Reform and Support Systems for the Elderly in Developing Countries:
Capturing the Second Demographic Dividend

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Abstract

Many third world countries face rapid population aging over the coming decades. The demographic trend poses two significant policy challenges – sustaining strong economic growth and establishing effective economic support systems for the elderly. This paper shows that the demographic transition presents two opportunities for more rapid economic growth. The first dividend arises because of the rapid growth of the productive population relative to the consuming population. The second dividend arises because the anticipation of population aging provides a powerful incentive for saving and capital accumulation. The second dividend will not be realized, however, if old-age security relies on transfer systems. In this paper our emphasis is on familial transfer systems rather than public systems. We show the importance of early reform that emphasizes the accumulation of pension wealth rather than continued reliance on the family. Given appropriate policies, population aging could lead to wealthier and more prosperous societies.

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**Introduction**

In many developing countries and in East Asia’s NIEs, demographic change has favored economic growth. The demographic dividend or the demographic window arises because the working-age populations are growing more rapidly than the number of consumers. This provides an extra boost to income per capita. As is widely appreciated, the demographic dividend is transitory. In the coming decades, the number of consumers will begin to grow more rapidly than the number of workers as a large part of population growth is concentrated at older ages where labor productivity is low and importantly well below consumption “needs”. By 2050 the dividend will have entirely dissipated in many countries.

This seemingly pessimistic scenario has a silver lining, however. Given appropriate policy formulation, population aging will yield a second dividend. The same demographic changes that lead to low support ratios (high dependency ratios) in the future, namely few children and longer life, also create a powerful incentive for individuals to accumulate capital to provide for old age. The capital deepening which results leads to a period of rapid growth in output per worker. The rapid pace of capital deepening is transitory. However, capital per worker and output per worker stabilize at a level that is permanently higher. In this respect, the second dividend persists whereas the first dividend is transitory.

The qualification “given appropriate policy formulation” is an important one because population aging could lead us down other paths. One possibility is that average incomes of and consumption by the elderly would be allowed to decline as they become more numerous and more burdensome. This is an unattractive and, we believe, avoidable scenario. A second possibility is that intergenerational transfers programs are strengthened. This could be accomplished either by expanding or initiating PAYGO public pension programs similar to those found in the US, Japan and Europe or by strengthening familial support systems that stress support for the elderly by their adult children. This option can meet the lifecycle objectives of individuals and the distributional objectives of societies, but the saving incentives that would lead to a second demographic dividend are deeply undermined.

In a sense, the first dividend and the second dividend are opposite sides of the same coin. The first dividend arises because (working-age) parents have fewer (dependent) children. The second dividend arises because one generation hence (post-working-age) parents will have fewer (working age) children. Low fertility is not the only demographic factor that underlies the second dividend, however. Steady and continuing improvements in adult mortality are even more important.

Although the second dividend is a consequence of population aging, the accumulation of wealth occurs in anticipation of aging. The exact sequencing depends on a variety of complex details, but the first and second dividend may be essentially contemporaneous outcomes. Indeed, one of the important conclusions we reach below is that an early policy response is essential to realizing the second dividend. This is particularly true and a major policy challenge for developing countries that will experience unusually rapid population aging.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we present a theoretical model that shows how changes in age structure influence economic growth and distinguishes the first and the second demographic dividends. In the second section, we
present and discuss estimates of the first dividend for countries around the world. In the
third section we turn our attention to the second dividend relying on a simulation model
with parameters based on Taiwan’s economy and population. We conclude with a
discussion of limitations of the analysis and highlights of the key findings.

Two Demographic Dividends

The First Dividend

The demographic dividend arises and dissipates as changes in age structure over the
demographic transition influence the rates of growth of producers and consumers. Define
the effective number of consumer (N) and the effective number of producers (L) as:

\[ \begin{align*}
N(t) &= \int \alpha(a) P(a, t) \, da \\
L(t) &= \int \gamma(a) P(a, t) \, da
\end{align*} \]  

where \( P(a,t) \) is the population. Output per effective consumer, \( y \), is given by:

\[ \frac{Y(t)}{N(t)} = \frac{L(t)}{N(t)} \times \frac{Y(t)}{L(t)} \]  

or the product of the support ratio (L/N) and output per worker.

The rate of growth in output per effective consumer (\( \dot{y} \)) is the sum of the
demographic dividend, the difference between the rate of growth of the effective labor
force (\( \dot{L} \)) and the number of effective consumers (\( \dot{N} \)), and growth in output per worker
(\( \dot{y}^l \)).

\[ \dot{y}(t) = \dot{L}(t) - \dot{N}(t) + \dot{y}^l(t). \]  

The dividend is driven by changes in age structure that occur over the demographic
transition. In recent decades fertility decline in many countries has led to slower growth
in the number of children. In Asia, the number of children is no longer increasing at all.
The working-age populations have continued to grow, however, yielding the
demographic dividend. As the transition proceeds, the working-age population will also
begin to grow more slowly dissipating the dividend. Growth in the elderly population
will continue unabated for decades to come. In the absence of changes in labor force
participation and the productivity of older populations, the effective number of
consumers will grow more rapidly than the number of producers. The demographic
dividend will turn negative. The decline in the dividend between 2000 and 2050 will
outweigh the gains between 1960 and 2000 in many European countries and some East
Asian countries as we show below (Table 1).

The Second Dividend

The second demographic dividend arises to the extent that consumers and policymakers
are forward-looking and respond effectively to the demographic changes that are coming.
With the decline in the support ratio on the horizon, consumption can be maintained only through the accumulation of wealth in some form. One possibility is that individuals and/or governments acting on their behalf will accumulate capital. If that capital is invested in the domestic economy, the result will be capital deepening and more rapid growth in output per worker (see equation (3)). If the capital is invested abroad, the current account and national income will grow more rapidly. In both cases, there must be an initial reduction in consumption. But it is also true that in both cases, income per effective consumer will grow more rapidly – yielding a second demographic dividend.

A second possibility is that individuals or governments accumulate transfer wealth, i.e., claims against future generations. Two institutional arrangements can be used to accumulate transfer wealth. First, governments can establish transfer programs of which PAYGO pension programs are the most prominent example. Under these arrangements, pension benefits of current retirees are paid by taxing current workers. Transfer wealth for current generations is created because future generations are obligated to pay future pension benefits. The flip side of transfer wealth is the implicit debt imposed on future generations. Second, families can also create transfer wealth by undertaking intergenerational transfers. Under these arrangements, working-age family members provide support to family members who are retired and, in turn, expect to receive support from their adult children upon reaching retirement. Familial support systems create transfer wealth for current generations and implicit debt for future generations in the same manner that public support systems accomplish this through PAYGO pension programs. In both cases, there is no initial reduction in consumption since no funds are set aside for capital formation.

Transfer wealth and capital are equivalent as a means of reallocating resources across the lifecycle. Either can be used to maintain consumption of low productive age groups. Transfer wealth and capital are very different in that accumulating transfer wealth has no capital deepening effect and no effect on output per worker. Accumulating transfer wealth does not yield a second demographic dividend.

The second dividend differs from the first dividend in several important respects. First, population aging is leading to an increase in the effective number of consumers relative to the effective number of producers. This causes the first dividend to dissipate but it is the source of the second dividend. Anticipation of the future decline in the support ratio leads to an increase in wealth and possibly capital. Second, the first dividend is transitory in nature. The support ratio rises over the demographic transition resulting in higher per capita income, but it eventually declines to pre-transition levels. In the absence of other changes, i.e., changes in output per worker, per capita income would return to a level near the pre-transition per capita income. The second dividend is not transitory in that capital deepening and higher per capita income may be permanent. In one important respect, the first and second dividends are similar. Both depend on effective complementary economic policy. The first dividend, for example, is realized only if employment keeps pace with growth in the working age population. The second dividend is realized only if support systems encourage the substitution of capital for transfer wealth.

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1 The per capita income of those who are alive during the dividend period is permanent so that in this sense the dividend is not transitory.
To simplify matters we assume that output depends only on capital and effective labor and that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Under these conditions it is straight-forward to show that the growth in output per worker is proportional to the growth in the ratio of capital to labor income ($k$):

$$\dot{y} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \dot{k}$$

where $\beta$ is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (Solow 1956). Note that capital deepening in this formulation is measured as an increase in capital relative to labor income rather than capital relative to labor.

Intergenerational transfer policy is defined as the proportion $\tau(t)$ of total wealth $W(t)$ held as transfer wealth at each point in time, so that:

$$K(t) = (1-\tau(t))W(t) \quad \tau(t) \leq 1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

If transfer policy is constant, the rate of growth of the capital stock will be equal to the rate of growth of wealth. Likewise, capital deepening will be determined by the rate of growth of wealth. If intergenerational transfer policy is undergoing change, however, capital deepening will occur more rapidly or more slowly than the underlying change in wealth. This is an important feature of the analysis presented below.

The wealth for each cohort at time $t$ follows from the intertemporal budget constraint. Wealth must equal the present value of future consumption less labor income.\(^2\) Thus, the wealth for the cohort aged $a$ in year $t$ is:

$$W(a,t) = \int_0^{\omega-a} e^{-r(t+x)x} C(a+x,t+x)dx - \int_0^{\omega-a} e^{-r(t+x)x} Y^l(a+x,t+x)dx$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $r(t+x)$ is the average interest rate for the period $t$ to $t+x$, $C$ and $Y^l$ are the total consumption and labor income of the cohort in the current and each future period of its existence, and $\omega$ is the maximum age achieved.

Assume that the shape of the cross-sectional consumption profile is constant and governed by the effective number of consumers profile defined by equation (1). The consumption of the cohort at age $a+x$ depends on the number of equivalent consumers belonging to the cohort in year $t+x$ and the consumption per equivalent consumer ($\overline{C}(t+x)$) in period $t+x$, i.e.,

$$C(a+x,t+x) = \overline{C}(t+x)N(a+x,t+x).$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Likewise, a cohort’s labor income in period $t+x$ depends on the number of effective producers belonging to the cohort and the average labor income per effective producer ($\overline{Y}^l(t+x)$) in year $t+x$, i.e.,

\(^2\) In this formulation bequests are assumed to be zero.
Designating the average growth rate of consumption per equivalent consumer by \( g_c(t+x) \), the average growth rate of labor income per effective worker by \( g_y(t+x) \), and substituting into equation (6) yields an expression for cohort wealth that is determined, in part, by current and future values of the elements of the support ratio – the effective number of consumer and producers:

\[
W(a,t) = \bar{c}(t) \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_c(t+x) - r_a]} x N(a+x,t+x) dx \\
- \bar{y}(t) \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_y(t+x) - r_f]} x L(a+x,t+x) dx
\]

Wealth for the population is found by integrating across all ages at time \( t \):

\[
W(t) = \bar{c}(t) \int_0^{0-a} \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_c(t+x) - r_a]} x N(a+x,t+x) dxa \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_y(t+x) - r_f]} x L(a+x,t+x) dxa
\]

Changing the order of integration and adjusting the limits of integration yields:

\[
W(t) = \bar{c}(t) \int_0^{0-a} \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_c(t+x) - r_f]} x N(a+x,t+x) dxa \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_y(t+x) - r_f]} x L(a+x,t+x) dxa.
\]

Noting that labor income is equal to \( \bar{y}(t)L(t) \), the ratio of wealth to labor income is given by:

\[
\frac{W(t)}{Y'(t)} = \frac{C(t)}{Y'(t)} \left[ \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_c(t+x) - r_f]} x n(a+x,t+x) dxa \right. \\
- \left. \int_0^{0-a} e^{[g_y(t+x) - r_f]} x l(a+x,t+x) dxa \right]
\]

where \( n(a+x,t+x) = N(a+x,t+x)/N(t) \) and \( l(a+x,t+x) = L(a+x,t+x)/N(t) \), i.e., they convert aggregate measures to “per capita” measures or, to be more specific, per equivalent consumer measures.
How do we interpret the terms within the brackets in equation (12)? The term
\[ \int_{0}^{\omega-x} n(a + x, t + x) da \] measures the effective number of consumers in year \( t+x \) who are members of the population alive in year \( t \). Ignoring the exponential terms this is aggregated over all future years to obtain person years of lifetime consumption by the current population. Similarly, the labor income term in the brackets measures the lifetime person years of production for the current population. The ratio of wealth to income varies with the difference between the person years of consumption and production.

The exponential terms “discount” future consumption and production by differences between the rates of growth and the rates of interest. The rates of growth capture out-of-steady-state changes over time in consumption and per capita income, while the interest rates convert future consumption and earnings streams into present values.

Given a stable population, the per capita age-profiles of effective consumption and production are constant. Given steady-state economic growth, the rate of growth of consumption per equivalent adult and production per equivalent worker would be constant and equal to the rate of technological change. The ratio of consumption to labor income would also be constant as would the wealth to income ratio. In the closed economy case, the capital-output ratio and income and consumption per equivalent adult would be determined by \( \omega * (1 - \tau^*) \), the equilibrium wealth to output ratio and the intergenerational transfer policy. We only sketch these results out here because the steady-state equilibria are not our primary interest. Our focus here is squarely on dynamic effects that arise over the demographic transition. For this purpose we employ simulation analysis to analyze how changes in age structure and transfer policy influence wealth and consumption paths.

**Estimates of the First Demographic Dividend**

The world as a whole and all major regions experienced a favorable demographic dividend between 1960 and 2000 with one important exception – the least developed countries located primarily in Africa (Table 1). In other regions of the world the gains were relatively modest. Income per effective consumer was higher by eight percent in 2000 as compared to 1960 for the world as a whole due to the demographic dividend. Income per effective consumer was higher by 12 percent in Asia, 16 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 11 percent in Northern America. Some of the high performing countries of East Asia enjoyed a very favorable dividend. Income per effective consumer increased by 21 percent in China, by 30 percent in Thailand, by 34 percent in South Korea, and by 36 percent in Singapore as compared to 1960 due to the first dividend.

<Table 1 about here>

Estimates of the dividend can be constructed in two different ways. The first approach relies on growth models typically estimated using cross-national aggregate time-series data (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Kelley and Schmidt 2001; Bloom, Canning et al. 2002; Bloom and Canning 2003). The second relies on growth accounting.
or direct calculation (Mason 2001). The age coefficients in equation (1) are estimated using micro data. For any population age distribution the effective number of producers and consumers is calculated directly as can be the difference in their rates of growth over any period.

The estimates presented in Table 1 are constructed using the same age profiles for all countries of the world. The profiles are estimated from the 1978 Family Income and Expenditure Survey for Taiwan. The effective worker age profile is an estimate of labor income by age and the effective consumer age profile is an estimate of private consumption by age (Figure 1).\(^3\) The profiles are similar to those estimated for other countries with earnings heavily concentrated in the working ages of 20-64 and consumption spread relatively evenly across age groups, with somewhat lower consumption by children and by the elderly as compared with prime age adults. The Taiwan consumption profile contrasts with the profile employed by Cutler et al. (1990) in their analysis of US aging. They assume that consumption by the elderly is greater than consumption by prime age adults. Using such a profile would increase the speed with which the demographic dividend will disappear in the future and would increase the increase in wealth associated with the second demographic dividend. The US profile may be somewhat atypical with regard to consumption by the elderly because of the nature of the US health care system and the high expenditure on health care for the elderly.

![Figure 1 about here](image)

Projections of the demographic dividend to 2050 are also presented in Table 1. These are based on the medium scenario of the UN population projections (United Nations 2003). The dividend is projected to be the most favorable in the least developed countries where the effective labor force will grow faster than the effective number of consumers by 0.64 percent per year. A dividend of the magnitude will produce an increase in income per effective consumer of about 30% over the fifty year period. A similar result is produced by calculations for Africa.

For other regions of the world the dividend will be much smaller in the future or turn negative. The greatest decline is in Europe where income per effective worker will decline by 0.36 percent per year due to its demographic burden. In most of the high flying Asian economies the first dividend will also turn negative. In Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore the effective labor force will grow more slowly than the effective number of consumers by at least 0.5 percent per year.

The final column in Table 1 compares income per effective consumer in 2050 with income per effective consumer in 1960. The purpose is to assess the extent to which the 1960-2000 dividend has dissipated by 2050. In Europe the net effect of the dividend is to reduce per capita income by 8 percent as compared with 1960. Northern America is essentially at the same point in 2050 as in 1960. Among Asian countries, Hong Kong and particularly Japan will experience a substantial deterioration in the first dividend. In Japan, income per effective consumer will be lower by 11 percent as compared with 1960 due a decline in its effective labor force projected to exceed one percent per year between 2000 and 2050.

\(^3\) Details of calculations are available from the authors.
Simulating the Second Dividend

The simulation results presented here are based on a model described in more detail in Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000; 2001b). Here we touch on only a few key points. We assume that the economy is closed to migration and open to international capital flows. The domestic capital stock adjusts to satisfy the arbitrage condition that the domestic rate of return to capital is equal to the world rate of return. Hence, domestic capital is independent of the total capital held by residents and the domestic interest rate equals the world interest rate. The labor supply is determined as the product of age-specific labor force participation rates and the population of each age. Population change is determined by exogenous age-specific fertility and mortality rates. The productivity of workers varies by age and changes over time governed by exogenous labor-augmenting technological change. National income is equal to earnings plus returns to total assets held by residents.

In accordance with the life cycle theory, adults save and dissave in order to achieve a smooth consumption path despite fluctuations in their labor earnings and their eventual retirement. Because household size and age distribution changes over the life cycle, we assume that it is consumption per equivalent adult consumer that is smoothed, rather than household consumption itself. The consumption path is also influenced by time preference, the rate of interest, and attitudes towards uncertainty.

Consumption plans are made such that the present value of the survival-weighted consumption for the household equals the survival-weighted present value of expected labor earnings for all members of the household, plus the survival-weighted expected value of net transfers received (where negative values represent net contributions). To formulate these plans, then, people must form an expectation of how rapidly their wage rates will rise; when they will retire; survival probabilities for all household members; ages at which children will leave the household and establish their own; future interest rates; and the future of all relevant transfer systems. Then they must carry out complex calculations to solve the optimization problem.

The model parameters are based on available data for Taiwan on age-earnings profiles, productivity growth rates, interest rates, and demographic rates. We abstract from immigration. We assume that the total fertility rate stabilizes at 2.1 births per woman and life expectancy at birth stabilizes at 78.8 years in 2036.

Wealth in the absence of transfers

We begin with simulations of saving and wealth in the absence of transfers. These results provide the maximum simulated path for capital that is consistent with lifecycle needs and provides a benchmark for assessing the effect on capital and the second demographic dividend of relying on alternative transfer systems.

The simulated path for the ratio of capital to income under the pure life cycle model, labeled “no transfers,” is presented in Figure 2. The dominant trend is an increase in the capital/income ratio. This change reflects a complex interaction of the effect of longer life expectancy on the demand for wealth for retirement at the household level, declining numbers of coresident children for whom consumption must be provided during earlier adult years, and shifts in the age composition of the population towards

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4 Complete documentation is available at [http://www.ceda.berkeley.edu/papers/rlee/](http://www.ceda.berkeley.edu/papers/rlee/).
5 We employ a very simple weighting scheme: children count 0.5 and adults 1.0. Lee, Mason, and Miller (2001b) considers the impact of varying weights for children and the elderly on saving and wealth.
6 Note that the lifecycle assumption used in the simulation model is different than the consumption profile determination assumed in the first part of the paper. In steady-state equilibrium the two assumptions are equivalent, but not during transitions.
older age groups with higher wealth holdings and low labor earnings. Taiwan’s ratio stabilizes at about 6 in 2050 reflecting the assumption that life expectancy stabilizes. If life expectancy were to continue to rise, the wealth income ratio would also continue to increase. The trend towards greater wealth was interrupted for three to four decades in the middle of the 20th century due to the major increase in the number of children due to rapid decline in infant and child mortality. But with the drop in fertility to low levels in the early 1980s, the influences of rising life expectancy and aging reasserted themselves.

The saving rates that correspond to the capital/income series are presented in Figure 3, again labeled as “no transfers”. The simulated saving rates increase from low levels during the late 19th and early 20th Century. A downturn that was particularly steep in 1950s and 1960s was followed by a large and dramatic increase in saving rates with a peak early in the 21st Century. This peak occurs because saving rates are particularly high at older working ages where populations are concentrated. The upswing in saving is very pronounced in Taiwan because of its rapid fertility decline and consequent larger swings in age structure (Lee, Mason et al. 2001a). Saving declines dramatically as population growth becomes concentrated among the low-saving elderly and as life expectancy stabilizes.

One might think that population aging would cause a reduction in capital per person as saving rates plummet during the first part of the 21st Century. But this does not happen because the decline in fertility, which causes population aging, also causes slower population growth. Because population growth is slower, the saving needed for capital “widening” is reduced, and a greater proportion of savings goes for capital “deepening”. The capital-income ratio continues to rise as shown in Figure 2 and capital per person rises correspondingly.

Anyone with a passing knowledge of Taiwan saving would note important differences between actual saving rates and the simulated no transfer, life cycle saving rates presented in Figure 3. This lack of correspondence between theory and fact is one of the motivations for considering the role of transfers.

Modeling Transfer Systems and Their Change

We model family transfers as though each elder is fractionally coresident with each of the elder’s surviving children and consumes an amount equivalent to adults in those households. Equivalent approaches from the perspective of our model are to randomly assign each elder to the household of one of the elder’s adult children or to model support as a financial transfer to a separate household of the elder. For accounting convenience, we assume separate coresidence for the elder, with financial transfers from children. This governs planning by both young and old.

Although the erosion of the family support system in East Asia has been gradual, in our simulation we assume a sudden break in 1960, around the time when fertility began to decline. This sudden break makes it easier to identify consequences in the simulations. Under one scenario labeled “Collapse,” we assume that all obligations, even to those already old, are suddenly and unexpectedly canceled in 1960. This is highly unrealistic because retirees would receive no help at all from their children, so we consider two other scenarios as well. In both, children continue to honor their traditional
parental support obligations by the fraction of the parent’s lifetime earnings that had been earned at the time of the transfer system change. In the second scenario, labeled “Unexpected,” the change in support system is not anticipated. In the third scenario, labeled “Anticipated,” everyone has full foresight about the system change, so they begin to save more before it actually occurs.

Each transfer system for old-age support provides an income stream for the elderly. This income stream may or may not be adequate for the elderly to achieve the life cycle consumption path that is desired. If not, then people save over their working years so as to accumulate the assets needed to achieve their optimal consumption paths. It could also happen, in principle, that transfer income exceeded the desired level for old-age consumption, in which case people would like to borrow against their transfer income to increase consumption earlier in the life cycle. It is also possible that working-age people may borrow and save in order to smooth their consumption over the periods in which they have elder support obligations as a result of the system.

**Results of Simulations: Transfer Wealth and Implicit Debt**

Our simulations provide a measure of the demand for life cycle wealth, conditional on demography, economic expectations, expectations about transfer systems, and various technical parameters in the utility function. Under the assumption of pure life cycle model, with no transfers, this demand for wealth is also the demand for capital.\(^7\) Our simulations also provide a measure of the demand for capital in the presence of a transfer system. The difference between these two hypothetical demands for capital measures the transfer wealth generated by the transfer system. This transfer wealth is equal to the implicit debt generated by the transfer system, which is the sum of the unfunded obligations not covered by future taxes to the existing adult population.

For Taiwan in the year 1960, the implicit debt generated by the family transfer system (as we have modeled it) is about 47% of the demand for wealth or about 0.9 times GDP. It is interesting to compare these figures to the ratio of implicit debt to GDP for public pension programs elsewhere. In the US in the year 2000, the implicit debt (discounting at 3%) generated by Social Security (OASI) amounts to 46% of the total demand for wealth or 1.7 times GDP (Lee, Mason et al. 2003). In Latin America for circa 1990, Bravo (2001) estimates implicit debt to GDP ratios as high as about 1 for Costa Rica, about 1.5 for Chile, Panama and Cuba, about 2 for Brazil, and about 3 for Uruguay and Argentina.

When a transfer system is phased out and replaced by a system of individual responsibility through saving, this implicit debt must be somehow repaid. The generations responsible for repaying it, who are mostly the current and future working-age population, will then have a double task: to make payments out of current income to honor past obligations by repaying the implicit debt and to save out of their current income to prefund their own retirements.

**Capital and Saving with Transfers**

As shown in Figure 2, the family transfer system in Taiwan significantly reduces, but does not eliminate, the demand for life cycle capital. The gap between the capital-

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\(^7\) The capital includes domestic capital and foreign capital owned by residents.
income ratio with and without transfer systems, representing the transfer wealth and implicit debt, widens substantially over time in both countries. This is an important point. As the transition proceeds in Taiwan, the size of the implicit debt relative to income increases from a ratio of 0.5 in 1900, to 0.9 in 1960, to 1.5 in 2000, to 2.9 by 2050. It will become increasingly costly and difficult to phase out the family support system in Taiwan the later this is done. At the same time, if it is done relatively early before implicit debt is great, then population aging will drive up the capital stock. This is a fundamental result.

Now let’s turn to the transitional phase itself. If the system collapses, then wealth immediately increases in a discontinuous fashion from its previous path (Figure 2). Aggregate saving rates immediately shoot up by 10 to 15 percentage points (Figure 3). This is the “super saving” arising as people in the working ages strive to catch up in their asset accumulation, while the elderly, deprived of their income source, no longer dissave. This scenario is an unrealistic, polar case, and we turn to alternative scenarios.

Under the scenarios in which family obligations are honored, the capital-reducing effects of the transfer system are prolonged, so that capital and saving rates are both substantially below the “no transfer” level for a few decades. When the demise of family support is anticipated, saving rates begin to rise some decades before. Thus, even assuming a sudden change in the system, modeling foresight and honoring obligations creates a gradual transition. In the long run, however, they all end up indistinguishable from the no transfer scenario, once all the original participants in the family system have died off.

**Brief Discussion of Simulated and Actual Values**

In this paper, we offer only a brief and general comparison of actual and simulated wealth and saving values. In Taiwan, the actual capital-output ratio in 1965 was similar to the “family transfer” simulated value for the same year. The ratio increased rapidly during the next two decades reaching a level similar to the “no transfer” scenario. Since then, however, the ratio has increased very gradually (Figure 2). Saving rates have also increased very rapidly from the early 1950s in a fashion broadly consistent with a transition from a family transfer to a no transfer transition. Household saving rates were somewhat higher whereas net private saving rates were somewhat lower than the “no transfer” scenario in 1993.

In its broad outlines, the saving experience of Taiwan has been repeated in several East and Southeast Asian countries but not in Latin America. Saving rates have not risen to high levels in Latin America even where PAYGO pension programs have been phased out. Two of the factors emphasized here may account for part of the difference between East Asia and Latin America. Because Latin America’s demographic transition has been slower, the swings in life cycle saving and wealth should be more moderate (Lee, Mason et al. 2001a). Moreover, the public transfer systems are much more important in Latin American than in Asia. Many other factors may also account for the differences, however. Until recently Asia escaped the financial crises that plagued Latin America. Moreover, income inequality is much lower in Asia. Thus, to the extent that the poor do not engage in lifecycle saving (Fox and Palmer 2001), aggregate saving may respond less to transition in support systems in Latin America than in Asia.

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8 See Holzmann (1997), for example, for an analysis of the effect of pension reform on saving in Chile.
The Bottom Line: Income and Consumption

The accumulation of wealth simulated above translates into higher per income. For a small open economy, the appropriate assumption for Taiwan, the additional wealth is invested abroad yielding gains in national income. Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the ratio of national income per worker to domestic output per worker is equal to:

\[
\frac{Y/L}{GDP/L} = 1 + \beta \frac{(K - K^b)}{K^b}
\]

where \( \beta \) is the elasticity of output with respect to domestic capital, \( K \) is the total capital stock including assets held abroad, and \( K^b \) is the domestic capital stock. Taking the equilibrium capital output ratio for the domestic economy to be 3 and the elasticity of output with respect to domestic capital to be 0.35, we can readily calculate the growth effect of the increases in the ratio of capital to income in the simulations presented in Figure 2. Consider first the life cycle simulation in which family support systems do not operate. An increase in the ratio of total capital to income from 2.5 to 5.75 between 2000 and 2050 would lead to an increase in national income forty percent greater than the increase in GDP. In annual terms, income per effective worker would grow faster by 0.67 percent per year due to the increase in total wealth induced by lower fertility and increased life expectancy.

Under the fully operating family support system, the capital-income ratio increases from approximately 1 in 2000 to 2.9 in 2050. The effect is to increase income per effective worker by an additional 29% over the 50 year period. Annual growth would be higher by 0.51% per year. Finally, consider the implications of moving from the family transfer system to the no transfer system between 2000 and 2050. Income per effective worker would increase by 72% relative to GDP per worker. The annual rate of growth of income per worker would be higher by nearly 1.1% per year between 2000 and 2050. Consumption per effective worker grows even more rapidly than income under the influence of the second demographic dividend. As shown in Figure 2, consumption rates drop considerably between 2000 and 2050.

The large gains after 2000 are not a free lunch, however. Incomes are higher and growing faster because of increased capital accumulation achieved through higher rates of saving and lower rates of consumption. Under any of the simulations, consumption rates rise substantially after 1975 and reach very high levels around 2010. Under the no transfer simulation, the sacrifice, in the form of reduced consumption, is substantially higher. More rapid economic growth is achieved, in part, through the sacrifice of current consumers.

Figure 4 shows this more clearly by comparing total consumption in each year under alternative transfer arrangements to the no transfer simulation. Continued reliance on the family transfer system leads to higher consumption than the no transfer system until approximately 2020. Per capita income is growing more slowly under the family support system, but individuals are consuming a high percentage of all that is earned. The adverse consequences of the failure to accumulate wealth in anticipation of...
population aging begins to emerge after 2020. Consumption drops steadily relative to the system with no transfers.

An anticipated abandonment of the family support system yields the smoothest transition in consumption. Consumption is reduced relative to the family transfer system, but remains higher than the no transfer system until 1960 – the date of the change over. After 1960, consumption is depressed relative to the no transfer system but eventually consumption converges to the higher level attained by the no transfer system.

The other approaches to reform, both of which offer no opportunity for preparation, leads to very substantial drops in consumption at the date of reform. The more realistic approach to reform, the “unexpected” transition, yields a decline in consumption of nearly eight percent – an enormous “tax” to impose in a single year. Not only are the costs of reform concentrated at a single point in time under this approach, implementing reform becomes all the more difficult politically.

Comparing these approaches to reform shows that anticipated changes are considerably less painful than the alternatives. It is also the case that implementing early in the demographic transition has clear advantages over delay. The pain of transition arises because workers essentially pay twice for old age support. First, they pay by honoring the obligations to elderly parents that persist after the phase out of the family support system begins. Second, workers must begin to save for their own retirement leading to further reductions in their consumption.

The first cost of transition is measured by the implicit debt in the transfer system. This is captured in Figure 2 as the difference between “no transfer” capital and “family transfer” capital. The difference measures the present value of the obligations of future generations. Early in the demographic transition the implicit debt is small. In 1900, for example, the implicit debt was about half of national income. By 2000, however, the implicit debt had increased to 150% of national income. The burden of retiring that debt represents a considerable cost of reform. The earlier reform is undertaken, the easier its implementation.

**Qualifications and Conclusions**

The research reported is subject to a number of important limitations. First, the simulation analysis has considered only the case of a small open economy. To the extent that increased capital is invested domestically, rates of return to capital will be depressed and the gains in national income will be reduced.

Second, we have focused our analysis entirely on the accumulation of physical capital. A potentially important and widely noted possibility is that parents or societies respond to reduced fertility by increasing investment in the human capital of children. To the extent that this is a lifecycle strategy for parents, the extended family is providing an investment opportunity rather than serving as a transfer system. Income flows from adult children to their parents are returns to investment in human capital, not familial transfers. Thus, the second demographic dividend creates incentives for investing both in physical and in human capital.

Third, the focus here is entirely on familial support systems with no attention to public support systems. Public transfer systems have been extensively analyzed and in previous work we compare public and familial support systems (Lee, Mason et al. 2003).
The effects on capital accumulation are largely independent of whether transfers are provided directly to the elderly or mediated by the public sector. Replacing family support systems with PAYGO public systems achieves none of the potential gains of the second demographic dividend.

Fourth, capturing the gains from the second dividend is no more automatic than from the first dividend. Individuals may not understand the financial implications of an extended retirement or may be incapable of exercising the self-control required to forego current consumption. Frequently, retirement saving plans involve an element of compulsion for exactly these reasons. Underdeveloped financial markets in many countries may limit the investment opportunities available to consumers. Similarly, international capital markets do not operate with the ease assumed in our simulations. Globalized capital markets offer a clear advantage to pensioners in aging societies.

Finally, it seems unlikely that governments would resort to banning family support systems nor is it our intention that they should. Experience has shown that the family has a clear advantage in providing personal care and attention. There does not seem to be a viable alternative to time transfers from children to elderly and these are likely to increase substantially as populations age. To the extent that familial support systems encourage efficient investment in the human capital of children, they also offer an advantage. However, any shift away from familial financial transfers in favor of capital accumulation is a welcome development and one that should be encouraged.

For countries with late demographic transitions, the first population dividend offers a positive development opportunity during the coming decades. For other countries in both the developed and developing worlds, the first population dividend is beginning to erode. This has led some to conclude that population aging will necessarily undermine development efforts. This view is unduly pessimistic. Intrinsic to population aging is a second demographic dividend. Population aging provides a powerful incentive for capital accumulation. Given early and successful efforts to exploit the second dividend, higher rates of economic growth could be achieved over an extended, if transitory, period. At the end of the day, population aging could lead to wealthier and more prosperous societies.

References


**Table 1. Demographic Dividend, 1960-2000. Major Regions of the World, High Performing Countries of East Asia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate (%), 1960-2000</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate (%), 2000-2050</th>
<th>Dividend Relative to 1960</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Effective labor force</td>
<td>Effective Consumers</td>
<td>Effective labor force</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
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<td>More developed regions</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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Sources: Calculations by authors. See text.
Figure 1. Mean Consumption and Labor Income, Taiwan, 1998 (NT$)
Figure 2: Simulated Capital/Income Ratio for Taiwan, 1900-2050, Under Life Cycle Saving with Different Assumptions About Family Transfers

- No transfers
- Familial transfers throughout
- Unexpected phase-out in 1960
- Anticipated phase-out in 1960
- Collapse of system in 1960

- Actual Capital/Income Ratio
- Actual Wealth/Income Ratio

Figure 3: Simulated Savings Rate for Taiwan, 1900-2050, Under Life Cycle Saving with Different Assumptions About Family Transfers

No transfers
Familial transfers throughout
Unexpected phase-out in 1960
Anticipated phase-out in 1960
Collapse of system in 1960

○ Actual net private savings rate
△ Actual household savings rate

Figure 4: Total Consumption Relative to Life Cycle Savings Scenario

- Life cycle savings
- Familial transfers
- Unexpected phaseout in 1960
- Anticipated phaseout in 1960
- Collapse of system in 1960