nativist religions as an alternative ideological vehicle for resistance against both foreign powers and indigenous secular rulers. This interpretation seems particularly valid wherever the native religion (such as Hinduism and Islam) could be also historically identified with past periods of independence and glory. In such cases, anti-imperialism, populism, and religious militancy have combined in providing a potent ideological potion. Cultural survival, national independence, and social transformation are the dominant themes of such fundamentalist movements and discourses.

The anti-communism of most militant religious movements presents some paradoxes for the previous interpretation. In the United States, the combination of populism and religious militancy found a convenient ideological ally in American nationalism and Cold War anti-communism. In much of the Third World, anti-communism may be considered as part of the more general anti-secularist and anti-foreign sentiments. However, in some Latin American countries such as Guatemala, where the growth of Protestant evangelism and religious militancy has been largely assisted by the financial and political support of U. S. fundamentalists, anti-imperialism and anti-communism seem to be sometimes at odds. This paradox appears less so, however, if we consider the fact that Roman Catholicism in much of Latin America is the religion of the ruling elites. The populist revolt against this elite has consequently expressed itself in two competing religious forms, i. e., the Theology of Liberation movement in the Catholic Church and the fundamentalist and evangelical movements in the Protestant Churches. But as Guatemala demonstrates, Protestant evangelicalism is also caught in the class struggle between the rich and the poor deeply divided between the older populist and the more recent counter-revolutionary churches.

The anti-marginalist interpretations of religious militancy explain this paradox in greater detail. The resurgence of religious consciousness in general and political religions in particular may be also viewed as efforts to redefine the world in terms more comprehensible to the peripheries of power while empowering them to act on behalf of their own perceived interests. Politically and economically, modernization processes have privileged the new secular, technocratic, and managerial elites at the expense of the traditionalist segments of the population. In the Third World, the secular elites also tend to be locked into and allied with the world capitalist system and are, therefore, perceived as a fifth column. The religious opposition, by contrast, often constitutes a second stratum of the elite ready to challenge the authority and prerogatives of the dominant elites. Furthermore, the resort to religious ideologies and movements to launch counter-hegemonic projects is historically rooted in the anti-imperialist and populist movements. In other words, culture has provided a last-ditch defense mechanism for the peripheries against the centers of power. Language, religion, ethnicity, and cultural preferences as reflected in educational and media programs have been thus politicized in a variety of contexts to an unprecedented degree.

The anti-feminist discourse and practice of religious militancy vary greatly from movement to movement subject to the specific cultural and historical contexts. However, a return to the traditional definition of sex roles as found in the holy scriptures or hallowed traditions seems to inspire them all. The division of labor between women as the homemakers and men as the field, factory, and office workers stands at the root of such traditional sex roles. However, the specific issues on which religious militancy has focused vary from society to society. Freedom of sexual relations is viewed as promiscuity in most militant religious discourse. Exclusion of women from certain professions traditionally reserved for men provides another controversial issue among the religious militants. Subordination of women to men at home or in society, however, constitutes an implicit if not explicit maxim in most religious militancy.

As recent studies of "fundamentalism" have amply demonstrated (Marty and Appleby), the anti-modernist sentiments of the fundamentalist movements do not result in a rejection of modernity. The cases discussed here add further documentation to this point by demonstrating that religious militancy in Iran, the United States, and Guatemala--and to a lesser extent, in northern India and Israel-- have shown an ingenuity in the adoption of the modern media of communication for their own purposes. And while the battle against some modern scientific theories such as evolution theory seems to be universally shared, some militant religious educators would go to extraordinary lengths to "prove" the scientific validity of the Biblical or Quranic prophecies. It appears that the power and prestige of modern science and technology is so overwhelming that religious movements and discourses have generally found their own unique ways of coping with some modern views while rejecting others. The variation in religious receptivity to modern science, technology, and life styles seems to be a function of the different cultural strategies adopted.

Last but not the least, the anti-decadence interpretation is often put forward by the religious militants themselves. To restore spirituality and decency, militant religious movements all seem to turn to education and the media for the socialization, recruitment, and organization of their members. In fact, both traditional and modern networks of communication in the religious institutions, schools, and the media have served as the indispensable tools in the formation and dissemination of militant religious messages. However, in those historical contexts in which the schools and the macromedia of communication (the national press and broadcasting) have been largely in control of secular authorities, militant religious movements have relied heavily on alternative schools and media. In the United States, for instance, the history of recent fundamentalist and evangelical movements is closely tied with the development of new fundamentalist television stations and higher educational institutions. In the Islamic world, the militant movements have availed themselves of the traditional educational, cultural, and communication forms and channels in conjunction with the modern micromedia (telephones, cassette recorders, copying machines, and mimeographing) to launch effective campaigns for the dissemination of their ideologies and programs.

Control of educational and media channels appears to be a function of government policy, cost, access, as well as degrees of social engagement and political activism of the militant religious groups. In India, the use of micromedia seems to have been somewhat constrained by the low levels of income and access. Hindu militancy concentrates therefore primarily on education and electoral campaigns for the propagation of its message. By sharp contrast, fundamentalism and evangelism in the United States have extensive access to their own broadcasting facilities and have extended some of it to Central America. In many less developed countries, governments directly or indirectly control broadcasting and access for the public to such facilities is therefore limited. In Israel, Egypt, and pre-revolutionary Iran, audio and sometimes video-cassettes have found extensive uses in fundamentalist education and propaganda. The Iranian case is the best-known (Tehranian 1979). The Ayatollah's messages were transmitted from exile via long-distance telephone calls while cheap transistor audio-cassettes recorded them for transcription by long-hand to be mass produced by copying machines at government agencies! They were widely disseminated within a few hours of transmission through the mosque and school networks. The same phenomenon has been recurring in other situations such as the Intifada Movement among the West Bank Palestinians (Shinar 1987), the Jewish fundamentalists in Israel, and the Sunni Muslim fundamentalist groups in Egypt.

Seeking access to the media, however, seems to be a function of specific strategies of social and political engagement. The more engaged groups need and employ the media in their cause; the less engaged rely more on religious networks and schooling. Separatist groups such as Farawiya and Hijra wa Takfir in Egypt as well as the Amish and the Hutterites in North America often reject science, technology and sometimes even literacy as manifestations of an evil modern world. But the socially engaged groups have no hesitation in employing the modern means of communication, education, and weaponry in their campaigns.

In Islamic radicalism, as Sivan suggests, modernity is diagnosed as a threefold problem: "the diagnosis-- modernity as Jahiliyya [the epoch of "Ignorance" before the dawn of Islam]; the cure-- rebellion (first internal, then external); the means for administering that cure-- the tali'a (vanguard) of the True Believers organized as counter- society" (Sivan 1985: 186). The counter-society considers secular education and media as the root of all evil while calling for their total control in a religiously reconstituted society. While the strategic goal remains constant, the tactics are a function of time and circumstances. Whenever and wherever the militant religious groups have some measure of political power and access, they use the regular commercial or government media and school systems. In the United Sates and Guatemala, they now are a permanent part of the media and educational tapestry. The Gush Emunim in Israel has its own radio station and recently acquired its own television station. From time to time, e. g. after the assassination of Sadat in 1980, the Egyptian government allowed some Islamist views to be aired in the mass media so that they can be refuted (Sivan 1985: ch. 2). However, as Sivan notes:

"... the ubiquitous modern challenge-- especially the global village of the media and pervasive state control-- made the withdrawal response less and less tenable, at least for all but tiny groups. Long-term educational efforts, designed to convert society segment by segment to "true Islam," has today even less prospect of success than when Sayyid Qutb began to doubt its efficacy as sole means thirty years ago, before the age of transistor radios, television, and the gigantic growth of the higher educational system. Seizure of power from the hands of 'Mongol rulers' like Anwar Sadat and Hafez Assad thus came to be perceived as the only answer to the threat." (Sivan 1985: 129)

In summary, religious militancy appears primarily as a reactive phenomenon-- to the unsettling effects of rapid social change (over-modernization in developing countries, post-modernization in the developed), to marginalization (of the ethnic majorities as in the cases of the Malay in Malaysia and the Hindus in India), to relative material or psychological deprivation (among the urban ghetto or yuppie fundamentalists, i. e. young upwardly mobile professionals), and to commodity fetishism as an antithesis to its own identity fetishism. It may or may not be a passing social phenomenon as it seizes power (as in Iran), or is frustrated by the superior power of the state (as in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, or Algeria), is gradually integrated into the mainstream of cultural life (as in the case of Moral Majority in the United States), or is allied to the ruling elites in preserving the status quo (as in Guatemala and Saudi Arabia). Its alternative strategies thus consist of revolutionary militancy (for total power), withdrawal (from mainstream society), accommodation (with the rest of society), or a relentless conservation of traditional religious values and norms. One of its unintended consequences might be to pave the way for greater epistemological tolerance between religious and secular worldviews as each one softens its monopolistic truth claims. Alternatively, it may take over and rule with an iron fist until it too is chastened by the human facts of diversity and need for tolerance.

Modernity and Its Discontents

To understand the historical roots of religious militancy, it is useful to consider it in the context of the problematic of modernization. I have argued elsewhere (Tehranian 1980) that the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, i. e. the complex package of revolutionary changes generally labeled as "modernization," seems to have historically entailed a Rousseau effect in most places. Religious militancy might be considered as another manifestation of this effect in our own times. As a major theorist of the Enlightenment Project, J. J. Rousseau provided one of the first and most intellectually sustained critiques of the Age of Reason by celebrating a return to the original innocence and goodness of the natural man, the so-called "noble savage." He also advocated recapturing the lost natural community by a social contract based more on a fusionist "general will" (volonte generale) than a divisive "will of all" (volonte de tous) or electoral head-counting (Rouseau 1968). This romantic and communitarian theme recurs in a variety of subsequent social movements in modern history. Despite their great variation in context and program, the Romantic movement in Europe, the American Transcendentalists, the Russian Narodniks, the Gandhian movement in India, and the Hindu and Islamist movements have one feature in common: a reaction against the social and psychological dislocations of the transition of millions of peasants from rural into urban areas, and a call for a return to nature and the simple virtues of traditional life. As William McNeil (1991:12) also points out:

"... even in affluent communities most persons do face hardship and disappointment of one sort or another in the course of their lives and then need comfort and support of a kind that cold reason and individualistic pursuit of happiness cannot provide; while among the hundreds of millions of peasants and ex-peasants, whose inherited rural ways of life have become impractical or unacceptable, hardship and disappointment are and will remain the norm, at least for the immediate future. Their need for comfort and support is correspondingly acute and ever present."

The meta-discourse of modernization has thus generated two sets of competing discourses in the modern world. On the one hand, the hegemonic projects of liberalism, communism, and fascism have offered a secular, scientific, and technological path to modernization. On the other hand, a variety of counter-hegemonic, communitarian discourses such as those of the European Romanticists, American Transcendentalists, utopian socialists, religious communalists, and contemporary Green movements have proposed a more decentralized and less rapacious route. Religious militancy seems to combine elements of these two discourses in a fashion reminiscent of the earlier discourses of secular nationalism; it offers worldly success without sacrificing the affective ties of meaning and community to the cash nexus. For this reason, the label of "religious militancy" is a more satisfactory characterization than the pejorative label of fundamentalist, which is often rejected by even by the Protestant fundamentalists to whom it may apply more accurately than others.

The material challenge facing modernization is how to build the necessary social and economic infrastructure of a modern industrial system. Historically, this task has been achieved by less than liberal means. The generation of the necessary economic surplus to get the industrial sector going often involves the exploitation of the peasantry and working class by keeping food prices and wages low over a few generations. That in turn requires the kind of discipline, order, and effort that only a political dictatorship and an authoritarian ideology has historically been able to produce. The transition from agrarian feudalism to modern industrial societies has been often accomplished by statist (etatist ) regimes under the banners of European enlightened despotism, totalitarian communism and fascism (as in the Soviet Union, China, and Japan), or authoritarian leaderships (as in the newly industrializing countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) (Anon., 1991). These regimes have employed a variety of ideologies of work ethics and postponed gratification to legitimate the sacrifices necessary for the period of primitive accumulation. In this respect, secular nationalist, communist, and fascist ethics have performed essentially the same function as the Protestant, Confucian, or Islamic ethics.

In the less developed countries, therefore, religious militancy might be considered in the light of the ideological role of Calvinism and Puritanism in the earlier periods of capitalist accumulation in Europe and the United States. Contemporary fundamentalism, however, owes much of its potency to a threefold revolutionary process in population, education, and communication. The postwar spread of public health facilities in developing countries has led to a population explosion unprecedented in human history. This in turn has created population structures heavily skewed in favor of the youth. Simultaneously, the expansion of educational opportunities to large masses by development-conscious governments has expanded the horizons and expectations of the youth. However, the revolution of rising expectations is not matched by rising opportunities. Unemployment rates of 30-40 percent are not uncommon in some developing countries. In the meantime, the mass media of communication are exposing the youth to a global pop culture that flaunts sex, violence, and the pursuit of pleasures.

The youth from a rural or newly-urban family background is thus typically exposed to at least three sets of conflicting values at home, school, and society at large. The traditional, often religious, values of the family demand modesty, frugality, and obedience to authority. The secular schools, on the other hand, impart a mix of religious and secular nationalist values primarily calling for loyalty to the national symbols of authority and the application of the scientific method to personal and social problem solving. Finally, the urban society exposes the youth to a complex range of values reflected in the exhilarating license of the modern life styles portrayed in Dallas, Dynasty, Bay Watch, and Melrose Place as well as in the repression and fear of living under authoritarian regimes. The response to these conflicting messages is initially one of confusion but subsequently a search for meaning and certainty prone to ideological extremism and syncretism. Combining traditional religious doctrines with selected elements of Marxism, nationalism, liberalism, or even fascism is well-known among certain groups such as the Islamic Marxists and the Christian Theology of Liberation.

The processes of primary, secondary, and tertiary socialization often carried out, respectively, by the family, school, and public discourse (through mediated and unmediated channels) thus tend to be at odds. Most militant religious movements clearly understand the pivotal importance of these socializing institutions and the value conflicts among them. Their strategies are therefore focused on a recapture of the family, school, and the media institutions as gateways to political and cultural power and influence. Generally speaking, in the pre-mobilized phases of a religious movement, the family and alternative schooling serve as the main channels for restoring the life of the sacred to an inner core of believers. Islamist, Hindu, and Jewish movements in Iran, India, and Israel seem to have chosen this strategy in their earlier stages. However, as political mobilization assumes momentum, a greater resort to the mass media in order to reach out to a broader spectrum of society becomes increasingly desdirable.

Fundamentalist Education and Media

Despite these commonalties among militant religious movements, there are also vast differences. In order to compare the impact of education and the media in a variety of religious traditions, a typology of militant movements is necessary. The typology offered here highlights the strategic objectives and consequences of religious militancy rather than theological beliefs and tendencies. As a challenge to secular authority, the simplest and perhaps most appropriate typology of such movements is a political one.

The five countries discussed here have all come directly or indirectly under the political impact of militant movements. Iran became an Islamic Republic in 1979. Guatemala gained a Pentecostalist leader when General Efrain Rios Montt assumed the Presidency in 1982; it also elected Jorge Serrano, a Protestant evangelical businessman President in 1990. India's Prime Minister V. P. Singh resigned in 1990 in the face of pressures from militant Hindus and higher castes opposed to his policies of protection for the Muslim minority and compensatory hiring of the lower castes. In the national elections of June 1991, following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a Hindu fanatic, the Bharatiya Jana Party won over 25% of the ballots cast, took over India's biggest State, Uttar Pradesh, and achieved the status of a national party. Had Rajiv Gandhi not been assassinated, it might have also emerged as the biggest single party (Anon. 1991: 37-38). In 1990, Israel's conservative Likud Party in alliance with the Jewish religious parties once again won a parliamentary majority against the challenge of the liberal, secularist Labor Party . American presidents Reagan and Bush have played to the Christian Coalition of militant constituencies in stressing their opposition to abortion, support for prayer in schools, and approval of the conservative backlash against the sexual and cultural "decadence" of the 1960s and 1970s.

These and similar examples demonstrate only that militant religious groups have been recently involved in political life. But the levels, purposes, and outcomes of that involvement vary significantly. One way of establishing a basis for comparison is to stress the commonly held perceptions that inspire militant interactions with non-militant groups. The movements studied in this chapter have reacted to what they perceive to be the unsettling effects of rapid social change and the uneven and imperfectly integrated process of modernization; to perceptions of their marginalization (in the urban ghettoes and among the ethnic minorities); and to an awareness of their own material or psychic deprivation. To all of these uncertainties, militant religious movements bring the certainties of a renewed faith, identity, and community.

However, different militant movements interact in different ways with the non-militant and enjoy varying degrees of influence upon them. Different movements are also affected in different ways by their interaction with outsiders. The inner tensions of particular militant ideologies and movements in large part shape the political strategy they adopt toward outsiders (including the apolitical strategy). The struggles within militant movements range between populist and elitist tendencies, dogmatism and pragmatism, and scriptural literalism and liberalism. While most militant movements are based on authoritarian leadership, for example, they also thrive by virtue of an equally strong attachment to the common people, their interests, and their salvation. While most militant movements draw strength from religious dogmas, as movements they have had to formulate and adapt their ideologies to changing circumstances in order to achieve their political and religious objectives. The relationship between the revealed dogmas and the movement's ideology of the moment is a constant source of tension. And while most militant movements consider their holy scriptures or traditions as the source of literal truth, they also provide novel interpretations of the revelation significantly at odds with those of the religious orthodoxy's.

The common thread among all religious militancy is, as we have argued, a reaction to a commonly perceived set of enemies in the external order. However, there is also considerable diversity among militant religious movements with respect to four major strategies taken in interaction with non-militants: conservation of traditional values in the face of encroachments of modernity, accommodation (with the rest of society), revolutionary militancy (for total power), and withdrawal (from mainstream society). Each of these responses has in turn called for its corresponding conservative, reformist, revolutionary, and separatist strategies in building educational and communication systems.

Lacking comprehensive political programs, the separatist strategy considers the integrity and solidarity of the community as the highest value; groups such as the Haredim in Israel consequently emphasize authoritarianism, dogmatism, and literalism almost to the exclusion of populism, dogmatism, and liberalism. Bob Jones University combines a separatist with a conservative strategy emphasizing authoritarianism at the expense of populism, dogmatism at the expense of pragmatism, and inerrancy at the expense of the more liberal interpretations of the holy scriptures (Schultze 1993). The reformist strategy appeals equally to authoritarianism and populism, dogmatism and pragmatism, and literalism and liberalism. Jerry Falwell's approach to Liberty University seems to have settled into this mode, as have the efforts of evangelicals in Guatemala and Hindu revivalists in India. The revolutionary strategy tends to favor populism to authoritarianism, pragmatism to dogmatism, and liberalism to literalism. This strategy has been in evidence in Iran during the last two decades.

Table 5.1 presents a schematic view of these alternative strategies in terms of their over-all aims, political tactics, educational methods, and communication channels. The table clearly presents the Weberian "ideal types." In reality, religious militancy may combine two or more strategies in the course of its evolution. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for instance, was militant before the coup d'etat of 1952, collaborated with the Nasserist regime for a while, then went underground and, under Sadat and Mubarak, has split into radical and moderate factions with the latter engaged in reformist and electoral politics.

Table 5.1 Political Strategies of Religious Militancy

Strategies	Conservative	Separatist	Reformist	Revolutionary
Aims	Conserve Tradition	Avoid Contamination	Reformation	Overhaul Society
Tactics	Reactionary alliance with state	Withdrawal & under- ground activities	Accommodationist: Electoral politics	Militant: propaganda, agitation, terror, violence
Typical Movements	Wahhabi: Saudi Arabia	Takfir va Hijra: Egypt Haredi Jews: Israel	Moral Majority: USA	Hizbullah: Iran, Lebanon
Educational Methods	State schools	Alternative schools	Alternative curriculum	Educational overhaul
Communication Channels	State media + Religious networks	Underground micro- media + Religious networks	Electronic church + Religious networks	Macro + Micromedia + Religious networks

Separatist Strategies. Among the militant religious movements, the Haredi "learning community" seems best to fit the features of a separatist strategy of political, social and educational action. The hallmark of the Haredi movement is politics of anti-politics focusing on its opposition to Zionism as a profane and secular enterprise. The Haredi Jews consider the State of Israel to be a continuation of the Galut (exile), albeit in the Holy Land. They are obligated to refrain from joining this enterprise and to focus their entire being on learning in the holy community for the purpose of transcending this world. The institutions of this learning begin at an Orthodox Jewish home and continue into the synagogue, the elementary school (Heder), and the high school (the Yeshiva). Torah study creates a total world by which Haredi Jews insulate the Torah and the life it prescribes from outside influences. The Haredim, as Michael Rosenak (1993) notes, disdain cultural interactions that would put them at risk. "They wish to protect themselves against false knowledge, " that is, against methodologies or data that allegedly militate against the truth of Torah and undermine the Jewish life of covenant." Haredi learning therefore is not comparable with what constitutes learning in the profane world; it does not satisfy curiosity, broaden horizons, gather "useful" information, conduct inquiry for the purposes of problem-solving, or theorize in order to understand and control. Instead, the Haredi curriculum is to instruct Jews in separatism and the preservation of purity; it must reflect and draw upon the constant struggle against the outside world, with its profane views of teaching, of the child and of achievement. Traditionalism in methods of rote learning, withdrawal from society, distinctive hair styles, long dark robes, refusal to serve in the army, and a general disdain for the secular world distinguish the Haredim.

The attempt to sustain the religious enclave has nonetheless placed the Haredi in a paradoxical situation that forces them away from mere traditionalism and into the orbit of modernity as an adaptive movement. Rosenak (1993) explains that even Haredi self-definition is drawn in relation to the outside world: "The Community of Transcendence and Torah, living in a fragile relationship with 'the Zionists' on whom it is so greatly dependent, not only withdraws from the modernists and their false standards and conceptions of knowledge and worth but (except in its most radical sectors) explains this withdrawal as serving the 'real' needs of society and state." This philosophical and cultural dispute with secular Zionism has moved segments of the Haredim to modify their tradition-based orientation to more effectively compete with the enemy. Rosenak finds significance in the fact that the extremists among the Haredim, aware that educational theories and methods cannot be divorced from philosophies and goals, have nervously castigated "moderate" Haredi educators who have introduced modern methods into education, believing them to be "neutral." Another departure from strict separatism and traditionalism noted by Rosenak is the intense "missionizing" of the maverick Haredi movement of Habad hasidism. Open to non-Haredi Jews, Habad's outreach work is highly successful and specializes in "soft sell" -- in the army, at street corners and bus stations. The general view, even among secular Jews, has been that "Habad is all right," though its recent active role in Haredi politics has created suspicion in some circles.

Bob Jones University (BJU) is in some ways the Christian fundamentalist analogue to the cultural separatism practiced by the Haredi Jews in Israel. In other ways, BJU also adopts a conservative strategy in its intent to train missionaries and pastors to sustain and expand the fundamentalist subculture in the United States. By the purity of their own lives, Quentin Schultze (1993) notes, this style of Christian fundamentalists is to be witnesses to the truths of conservative doctrine and behavior. From their separatist citadels, they are to militantly defend "'Biblical authority and infallibility'" by attacking "'the enemies of the faith.'" BJU' s brand of fundamentalism, Schultze maintains, does indeed imply both defensive and offensive strategies. Faith comes before reason, religion before academics, and personal conversion before formal education. Believers must know where they stand religiously before they are trained academically. "BJU requires students, Schultze (1993) notes, "to take at least one Bible course every semester, demands chapel attendance and generally controls the personal life style of its students, including dating practices, which are strictly regulated. Challenges to stated beliefs and practices are nothing short of disloyalty, which Bob Jones, Sr., called an 'unpardonable sin.'"

On the other hand, BJU seeks to prepare its students not just to live and know fundamentalism but also to militantly defend and thus conserve it and the values for which it stands. These fundamentalists will openly contend for the faith even when their own separatist communities are not directly under outside attack by critics. The "Creed of the College" calls upon BJU graduates to combat "'all atheistic, agnostic, pagan, and so-called scientific adulterations of the Gospel.'" This broader mandate, Schultze (1993) points out, required far more than doctrinal knowledge and behavioral purity; it demanded a fairly broad, liberal education that examined and evaluated secular ideas and social trends. The fact remains, however, that the university has not fully met these demands; its emphasis on communication skills has not been balanced with serious academic inquiry and open intellectual discussion and dialogue. Such openness would be a challenge to the strict separatism of Bob Jones-style fundamentalism. The cost of failing to relax the separatist stance is counted in BJU's correspondingly diminished effectiveness as a genuinely conservative institution.

Nonetheless, BJU has trained thousands of fundamentalist elementary and secondary school teachers -- graduates who often use textbooks published by BJU Press. And it has supported a flourishing fundamentalist subculture in America on its own terms, as evidenced by its refusal to adjust its racial policies in order to reclaim tax-exempt status after losing a Supreme Court case to the IRS in 1982. As Schultze (1993) puts it, "racial separation was a matter of religious principle, so there was no way to compromise."

It is instructive to note that in these separatist circles, mass media of communication play a limited role. The religious networks, schools, and small media serve as the main channels. In this respect, the separatist strategy has something in common with the underground revolutionary movements such as that in Iran which, under police surveillance, had to resort to low cost, accessible, and easily concealed micromedia. By contrast, among the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Israel, the cassette tapes are used to fight secularism from a defensive position, that is not for envangelical or revolutionary purposes (Anon 1991:44). There are two stores in Mea Shearim and 42 other lending libraries which distribute the religious cassettes. One store has 2500 subscribers.

It may be generalized that (1) a major tactic, especially among rabbis of sephardic origin, is the constant reference to current events, especially the explanation of disaster as the product of sin, failure to pray, observe commandments, and of miracles as product of the fact that many people were praying, (2) sermons are not given to be recorded; they are recorded as an additional activity while being delivered; (3) there is a handful of sermons by rabbis' wives; (4) a rhetorical strategy of some of the rabbis is to play brilliantly with language, including plays on words, alliteration, slang, and army jargon in their sermon; and (5) the preoccupation with causal explanations of miracles and disasters was especially prominent during the Gulf War in terms of rewards and punishments.

Conservative Strategies. Elements within fundamentalist Protestant movements in the United States and within the religious Zionist groups in Israel qualify for this label. Some may argue that the excesses of some of these movements qualify them as "reactionary" or "fanatical." Yet the movements under discussion clearly share a bias for conservative social, educational, and media policies. They have pushed their respective polities towards conservative and nationalistic policies.

Fundamentalist movements in the United States particularly focus on American primary, secondary, and tertiary education. The battle is in all cases for the recruitment, socialization, and organization of the young into fundamentalist ranks in pursuit of larger national and global missionary goals. These conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists have departed from a position of strict separatism; the impact of fundamentalist discourse and practice has extended well beyond their own classrooms into the American public school system and national political discourse. As Rose (1993) reports, the Christian School Movement has been the fastest growing sector of private education in the United States. Approximately one million students (K through 12) are enrolled into some 18,000 schools, representing about 20 percent of the total private school population. Since 1965, Catholic school enrollments (still the largest group among religious schools) have declined 54 percent, while enrollments in non-Catholic schools (mostly evangelical) have increased some 149 percent. As evangelicals and fundamentalists have asserted their presence and influence during the past two decades, they have moved away from an earlier separatist to a more conservative and activist strategy. This has drawn them into court battles to protect their schools and to make an impact well beyond. An index of this impact is the production and distribution of textbooks by the Accelerated Christian Education (ACE) to some 6,000 schools in the United States and 86 foreign countries, reaching over 275,000 students. ACE also provides curricula to 1,600 families in the U. S. and 300 families in foreign countries for home education.

The evangelical curricular contents, methods, and consequences are significantly different from the secular public schools. Fundamentalist education in the United States is a response to a set of perceived threats emanating from the general secularization of life and the legislatively mandated secularization of public schools. It aims at a restoration of religious and parental authority, provision of quality education, and protection of the children from the evils of drugs, sex, violence, and lack of discipline. Aside from the fundamentalist emphasis on the teaching of Bible, creationism, patriarchal values, and a denigration of secular humanism in general, the curriculum teaches the same subjects as the secular schools. The methods however include corporal punishment and standardized pedagogy. "ACE, for instance, provides all the information, materials, and equipment necessary to set a school quickly and inexpensively. No one teaches in ACE schools, rather students teach themselves. Little is open to question, all answers lie within the text," Rose (1993)writes. The consequences of this pedagogy are remarkable. ACE graduates have scored higher than 65 percent of a nationally representative sample of other students, and their Stanford Achievement Test scores appear to be one year and seven months ahead of the national norm. The graduates are considered by the military to be superior workers-- disciplined, obedient with respect for authority.

Evangelical schools draw their students from most socioeconomic groups, particularly from white, middle class families with an average income of $25,000, more educated than the national average. Given their relatively homogeneous social background and strong sense of community, the fundamentalists have had an impact on society beyond their numbers. They have managed during the past two decades to put the issues of prayer at schools, creationism, patriotism, flag burning, and textbook censorship on the national agenda for discussion. The Reagan Administration, under the leadership of Secretary of Education William Bennett, attempted first to eliminate and then to reduce the Department of Education. Although the fundamentalists have not succeeded in basically altering secular education, they have brought sufficient pressure on the secular schools to move them to the right of center, with an emphasis on the neutrality of the basic subjects and control through standardized programs. Rose (1993) argues that having partially achieved its educational aims, the movement may have reached a plateau with the possibility of a convergence of Christian and public schools.

Although frequently identified with the Electronic Church and televangelists such as Pat Robertson, Jimmy Swaggart, and Oral Roberts, fundamentalist higher education has moved beyond strict separatism and is actually represented most clearly by Jerry Falwell's Liberty University. The failure of Pat Robertson, in 1988, to win the Republican presidential nomination and the sexual and financial scandals of Jimmy Baker and Jimmy Swaggart during the 1980s have somewhat diminished the momentum of the Pentecostalist movement in higher education. It must be noted, however, that during the 1980s the movement achieved impressive success in reaching vast audiences through several television stations and programs, raising millions of dollars for its activities, including several institutions of higher learning. And in the 1990s Robertson's Regent University is consolidating the gains made by the television ministry in the 1980s. The marriage of television and higher education indeed proved a potent force in this movement (Tehranian, 1990: 141-146). Schultze (1993) demonstrates that the "New Evangelical" higher education represented by Liberty University (1) is not totally anti-intellectual, (2) has had an impact on the society at large, and (3) will not disappear but may be absorbed into the larger academic world. Although conservative in educational goals and methods, this approach to higher education does not reject modernization or interaction with the secular environment. In fact, it may be viewed as an attempt to reconcile conservative religious traditions with modern science, technology, and education.

As Schultze (1993) points out, Liberty and Regent have been willing to compromise in order to gain national legitimacy and accreditation. Even their unconventional academic units such as The Center for Creation Studies and the Museum of Earth and Life History at Liberty University have served the dual purpose of attracting conservative backers and gaining academic respectability. Although each of these universities is identified with a particular charismatic or authoritarian leader, both gained some measure of institutional independence from their founders. Regent University has also gone abroad to establish a branch in Poland.

The evidence shows therefore that evangelical higher education might have a dual impact. On the one hand, these institutions may traverse the same evolutionary path as other formerly religious colleges across the country have in the past, from strict separatist ("fundamentalist") education into conservative engagement with the mainstream culture ("new evangelical") until the process leads increasingly to a secular-pluralist model for higher education. On the other hand, both Liberty and Regent have already challenged the more secular institutions on such enduring issues as "the nature of the human condition, the place of norms in scholarship and society, the quest for universal meaning and significance, and even the search for standards of right conduct." Schultze (1993) argues that requirements of accreditation, the problems of accepting public funds, and the secularizing effects of higher education will likely temper fundamentalist education towards an accommodation with the rest of higher education in the United States.

As for media strategies, Fore (1987) discerns five 'generations' of the electronic church, spanning the history of American television. The first, represented by Billy Graham, was typified by the use of television to cover revival meetings, mush as it would a sport or political event. The second generation marked a change to the style and technique of Oral Roberts, a tent evangelist and faith healer. In the 1960s, a third generation represented by Rex Humbard built a church especially designed for television. A fourth generation was inaugurated by Pat Robertson's 700 Club, adopting a 'host show' format, in which he brought the viewing audience into intimate contact with the studio through phone-ins and membership in the 700 Club. Robertson also blazed the trail for a fifth generation by establishing his own network, Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). The CBN format for cable-satellite network has since been copied by many such as the PTL Club of Jim and Tammy Bakker. Typically, the audience for the electronic church is more female than male, older rather than younger, of lower income and education, from more southern and midwestern states, and more generally active church goers (Biernatzki 1991:13). The size of the audience for electronic church is a matter of considerable dispute. Estimates range from Gallup's 22.8 million to Annenberg School of Communication's estimate of 13.3 million (Biernatzki 1991:14).

In the Islamic world, the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia represents perhaps the best known and most successful example of a conservative fundamentalist strategy. As an eighteenth century movement, the Wahhabis antedated the impact of the modern world in Arabia, but they provided the ideological vehicle for the final triumph of the House of Saud in the twentieth century. The movement has also provided a highly puritanical Islamic doctrine to legitimate continuing Saudi rule, to seal off Saudi society from the more severe erosions of modernity, and to fend off internal and external challenges (for an official story, see Fouad Al-Farsy 1986).

Reformist Strategies. By contrast, reformist movements provide an example of an interventionist strategy. However, they seem to be characterized by an equilibrium between the forces of populism and elitism, dogmatism and pragmatism, and literalism and liberalism. This may be due to the fact that the status quo under such circumstances is perceived as indefensible, and it has to be changed. The militant religious discourse presents therefore a hegemonic project for an alliance of the old and new elites riding on the wave of a populist movement.

Guatemala and India present cases that exemplify this strategy. In both countries, militant religious movements represent new hegemonic projects combining nationalism and religion to challenge the authority of established secular elites. In Guatemala, in an alliance with North American evangelism and indigenous populism, Protestant evangelicalism is dislodging a corrupt, semi-feudal, Catholic elite. In India, Hindu militancy is undermining the hegemony of the secular Congress Party by whipping up religious nationalism and Hindu cultural politics.

In Guatemala, the situation has been dramatized by the left-wing guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union against whom the government has been fighting for the past three decades resulting in some 100,000 deaths. As Biernatzki (1991: 18) reports,

"When General Erfraim Rios Montee, a convert to Pentecostalism church, became president of Guatemala in 1982, he was hailed by the more politically-oriented North American televangelists, particularly the 700 Club of Pat Robertson. Guatemala was by no means unacquainted with militarism and repression prior to Rios Montt's presidency, but a new element of zeal was added by his Pentecostalist identity which may have contributed to the slaughter of thousands of Indians during his campaign to repress a leftist rebellion allegedly inspired by Catholic liberation theology but labeled 'Communist' by the army. By the time Rios Montt was overthrown, evangelical leaders in Guatemala had come to recognize that they were being blamed for his policies because he had created the impression that he wanted to set up a Protestant theocracy. They consequently tried to disassociate themselves from him. He had done little for Guatemalan Protestantism, and in fact many evangelical Indians had been caught up in the indiscriminate slaughter."

Despite the predominance of the military, defining the boundaries of civilian power, Guatemala elected its second civilian President in November 1990. The new President, Jorge Serrano, is an evangelical businessman who replaced Vicio Cerezo, leader of the Christian Democrats. Religious identification is as integral part of the Guatemalan political tapestry as much as the military is. The failure of the predominantly Catholic elite to make any serious attempt to change the country's semi-feudal power structure has in part led to the rival Protestant evangelical and neo-Pentecostals gaining ground. Serrano, the only evangelical Protestant ever elected to rule in a Latin American nation, won 68% of the vote in a run-off ballot in 1990. His campaign promise was to bring Guatemala "total peace." In April 1991, he opened peace negotiations with the left-wing guerrillas of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity movement. To achieve peace and democracy, he would have to tackle his generals. In the 30-year war against the guerrillas, the army killed thousands of the highland Indians among whom the insurgents lived, and burned hundreds of their villages. The generals are watching over Serrano's shoulders. General Hector Gramajo put down two coups before going last year to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, where he explained his doctrinal innovations to the Harvard International Review: "We have created a more humanitarian, less costly strategy, to be more compatible with the democratic system. We instituted civil affairs which provides development for 70% of the population, while we kill 30%. Before, the strategy was to kill 100%."

Susan Rose and Quentin Schultze (1993) demonstrated how Protestant evangelicalism and neo-Pentecostalism have advanced to serve certain interests in Guatemala. Their analysis challenges some prevailing interpretations such as Peter Berger's contention that we are witnessing the "Second Protestant Internationale" in Central America. That historical analogy suggests "revolutionary" potential for Protestantism while ignoring the essentially reformist and repressive nature of the alliance of fundamentalistic Protestantism with the military, transnational corporate interests, and the United States. However, the case study also points out how the Protestant churches, like the Catholic church, are torn in the class struggle between rich and poor, government and guerrillas. The authors argue persuasively that (1) we may be over-emphasizing the importance of Protestant evangelicalism and neo-pentecostalism in the same way that we overemphasized the role of Theology of Liberation; (2) that we must recognize the class interests framing the ideological positions of both the Theology of Liberation and neo-Pentecostalism (which "represent" Guatemala's professional and business classes), and; (3) if evangelical education and media join the chorus of the political right, old and new pentecostals may find a common voice in opposition to the left. In other words, a politicized fundamentalist Protestant movement may be considered as part of a new reformist, hegemonic discourse aligning the old feudal and new business elites against revolutionary change.

The case study by Rose and Schultze focuses on a careful analysis of the role of education and the media in the remarkable rise of evangelical awakening in Guatemala. Several factors seem to have contributed to this rise. First, the North American Electronic Church has played an important role in a media blitz of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Second, there are also indigenous religious and political forces in Guatemala which have paved the way. While it is "'not difficult to show how the religious right has tried to turn missionary work into an instrument for U. S. militarism,'" it is also true that "evangelism has widespread, popular support among the poor." In contrast to Catholic priests, 86.7 percent of whom are foreigners, almost all evangelical priests are Guatemalan. Third, evangelicals have grown in numbers from 3.5 percent thirty years ago to between 30-35 percent of the population. This remarkable growth has taken place primarily in the last two decades by a shift from written to oral traditions, and from old to neo-Pentecostalism. Neo-Pentecostalism has legitimized indigenous languages and preserved cultures even at the very point when they are undermined by an intrusive and corrosive world. Generally speaking, the neo-Pentecostals have supported the political right, consisting of the government, military, and middle and upper class business and professional interests. By contrast, the Catholic Theology of Liberation has sided with the left in championing the cause of the peasantry.

Turning to the roles of education and the media, Rose and Schultze argue that in Guatemala, where illiteracy rates are high, schooling scarce, and a traditional oral culture prevalent, together with the family and schools, the media play a central part in the socialization of children. It may be further argued that the mass media become more prominent as we move from the fundamentalist strategies of disengagement to one of engagement with the world outside, i.e., from separatist to reformist and revolutionary. In the case of the separatist groups such as the Farmawiya, and Takfir and Hijra in Egypt, science, technology and even literacy are sometimes rejected (Sivan, 1985: 120). But to the degree that a fundamentalist movement gets involved with reformist or revolutionary projects, the need for the use of modern means of education, communication, and warfare becomes apparent. The Guatemalan situation illustrates the point further. The difference between old and neo-Pentecostalism becomes particularly clear in their respectively conservative and reformist political and curricular projects. With one of the lowest per capita expenditures on public education (1.8 percent) in Latin America, one of the highest drop-out rates (90 percent never make it to secondary school and 99 percent never to university), the neo-Pentecostals have embarked on an educational venture that the Catholic elite had failed to launch. While the old-style Pentecostal churches (the Assemblies of God, the Church of God, and the Jehovah's Witnesses) worked extensively among the poor, the new Pentecostals are providing education for the Protestant middle and upper classes by the establishment of relatively expensive private schools. They also import North American fundamentalist values into the curriculum "that strongly support the free enterprise system and condemn communism as the work of Satan. The curriculum communicates that Catholics are non-Christians and Jews are not accepted by God; that secular humanism and relativism are diabolical dangers in the public schools; and that it is essential to restore the United States to the status of a truly Christian nation while simultaneously Christianizing the rest of the world." Modernity is thus accepted as an instrument but not as a value system.

The impact of evangelical fundamentalism on Guatemalan public education, mass media, and national ideology has been far-reaching. Despite their opposition to scientific research, the evangelicals in Guatemala have become the new professional and social engineers. They are interested in social reform in ways that parallel the Social Gospel in the United States at the turn of the century. They are not however interested in directly transforming the basic social structures of inequality. They hope to improve society through combinations of personal religious conversion, individual self-discipline, and professional social work. The growth of fundamentalist radio broadcasting has been astounding even compared to the United States. By 1988, there were 145 radio stations, 53 of which in the capital. Eighty-seven percent of evangelical radio--preaching, sermonizing, and persuading-- is aired live. As a more expensive and less prevalent medium, television programming is dominated by American fundamentalist and Pentecostal imports. Jimmy Swaggart and Pat Robertson are the most represented. Swaggert's organization has established regional centers which answer letters and sell books. His program is oriented toward the lower middle class (Biernatzki, 1991: 17). Robertson's directly theocratic appeals do not fit Guatemala's need for ecumenical cooperation between the Catholics and Protestants. Anti-communism unites the right, but exclusionary evangelism tends to divide it.

On the longer-range prospects of evangelism in Guatemala, Rose and Schultze (1993) are ambivalent. It remains to be seen, they argue, whether the rise of Protestant ethics will lead to the development of democratic capitalism (as the neo-Weberians such as Peter Berger hope) or end up in another cycle of elite exploitation of the majority in collaboration with foreign capital. However, they offer some reasons to suggest that the results will be probably different from those we have known historically in the West. Religious polarization will continue to persist, not only between Catholics and Protestants, but also between conservative Catholics and radical Catholics as well as between old-style, non-political Pentecostals and new-style, political Pentecostals. In any case, religion, education, and the media will continue to play their contradictory, Janus-like role in the formation and dissemination of the dominant hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects.

Religious Zionism in Israel is a second example of a reformist fundamentalist movement. United States and Israel present two radically different national traditions on issues of religion and state. Whereas the separation of church and state is a constitutional requirement in the

U. S., Israel was founded on Zionism, a nationalism based on the presumed religious and cultural unity of the Jewish people. As an official Israeli ideology, therefore, Zionism provides a useful litmus test for distinguishing some of the subtle differences between a rich variety of Jewish fundamentalist movements. Religious Zionism, Zionist fundamentalism, non-Zionist Judaism, and anti-Zionist Judaism present different responses vis-à-vis the liberal, socialist, and secular Zionism of the founding fathers of Israel. Not all of these tendencies can be considered fundamentalist. Michael Rosenak's (1993) case study of Jewish fundamentalist education presents a rich tapestry of theologies and movements that pursue both separatist-conservative and reformist strategies, corresponding more or less to what Rosenak calls anti-Zionist and Zionist fundamentalisms. While the Haredi Jews are anti-Zionists pursuing a separatist strategy, Radical Zionist Fundamentalists, Messianic Fundamentalists (Gush Emunim), and the late Rabi Kahane's Kach movement (including its offshoot in the United States, the Jewish Defense League) follow a reformist fundamentalist line. They seek neither to overthrow the Zionist state (revolutionary fundamentalism) nor to accommodate it for the sake of conserving their religious traditions (conservative fundamentalism); rather, they intend to transform Secular Zionism from within by revealing and bringing to prominence its latent religiosity.

As Rosenak (1993) argues, the notion of Galut (Exile) is central to an understanding of Jewish fundamentalism. "Exile, Galut, is a heavy-laden concept with political, religious and existential layers of meaning. It signifies precarious existence among the nations; it bespeaks alienation and remoteness from God, for the Torah cannot be fully carried out in Galut where Israel lacks a society, and it describes the malaise of the world before the coming of the Messiah (redemption)." In the religious Zionist community there were, however, moments of confrontation with Zionism that served as a challenge to religious renewal. Those who were inquisitive and innovative in theological matters became "'religious expansionists.'" Expansionism reinterprets modernity through the prism of the Jewish tradition; "it aspires, in theory, to bring all aspects of life under the rubric of its interpretation of Judaism." (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1984). Liebman (1982), who developed these concepts, , writes of the dichotomies between expansionism and adaptationism and associates expansionism with the radical approaches he finds prevalent in the Zionist Yeshivot and in Gush Emunim. I am proposing that in the religious kibbutz movement, both may have been uniquely linked. When "religious expansionism" was combined with adaptationism, which "affirms that the basic values of modernity are not only compatible with Judaism but partake of its essence," as Rosenak (1993) points out, there emerged a vibrant and ambitious type of religious Zionism.

Thinkers and educators in this circle perceived no conflict between Zionism and Judaism. Rather, Zionism was the opportunity to fully apply the Torah to the reborn social reality of Judaism in the modern world. The Torah was meant to inform every aspect of life, but this was impossible in Galut. Thus Torah scholars had to engage in dialogue with all knowledge and culture, to be thereby liberated from the shackles of Galut ghettoization and, in turn, to transform the social message of universal ideals. In the religious kibbutz it could be shown that the Torah was the constitution of an ideal society and the foundation of a socially progressive and humanistic religiosity. Conversely, the "expansionistic-adaptationist" religious Zionists held that Galut was ending and that the long-awaited challenge to the truth and viability of Judaism as a social vision was at hand. The Torah would be "the spiritual infrastructure of a new moral and religious-humanistic society."

Each social and existential ideal creates its own educational institutions, and so did the religious Zionists. Their initial innovative yet Orthodox approach was open to outside influences and rhetoric, yet wished to impose the Torah upon them. This was a difficult educational challenge. The expounders and teachers of this "expansionist" approach had to teach that the Torah was capable of addressing every issue, but it was not clear to them how this worked in practice. As modern Orthodox non-fundamentalistic Jews, they lived in a hyphenated valuative world of "Torah" and "general culture;" of "Torah" and "labor" (i.e., socialism). Though their ideology was both "expansionist" and "adaptationist," the lives they led and the concrete educational programs they felt qualified to construct and implement were mostly compartmentalized. Some things were Jewish and some were not.

They could not possibly fit into a traditional Yeshiva worldview conferring status inferiority on women, disdaining physical work, and deferring the transformation of the world to the coming of the Messiah. Equally Committed to Judaism, Zionism, and modernity, religious Zionists have had to create their own educational institutions. Under the leadership of the charismatic first Chief Rabbi of modern Eretz Israel, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, radical Zionist fundamentalists established their first Zionist Yeshivot for high school youth. The theological justification for such a bold action was to assign Messianic meaning to the State of Israel as the concrete Kingdom of God on earth. It followed that the new Yeshiva must socialize the youth into the stringently Jewish legal community as embodied in the Israeli society. But this religiously radical approach is profoundly ambivalent about the secular Zionist reality that Rabbi Kook declared to be holy. On the one hand, the Zionist radicals have established their own broadly Haredic-yet-Zionist institutions of learning in order to forestall the threats of the decadent secular Israeli culture to religion. On the other hand, as Zionists, the "radicals" serve in the military within a Yeshivot framework arranged with the Army.

Gush Emunim, "the bloc of the faithful," is the most well-known group of the radical religious Zionists who have tied territorial Israeli expansion with Messianism and right-wing education. Established after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Gush Emunim has provided an ideological bridge between religious and secular Zionists and, for that reason, it has had a great impact. While pursuing fundamentalist religious education, the movement allows its members to join the Army in defense of Eretz Israel and against territorial concessions. Although racially tolerant, the movement has given rise to racist factions such as the late Rabi Kahane's Kach movement which argues for the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs. Educationally, Gush Emunim is critical of Yeshiva learning and its withdrawal from reality, a withdrawal that in their view is no longer justified.

Hindu militancy in India presents a third example of a movement that challenges the prevailing status quo in favor of social, educational, and cultural reform programs with a complex blending of populism and elitism, dogmatism and pragmatism, and literalism and liberalism. In India, Krishna Kumar (1993) argues, "the term 'revivalism' is... preferable to 'fundamentalism' mainly because the latter term seems rather inappropriate in the context of Hinudism. Unlike Semitic religions, Hinduism is characterized by the multiplicity of basic beliefs, texts, and practices." But if we consider a pluralist, secular India as envisaged by the founding fathers of the Indian independence movement (notably Gandhi and Nehru) as progressive, the rise of a Hindu nationalist movement calling for Hindu religious and linguistic hegemony could be considered as retrogressive. From another point of view, Hindu revivalism may be considered as the Indianization of India. Eighty-five percent of India's 840 million people are Hindus. Lal Krishna Advani, president of the Bharatiya Janata Party, told a group of foreign correspondents in June 1990 that Hindus were asking only for a recognition of majority rights, and an end to special privileges for religious minorities. Both internal and external forces seem to have combined to bring about this change of heart among the Hindus from secular to religious politics. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy in Pakistan may have contributed to the growth of Hindu nationalism, but urbanization, the growth of new middle and lower-middle classes, and a redefining of caste and regional identities are perhaps the more basic causes of Hindu religious militancy (Crossette 1990).

The students who demonstrated and immolated themselves, in 1990, were of lower middle class origins. They were protesting against the government's plan to set aside 27 percent of federal government jobs to 'backward' castes. These students were acting out of a deep despair. The situation in the "Hindi Belt" is very grim. As India's most densely populated, least literate region-- from Rajasthan through Mdhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh to Bihar-- pressure is building up to find jobs and land for sons and daughters. No job is more secure than the civil service, and no political campaign is more powerful than religious militancy.

Religious militancy is, of course, nothing new in India. In 1948, Mahatma Gandhi fell victim to its fanaticism. What is new is its recent political muscle as evidenced by the fact that secular politicians are playing up to its prejudices. The most recent dramatic incidence has centered on a mosque at Adyodhya in Uttar Pradesh built on a site that is the birthplace, say Hindus, of their god of war Rama. Militant Hindus have long sought to build a Hindu temple in place of the mosque. In 1950, the mosque was closed down by the government. In 1986, the government ordered the building to be reopened as a Hindu temple. This could be interpreted as an attempt by Rajiv Gandhi to purse Hindu votes. Before Rajiv, Indira Gandhi had already appealed to Hindu militancy by taking on Sikh militancy in Punjab. The fall of Prime Minister Singh, in 1990, may be also interpreted as his failure to heed Hindu nationalism by increasing appeals to lower castes and Muslims. The result may be increasing communal violence and appeals to religious politics undermining a secular India (Anon. 1990: 15, 42).

Kumar (1993) focuses on the historical and cultural background of the rise of Hindu revivalism. He argues that the development of Hindi as a medium of modern education has served as a symbol of anti-colonialism as well as the consolidation of revivalist ideology. "Unlike some other societies where fundamentalism or revivalism has surfaced as a discrete element in politics, revivalism in northern India must be seen as a phenomenon organically related to the cultural development of a specific stratum of society." But Kumar hastens to add that "opposition to modernity" is not a feature of the revivalist movement , which proposes only "a different political route to modernization from the one proposed and pursued by organizations usually seen as non-revivalist or secular in the Indian context."

Hindu revivalism can be thus interpreted as a movement both for cultural survival and cultural hegemony, including linguistic, religious, and mythological revivals through education and the media. A reconstruction of cultural and political identity in this case as in most other cases of religious militancy appears to be a recurrent feature. Kumar argues that Hindu revivalism owes much to the Christian and Islamic variants, but we can equally argue that all militant religious movements are responding to the specifically modern conditions in which the state has overtaken civil society in its claims for total authority and power over resources and lives of the citizens. To lay equal claims to that power, religious militants has had to reconstruct history and identity in order to claim state power. In the case of Hindu revivalism, however, Kumar (1993) argues that "Hindu society could not find adequate resources for their purposes within religion alone. They had to assemble bits and pieces of relevant material from literature and mythology, history and geography."

Kumar demonstrates how the revival of Hindi as an Indian national language in preference to English, Hindustani, and Urdu has played a central role in this process. He also shows how the development of modern Hindu schools and universities must be understood as part of both the anti-colonialist and cultural revivalist movements. He further describes how the development of a Hindu Indian press "provided to the educated, mostly urban parents of the Hindi region, a rich resource for acculturation of their children." He also provides an analysis of the rise of political revivalism as an outgrowth of religious revivalism, in the emergence first of the Arya Samaj movement and its championship of Hindi language schools (Dayanand Anglo-Vedic or DAV) and then of the Rashtriay Sawyamswak Sangh (RSS) movement upholding the ideal of a militarily strong nation in which the term 'Indian' and 'Hindu' would be synonymous. DAV schools have shown a remarkable growth in the 1980s attracting students from urban and small-town shopkeepers as well as professional and civil service ranks. Kumar argues that since the beginning of the 80s, under the impact of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and the Middle East, Hindu cultural revivalism has become politically revivalist as well in order to compete openly for power.

Revolutionary Strategies. The case study of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran supports Kumar's thesis that in certain contexts religious militancy may be reactive but not reactionary. In the Indian and Iranian cases, religious militancy has also expressed anti-colonial aspirations for reform and revolution. Although Iran presents the most spectacular "success story" of a religious revolutionary movement, it also demonstrates the problems of a theocracy in position of state power. The tensions between populism and elitism, dogmatism and pragmatism, scriptural literalism and liberalism erupt more violently into the open under revolutionary conditions. As a populist movement, the Islamic revolutionary movement in Iran brought about a broad coalition of secular liberals and Marxists joining hands with Islamic liberals, Islamic Marxists, Islamic traditionalists, and Islamic fundamentalists in opposition to the Shah. Following the overthrow of the Shah in February 1979, however, this coalition broke down.

One of the central issues that deeply divided the revolutionary ranks revolved around the tensions between populism and elitism. It focused on the question of sovereignty. Whereas the liberals and Marxists argued for popular sovereignty as the basis for the new constitution, Ayatollah Khomeini and his militant followers proposed wilayat-i-faqih (the Trusteeship of the Jurists) as the only valid Quranic principle of sovereignty. In his treatise with the same title, Khomeini (1981) had argued that sovereignty rightly belongs to God, his Prophet, and the Shiite Imams (Tehranian 1992). In the absence of the Hidden Imam (the 12th Shiites Imam who disappeared in the fourteenth century), he further argued, the duty of governance is passed on to the Muslim Ulama and their chosen leader, the Supreme Faqih. This theocratic principle was hotly debated before it was written into the new Islamic constitution. Those who disagreed with it were soon either expelled or sent underground. In a new round of debate in post-Khomeini Iran, the doctrine is being challenged by a prolific publicist, Abdul-Karim Soroush, arguing that the ideologization and policization of religion is leading to corruption of state and faith (Soroush 1995). His views have found a significant following among a disillusioned generation of middle-aged, professional Islamic revolutionaries critical of the clerical leadership.

The tension between pragmatism and dogmatism became most evident in the subsequent legislative battles over the issues of land reform, and cultural, media and educational policies. The conflict between pragmatists and dogmatists, also known in constantly shifting alliances as moderates and radicals, was reflected in all debates on matters of domestic and foreign policy. In agricultural policy, land reform legislation became an issue of intense conflict between a radical parliament (the Majlis) and a conservative Council of Experts (majlis-i-khebregan). While the Majlis passed a sweeping land reform law, ruling on its constitutionality, the Council considered it contrary to the Quranic injunctions against violations of the rights of private property. At the end, Ayatollah Khomeini intervened by an extraordinary edict that declared all Quranic injunctions are subject to the current interests and policies of the Islamic state.

Similarly, the conflicts between dogmatists and pragmatists, scriptural literalists and liberalists, has been a source of continuing tension in cultural policy. Before the revolution, Islamic traditionalists were critical of the Pahlavi regime's language purification policies that attempted to purge Farsi of all foreign (including Arabic) words. These efforts were considered as part of the regime's anti-Islamic secularization policies. Although Arabic and Islamic studies have been revitalized after the revolution, the modernization of Farsi has also continued its normal course. The process has entailed a twofold effort; to coin new Farsi words for modern scientific and technical terms and to purge the language of foreign (including Arabic) words. A new-style Farsi has consequently emerged, often used in the media, scientific, and government documents, that is less flowery and more precise. The prose of several of the "modernizers" among the clerical leaders, notably the late Ayatollah Beheshti, President Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Khameneii, reflect this shift to purist Farsi. Despite Islamic ideological protestations, language modernization thus reflects the continuity of nationalist traditions.

Women's rights and place in society, however, became an early issue in the life of the revolution. Young women had played a critical role in the revolutionary movement, particularly in urban guerrilla activities. They expected therefore a recognition of their rights. However, as the clerical factions drove the Islamic liberals and Marxists out of power, new constraints were gradually imposed on women's public place and conduct. Women were declared to have equal but separate rights from men. It was required of women to observe hejab (covering), to attend primarily to family affairs, and to generally play a supportive role to men in society. Although women are granted the rights of suffrage, education, and pursuit of modern professions, their principle role in society, as homemakers vs. officeholders, has been a matter of controversy. For example when, in 1996, the president's daughter, Faezeh Rafsanjani, and a number of other women won some leading Majlis seats in major cities, the regime resorted to cancellation of some of the elections. When Ms. Rafsanjani argued for the freedom of women to ride bicycles, she was publicly attacked.

The new position of women is also reflected in the Islamic regime's media and educational policies. "Indecent" exposures of women, including the showing of women's hair and bare arms, are banned from film and television programs. Any print and audio-visual media content with sexual overtones is also censored. Following the revolution, boys and girls have been completely separated at the primary and secondary school levels. While the universities continue to admit women, male students outnumber female. A few universities have been also designated exclusively for women. The government documents on educational reform emphasize sex role differentiation and the need for educational programs specially suited for women.

Another consequence of the cultural revolution in Iranian media and educational programs has been the shift from "decadent" to wholesome Islamic art forms and cultural programming. The instruction of Quran at schools and its regular recitation on radio and television have set a new cultural tone. "Decadent" Western music has been excluded from school curricula and broadcasting in favor of folk and classical Persian and foreign music. Although the making of images is prohibited under the more strict fundamentalist Sunni laws, Shi'a Islam has encouraged both the traditional abstract Islamic calligraphy and mosaics as well as "realistic" paintings of religious subjects such as portraits of the Imams and scenes from religious history and mythology. In view of their mass popularity, feature films, television serials, and historical documentaries have also experienced a new rebirth. Following the Majlis elections of 1996 which demonstrated an unexpected strength by women and Islamic liberals, a new campaign was waged on television to discredit all "liberals" as agents of U. S. imperialism. The TV series, labeled as "cultural identity," led to suspicious murder of a few intellectuals, harassment and exile of others, and new restrictions imposed on loyalists such as Soroush.

As the case Iran demonstrates in some detail in the following chapter, the impact of the Islamic revolution on Iranian culture, society, media, and education has been thus profound. However, the revolution is also characterized by a continuity of the problems and processes of modernization. The Iranian revolution may be said to be primarily a political and cultural revolution rather than a social and economic restructuring. The revolution basically transferred power from one elite to another, from the military-bureaucratic elite ruling under the aegis of Pahlavi monarchy to the Shia clerics ruling under the banner of an Islamic republic. Although Islamic ideology and leadership have replaced secular ideology and leadership, the revolution does not appear to have succeeded in creating uniquely Islamic social and economic institutions. The processes of state building and nation-building which began with the Pahlavi regime, the centralization of power and authority in the hands of the state, and the efforts to build a social, cultural, and educational infrastructure conducive to economic growth have continued. The Islamic revolution may be thus considered as yet another chapter in the relentless struggle of a proud but dependent nation to achieve autonomy in a turbulent world.

Conclusion

Despite their enormous diversity, the six cases under review in this chapter have demonstrated that religious militancy and fundamentalist-like ideologies and movements present a common challenge to the dominant secular ideologies of progress. Return to the certitudes of religious traditions, indigenous cultural roots, sacred languages, and primordial identities is a promise that religious militants hold before the believers. While such movements appear to be responses to the increasing penetration of a transnational culture of secular, scientific, and technological world, their sources of social support and consequent impact vary from case to case. This chapter has identified at least four types of movements and strategies, including the conservative, separatist, reformist, and revolutionary. While the conservative and separatist movements may be considered as quixotic and limited to special cases, the reformist and revolutionary movements have proved powerful enough to seize power in Iran, elect a president in Guatemala, unseat a Prime Minister in India, provide considerable political support to the conservative social policies of three successive presidents in the United States, while tipping the political balance in Israel in favor of the conservative Likud Party.

The impact of militant religious movements on media and education has been more far reaching. In Iran, the Islamic revolution has revamped the entire educational and media systems. In the United States, the Electronic Church and its educational establishments were the leading growth sectors in media and education during the 1980s. In Guatemala, the Protestant evangelical schools have broken through the elitism of the Catholic hierarchy and education to bring education to greater numbers and layers of society. In India, the Hindu educational and cultural movement has revived Hindi as the leading national language while attempting to de-secularize Indian politics. In Israel, however, the fundamentalist Jewish movement has led to a greater schism between the secular and religious Zionists, secular and religious schools. All militant religious movements and ideologies in our case studies have succeeded in redefining the terms of national discourse on culture, education, media, and politics. They all may be viewed as responses of the more traditional, lower classes to the transnational penetration of their economic and cultural lives and attempts toward indigenous cultural and economic restorations of power.

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1 This essay is adopted from chapter 8 of my forthcoming book, Globalism and Its Discontents: International Communication and Modernization in a Fragmented World (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998). I am grateful to the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for their support of my case studies of Iran, Israel, the United States, and India. An earlier version of this article appeared in "Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media: An Overview," in Fundamentalism and Society: Reclaiming the Science, the Family, and Education, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 313-340.