FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: MIDDLE EAST

by George Kent*

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Arabs and Israelis has erupted into war three times, and instead of stability there is every expectation of another, more dangerous war. Commanding less world-wide attention is the chronicle of integration and disintegration of the Arab states. The politics of the Middle East are of crucial importance locally, and increasingly affect the welfare of other nations.

The region is a cauldron illustrating the major international problems everywhere. Limited war, guerrillas, arms races, rising expectations, imperialism, economic development, radicals versus conservatives, East versus West—all of the new vocabulary of international affairs finds application in the Middle East.

The difficulties of analysis are typical too. Whether to solve, to mitigate, or only to comprehend the political problems, one must know something about the policies of the parties. What is a foreign policy? There is remarkably little agreement on this among students of international relations. There is hardly any disagreement either, since the question is rarely raised. How can one know when a foreign policy has been adequately described? Often an essay which purports to be about a nation's foreign policy turns out to be little more than a history and commentary about the nation's international behavior, possibly garnished with an organization chart of its foreign office. If we are not clear about what is sought in such a study, how can we know when success is achieved? Or should the study of foreign policy remain a foolproof enterprise, one without criteria, and therefore one which cannot really fail?

Little attention has been given to the question of how foreign policies should be studied.[1] Here we examine the policies of nations in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the method is not the traditional one. We do not assume that everyone knows what a foreign policy is, where and how it can be found, and how it should be written down. We are as much concerned with the conceptual and

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[1] Up to the late 1960s the most significant works were Feliks Gross, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1954; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, New York: The Free Press, 1962; and Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. These were devoted more to solving conceptual problems than to the work of articulating actual foreign policies. The full magnitude of the methodological problems has been recognized only recently.

procedural difficulties as with Middle Eastern politics. We attempt to develop and demonstrate a methodology which would be generally useful for the discovery and articulation of foreign policies.

FOREIGN POLICY DEFINED

Policies are best understood as expressions of values or preferences. These, in turn, are best interpreted as referring to choices. A decision-maker's policy indicates what choice he would make if confronted with some set of alternatives. A policy statement may be a generalization referring to a wide variety of situations, but its essence and substance is that it indicates the choices that would be made in these situations. If it does not convey choice, either explicitly or implicitly, then it cannot be a policy statement. A policy statement indicates advocacy or support or favoring of some future condition.

A nation's foreign policy, as distinguished from its domestic policy, refers to future conditions outside its own boundaries. It says something about the world conditions that that nation would prefer to be the case.

It is useful to distinguish between statements about what a country's foreign policy is and statements about why it has that policy. Essays too often talk about the sources of foreign policy, its determinants, without saying what it is. A sharp and clear distinction should be made between *what* and *why*. Foreign policy is defined here as concerned only with what choices would be made, and not with the reasons for making them. The reasons are obviously important, but they are separated out and excluded here so that we can maintain a sharp focus on what the policies of nations are.

Some may disagree with our definitions, but there is little use in arguing over them. Whether described as ideologies, goals, objectives, values, or foreign policies, our concern is with the preferences of nations for particular future states of the world.

APPLICATIONS

Systematic methods for revealing and describing the policies of decision-making units, whether individuals or larger political units, can be useful in many ways. Of course they do have substantial disadvantages. They cannot possibly capture the nuances a skilled writer can convey through his prose. But the argument here is that concern with nuances is premature if we cannot yet deal adequately with gross distinctions in the analysis of political units. The disagreements among experts are evidence of this incapability. The wide variation in findings from scholar to scholar should itself be enough to demonstrate that their confidence is often unwarranted.

In traditional studies it is usually impossible to judge the extent to which conclusions are due to the nature of the analyst. They often convey more information about the author's opinion than about the nation in question. Moreover, these discursive essays are typically unsystematic and ambiguous and carry a great

deal of extraneous information. It is usually difficult to compare the findings of different analysts. Methods of the kind suggested here do not eliminate these problems. But they can be used to clearly reveal the policies different observers impute to the same unit and thus show where differences need to be reconciled. Differences in understandings are more easily resolved if they are plainly exposed.

Plain statements of values can help decision-makers themselves. They would help political units insure that all their representatives and spokesmen had the same conception of the unit's position. It is also useful to know the values of other political units. Improving the understanding and predictability of the behavior of others can usually improve one's own strategic position. This understanding can help in developing solutions to particular political problems.

Systematically describing the values of different political units would show where they had the same values, where they had different values, and where they had incompatible values. Although misunderstandings about values are certainly not the only source of hostilities, misunderstandings often do aggravate difficult situations. Clear descriptions of values can reveal exactly what a conflict is about, and may help the parties themselves or neutrals in the management of the conflict. Negotiations, for example, might sometimes be facilitated by the systematic exchange of information about the parties' values.

Such an exchange of information may sometimes be detrimental and aggravate the conflict, even if it is not *mis*information that is conveyed. In most cases, however, it is probably beneficial to the parties to a political conflict to exchange accurate information about their values. Certainly they should have the facility for developing that information, even if they ultimately keep it to themselves.

DESCRIBING FOREIGN POLICIES

If we know a nation's values, how should we describe them? A method is needed which would be precise and to the point. The ideal form of the description of a nation's foreign policy follows directly from the definition of the term. Sets of alternatives would be enumerated and for each set the one the nation would choose would be indicated. Besides the inherent awkwardness of this procedure, there is a substantial problem in deciding what alternatives to offer. A variation on this theme is to offer statements advocating different future conditions, and ask whether the nation under study would approve or disapprove of each of the statements. This has the disadvantage of being imprecise about the exact nature of the alternatives against which the proposal is to be compared. It has the very substantial advantage of using the format commonly used in parliamentary bodies, the form of a resolution.

Suppose we had a list of resolutions advocating particular future world conditions or asserting that certain conditions are preferred over others. The essence of a country's foreign policy could then be recorded as the approval or disapproval of these resolutions. The following statements about the Arab-Israeli conflict illustrate the type of resolution that might be used. Each advocates or supports

some future condition or action.   They could conceivably be offered as resolutions at an international meeting:

RESOLUTIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

1. If the refugees wish, they should be allowed to establish a new sovereign state of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in area occupied by Israel in the war of June, 1967.
2. Israel should withdraw from all territories occupied in June, 1967, including the Old City of Jerusalem.
3. Israel should withdraw from all territories occupied in June, 1967, except for Jerusalem.
4. Israel should withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967 as part of an overall settlement, when the sovereignty and integrity of the State of Israel are secured.
5. Israel should withdraw to the armistice lines established in 1949.
6. The Arab states should coordinate their build-up of their military forces, in preparation for the elimination of Israel as a state.
7. Israel should relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem to international control.
8. Direct, face-to-face Arab-Israeli negotiations should begin, without intermediaries.
9. Both the United States and the Soviet Union should report all arms sold or given to countries of the Middle East to the United Nations, on a regular basis.
10. Passage through the Suez canal should be open equally to all, at all times.
11. The conflicting parties should agree to a peace treaty in which boundaries and other questions would be clearly settled.
12. The Arab states should pool their military resources under a new Joint Defense Command to coordinate their movements in times of war.
13. The United States should help Middle Eastern countries pursue joint development of their resources, work to keep nuclear weapons out of the region, and try to prevent the recurrence of local wars through the United Nations.
14. The United States should continue supplying arms to Israel so long as its existence is threatened.
15. The United States and the Soviet Union should begin talks with a view to curbing the flow of arms into the Middle East and maintaining the security of all nations of the area.
16. The Arab states should declare an end to the state of belligerency with Israel.
17. Israel should permit the return of all refugees to their former homes.
18. Israel should offer Israeli citizenship to all refugees, granting them the same rights as other new immigrants.
19. Israel should pay reparations to the Arab countries for damages incurred during the war of June 1967.
20. Israel and individual Arab countries should enter into negotiations, with the understanding that no formal recognition of Israel would be implied.

21. The Old City of Jerusalem should be returned to its status prior to the 1967 war.
22. Israel should control all of Jerusalem, with the Holy Places under the administration of the three major religious bodies concerned.
23. All nations, including Israel, should be granted unrestricted navigation rights through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.
24. After permanent borders are agreed upon by Israel and the Arab states, a strong United Nations peacekeeping force should be posted at the borders.
25. A general Middle East peace guarantee should be made jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.
26. The Arab states should make no concessions to Israel, offer no diplomatic recognition, and never engage in any negotiation, direct or indirect, with Israel.
27. The major powers, the Security Council, or the United Nation's Special Representative to the Middle East should propose a timetable toward peace and the Security Council should guarantee that it would be put into effect.
28. Discussions should be conducted with a view toward laying the foundations for a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states.
29. Israel should withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967 in exchange for a declaration of an end to belligerency by the Arab states.
30. The United States should unilaterally terminate all military assistance to nations of the Middle East.

The allowable responses to the resolutions-questions could, by fiat, be restricted to *yes* or *no* or possibly *abstain*, with no qualifications or explanations. Refinements and clarifications could be captured by developing appropriate new and revised statements of resolutions.

A nation's complete foreign policy could be recorded in this form, as a series of responses to resolutions. To know a country's foreign policy is to know how it would vote on issues of this sort, just as knowing an individual means knowing how he would respond to different kinds of questions. (While there may be a discrepancy between a country's true attitudes and the way it would vote in a public forum, this probably does not occur as frequently as many cynics would have us believe. We proceed as if there is no important or systematic difference between public and private positions, which is probably true in the majority of cases.) The list of answers to the resolutions provides the simplest possible description of a country's foreign policy. How thoroughly it is covered depends on the variety of questions that are posed. Whatever portion of the policy is described by this method, the answers are clear, unambiguous, and highly informative.

If we have the responses of a second country to the same resolutions we have the basis for studying comparative foreign policies. Before exploring that possibility, however, we must face the problem of finding satisfactory answers for the countries individually.

COMPARISONS ACROSS OBSERVERS

Having established the kind of question that is appropriate and the form of the answer, how can we find out the correct answers for any given country? Determining how a nation would respond to such resolutions, whether it would agree or disagree, approve or disapprove, is a fundamental problem of foreign policy analysis.

Many research guidelines can be suggested, all precepts of traditional political analysis. Certain documents are more authoritative than others. Partisans are not so trustworthy as neutrals. And so on. But in foreign policy analysis, no matter how authoritative the sources of information, critics will question their credibility. Even the pronouncements of heads of state are frequently dismissed as mere propaganda or as designed only for internal consumption, and therefore not representative of the nation's real intentions. All sources are met with skepticism. What then is the foreign policy analyst to do?

The difficulty is not in finding an answer but in finding many contradictory answers. Experts often disagree on how a given country would resond to a given proposition. The only way to avoid disagreements altogether is to consult only one source, a recourse which is used all too often.

Even if we choose a single source, an official newspaper perhaps, or a foreign minister's collected speeches, we must acknowledge that different readers will interpret it differently. No matter what information source is used, in the final analysis someone must make inferences from it. It is inference that particular documents are authoritative, even if they are official. If he goes beyond repeating the raw text, the analyst's report is based on inferences from the documents. It is peoples' interpretations which ultimately serve as the source of information about foreign policies.

Since there are inferences to be made, variations in conclusions from observer to observer are inevitable. Disagreement in imputation of values is one of the surest facts of political life. It should not be wished away or waved away or dismissed as error on the part of everyone else. This variation is itself of major political importance and deserves recognition. The variation is a central part of the problem of foreign policy analysis, and is a proper object of study.

Whether from experts or laymen, information about foreign policies must ultimately be obtained from people. If we are to interview just one or two people there is little problem in conducting the interrogation. The respondent can be questioned in depth, each reply leading to increasingly refined questions. But although we gain depth, the credibility of the information that is obtained remains uncertain. The believability of the information can be assessed by crosschecking it with a number of different people. Perhaps the ideal approach is to conduct a few interviews in depth to determine the key questions, and then use these as a basis for an inquiry with larger groups. Better information will be drawn from the large group the greater the expertise of the members of that group, so the analyst should work with as expert a group as possible.

The question raised here is, for any *given* group, how can information about

foreign policies best be extracted?

Each respondent could be asked to indicate how he thinks the country in question would respond to each of a given list of resolutions. The primary objective is to get information about the countries, not about the people. Since there will inevitably be disagreements among the respondents, how can believable information be distilled from the answers? The following guideline will serve us:

The most credible observations are those for which heterogeneous (uncoordinated) observers give homogeneous reports.

Reports are more believable when a number of different people all report the same thing than when they all report different things. This is even more true when the reporters are of several different types. If both Republicans and Democrats report that the Republican candidate is leading, that is a good deal more believable than when only Republicans report that.

The reasoning behind the guideline is that, to the extent that different observers of the same thing give different reports, we presume the reports are influenced by the observers' own individual beliefs. If their reports agree, the influence of their own beliefs must have been relatively smaller. With greater agreement among them the reports were probably determined more by the nature of that which was observed than by the nature of the observers.

But homogeneity of responses can be misleading if it is obtained from a homogeneous group of observers. The uniformity of response may be obtained, not because the observers' beliefs do not influence their perceptions, but because they are all affected uniformly. If we ask Zionists about Syria's foreign policy we will probably get a great deal of agreement. If we ask Egyptians about Syria's foreign policy we will get agreement, but on answers very different from those given by the Zionists.

Of course the amount of disagreement between the Zionist group and the Egyptian group would vary from question to question. The more the two groups agreed on any particular one, the more we would believe their collective answer did in fact reflect the true Syrian position.

Suppose we have an arbitrarily chosen group of people indicate how they think a number of different countries would respond to some set of resolutions. The group is more or less heterogeneous. According to the guideline, we would find more believable those answers on which there was more agreement within the group. If we have a measure of the amount of agreement on particular questions, we could rank them from the most informative and trustworthy to the least informative and trustworthy. We would do this issue by issue or country by country.

Similarly, if we had asked two different groups, we would generally have more confidence in that group for which there was less variation in answers within the group. That would be a basis for believing that group had greater expertise. For any given amount of variation in answers, we would find more believable that group whose members were more heterogenous. That would be a basis for believing that group's answers were less subject to systematic bias.

DATA

Data have been collected to explore these arguments. The resolutions used were the thirty listed earlier referring to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thirty undergraduate students at San Francisco State College indicated how they thought each of twenty countries would respond to each of the resolutions, with their answers restricted to *yes, abstain*, or *no*. Each student wrote *Y, A*, or *N* in each cell of his answer form, depending on how he thought the country named at the left would respond to the resolution whose number appeared at the top of the column. Table 1 shows the percentage of students who gave answers of *Y* or *N* in each of the cells.

After indicating how he thought the countries would react to the resolutions, each respondent was asked to say how he personally would respond to them. This in effect produced a twenty-first row of *Ys, As*, and *Ns.* labeled *self* rather than with the name of a country.

This body of data can be pictured as a cube whose dimensions are respondents (students), resolutions (the questions), and countries. Not counting the *self* data, it measures 30 by 30 by 20, with a *Y*, an *A*, or an *N* in each of the 18,000 cells of the cube.

Other data collected beyond this core set are described below.

The purpose of the analyses presented here is to mine the data for information about the foreign policies of the countries. Approached from a different angle, the same data can be used to learn about the respondents. To keep them clearly separated, the ways in which this data yields information about the respondents are demonstrated in another study entitled "Perceptions of Foreign Policies" to appear in a forthcoming volume of the *Peace Research Society: Papers*.

VALIDITY

Of the many possible analyses of this data, for our purposes the most important is that which yields an assessment of the relative believability of the different propositions about the foreign policies of the countries under study. By the general guideline that has been offered, for any given group we can judge as more believable those propositions for which there is a greater homogeneity of response. Thus the cells with the higher percentages in the *Y* or *N* categories show the more credible responses. (Respondents often answer *A* because they do not know how a country would reply. Uniformity of abstentions therefore does not signal believable answers in the way that agreements on *yes* or *no* do.) Perhaps the most important validity test to which these arguments and data can be subjected is the test of face validity. Do the answers produced by this analysis generally correspond with one's knowledge of Middle Eastern politics?

The results in which we would have the most confidence are those for which the respondents answers were unanimous. On this basis, from Table 1 and the list of resolutions, we can be quite certain that, for example, . . .

Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria,

TABLE 1: Percentages of *yes* and of *no* answers for each country to each resolution.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ALGERIA	%Y	43	90	27	33	87	67	57	33	17	30
	%N	47	7	63	60	7	20	27	63	73	60
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	37	83	33	30	87	60	47	27	53	37
	%N	43	3	50	57	10	30	40	50	27	43
FRANCE	%Y	70	53	37	73	30	0	80	50	63	90
	%N	20	23	33	13	27	87	3	13	17	0
IRAN	%Y	53	83	23	47	80	40	57	37	27	33
	%N	33	0	57	40	7	27	27	43	47	43
IRAQ	%Y	57	97	27	23	97	77	57	23	17	13
	%N	43	3	70	60	0	10	30	70	63	73
ISRAEL	%Y	33	0	7	53	7	0	7	80	37	93
	%N	63	97	90	37	90	100	90	17	50	7
JORDAN	%Y	57	100	30	23	100	83	50	13	13	13
	%N	43	0	67	63	0	3	43	77	70	80
KUWAIT	%Y	43	83	27	33	87	60	63	20	23	30
	%N	43	3	57	57	7	20	27	67	50	67
LEBANON	%Y	60	90	30	33	80	53	57	23	20	17
	%N	33	3	57	53	7	17	33	63	63	60
LIBYA	%Y	50	83	33	43	80	37	70	23	20	30
	%N	33	7	50	40	10	30	20	53	40	40
MOROCCO	%Y	50	87	37	33	90	40	60	27	20	27
	%N	27	3	53	40	3	23	23	47	43	57
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	57	100	37	30	100	73	57	27	13	23
	%N	43	0	60	60	0	10	33	70	60	70
SUDAN	%Y	53	100	33	23	93	60	63	30	17	23
	%N	37	0	57	53	0	13	20	60	53	60
SYRIA	%Y	57	97	30	20	100	93	47	13	10	13
	%N	43	3	67	70	0	3	47	83	77	80
TUNISIA	%Y	43	83	27	30	83	37	63	33	23	27
	%N	37	3	53	43	3	30	23	37	50	43
U.S.S.R.	%Y	50	97	20	23	77	37	50	20	0	43
	%N	30	0	57	47	3	33	23	57	77	30
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	50	93	27	13	93	93	50	17	13	7
	%N	47	3	70	77	7	3	40	80	73	90
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	40	30	43	80	13	4	73	73	57	97
	%N	27	30	27	10	47	90	10	13	23	0
UNITED STATES	%Y	43	23	27	93	7	0	73	77	20	100
	%N	23	50	37	3	67	97	10	10	50	0
YEMEN	%Y	53	80	20	20	87	53	53	27	20	20
	%N	30	3	60	50	3	20	27	60	60	63

TABLE 1: Continued

		11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
ALGERIA	%Y	57	77	33	3	30	13	100	67	77	63
	%N	37	10	40	83	47	73	0	20	3	27
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	57	77	13	10	20	17	93	57	73	33
	%N	27	13	83	87	70	63	0	20	7	37
FRANCE	%Y	93	10	40	23	67	70	73	73	23	77
	%N	0	47	40	53	13	7	7	10	30	3
IRAN	%Y	60	47	50	3	50	30	93	63	70	60
	%N	23	13	23	70	33	53	3	20	3	20
IRAQ	%Y	47	67	37	0	27	13	100	60	87	50
	%N	47	10	47	97	60	80	0	23	0	37
ISRAEL	%Y	93	0	70	100	60	97	13	17	0	23
	%N	3	100	17	0	30	3	77	67	97	63
JORDAN	%Y	47	87	40	0	33	3	100	57	100	60
	%N	50	0	43	100	53	90	0	23	0	27
KUWAIT	%Y	57	63	50	0	30	20	100	63	77	57
	%N	43	3	27	80	53	70	0	20	3	23
LEBANON	%Y	57	67	47	0	30	13	100	60	83	53
	%N	37	7	23	87	47	67	0	27	0	20
LIBYA	%Y	57	57	43	0	37	13	93	60	67	53
	%N	30	13	23	73	27	63	0	20	0	10
MOROCCO	%Y	57	57	40	0	40	13	100	63	80	50
	%N	30	10	30	80	40	63	0	17	0	23
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	50	70	47	0	27	3	100	60	97	67
	%N	50	17	33	97	53	93	0	23	0	23
SUDAN	%Y	57	77	40	3	23	7	97	63	87	63
	%N	33	10	37	87	43	80	0	23	0	17
SYRIA	%Y	33	93	30	0	10	3	100	60	97	50
	%N	63	3	70	100	87	93	0	30	0	40
TUNISIA	%Y	60	47	40	0	33	20	93	60	77	47
	%N	23	17	27	73	40	53	0	23	0	17
U.S.S.R.	%Y	53	67	13	0	57	10	87	63	93	73
	%N	20	10	70	90	17	57	0	23	0	10
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	40	97	20	7	7	3	100	50	97	47
	%N	53	3	77	93	87	97	0	30	0	40
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	93	7	93	63	97	90	47	53	13	57
	%N	3	67	3	7	0	3	17	7	47	20
UNITED STATES	%Y	100	0	97	93	87	97	37	47	10	57
	%N	0	80	0	3	3	0	20	3	60	23
YEMEN	%Y	47	63	33	7	23	13	97	63	83	47
	%N	37	3	40	83	43	80	0	20	0	33

TABLE 1: Continued

		21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
ALGERIA	%Y	83	3	13	33	17	40	33	50	30	53
	%N	3	87	70	47	57	40	40	20	47	23
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REP.	%Y	77	10	27	23	10	47	7	27	33	83
	%N	3	77	57	67	83	27	60	43	37	17
FRANCE	%Y	53	7	80	83	80	0	67	90	70	33
	%N	13	40	10	10	10	83	13	3	17	33
IRAN	%Y	83	7	30	50	37	20	47	63	57	27
	%N	7	80	47	30	40	43	33	17	27	47
IRAQ	%Y	93	3	17	40	17	53	33	43	40	53
	%N	0	90	70	43	57	27	50	43	40	30
ISRAEL	%Y	7	80	87	63	47	7	47	87	30	7
	%N	90	10	13	27	30	87	37	3	50	93
JORDAN	%Y	100	0	7	40	23	33	23	47	37	27
	%N	0	100	87	50	43	27	57	33	50	53
KUWAIT	%Y	83	7	30	40	17	37	33	50	43	50
	%N	3	87	70	40	50	43	47	33	40	20
LEBANON	%Y	93	7	13	40	30	30	30	53	50	27
	%N	0	83	67	47	33	43	43	27	33	30
LIBYA	%Y	80	3	23	40	20	17	33	47	53	33
	%N	0	83	60	30	40	40	30	30	27	30
MOROCCO	%Y	87	3	23	43	13	20	30	40	47	33
	%N	0	83	57	37	43	37	30	30	30	33
SAUDI ARABIA	%Y	97	0	10	30	17	37	23	43	37	30
	%N	0	100	83	53	57	33	57	40	47	50
SUDAN	%Y	90	0	10	37	13	37	23	53	47	43
	%N	0	90	70	37	47	30	40	23	27	27
SYRIA	%Y	93	0	3	20	10	83	17	33	27	77
	%N	3	100	90	67	73	13	73	57	60	17
TUNISIA	%Y	90	3	23	40	20	13	33	53	47	30
	%N	0	80	47	37	30	47	33	23	27	30
U.S.S.R.	%Y	83	0	27	37	57	3	37	37	43	83
	%N	0	73	30	43	20	43	27	27	23	10
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	%Y	93	0	0	17	10	77	20	37	27	27
	%N	3	100	100	70	70	13	67	53	57	20
UNITED KINGDOM	%Y	23	47	97	90	77	7	87	90	73	7
	%N	30	13	0	0	7	90	3	3	7	70
UNITED STATES	%Y	17	37	97	87	80	0	87	100	67	3
	%N	37	10	0	0	7	97	7	0	13	87
YEMEN	%Y	83	10	20	30	13	30	13	43	30	47
	%N	3	83	63	47	60	30	43	33	37	23

and the United Arab Republic all feel that Israel should permit the return of all refugees to their former homes (Resolution #17). Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria feel that Israel should withdraw to the armistice lines established in 1949 (#5).

Israel feels that the Arab states should not coordinate their build-up of their military forces in preparation for the elimination of Israel as a state (#6), and also feels that the Arab states should not pool their military sources under a new Joint Defense Command to coordinate their movements in times of war (#12). Israel believes that the United States should continue supplying arms to Israel so long as its existence is threatened (#14).

The United States thinks that passage through the Suez Canal should be open equally to all, at all times (#10), and that the conflicting parties should agree to a peace treaty in which boundaries and other questions would be clearly settled (#11). The United States also believes that discussions should be conducted with a view toward laying the foundations for a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states (#28).

These are just a few of the cases in which all respondents gave the same answer. The assertions seem to be very believable. A general survey of Table 1 will show those cases in which there was a high level of agreement, and thus provide the knowledgeable reader with the opportunity to more thoroughly test the face validity of this scheme. Do these results correspond with one's own intuitive expectations? Has this process successfully separated out the more believable information?

While the intuitive test of knowledgeable persons is of great importance, other more explicit tests of validity will be useful, especially for those less familiar with the particular problem area. If we had documents describing the true foreign policies of these countries we could test to see if our answers are correct. But it is precisely the lack of such definitive sources that motivates this study. One way to assess the extent to which this procedure yields good answers is to compare the results with that obtained from experts. To this end two specialists in the politics of the Middle East, one a professor of international relations in Israel, and the other an American professor of international relations leaning more toward the Arab side, were asked to fill out the questionnaire. Like the students, they were asked to indicate how they thought the countries would respond to the resolutions. They also gave their own *self* responses.

As the standard for this validity test, we assume that where these two experts agreed either on *yes* or on *no*, that answer is correct. The argument for this analytic procedure is not that it produces thorough or extensive information, but that where it does produce answers they are likely to be correct. Therefore we are not so concerned with *how often* the group's responses matched the experts' as with the question: *if* an answer was produced, did it match the experts'?

Let us specify that the test cases are those cells in which there was more than 75% agreement in the group *and* the two experts agreed with each other. There were 183 such cases. If this procedure was not at all valid, by chance alone the group would have been expected to come up with the same answer as the experts

in about half of these cases. In fact they produced the same answer in all but two of the cases. The undergraduates agreed on the same answer as the experts more than 98% of the time, indicating that the arguments and method of analysis are valid.

Other additional tests can be used to evaluate this instrument for obtaining information about foreign policies. For example, the information is unlikely to be either reliable or valid if the respondents' answers in behalf of the countries are largely determined by their own personal values. While the absence of this influence would not itself make the results valid—there may be other sources of error—lower levels of personal influence or "bias" would enhance our confidence in the procedure. The extent of this influence can be measured by the extent of agreement in imputations between subgroups whose personal values are substantially different. If the subgroups tend to agree, their personal values must not have had any great effect on their imputations of the countries' values.

To perform this test, two subgroups of respondents whose personal values were very different were identified. One subgroup was composed of the ten respondents who agreed most with the values imputed to Israel, and the other subgroup was composed of the ten who disagreed most with Israel. The extent to which the respondent was pro- or anti-Israel was measured by the Index of Agreement between the individual respondent's *self* answers and the answers he imputed to Israel.[2]

The consensus answers in each subgroup were then determined by identifying those answers on which 70% (i.e., seven) or more of the respondents in the subgroup agreed. These two sets of answers, one for each subgroup, were then compared by calculating the Index of Agreement between them.

The result was that the pro-Israel and anti-Israel subgroups agreed in their imputations 98.7% of the time. Clearly, personal values had only a negligible influence in determining the values respondents attributed to the countries.

It is really too stringent to compare this result with 100%, since the agreement would not be expected to be perfect even if there was no personal bias at all. A more appropriate (and less demanding) standard of comparison is obtained by estimating the Index of agreement that would be obtained if the subgroups were chosen randomly, rather than being systematically selected on the basis of the personal values of the respondents.

Two subgroups of ten members each were selected at random, the consensus answers for each subgroup were identified, and then the Index of Agreement between the two randomly selected subgroups was calculated. The result was that the two subgroups agreed 100%: whenever both subgroups produced a consensus answer, their answers were the same. The procedure was then repeated two more times. In the second trial the two new randomly selected subgroups agreed in 92.5%

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[2] The Index of Agreement is the number of cases of agreement (both yes or both no) plus half the number of partial agreements (yes and abstain, no and abstain, or abstain and abstain) divided by the total number of cases in which agreement could have been obtained. See Lijphart, cited below.

of the cases. In the third trial, still another pair of random subgroups agreed in 100% of the cases. The average for these three randomized test pairs is 97.5%, a level clearly not substantially different from the 98.7% agreement obtained in the comparison of the pro-Israel and anti-Israel subgroups.

The measures of agreement between the randomly selected subgroups themselves indicate the quality of this procedure. The high levels of agreement provide strong evidence that it is reliable. The same information about the policies of the countries is likely to be obtained even with wide variations in the conditions under which the questionnaires are administered.

COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICIES

Practically any country would prefer more material welfare to less. Inquiries about whether human dignity or liberty or freedom are valued are hardly likely to separate advocates of one ideology or policy from advocates of another. Questions must be discriminating to be useful. The really interesting observations about foreign policies are those which show differences and incompatibilities in the preferences of different countries.

These differences are most clearly revealed by asking the same questions of different countries. One might ask, say, whether or not Britain should be admitted to the Common Market. The question can be meaningfully asked of any nation, whether or not it would have any influence in making that future come about. Comparing and interpreting the answers of the different countries *is* comparative foreign policy analysis. The procedure developed here is suited to the task, in the precision and explicitness of its answers, if not in its subtlety.

Let us take agreement by more than 75% of the group of students as providing a valid indicator of how a country would respond to the resolutions. The extent of agreement between any pair of countries can then be measured by the number of times they agree (both *yes* or both *no*) divided by the number of times they could have agreed (all those instances in which consensus answers were obtained for each of the two countries.).[3] The resulting Index of Agreement is zero if the two countries always disagree, and 100% if they always agree.

A matrix of the indices for all pairs of countries studied is shown in Table 2. The matrix has been arranged to show political blocs as plainly as possible. The Arab countries are found to form a clear bloc, with *all* pairs agreeing at the level of 87.5% or higher. While this result may be partially due to stereotyping of the Arab countries, it does correspond to prior knowledge and to results obtained from analysis of General Assembly voting patterns.[4]

Besides showing cohesive blocs, these data also reveal the polarization of contending forces. Figure 1 shows how each country falls when plotted according to the extent of its agreement with Israel and with Egypt. The distribution is re-

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[3] This is a simple version of the technique developed by Arend Lijphart in "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review*. Vol. LVII, No. 4 (December 1963), 902–917.

[4] *Ibid.*

TABLE 2:   Index of Agreement in foreign policies for each pair of countries

|	U.S.	U.K.	France	Iran	U.S.S.R.	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia	C.P.R.	Iraq	Algeria	Yemen	Syria	Libya	Morocco	Saudi A.	Sudan	U.A.R.
Israel	93	92	63	33	9	9	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.S.		100	71	75	25	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.K.			86	75	33	0	0	14	0	7	7	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	7
France				100	100	100	80	83	100	44	50	50	50	50	80	80	80	67	50
Iran					100	100	80	80	100	100	57	67	67	57	80	80	80	80	57
U.S.S.R.						90	90	100	100	83	83	91	90	83	100	100	100	100	83
Jordan							100	100	100	93	93	93	93	93	100	100	100	93	93
Kuwait								100	100	93	93	93	93	93	100	100	100	93	93
Lebanon									100	94	100	94	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Tunisia										87	87	100	100	87	100	100	100	100	87
C.P.R.											100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Iraq												100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Algeria													100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Yemen														100	100	100	100	100	100
Syria															100	100	100	100	100
Libya																100	100	100	100
Morocco																	100	100	100
Saudi A.																		100	100
Sudan																			100
U.A.R.																			

FIGURE 1:   Distribution of nations according to degree of
agreement with U.A.R. and with Israel.

markably close to intuitive expectations.

Of course the absolute number of disagreements does not directly measure
the degree of conflict between two parties.   The questions posed were not repre-
sentative of the variety that could be posed, but were specifically chosen to examine
the contentious issues separating the sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict.   The value
of the inquiry is in revealing the substance of the issues on which there is disagree-
ment.   Intensities of disagreement might be measured in a followup study using
more sensitive measuring scales to determine the degrees to which different futures
are desired.   The present, first stage study is much simpler, designed to determine
only whether something is desired, or whether there is disagreement.   The ques-
tion of how much requires more sensitive tests.

THE QUESTIONS

It is reported that Gertrude Stein, on her deathbed, turned to her lifelong companion, Alice Toklas, and asked, "What is the answer?" After a long pause Miss Toklas replied with equal profundity, "What is the question?" The validity checks were designed to assess the quality of the answers that were obtained. Perhaps a more fundamental problem is whether or not we have the right questions.

The resolutions offered here were suggested by an unsystematic review of press reports, official statements, and other literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The questions posed may have dealt only with marginal factors, missing the real issues. Our reply can only be that this procedure is not committed to any fixed set of questions, but can be used with any propositions at all. Resolutions of any degree of detail, profundity, or complexity can be used. Other, better questions need only to be suggested.

These tools can help in selecting questions. Usually data of the kind collected here is used to find out something about the respondents. We have shown that by adopting a different perspective it can instead be used to study countries. There is no reason why we cannot take still another view of the cube of data and use it to find out something about the resolutions.

Examining the data, we find that for some resolutions there was not a high level of agreement on the answers for any of the countries. For resolutions 1, 18, and 29, for example, there were no countries for which more than 75% of the group agreed on the same answer. Whether this was due to a lack of knowledge in the respondents or due to ambiguity in the statements, it is clear that they did not produce very much information. These resolutions did not help us to learn much about foreign policies.

Some resolutions, like 2, 5, 17, and 21, yielded high levels of agreement for many countries. But the answers were the same for almost all of these countries except Israel. While they did produce some information, they were not very discriminating. They did not help in distinguishing countries, failing, for example, to detect the differences among the countries of the Arab world. Of course, it may have been the respondents who failed to detect differences.

If the procedure is repeated, questions found to be relatively useless could be replaced with other, hopefully better, questions. The resulting data helps to determine which of them is more fruitful.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this study is that a nation's foreign policy can be articulated in the form of answers to a series of questions, questions designed to determine which choices the nation would make if it were confronted with a variety of alternative world conditions. To know a nation's foreign policy is to know its values.

If relevant questions can be identified, the next problem is to determine valid answers. The procedure suggested here calls for asking a number of individuals to answer in behalf of the country. These respondents should preferably be experts, but even laymen can provide useful information. Whether experts or laymen,

there will be disagreements among them. The more valid imputations of values are likely to be those on which there is greater agreement among the respondents. That is, for any given level of heterogeneity of respondents, their answers are more believable the more homogeneous their answers. Although the theme was not pursued, we also argue that for any given level of homogeneity of answers, the answers are more believable the more heterogeneous the respondents.

(One might feel that documentary sources should be consulted more directly. Questionnaires of the kind described here can be used effectively for the content analysis of documents. A heterogeneous panel of judges can be asked to read the text and then to reply to the questions on the basis of that text. The more valid inferences are likely to be those on which there is greater agreement among the judges.)

Critics might hold that, while this technique successfully taps peoples' opinions about the foreign policies of nations, it does not get at the policies themselves. The group studied here was composed exclusively of students at an American college. The public, subjected to the mass media, bases its opinion on the propaganda and official myths to which it is exposed. How can students possibly know the true policies of distant countries?

There is a pathetic cynicism in this position. Political scientists too often begin with the premise that things could not possibly be as they seem. While this technique certainly can produce incorrect answers, that possibility should not be escalated to the presumption that it must produce incorrect answers. The possibility of error does not imply the inevitability of error. The results obtained here do appear to be valid.

Our purpose has been to demonstrate a method for extracting and evaluating information about foreign policies from any given group of informants. The more expert the individuals, the more credible will be the information they produce. The level of expertise need not be judged in advance. It will be reflected in the level of consensus that is obtained.

The results reported here indicate that this procedure is reliable: any analyst following the same procedure is likely to obtain the same results. Though not very subtle, the method does produce unambiguous, informative, and potentially very rich data on the foreign policies of nations.